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Abstract
The thesis considers the expansive interpretation of established human rights law 
from the provincial, domestic, regional and international legal spheres to protect 
environmental features crucial to the continued existence of indigenous cultures. Specifically 
the research will assess whether a practicable basis for a litigious action on these grounds 
might be constructed and applied. This is achieved through the use of the case study of the 
extraction of the 'tar sands' of Alberta, Canada.
The tar or oil sands are a source of so-called unconventional oil, which has become a 
commercially viable source of the resource following rises in market price over recent 
decades. Debate surrounds the environmental impacts of the extraction and refinement 
processes however and in particular its affects upon inimitable ecosystems in the regions 
exploited. The indigenous populace of the province are inextricably reliant upon said 
ecosystems for the expression of their culture and maintenance of their traditional practices. 
The thesis will answer the question as to whether the interpretation of domestic Canadian, 
regional and international human rights law offers the potential for a justiciable legal action 
seeking the cession or restriction of tar sands extraction in order to protect culturally 
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When asked the states which possess the largest oil reserves, or the state which meets 
the majority o f the crude oil demand of the United States of America (U.S.) , the 
overwhelming preponderance of suggestions from the average member of the public would 
be states in the Middle East, or for those more aware of contemporary human rights issues 
Nigeria. When told that Canada sits atop the second largest confirmed oil reserves by barrel1 
(only Saudi Arabia possesses more), and supplies the largest proportion of the crude oil 
demands of the U.S. o f any State (including the United States itself), the continuous 
procession of shocked expressions would be almost as impressive as the figures which 
confirm these statements. The import of crude oil and petroleum products into the U.S. has 
steadily increased over the last two decades, imports from the world’s largest oil reserves in 
Saudi Arabia have however fallen slightly, likely as a result o f political tension in the Middle 
East. Those from Mexico, the third largest provider of oil to the world’s largest consumer 
have increased by approximately twenty five per cent since 1993.
Canada by contrast has increased its exports of oil and petroleum products to the U.S. 
by over fifty per cent over the same period. The influence of Canada in so called,
^ A‘Petropolitics since its discovery of vast deposits of ‘unconventional crude’ beneath the
1 The reserves o f  Venezuela although thought to be larger than those o f  both Canada and possibly the largest o f  
any state have not been officially confirmed.
2 Refer to Annex 1. All figures taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration website, at: 
<http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUSCAl&f=M> Accessed 20th July 
2014.
3 Phrase coined by renowned author and journalist in; Friedman, T. ‘The First Law o f Petropolitics’ Foreign 
Policy (Washington, May/June 2006) <http://www.ituassu.com.br/oil_fp2.pdf> Accessed 20th January 2011
4 Defined by the National Energy Board o f Canada as ‘Crude oil, which at a particular point in time, cannot be 
technically and economically produced through a well using normal production practices and without altering 
the natural viscous state o f  the o il,’ in Canada’s Oil Sands: Opportunities and Challenges to 2015 National 
Energy Board o f  Canada (Calgary, June 2006) <http://www.neb.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/lsnd/pprtntsndchllngs20152006/pprtntsndchllngs20152006-eng.pdf> Accessed 15th 
February 2011
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province of A lb e rtah as  increased exponentially, making it a major player on the world 
energy stage as the non-renewable nature of fossil fuels becomes ever more apparent. Prior 
to the late 1970s the maximum level of oil exported to the U.S. by Canada within a year had 
only once in history exceeded one million barrels.6 Today that figure is exceeded twice in a
n
single day, and annually Canada exports almost half as much oil to the U.S. as all of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member states combined. Only 
recently, however, has a discovery made nearly three centuries ago8 truly altered the political 
and economic future of the North American neighbour of one of the most influential states in 
human history, catapulting it onto the world stage and to a standing the likes of which it has 
never before found itself in.
The ‘slow-motion stampede of sorts in Alberta’9 triggered by the discovery in the 
province of so called ‘tar sands’10 and processes capable of accessing its economic potential, 
has however had significant adverse environmental effects as well as granting a source of 
considerable prosperity for the province and Canada as a whole. This less well publicised 
damage, of various forms, caused by the tar sands projects has been felt by the population of 
Alberta generally. However, no social group has felt the environmental impact more than the 
indigenous people of the province whose very way of life, in terms of their culture and 
sustenance is threatened by the ever accelerating development of the projects. As Short states, 
‘when indigenous lands are used by extractive industries the inherent corporate preference for 
externalising environmental costs can lead to physical, as well as cultural destruction. The tar
5 Although deposits extend into Saskatchewan, the overwhelming majority o f  deposits are within the borders o f  
Alberta.
6 Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board, Annual Oil and Gas Statistics, Calgary, 1979.
7 Refer to Annex 1. All figures taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration website, at: 
<http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m.htm> Accessed 20th January 
2 0 1 1 .
8 Sweeney, A. ‘Black Bonanza: Canada's Oil Sands and the Race to Secure North America's Energy Future' 
(John Wiley and Sons, Toronto, 2010)
9 Marshall, E. ‘OPEC Prices Make Heavy Oil Look Profitable’ H 979) 204 Science, New Series 4399 at 1287
10 This terminology and that o f oil sands is addressed in the later Section 2.5.
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sands project is a prime example of this.’11 A legal challenge has been mounted by these 
peoples against both the province of Alberta and the Canadian government on the basis of 
breaches of their rights imbued under historic treaties between them and the Crown. The 
notion of a breach of human rights is however not considered within this litigious action, 
although media and activist groups’ speculation of such a breach has surrounded the case.12
The notion that human rights law offers protection by extension to the environment 
owing to the reliance we have upon it is well established in both academic literature and case 
law. Whilst case precedents will be discussed at length later in the thesis, the philosophical 
reasoning for the protection of the environment under the auspices of human rights is worthy 
of note. This justification will also serve to highlight the relevance of this field of law to the 
particular context of the tar sands industry in Alberta and the impacts it allegedly has upon 
the indigenous populace of the province. Whilst one of the central tenets of human rights law 
is the protection of the individual from abuses of power by the state, and this is undoubtedly 
of some relevance to the focus of the piece, it is in the connection of the individual to their 
environment that the rationalisation of assessing the tar sands industry through human rights 
jurisprudence can be found.
Anderson perhaps describes the connection between human rights and the
13environment best by stating that they both, ‘touch upon all spheres of human activity.’ 
Immediate connections here can also be established between the basis for human rights in
11 Short, D. ‘Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples: A Sociological Approach’ (2010) 14 (6) The 
International Journal o f  Human Rights 833, 844
12 See for example the work o f Amnesty International and the Rainforest Action Network: 
<http://www.amnesty.ca/our-work/issues/indigenous-peoples/the-lubicon-cree-ongoing-human-rights- 
violations> Accessed 30th July 2014 and <http://www.ran.org/royal-bank-canada-steps-away-tar-sands-support- 
first-nation-rights-0> Accessed 30th July 2014
13 Anderson, M.R. Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview  in Boyle, A. and 
Anderson, M.R. (eds.) Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection  (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) 
, 1
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‘inherent dignity... ol all members of the human family,"14and the need of all humans of ‘an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being.’15 Similarly Nickel’s 
suggestion of a ‘minimally good life’ 16 as a focus for human rights would fit with this 
inextricable connection between human dignity and a basic environmental standard which 
supported this. As such the contention here is that the impact of the tar sands industry on the 
indigenous populace is so great as to potentially impact upon their inherent human dignity. 
Specifically these breaches of fundamental rights are suggested as arising from harm to 
environmental features of particular cultural significance.
Whilst the proximity of industrial projects to residential or culturally significant areas 
is by no means a new issue, and a relationship which can in some case be harmonious, the 
potential and actual impacts of the tar sands industry on the indigenous peoples of Alberta are 
particularly severe. These impacts will be discussed in at length later in the piece, but a 
number of academics have suggested that cumulatively these impacts constitute a ‘slow 
industrial genocide’17 of these peoples. Whilst it might be suggested that the language of 
genocide is extreme, the testimony of those facing the impacts to be discussed would suggest 
it may be apt. Caribou, a source of food and traditional materials to be discussed at length in 
the thesis are particularly susceptible to these adverse effects and in the opinion of the 
peoples who utilise them in this manner, ‘The extinction of caribou would mean the 
extinction of our people.’18 Although this rhetoric might seem somewhat hyperbolic, those 
campaigning against the projects feel their hand has been forced. ‘When the government fails
14 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) Preamble.
15 Stockholm Declaration o f  the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972,
U.N. Doc. A/.CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 at 3 (1973
16 Nickel, J. ‘Making Sense o f  Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration o f  Human 
Rights ’ (University o f California Press, Oakland, 1987) 51
17 Huseman, J. and Short, D. ‘A Slow Industrial Genocide: Tar Sands and the Indigenous Peoples o f  Northern 
Alberta’ (2012) 16(1) International Journal o f Human Rights 216
18Pembina Institute Canadian Aboriginal Concerns with Oil Sands: A compilation o f  key issues, resolutions and  
legal activities <https://www.pembina.org/reports/briefingnoteosfntourseplO.pdf> Accessed February 20* 2015
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to engage with First Nations about our concerns, and fails to respect our rights, these things 
have nowhere to go but the courts.’19The thesis does not intend to consider whether the harms 
constitute genocide as is suggested by Husemann and Short,20 but instead to assess whether 
the severing of the connection between the environment and the indigenous peoples who rely 
upon it could constitute a breach of established human rights provisions to which the 
Canadian and hence Albertan governments are subject.
The tar sands extraction projects of Alberta present a case study in which this 
connection between inimitable environmental features and culture can be explored. In 
particular this context allows for the consideration of whether the inhibition or destruction of 
cultural connections to such irreplaceable features might give rise to breaches of human 
rights law. Innumerable industrial projects across the world present potential harms to 
environments which bear great significance to identifiable and distinguishable cultural groups, 
however a number of factors make this instance of environmental damage to such features 
acutely useful for the purposes of the analysis to be undertaken in the thesis.
Firstly the range and severity of the harms to the features of cultural significance to 
the indigenous populace is considerable. The industrial extraction of the tar sands presents 
threats to traditional food sources, materials for clothing and building, and an array of other 
practices of significance peculiar to the groups inhabiting the regions affected. These impacts 
are arguably so severe as to threaten the very existence of the groups themselves. Pat Marcel, 
an indigenous elder even suggested in a report on the health of the Athabasca river in 
proximity to extraction operations, ‘We’re talking about the survival of the Athabasca river,
19 Ibid.
20 Huseman, J. and Short, D. (n!7)
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but more than that this is about the survival of our people.’21 The strength of this connection 
between this ecosystem and the continuation of a culture ensures that the claims of human 
rights breaches could not be assuaged out of hand by the contention that the economic 
benefits of exploiting this resource far outweighed any harm caused in doing so.
Similarly the status of Canada as a developed nation reduces the strength of 
contentions concerning the need to exploit natural resources to access wealth and utilities 
necessary to improve the standard of living of citizens. In spite of this, the suggestions of the 
necessity of the extraction of the tar sands as a resource to ensure energy security for Canada 
and indeed North America as a whole remain undiluted. Indeed a report submitted to the 
International Monetary Fund suggested that a boost to gross domestic product was likely 
were oil sands extraction to continue at present rates, though highlighted the inherent risks in
9 9such a rapid expansion also. As such whilst not avoided in their entirety the suggestions of 
the absolute necessity of extraction which might be prevalent in similar debates in other states 
are undeniably weakened by the level of development of Canada.
The legal system of Canada and in particular the approach of its judiciary to the 
interpretation and application of human rights jurisprudence to be discussed in greater detail 
in the thesis23 also affords a unique opportunity to consider liberal approaches to the 
application of human rights law in a sympathetic arena. As a result, international, regional 
and domestic human rights legislation are all available avenues for discussion of the 
suggestions of the thesis that severe damage to culturally significant environments could
21 Pembina Institute Government Protects Oilsands Industry, Fails to Protect Athabasca River 
<http://www.pembina.org/media-release/1384> Accessed February 20th 2015
22 Bayoumi, T and Muhleisen, M Energy, the Exchange Rate and the Economy: Macroeconomic Benefits o f  
C anada’s O ilSands Production  < https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0670.pdf> Accessed 
February 20th 2015
23 See in particular Chapter 3 in this regard.
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breach rights enshrined in these jurisdictions. Added to this is the inherent recognition of the 
significance and need for protection of these regions within the Canadian legal system.24 Vast 
swathes of the land under which the tar sands resource is located are afforded constitutional 
protection owing to their historic occupation by the indigenous peoples by a series of treaties 
with the Canadian government signed in the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries.25 
These treaties confer rights over the land to the indigenous peoples who bear inextricable 
cultural connections to it. As such there is an established legal basis on which to build the 
suggestion that the land in question holds unique significance to said peoples which could, if 
inhibited or removed entirely, could constitute breaches of established human rights 
provisions. Thus established aspects of the Canadian legal system support the contentions of 
the thesis in a manner unique to the case study providing an established recognition of the 
significance of the land in question but falling short of establishing individual rights to utilise 
the land in a particular culturally significant manner.
Whilst Canada remains the only nation with a large scale industry based around 
extracting tar sands, refining the raw material and selling the product on the market as 
synthetic crude oil, a number of other nations sit atop significant, and in the case of 
Venezuela larger, reserves of the resource. As such the discussion surrounding the impacts of 
the processes involved in the industry and the human rights implications thereof has 
relevance to emerging industries globally. The relevance of this discussion is however not 
limited to other instances of extraction of material akin to that considered here. The tar sands
24 This is clearly established in the The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. at section 35 but 
also in a number o f  seminal precedents such as Corbiere v. Canada (Minister o f  Indian and Northern Affairs)
[1999] 2 SCR 203, R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 and Haida Nation v BC  [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, [2004] 
S.C.C. 73.
25 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. S.35
are amongst a growing number of resources termed by some as ‘extreme energy’26 or 
‘unconventional oil and gas.’27 These are resources which are only economically and socially 
viable only by virtue of global reliance on the so called fossil fuels and the realisation that 
reserves of more easily accessed resources are declining. The human rights implications of 
this broad group of resources are potentially considerable, particular to them, and far beyond 
that which could be addressed in this thesis. Academic discourse outside the natural and 
physical sciences surrounding them is in its infancy. Legal discourse is no exception to this, 
and as such the distinct impacts and considerations of this group of previously unutilised 
sources of energy warrants academic investigation beyond the existing literature surrounding 
conventional resources. The consideration of the issues raised in a setting as conducive to 
logical interpretation of established human rights instruments as Canada will, it is hoped, 
facilitate discourse in states with sovereign resources of a similar nature and where their 
exploitation might similarly impact upon land of acute significance to minorities and 
particularly minority cultures.
More specifically thesis aims to examine the rights which might be used as a basis for 
a case against the licensing of tar sands projects arising from the environmental damage 
caused by them. This will be constructed around suggested breaches of the human rights of 
the indigenous peoples of Alberta. In order to provide some relevancy to their own specific 
culture, the rights purported by the piece to have been breached will be linked to fundamental 
expressions o f it as represented in those rights enshrined within the historic treaties and 
declarations made prior to the start of the twentieth century. The reasoning for this 
methodology in relation to each adverse impact and a more detailed analysis of the various
26 Extreme Energy Initiative What is extreme energy? < http://extremeenergy.org/about/what-is-extreme-energy- 
2/> Accessed February 20th 2015
27 The distinction between unconventional and conventional oil should be noted as being potentially misleading. 
Scientifically this is a distinction concerned with the density o f the oil by comparison to water
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components surrounding the central theme will be discussed in more detail at various points 
in the work. Firstly in this introduction the methodology for the work as a whole will be 
outlined. Following this a chapter has been dedicated to background information necessary 
which serves to provide a brief overview of the main proponents in the dispute concerning 
the tar sands as well as a basic understanding of the impacts the extraction thereof is 
suggested as having upon the ecosystems of Alberta. Following this, more specific detail will 
be provided within later chapters where it is necessary to elaborate upon the basic 
background provided herein.
1.2 Methodology
The methodological approach to the piece will be largely empirical, in that it will 
outline an approach to challenging the licensing of tar sands projects in theory already 
available to the indigenous peoples within the province of Alberta. This is as such a claim 
could be made for human rights breaches under the existing federal legislative and judicial 
frameworks of Canada or the provincial mechanisms of Alberta. The normative aspect of the 
research will be formed by the proposition that interpretations of the applicability of accepted 
human rights provisions within the domestic jurisdiction of Canada could give rise to a basis 
for a legal challenge to the tar sands projects founded on human rights law from various 
levels of enforcement.
28The premise is therefore that the legal provisions to be discussed are lex lata, but 
that interpretation of that law and its application to the damage caused by the tar sands is lege
28 The law as it stands.
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? 9ferenda: Note should be made that the thesis does not intend to contest that there exists or 
should exist a broad right to the environment, or narrow protection of specific aspects thereof. 
Instead the proposition is that the damage caused by the tar sands projects to specific 
environmental features which the indigenous peoples of Alberta inhabit, rely upon to express 
their culture and have inimitable rights over, is so severe that it constitutes a breach of 
established human rights provisions when applied using culturally relative judicial 
interpretation.
Care will also be taken to avoid contentious political and social issues which might 
bring the work into disrepute or leave it open to criticism on the basis of unsubstantiated 
arguments. In this regard a specific example would be the intense debate surrounding the 
issue of climate change. Where such issues are at risk of being touched upon by the piece a 
clear statement will be made to separate it from any contentious debates and unsupported 
statements of personal opinion on any such issues will be avoided. The purpose of this 
methodological approach is to highlight the lack of recognition for human rights law as 
recourse to bring an end to, seek compensation for and reparation of, the damage caused by 
the tar sands projects in the province o f Alberta.
Methodology will also therefore guide the structure of the piece in that the logical 
approach to the development of the aforementioned argument will be to consider the human 
rights provisions of each level of enforcement, national, regional (multinational) and 
international separately in relation to the interpretation of the existing domestic provisions 
pertinent to the subject matter. In essence the broad rights which might give rise to a basis for 
a legal challenge against the damage caused, through judicial interpretation, will be identified
29 The law as it should be.
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and the relevant human rights provisions at each level of enforcement then assessed as to 
their applicability and utility in relation to the case study of the indigenous peoples of Alberta 
and the effects the tar sands projects are having upon them.
Thus a clear structure resulting from this methodology is established. This is first to 
analyse the effects of the tar sands projects and their scope, and select the rights relevant to 
that subject matter. Following this a consideration of those broad rights at each level of 
enforcement will be made. To conclude, an assessment will be made in each case of their 
potential utility in relation to the creation of a basis for a viable legal challenge, or part 
thereof. The core aim of the piece in this regard is to construct a legal basis for contesting the 
licensing of tar sands projects by the Canadian government, which despite being based in 
theory could be practically applied. Such an application would ideally have a relative 
potential for success in securing, as a minimum, the restriction of the tar sands projects and 
their licensing in the province of Alberta so as to limit the damage being done to the 
indigenous peoples of the province and the inimitable environment on which they rely to 
perpetuate their culture.
Qualitative research methods will evidently form the majority of those utilised within 
the thesis, with analysis of the potential application and interpretation of existing legal 
provisions being based upon such methods. However, a significant amount of quantitative 
data is available concerning the effects of the tar sands projects, especially in relation to their 
alleged environmental and human health impacts. Thus utilising this data to support 
qualitatively based propositions could not feasibly be avoided. Note should be made that 
manipulation of such data will not be required, and conclusions drawn from it will be factual 
in nature, avoiding the necessity to interpret said data and hence justify those interpretations.
1 2
To avoid the plethora of published and documented quantitative data available would be 
remiss as its potential to support qualitative arguments solely through its quotation in relation 
to statements is vast.
Thus although the methods utilised in the research and the subsequent conclusions 
will be purely qualitative, the propositions put forward would be weakened should the 
superfluity of quantitative data widely published and recognised not be utilised in a 
supportive evidential role. All data utilised will be fully referenced to ensure that no 
requirement for justification of quantitative methods is required. The credibility of any data 
will be questioned at all stages, endeavouring constantly to ensure that any contested data is 
not drawn upon, or is highlighted as being so. Also where use of such data is beneficial, or 
necessary, opposing views or published challenges to the veracity of said data will also be 
highlighted.
During the course of the research a number of reports, articles, studies and other 
publications will be utilised to illustrate statements or to support arguments made within the 
piece. However, as is the case with developments of the size and commercial importance of 
those in relation to the tar sands, parties who stand to benefit from the continuation or 
expansion of them will seek to publish material improving the likelihood of their being able 
to do so. Thus many publications are funded by the very bodies whose work may well depend 
upon a favourable portrayal in that same piece. In relation to the research at hand, the sources 
of funding for publications utilised, where provided or if unknown, whose veracity and 
impartiality could be brought into question as a result of said funding will be stated. 
Otherwise the piece in question will be excluded from use within the thesis. These measures 
aim to ensure the impartiality and the utility of the legal arguments presented in the work, in
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order that they could be used in the formulation of a case against the current policy applied in 
the licensing of tar sands developments in Alberta, Canada.
A brief note on the precautionary principle found in environmental law and 
established as a core principle of field in the Rio Declaration30 is necessary at this point. The 
thesis cannot discuss the precautionary principle and its implications in relation to the case 
study within the constraints made upon it. As such although the principle will be mentioned 
briefly at points within the text, it should generally be regarded as referring merely to a 
requirement to take reasonable measures to mitigate or eliminate foreseeable harms which 
could severely affect the health of individuals. Such an approach reflects a commitment to 
both environmental impacts assessments and precaution more generally in the licensing of 
industrial projects which provincial and federal authorities alike in Canada have espoused. 
The reasoning for this approach is twofold. Firstly the piece is concerned with the application 
of human rights law to the impacts upon the indigenous populace of Alberta arising from the 
tar sands extraction industry. The precautionary principle, whilst considered in some seminal 
cases31 in this field is not an established principle of human rights law. Secondly the principle 
suggests precaution on the part of governing authorities with regards to impacts of which 
there is an existing knowledge, or a reasonable foreseeability. As will be discussed however, 
some of the impacts of the tar sands industry are as yet unascertained to an extent which 
would demand precaution under the principle. Also such precaution would likely constitute 
only heightened monitoring of potential impacts, and as such offer little protection of 
indigenous peoples and culture.
30 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) / 31 ILM 874
31 See for example: Tatar v. Romania [2009] ECHR, Application no. 67021/0land Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v Paraguay Case 12.313, Report No. 2/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 387 (2002)
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In this regard some consideration of the concept of Human Rights Impact 
Assessments is necessary. The ‘phenomenon of undertaking human rights impact
32assessments’ has grown in prevalence in recent years and can take two broad forms, ex ante 
(before the activity being assessed), and ex post (after the activity being assessed), de Beco 
also highlights that divisions of ‘positive and negative, intended, and unintended and direct 
and indirect impact’33 can also be made. Such distinctions would undoubtedly be of value to 
the discourse surrounding the human rights impacts of the tar sands extraction projects 
particularly in relation to direct and indirect impacts. Indeed this distinction is a crucial aspect 
of some of the conclusions drawn by the thesis as will be highlighted.
The methodology of the thesis is however aimed at assessing whether a breach could 
be suggested as having occurred at all on the basis of the harm to culturally significant 
environmental features rather than that assessed by human rights impact assessments, the 
potential risk of doing so or the extent to which they have been breached. The nature of 
human rights impact assessments is in itself diverse. As Harrison, an avid proponent of the 
concept, concedes, ‘we will never be able to define a uniform process for all HRIAs....[t]he 
appropriate model will depend on the nature of what is being assessed.,34They are broadly 
defined as, ‘measuring the impact of policies, programmes, projects and interventions on 
human rights,’35 and as such are constrained by the ‘difficulties in gaining access to relevant 
data and the challenge of attributing policy change to the HRIA.’36
32 Harrison, J. ‘Human Rights Measurement: Reflections on the Current Practice and Future Potential 
o f  Human Rights Impact Assessment' (2011) Journal o f Human Rights Practice 3(2) 162, 163
33 de Beco, G. ‘Human Rights Impact Assessments ' (2009) 27 Netherlands Human Rights Quarterly 139, 143
34 Harrison, J. ‘Human Rights Measurement: Reflections on the Current Practice and Future Potential 
o f  Human Rights Impact Assessm ent’ (2011) Journal o f  Human Rights Practice 3(2) 162, 165
35 Human Rights Impact Resource Centre, An Introduction to Human Rights Impact Assessment 
<http://www.humanrightsimpact.org/hria-guide/overview> Accessed February 20th 2015
36 Bakker, S. Van Den Berg, M. Duzenli, D. and Radstaake, M. ‘Human Right Impact Assessment in Practice: 
The Case o f  the Health Rights o f  Women Assessment Instrument (HeRWAI) (2009) 1(3) Journal o f  Human 
Rights Practice 436, 451
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These issues in particular preclude the application of the Human Rights Impact 
Assessment methodology to the case study of the thesis. Human rights impact assessments 
undeniably bear considerable relevance to extractive industries in particular as they allow for 
the incorporation of scientific data into assessments of potential breaches of said rights. 
However, in relation to industrial activities of considerable economic value, the need for 
evidence of significant strength to dissuade both government support and corporate fervour to 
extract, and indeed to suggest an unjust regulatory process is well documented and 
recognised by jurisprudence in this area.37 As will be discussed throughout the thesis, 
contentions as to the veracity of data regarding the impacts of the tar sands industry generally 
and in relation the indigenous populace specifically is both lacking and, where available, 
highly contentious. Thus the validity of any proposed impact assessment would undoubtedly 
be contested on these grounds irrespective of the proposed outcome.
Of greater importance however if the fact that the thesis proposes a novel application 
of existing provisions, and as such one which might be deemed as misguided in the 
conclusions drawn. As such to suggest that the impact upon rights which have not been 
widely recognised as being potentially breached in the manner proposed could be assessed
' l  o
using Harrison’s methodology would be remiss. Essentially, that which is not known cannot 
be measured. Thus, it is hoped that the thesis might instead act as a precursor to such analysis 
by providing a basis for potential breaches from which an assessment of their extent could be
37 In this regard see the case o f  Hatton v United Kingdom  (2002) 34 EHRR 1. Here the overall social and 
economic value o f  night flights to and from London’s Heathrow airport was deemed as outweighing the minor 
environmental impacts o f  the noise they produced. This process is often referred to as the margin o f appreciation 
or the fair balance test. See in this regard: De Hert, P. A Human Rights Perspective on Privacy and Data 
Protection Impact Assessments in Wright, d and de Hert, P Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer, London, 
2012)32-77
38 Harrison, J. ‘Human Rights Measurement: Reflections on the Current Practice and Future Potential 
o f  Human Rights Impact Assessment’ (2011) Journal o f Human Rights Practice 3(2) 162
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made. The relevance of the human rights impact assessment methodology to the effects of the 
tar sands industry on the indigenous populace as a result of environmental damage is 
therefore not entirely absent. Instead it is merely premature where the rights which might be 
assessed as having been breached remain unidentified. As such the concept will not be 
included in the discourse of the thesis but might provide an avenue for expansion upon the 
conclusions drawn herein.
1.3 Structure of the Work
The work will be divided into three main sections, each dealing with potentially 
applicable rights originating from the Canadian domestic legal system, regional human rights 
mechanisms and finally international legal instruments in this field. These will be further 
segregated into rights protecting the individual from physical and psychological harm and 
those which condemn the suppression of the ability of individuals to conduct themselves in a 
manner they see fit. In the context of the thesis this will primarily concern the ability of 
individuals to live in a manner conducive to their cultural beliefs. The influence of the 
European regional human rights system and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples39 will be the only exception to this basic structure and will be discussed in totum40 
within the chapters concerning the regional mechanisms and the international instruments 
respectively.
Following this introductory chapter of the piece, the background information 
necessary to understand the context of the piece which support the legal arguments made 
herein will be provided. The processes involved in tar sands extraction, along with a brief 
history of the development of the industry will begin this chapter. The specific environmental
39 United Nations Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples (A/RES/61/295) HR/PUB/13/2 (DRIP)
40 In full.
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impacts of the tar sands extraction projects which provide the basis for the proposed action 
constructed within the piece will then be outlined. This will be segregated into the three main 
impacts considered by the piece, water consumption, tailings ponds41 and those felt by the 
boreal woodland caribou. Finally this chapter will connect these two areas by providing a 
brief background to the indigenous populace of Alberta, and in particular the regions 
impacted upon most intensely by the tar sands operations therein.
The third chapter of the piece will begin the analysis of human rights instruments to 
which the Albertan and federal Canadian governments, and organs thereof are subject in 
relation the licensing of the extraction of tar sands. The first of three chapters in this regard it 
will focus on the domestic instruments pertinent to the piece. Within this it will outline the 
particular rights which are suggested as having been breached by the current approach to 
licensing or the operations approved thereby. Both federal and provincial legislation will be 
considered and the ramifications of the constitutional arrangements of Canada will be 
outlined where appropriate also. The aim of this section will be to highlight those rights of 
potential utility to the aim of the piece, whilst also affording a basis on which to interpret 
rights from the other two broad jurisdictions to be considered by the piece which are not all 
able to be upheld directly in the Canadian domestic legal system.
The following two chapters will focus upon the two other jurisdictions considered by 
the piece, those of the regional and international human rights mechanisms with connections 
to Canada. These connections will be both interpretative and enforceable in nature, and the 
particular applicability of each instrument discussed to Canada, and Alberta, will be outlined 
where appropriate. The chapter focused on regional mechanisms will consider the Inter-
41 This term is explained in full in heading 2.33 concerning Tailings Ponds.
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American and European regional systems, both of which have had some bearing on judicial 
decisions within the domestic Canadian courts. Introducing this chapter will be a detailed 
justification for the segregation of the discussion of regional and international instruments 
within the piece. Following this, the nature of Canadian relations with the Inter-American 
system will be highlighted as a particular concern in relation to the piece, as strained 
interaction influences the applicability of provisions from this jurisdiction in relation to the 
aim of the piece.
The last substantive chapter of the work will consider the international human rights 
instruments of note in relation to the extraction of the tar sands and the environmental 
impacts thereof. As well as the widely applicable texts affording rights to all citizens of 
ratified parties, the piece will also discuss the interpretative value of non-binding instruments 
from this legal sphere with particular relevance to indigenous peoples. This will allow for not 
only culturally relative interpretations of binding rights to be suggested, but interpretations 
with specific applicability to the often culturally idiosyncratic context of indigenous peoples. 
The potential utilisation of non-binding mechanisms within this sphere, particularly those 
under the auspices of the United Nations, will also be discussed. Whilst not strictly binding or 
enforceable in themselves the interpretative and political benefits they afford in relation to the 
aim of the piece.
The last chapter of the work will be reserved for concluding remarks. The conclusion 
of the piece will highlight the human rights provisions which offer the basis for a litigious 
action opposing the current approach to licensing and regulating the tar sands industry with 
the greatest possibility of success. Beyond the rights themselves, the most apt forum for such 
challenge will be suggested. This will be based upon an analysis of the strengths and
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weaknesses of the mechanisms available in each jurisdiction in relation to Canada 
specifically. However, arguably the most important consideration in this regard will be the 
likelihood of a favourable outcome for the suggested action within each of the fora. The 
distinction between the proposed interpretative approach to opposing the knowing damage of 
culturally significant environmental features and protection afforded to the environment 
under the auspices of human rights law internationally to date will also be stressed to 
demonstrate what the piece offers to wider academic debate in this regard.
2 0
Chapter 2 
Historical and Scientific Context
2 1
2.1 Historical Context of Tar Sands Expansion
Despite knowledge of the mineral rich nature of the sands of the Athabasca river basin 
and their abundance being relatively common, it was not until the 23rd of April 1929 that a 
method of effectively processing the bituminous sand was patented and the true potential of 
the previously unattainable bitumen became apparent. Karl Adolf Clark, an Ontario born 
chemist, is regarded as the grandfather of tar sands development for his discovery of, ‘a 
process for separating and treating bituminous sands and like material into its bituminous and 
other constituents.’ 42 The process is now known as the hot water recovery process, and 
despite refinement and a massive increase in scale to industrial levels, remains the most 
commonly used production method in the modern tar sands extraction operations outside the 
utilisation of alternative methods to extract from deep reservoirs.43
Despite this discovery a further thirty eight years would pass until the first tar sands 
extraction plant, akin to those now prevalent in the Athabasca oil sands fields, began to 
operate.44 This was largely due to the considerable cost of extraction of bitumen from the tar 
sands, and then its upgrading to the more highly demanded synthetic crude oil. The opening 
of a relatively small, by current standards at least,45 project for extraction of crude oil from 
the tar sands by the Great Canadian Oil Sands company outside Fort McMurray, Alberta, on 
30th September 1967 marked the beginning of insatiable contemporary development of what
V2Canadian Intellectual Property Office Patent CA 289058: Bituminous Sand Processing  (Issued 1929) 
< http://brevets-patents.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/cpd/eng/patent/289058/page/289058_20031129_description.pdf> 
Accessed 15th February 2011 Accessed 30th July 2014.
43 A pocket o f  tar sands beneath the ground, which has been mapped using imaging techniques, and as such has 
an ascertainable crude oil output.
44 Attempts were made to extract bitumen from the tar sands on an industrial scale prior to this, but all proved to 
be impracticable prior Clark’s discovery.
45 A limit was placed initially on the volume o f synthetic crude oil allowed to be produced by the plant at 31,500 
b/d, which shortly prior to opening was revised to 45,000 b/d. Today plants average production values o f  around 
300,000 b/d.
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is now described as one of the 'most destructive projects on earth.’46 Just over a decade 
passed until a conglomerate of investors, forming Suncor Energy Incorporated (Suncor) 
began production at their plant in 1978 with daily production outputs doubling those of the 
Great Canadian Oil Sands plant, but still falling far short of modern standards, producing a 
mere 100,000 barrels per day (b/d).47 The next two decades would mark rapid and 
unhindered growth in tar sands extraction and refining towards the levels we see today, with 
the average modern plant producing three times the amount the Suncor plant was capable of 
at maximum output.
A number o f factors caused the enormous swell in interest, and crucially investment, 
from oil and engineering companies, professional investors, funds and banks, and indeed the 
governments of both Alberta and Canada. The two most obvious of these were the basic 
economic factors of supply and demand. Demand crucially rose exponentially from Canada’s 
closest neighbour, the U.S. Between the opening of production of the two inaugural projects
4R
aforementioned, US oil imports more than tripled, and have almost doubled again between 
1978 and today. This surge in demand was coupled with the delicate and highly politicised 
supply of crude oil from states forming OPEC, and emphasised by the oil embargo imposed 
by the organisation in 1973 as a result of continued American backing of Israel. These factors 
provoked the massive increase in both financial investment and research and development 
into the potential of the tar sands in terms of crude oil production, the benefits of which are 
being reaped today.
46 A phrase now in wide usage when referring to the tar sands projects, coined by the environmental campaign 
group Environmental Defence in its report ‘Canada's Toxic Tar Sands Report by Environmental Defence 
<http://environmentaldefence.ca/sites/default/files/report_files/TarSands_TheReport.pdf> Accessed 15th 
February 2011
47 b/d : barrels per day.
48 See total import figures in the table published by the US Energy Information Administration, taken from:
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/txt/ptb0504.html> Accessed 15th February 2011 (Full table at Annex 2).
23
Debate surrounding the tar sands extraction projects does not focus solely upon the 
environmental and economic arguments however. A unique perspective and standpoint on the 
issue is possibly the most hotly contested aspect of the arguments engulfing the practice. 
Those in favour of the tar sands developments contest that the utilisation of the resources 
possessed by a State such as Canada where human rights are guaranteed, is preferable to the 
continued reliance upon that sourced from States where this is not necessarily the case. Even 
where the financial and environmental costs of the resource far outweigh that from such a 
State it is argued that the moral case for the more expensive, in this case Canadian, oil should 
result in its extraction and use. In relation to the Canadian tar sands, the synthetic crude oil 
their refinement produces has been labelled as being such ‘Ethical Oil’ by those seeking its 
development, continued extraction, and expansion in its marketing.
One of the most high profile and outspoken proponents of this side of the debate is 
Ezra Levant, who argues, ‘Every drop of oil from Alberta is one less drop from some fascist 
theocracy, or some brutal warlord; one less cent into the treasuries of Russia’s secret police 
and al-Qaeda’s murderers.’49 This standpoint has however, caused ire at an international level, 
with those States accused of producing ‘unethical oil,’ speaking out about the accusation in 
the Canadian media.50 The ethicality of tar sands oil alone, regardless of the oil industry as a 
whole, could however produce a thesis of considerable length, and as such this debate will be 
side-lined within the research, however to fail to provide context to the wider arguments 
surrounding the issues focused upon by the piece would be remiss.
49 Levant, E. ‘Ethical Oil: The Case fo r  C anada’s Oil Sands ’ (McCelland and Stewart, Toronto, 2010) 233-4
50 McCarthy, S. “ Ethical o il’ and sparks war o f words between Ottawa, Saudis.’ The Globe and M ail (2011) 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ethical-oil-ad-sparks-war-of-words-between-ottawa-
saudis/article4256682/ > Accessed 30th July 2014
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2.2 Tar Sands Extraction and Processing
Despite highly volatile oil prices throughout the latter half of the 20th century,51 
expansion was tempered until the OPEC oil embargo of the U.S. in 1973. This was owing to 
the high cost of both extraction and refinement or ‘upgrading’ o f the bitumen so readily 
available in the north east of Alberta.52 The natural state of the tar sands unlike conventional 
crude oil is solid, not the easily utilised liquid or Tight’ crude to which the world has become 
accustomed. Also the tar sands are not pure bitumen immediately ready to be refined, unlike 
‘conventional crude’ whose state allows for both easy transportation and relative purity upon 
extraction facilitating almost immediate use, or at least quick and cheap refinement into a 
highly lucrative end product. As such extraction of the raw material to be processed into 
crude oil sold by the barrel and listed on stock markets the world over is a challenge in itself.
Two broad approaches to extraction are available to companies who have had projects 
approved, and these are dependent upon the depth at which the reservoirs of tar sands are 
situated. Shallow reservoirs are easily strip mined from the earth, with material covering the 
reservoir excavated and removed to expose the raw material which is then dug from the 
ground and transported to refineries. The alternative is so called, ‘in situ’ extraction, which 
relies upon an element of refinement within the reservoir itself. In this method the high 
viscosity of the tar sands prevents its extraction from significant depth in its natural form. The 
solution is, in the simplest of terms, the application of extreme heat and pressure to the 
reservoir. Two forms of ‘in situ’ extraction are utilised by companies currently operating in 
the tar sands fields of Alberta, steam assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) and cyclic steam
51 WRTG Economics Crude Oil Prices (2011) <http://www.wtrg.com/oil_graphs/oilpricel947.gif> Accessed 
30th July 2014 (Full table at Annex 3).
52 Clarke, T. Tar Sands Showdown (James Lorimer and Company Ltd. Publishing, Ontario, 2008) 35-36
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stimulation (C SS jf3 Note should be made that SAGD is by far the more commonly used 
method in the Athabasca region tar sands, and its effects will therefore be focused upon 
within the thesis54.
Steam assisted gravity drainage essentially involves heating and pressurising the 
highly viscous raw tar sands beneath the ground in order that it can be pumped from the earth 
directly. This involves the drilling of two wells into a ‘reservoir’ of tar sands beneath the 
ground. The first is used to directly inject highly pressurised water and other chemicals into 
the reservoir. This results in a change in consistency of the tar sands within the reservoir to a 
less viscous state and allows the mixture to be pumped out of the second well drilled and sent 
for refinement into synthetic crude oil via pipelines (a method of transportation made 
possible by this new state).55 Favoured by the industry as the visual damage caused as a result 
of extraction is far less than open pit extraction, ‘in-situ’ extraction still accounts for a 
fraction of the total of synthetic crude oil output of the projects in Alberta, though this will 
inevitably increase. Estimates place only around 10% of the confirmed tar sands deposits of 
Canada at a depth capable of open pit mining, and as such the future of extraction 
undoubtedly lies in these methods, even if current production levels attributed to them do not 
reflect this reality.
Although these approaches mitigate some of the more obvious effects of open pit 
extraction, they still entail many of the considerable ramifications of open pit mining. The 
processing of the final saleable product of crude oil from the tar sand mixture extracted,
53 A process called VAPEX is also being experimented with by oil companies operating in the tar sands, though 
this is highly similar to SAGD, but utilises solvents instead o f  water.
54 The two processes are not exclusively used by oil companies, and in some cases are rotated to achieve the 
highest yields, but SAGD is by far the most widespread and commonly utilised extraction method for deep 
reservoir tar sands in the Athabasca projects.
55 A basic illustrative diagram o f the SAGD process is included at Annex 4.
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although in liquid form and thus more easily transported to the surface and to refineries, 
retains the very same refining difficulties and adverse effects once the raw material emerges 
above ground. The post extraction process is exactly the same but with one less link as the 
heating occurs below the surface instead of in a refinery above the ground, and as such the 
adverse effects of these stages are retained.
In basic terms the SAGD process benefits only the oil companies as smaller leases are 
required for the land, as they are based upon the area of the surface utilised. The area 
impacted upon directly is reduced massively as deviated wells56 can be used and as such 
multiple reservoirs can be accessed from one drilling rig. The SAGD approach is preferred 
therefore from a public relations standpoint as it does not require the highly visible and 
emotive damage to the surface demanded by open pit extraction. The details of the specific 
effects of the two main processes utilised in the Athabasca region on various aspects of both 
the environment and the indigenous cultures of Alberta will be discussed in greater depth in 
relation to the proposed human rights violations they give rise to later in the piece.
2.3 The Environmental Impacts of Tar Sands Extraction
The thesis will consider three main impacts of the tar sands, all of which have 
significant repercussions for the environment on which the First Nations of Alberta rely. In 
particular impacts to the boreal forest ecosystem will be considered as it is within this type of 
environment that the bulk of current extraction operations are being undertaken. In this 
context the focus will be upon the impacts of water extraction from naturally occurring 
sources, tailings ponds, and the impacts to boreal woodland caribou. The three are somewhat
56 Deviated wells are those wells which do not follow a vertical path, and instead travel at an angle other than 
perpendicular to the surface to access resources which are not located directly below a well site.
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interconnected for example the impacts of tailings ponds will affect caribou as well as the 
indigenous populace, as would a significant reduction in the presence of water in the regions 
exploited. However the specific effects to them necessitate discussion owing to their 
significance as a species still hunted in a traditional manner by a proportion of the indigenous 
populace of north east Alberta. Whilst other smaller mammalian species are also hunted, the 
sub-species of caribou to be discussed migrate only within a particular latitudinal band which 
runs across the north of the province. As such impacts to them are both acute and likely 
irreversible owing to their existing status as ‘at risk,’57 increasing the severity of resultant 
impacts upon First Nations also.
2.31 Water Consumption
Water has long been a contested issue between the indigenous peoples of Canada and 
the federal and provincial institutions. Indeed some of their earliest interactions concerned the 
use of water on traditional lands both in Alberta and throughout the Western half of Canada, 
as colonialism spread from its origins on the Eastern seaboard. The debate over the use of 
water largely surrounded the irrigation of the southern half of Alberta, topographically 
dominated by arid plains, to allow for the land to be farmed. The northern half of Alberta was 
largely disregarded in these negotiations owing to its vastly differing topography of dense 
forest and mountains. However, the rights to water it was decided were enjoyed by the 
indigenous populous during this period of the late 19th and early 20th century. This mentality 
shaped the basic laws regarding water use present in Alberta as a whole to the present day, 
both within the numbered treaties establishing reserve lands and provincial legislation, and as 
such warrants discussion.
57 Species At Risk Act 1985 S.C. 2002 c.29
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The focus of colonial authorities governing Alberta was the establishment of a culture 
of farming to both sustain the local population and promote and support trade routes. This 
was especially true of the lower half of Alberta, which consists of far more easily traversed 
terrain, thus providing efficient trade links with the Western seaboard through the 
neighbouring province of British Columbia. Forcing the Western European ideal of a farming 
economy upon the indigenous population was however fraught with difficulties, both cultural 
and physical. Poor weather conditions, reluctance to forego traditional practices and methods 
on the part of the Indians, and disagreements regarding the best methods to attribute the land 
and rights thereto all hampered the development process. These setbacks were however, in 
part responsible for the basic principles underlying the water use laws present today in 
Alberta and can be seen as having influenced the negotiations and formation of the numbered 
treaties concerned with the regions of Alberta on which the thesis is focused. Such effects are 
far more palpable in the text of Treaty 6 as its geographical scope covers a mixture of both 
boreal forest and arid plains. In the case of Treaty 8 however, the purview of which is based 
almost solely on boreal regions the comments on the negotiations between the Crown and the 
First Nations presented by the Crown representatives in appendices as opposed to the treaty 
itself bear the hallmarks of these influences though to a lesser extent.
The primary issue which has driven the direction of the water use policy and 
legislation in Alberta since its creation is that of, who in basic terms possesses rights over the 
water coursing through and beneath province. Essentially the debate concerned the 
application of riparian rights or the doctrine of prior appropriation to the regulation of the use 
of water in the province. Riparian rights consider water to be a shared resource, and whilst 
the land owner on or through whose land water is settled or flows, ‘were entitled to receive
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the flow of water to their property substantially undiminished in quantity and unimpaired in
* 58quality,’ the central tenet remains that, ‘Riparianism was grounded firmly in the principle of 
shared use of water as a common resource.’59 Prior appropriation by contrast granted rights 
to water, ‘based on the first in time to put the water to beneficial use’.60 Under the western 
Canadian system, rights to take and use would be authorised by way of a licensing scheme. 
‘Prior to granting such licenses the Dominion first vested in the Crown the property in water 
and thereby the right to grant licenses to it.’61 The colonial promotion of the irrigation of 
large tracts of land for the purposes of farming and the imposition of western agricultural 
methods including ranching favoured, and indeed required, the implementation of the prior 
appropriation doctrine. This was a marked step away from the riparian rights doctrine of 
English common law at the time, and an inheritance of successful policy south of the border 
in the neighbouring states of the USA with similar climates and topographies.
Separation from the common law principles of the English legal system to which 
colonial administrators were accustomed was largely a result of the sharing of experience, 
information and successes with the authorities over the border in the USA and the realisation 
that the similar climate and topography provided more relevant guidance than the English 
position. The completion of the progression towards this basis for water rights came in 1894 
with the enactment of the North West Irrigation Act, which resulted in the abolition of the 
riparian rights structure which had formed the basis of water rights until this time. The 
position with regard to the indigenous peoples subject to the Act by virtue of dwelling within 
the geographical scope of its application was not clarified as the Act did not mention the
58 Lucas, A. Security o f  Title in Canadian Water Rights (Canadian Institute o f  Resources Law, Calgary, 1990) 6.
59 Smith, C.M. and Passelac-Ross, M.M. Defining Aboriginal Rights to Water in Alberta. (Canadian Institute o f  
Resources Law, Calgary, 1990) 4
60 ibid. 4
61 ibid. 34
62 North West Irrigation Act 1894 c.30
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rights o f indigenous peoples with regard to water, merely asserting, ‘property in and the right 
to the use of all the water at any time in any stream be deemed to be vested in the
63Crown,’ though it did also stipulate that this was, ‘save in the exercise of any legal right 
existing at the time.’64
In relation to the thesis this provision creates some confusion as the provisions of 
Treaty 6 were negotiated prior to the passing of the Act, whereas Treaty 8 was concluded 
some four years later. Similarly the provisions of the Act do not cover all of the territories 
reserved under Treaty 8. The position of the Canadian courts in this regard, whilst not 
specific to rights to water, has been to uphold rights to practices and actions reserved under 
the numbered treaties, such as the right to fish, thereby not challenging the supremacy of 
federal and provincial authorities to control the use of water within their territory generally. 
This approach has for the most part been adopted since the enactment of the North West 
Irrigation Act65 and in relation to subsequent acts concerning the attribution of water rights in 
the province into the modern era. Thus, whilst the position with regards to the water rights of 
the indigenous peoples of Alberta remains somewhat unclear, the acknowledgement of the 
immense significance o f the resource can be traced almost to the very commencement of 
relations between those peoples and those authorities which would evolve to form the modem 
provincial and federal governments. Indeed whilst rights to the removal of water remain 
rights to practices reliant upon certain flow levels being maintained are clear and 






2.32 Boreal Woodland Caribou
Ongoing development of tar sands projects has farther reaching effects than might at 
first be apparent to the casual observer or interested party engaged in the media coverage 
surrounding the projects. Physical damage to the boreal forest, water systems and 
geographical features are worryingly obvious, with some insisting such damage can be seen 
from space,66 and as such lend themselves to the kind of startling and headline grabbing 
campaigns desired by those opposing the extraction of the tar sands for oil. However, one of 
the most crucial links to the specific region and ecosystems of Alberta for the Indians is not 
the forest itself, but that which it in turn supports.
The Indians of Alberta, and indeed Canada as a whole, are not famed loggers, and nor 
are they reliant solely upon fish as their source of sustenance, although the effects on this 
aspect of their culture are discussed in a later chapter. In the northern areas of the province, 
dominated by the boreal forest ecosystem which is home to the three oil sands fields in the 
province with which the thesis is concerned,67 caribou provide nourishment, clothing, and 
even building materials as well as cultural enrichment to the Indians. In the more southern 
areas, where plains ecosystems border the tar sands fields, similar benefits are attained from 
the hunting of bison. A note should be made that, whilst in some regions bison are still 
hunted in a traditional fashion by the indigenous peoples populating the ecosystems where 
they are prevalent, the frequency of both this practice, as opposed to an approach akin to 
farming, and of the peoples which undertake such practice and have been affected by the tar
65 National Geographic, Satellite Views o f  Canada's Oil Sands Over Time (2011) <
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2011/12/pictures/111222-canada-oil-sands-satellite-images/> 
Accessed 30th July 2014
67 The Athabasca, Peace River and Cold Lake oil sands fields are displayed in Annex 5. Alberta Geological 
Survey, Alberta Oil Sands (2013) <http://www.ags.gov.ab.ca/energy/oilsands/alberta_oil_sands.html>
Accessed 30th July 2014.
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sands developments is minimal. As such, whilst the affects to bison will be mentioned in the 
research, the primary focus will remain upon caribou with bison being discussed in relation to 
the reclamation of tailings ponds and strip mine sites, where bison have been introduced to 
populate such land, with disputed success. Factors affecting these species, especially that of 
the caribou, indirectly affect the Indians of Alberta equally as dramatically, threatening not 
only their source of food but their very way of life.
The effects of the tar sands development on caribou especially has been widely 
researched and publicised by animal welfare, conservation organisations and academic 
institutions alike, but the effect that their decline in turn has upon the indigenous peoples of 
the province is often barely considered, if at all, despite the two being inextricably linked. 
This chapter of the work intends to establish that this link is so strong that the very existence 
of some of the Indians of Alberta is threatened as a result of the damage to the fauna and flora 
of the boreal forest, and consequentially that the human rights of those indigenous people 
affected are breached. The discussion will conclude with a suggestion as to the best basis for 
a case to be brought against the governmental authorities permitting the tar sands 
developments based upon the aforementioned suggested human rights breaches.
The right of the Indians of Alberta, ‘to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, 
trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered,’68 is protected in both Treaty 6 and 
Treaty 8, and represents recognition of both their traditional and cultural practices, but also 
their need for sustenance within the Canadian domestic legal system and by the executive of 
the state. The ‘Commissioners for Treaty No. 8’ highlighted the significance of the hunting 
and trapping practices of the Indians subject to that treaty, stating that, ‘There was expressed
68 Treaty 8 <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/hts/tgu/pubs/t8/trty8-eng.asp> Accessed 15th February 2011. Treaty 
6 available at <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/hts/tgu/pubs/t6/trty6-eng.asp> Accessed 15th February 2011.
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at every point the fear that the making of the treaty would be followed by the curtailment of 
the hunting and fishing privileges,’69 and following the negotiations and signatures noted;
‘(a) disinclination to adopt agriculture as a means of livelihood for the more congenial
occupations of hunting and fishing are still open, and agriculture is not only arduous to those 
untrained to it, but in many districts it as yet remains untried.’70
This expertise in hunting and trapping, as has already been highlighted, was exploited by the 
European settlers who used indigenous people both as guides and intermediaries in the 
development of the fur trade.
In the modern era, where fur is no longer in demand and food is more readily 
available in a developed state such as Canada, respect for and understanding of more 
traditional sources of food and other resources is less forthcoming. As a result the indirect 
impact on the indigenous peoples o f Alberta of the effects on wildlife of the tar sands projects 
is not immediately considered as once it might have been. Arguments against the extraction 
of tar sands for the production of synthetic crude oil relating to the affects to caribou, are 
therefore constructed almost exclusively on their numerical prevalence and not also the wider
• 71ramifications of their decline. This fact is also represented in the legislation of Canada itself, 
which recognises the boreal woodland caribou as a ‘species at risk’ under the provisions of
79the Species At Risk Act 1985, and provides specific measures for the protection of listed
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
71 Wasser, S.K, Kleim, J.L, Taper, M.L, and Lele, S.R. ‘The influences o f  w olf predation, habitat loss, and 
human activity on caribou and moose in the Alberta oil sands’ (2011) 9(10) Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment 546
72 Species At Risk Act 1985 S.C. 2002 c.29
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species, whereas the Canada Wildlife Act 19857j protects the lands for the purpose of, ‘the 
protection of any species of wildlife in danger of extinction.’74 In neither piece of legislation 
however are the effects of wildlife extirpation on humans considered.
The two main influences of tar sands development on the caribou inhabiting Alberta 
and the reserves protected by the numbered treaties are the loss of habitat, and ‘linear features’ 
resulting from the exploration and extraction of the tar sands, and the transportation of the 
refined product, synthetic crude oil. The destruction of the boreal forest habitat of the 
caribou, specifically woodland caribou,75 culturally significant to the majority of the nations 
encompassed by the thesis is primarily as a result of deforestation to allow open pit mining of 
the bitumen, sand and mineral mixture forming the tar sands. However, the clearing of 
smaller areas of forest to allow the construction of drilling platforms for in-situ extraction, the 
construction of roads and pipelines, and the creation of tailings ponds also devastates this
7  f \ecosystem. As Dyer highlighted over a decade ago, ‘industrial development and its 
associated infrastructure of roads, wells, and seismic lines seriously reduce availability of 
habitat for woodland caribou,’ and, ‘Assessments that take into account only the physical 
disturbance associated with industrial development may greatly underestimate the cumulative 
impact of development on caribou.’77
The effects on the caribou of this loss of habitat are numerous and all equally 
devastating to their numbers and thus ability to support the traditional hunting of the Indians
73 Canada Wildlife Act R.S.C. 1985 c W-9
74 Canada Wildlife Act R.S.C. 1985 c W-9 s.8
75 As identified by a research study undertaken by the University o f  Alberta. Oberg, P. Rohner, C and 
Schmiegelow, F.K. A. Responses o f  the Mountain Caribou to Linear Features in a West-Central Landscape
(2000) <http://www.ualberta.ca/~fschmieg/Caribou/pdfs/Caribou_Responses%20to%20Lines.pdf> Accessed 
30th July 2014
76 Note should be made that the majority o f tailings material is stored in former pit mines, reducing the 
immediate physical impact o f  these features to some extent. The ability o f  such ponds to return to a state akin to 
the native ecosystem is another source o f  considerable debate and will be discussed later in the piece.
77 Dyer, S.J, O ’Neill, J.P, Wasel, S.M. and Boutin, S. Avoidance o f  Industrial Development by Woodland
Caribou’ [2001] 65 (3) The Journal o f Wildlife Management 531, 538
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inhabiting the oil sands fields themselves or areas bordering their development projects and 
infrastructures. ‘Unlike other caribou ecotypes, boreal woodland caribou (Rangifer tarandus 
caribou) in northern Alberta, show considerable overlap between their summer and winter 
ranges, suggesting strong range fidelity to particular locations. This overlap is believed to 
occur because the peatland complexes that caribou use provide refuge against predation as 
well as access to their primary winter forage, lichens.78. The woodland caribou inhabiting the 
boreal forest of Alberta prefer the, ‘undisturbed old growth boreal forest’79 as opposed to,
O A
‘young forest and shrub-rich habitats,’ left behind after the old growth is disturbed or 
destroyed as a result o f tar sands development.
Despite the organic material and species of plants which return not being harmful to 
the caribou in themselves and as such provide a source of sustenance for them, they are 
nervous and timid creatures preferring the seclusion and cover that the denser established 
growth provides. Although caribou will eat this alternative plant material, their main source 
of sustenance throughout the harsh winters of northern Alberta, where the vast majority of 
foliage dies back or is buried beneath a carpet of snow, is lichen. This takes a greater length 
of time to become established than other indigenous flora and as such is more abundant in 
areas of old growth, thus making such areas preferable to the native woodland boreal caribou. 
This in turn results in decreasing the variance in their seasonal migration ranges in 
comparison with other similar ungulates, and even other sub-species of caribou as studies into
01
the boreal woodland caribou have highlighted. Caribou obtain lichen throughout the winter
78 Tracz, B.V, LaMontagne, J.M, Bayne, E.M. and Boutin, S. (2010) ‘Annual and monthly range fidelity o f  
female boreal woodland caribou in response to petroleum development' 3 0 (1 )  Rangifer 31,31
79The Cooperative Save the Caribou: Stop the Tar Sands. (2010) ,2 < http://www.co- 
operative.coop/upload/ToxicFuels/docs/caribou-report.pdf > Accessed 13th December 2011. Accessed 13th 
December 2011
80 ibid. 6
81 Tracz, B.V, LaMontagne, J.M, Bayne, E.M. and Boutin, S. (2010) ‘Annual and monthly range fidelity o f  
female boreal woodland caribou in response to petroleum development’ 30 (1) Rangifer 31,31
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by digging craters in the snow to unearth patches of this essential source of sustenance which 
is only found in quantities large enough to support an animal the size of woodland boreal 
caribou in certain areas with a specific topography, as such any disruption to this habitat is 
amplified in its effect on those reliant upon it.
The less dense young forest is the habitat of the more populous deer species of the 
boreal forest as well as rodent life and as a result is also home to the top predator in this 
unique ecosystem, the wolf. As Schneider, Hauer, Adamowicz and Boutin state, ‘Caribou 
have persisted in Alberta for millennia despite the presence of wolves, which suggests that 
the current unsustainable rate of wolf predation is not the norm and that caribou-wolf 
dynamics have been modified in some fundamental way over the past few decades.’ A 
number of ramifications of the loss of territory and increased predation by wolves have been 
proposed, firstly it has been argued that, by reducing the size and quantity of the preferred 
habitat of the caribou, their numbers are increased in the less dense young forest exposing 
them more frequently to the predators which prefer to hunt there, and consequently reducing 
their numbers. The second effect proposed is that increases in the density of the primary prey 
of the wolf, white tailed deer and moose as a result of the habitat loss caused by the tar sands 
developments, have resulted in increased density also of wolves in restricted habitat, again 
increasing the likelihood of encounter between wolves and boreal woodland caribou. Thirdly 
it is argued that the increased interaction with caribou over the years during which tar sands 
development has occurred will have increased the efficiency of wolves in hunting this 
previously less common source of sustenance.
82 Schneider, R.R, Hauer, G, Adamowicz, W.L. and Boutin, S. (2010) ‘Triage for conserving populations o f
threatened species: The case o f woodland caribou in Alberta’ 143(7) Biological Conservation 1603, 1604
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These might seem prima facie to be an insignificant set of effects, in that the caribou 
was a natural source of prey for wolves prior to the tar sands developments changing the 
topography of the area. However when considered in light of low numbers of woodland 
caribou in Alberta, and indeed Canada, as a whole in relation to historic values, one of the 
few facts on which all studies agree,83 is the considerable effect of the increased likelihood of 
their interaction (where previously deer would be the prey of choice for wolves in the 
ecosystem), increased predation efficiency and wolf density in the habitat, become far more 
apparent.
A conservative estimate of 175 to 275 woodland caribou remain in the territory of the 
Beaver Lake Cree First Nation, which covers an area of around 40,000 km accounting for 
approximately 9% of the total boreal forest of Canada. These figures have been challenged by 
a recent study which suggests higher numbers of around 330 caribou within a largely 
overlapping study area, having identified from scat a minimum of 208 unique caribou in the 
region84. The research of Wasser which reports the larger numbers of caribou than had 
previously been thought to exist in the north eastern region was however funded and given 
logistical support by Statoil Canada Limited, and as such has been subject to some criticism. 
The method used to attain these figures has however been lauded as far more accurate than 
the previous methods used to ascertain an estimate as to boreal woodland caribou numbers in 
that region of Alberta.
Wasser study utilised DNA sampling from caribou scat to identify an exact number of 
individual caribou, and also provide insight into the effects on nutrition felt in areas bordering
83 Despite differing in the highlighted indications as to severity and thus suggested urgency o f  reaction, such 
studies have all highlighted concerns with similar results.
84 Wasser, S.K, Kleim, J.L, Taper, M.L, and Lele, S.R. ‘The influences o f  w olf predation, habitat loss, and 
human activity on caribou and moose in the Alberta oil sands’ (2011) 9(10) Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment 546
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tar sands developments. Previous studies had been based upon unreliable visual studies, made 
very difficult by the topography of the boreal woodland, and using which distinguishing 
accurate numbers of individual caribou is arguably impossible. In spite of the larger number 
suggested by study of Wasser, in the results of the study the researchers argue that the 
increase is not significant enough to allay fears regarding the survival of boreal woodland 
caribou in the areas influenced by the tar sands developments, and instead issue a warning;
‘These results do not suggest that caribou populations are free from risk in the Alberta 
oil sands nor do they imply that management action is unwarranted. They do, however, 
indicate that more time is available than previously thought for managers to arrive at the best 
solutions to facilitate caribou recovery in this region.’85 
Although the figures suggested by both reports for numbers in the regions where tar sands 
developments are at their most intense, they represent a small percentage of the total caribou 
population of Canada and indeed Alberta, and as such a number of factors must be taken into 
account.
Firstly the woodland caribou is the largest sub-species of caribou making it uniquely 
suited to supporting the traditional hunting of the First Nations people. Also being relatively 
nomadic creatures, with very specific habitat and dietary preferences, boreal woodland 
caribou are notoriously difficult to observe and track, let alone hunt for sustenance, thus any 
effect on their habitat will result in an amplified effect on those reliant upon them. Secondly 
the First Nations peoples only have limited rights to hunt the caribou, with restrictions placed 
on areas where hunting is allowed and quantity dependent upon the province in question, thus 
changes in either caribou numbers or their migratory ranges would have severe effects on the 
indigenous peoples reliant upon them, especially as hunting is performed on foot and using
85 ibid. 6
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traditional methods. Only individuals recognised as aboriginal peoples or ‘Indians’ under the 
86Indian Act 1985 may hunt the boreal woodland caribou, otherwise they are subject to the 
same regulations as all other Canadians, for whom hunting of woodland caribou is banned in 
Alberta, owing to their status as a ‘species at risk’87. Thus in spite of conflicting studies 
relating to the specific numbers of caribou and the precise consequences of reducing the 
habitat in which they prefer to dwell, the research is largely in agreement that the impacts of 
the tar sands have an amplified effect beyond that which might initially be envisaged.
A very specific effect on the caribou and their habitat, although not always destroying 
it to the visually dramatic extent that wholesale deforestation does, is the imposition of so 
called ‘linear features’ upon the landscape by the development of the tar sands projects. 
Linear features take two main forms, pipelines constructed to transport either heated tar sands 
or the refined synthetic crude oil, and ‘seismic lines.’ These are lines created by 
seismographic surveys undertaken to assess the location, size and thus potential yield of 
subterranean oil sands reservoirs, utilising an approach known as reflection seismology. This 
process involves sending powerful vibrations down into the earth and measuring the reflected 
vibrations, or the speed these waves travel through the various levels (or strata) in order to 
identify the type, size and location of the materials composing the earth beneath. Such 
vibrations are most commonly generated using one of two methods, either by an explosive
o  o
shot or charge or a seismic vibration source.
Both methods involve significant disruption to the boreal forest environment which 
the woodland caribou inhabit. Explosive shots clearly induce not only the initial physical 
shock of the blast and the unavoidable noise generated, but also the physical damage caused
86 Indian Act R.S.C. 1985, c 1-5
87 Under the provisions o f  Species At Risk Act 1985 S.C. 2002 c.29
88 Usually composed o f dynamite, encased in a dense material where the earth is loose.
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by said explosion, and although the blast is contained beneath the surface and apparent 
disruption appears minimal, the subterranean impacts are felt by flora and fauna alike as root 
beds and subterranean animals are either disturbed or destroyed. By contrast the seismic 
vibration source does not cause the immediate and obvious physical damage that the 
explosive source causes, but has a more prolonged effect, and can require larger secondary 
disruption dependant on the specific vibration source utilised. The source is most commonly 
a vehicle mounted weight89 dropped at regular intervals along a chosen course, though there 
is increasing use of seismic vibrators which send continuous signals into the earth to provide 
a more accurate and detailed seismic survey, and again this is most often mounted on a 
vehicle.90 Like the explosive source of the necessary vibrations to conduct the surveys, the 
noise produced by this method does not constitute a sufficient infringement of noise pollution 
regulations in the province relating to human inhabitants, but undoubtedly influences the 
movement and feeding patterns and grounds, of all fauna in the immediate vicinity, including 
the already shy woodland caribou.
The instantaneous effects of the vibration sources required to conduct these surveys 
are not however the only effects felt in the boreal forest of Alberta, and the wildlife 
dependent upon it. The regular pattern of the surveys conducted to ensure maximum coverage 
in the seismic results produced is etched on the landscape.91 Seismic lines mark the areas 
disturbed by the survey techniques, and present physical barriers to a number of inhabitants 
of the boreal forest. As well as causing further small scale deforestation by destroying the 
root structures of the established trees and other flora, thus killing them and leaving the clear
89 Colloquially termed a ‘thumper’ in the seismography industry.
90 These seismic vibrators are often termed ‘Vibroseis’ after the patent o f the same name originally granted to 
oil company Conoco, which has since lapsed.
91 ‘Seismic lines’ are clearly visible in the pictures at Annex 6. The images form part of: The Cooperative Save 
the Caribou: Stop the Tar Sands. (2010 ), 6. < http://www.co-operative.coop/upload/ToxicFuels/docs/caribou- 
report.pdf > Accessed 13th December 2011. Accessed 13th December 2011.
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lines of barren earth running for miles and carving up the forest, the open patches created 
have similar effects to the deforestation undertaken to allow open pit extraction of tar sands. 
Such pits as has been discussed have been shown to limit caribou movement, increasing their 
population density in the remaining established old growth boreal forest, or forcing them to 
inhabit new growth, where their preferred sustenance is less abundant. In both cases this 
exposes them to a greatly increased likelihood of interaction with natural predators beyond 
that which their numbers can sustain and the same results occur due to linear features.
The vastly increased number of roads in the regions where tar sands are being 
developed imposes similar effects to the seismic lines which facilitate them. As well as 
adding the effects felt as a result of the lines, such as habitat and food source loss, roads also 
present their own inimitable problems, that of increased caribou mortality as a result of 
collisions with vehicles, an effect felt also by other animals on which the indigenous peoples 
of the province do not rely so heavily. The caribou, accustomed to minimal human and motor 
vehicle contact, are unaware of the dangers the roads present when cautiously, and hence 
slowly ambling across them. This is often at narrow points in the road or near bends and 
comers where the trees lining the road afford them larger amounts of cover, whilst also 
reducing the likelihood of a motorist being able to see them in time to prevent an often fatal 
collision.
The recent study of Wasser suggested that the effect of linear features varied, stating 
that the results obtained implied, ‘that caribou are not experiencing functional habitat loss 
from linear features alone. Caribou did avoid areas near primary roads, indicating that habitat
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loss may have more to do with human use than with the linear features themselves.’92 The 
conclusions of the study therefore recommend a restriction on the use of linear features in 
order to minimise their impact however, recognising that the cession of all tar sands 
developments is unlikely some prudence is needed in relation to these recommendations as 
despite using highly accurate and lauded techniques, as mentioned above, the study was 
logistically supported and funded by one of the largest tar sands developers. Thus, although 
there is some debate as to the extent, it is not only the extraction process itself which presents 
a considerable threat to the existence of the creatures so inextricably linked to the culture of 
the indigenous peoples o f the province, but the vast infrastructure which supports this rapid 
and prosperous, yet incredibly harmful development.
Added to the damage wrought by the seismic lines and roads, and another example of 
the secondary effects wrought by the supporting infrastructure, is that caused by an 
alternative linear feature, pipelines. Used to transport either unrefined but heated tar sands 
extracted via steam assisted gravity drainage from the well to the refinery, or refined 
synthetic crude oil from the aforementioned refineries to commercial distributors, the 
pipelines latticing Alberta as a result of the tar sands development are a major source of 
controversy within the province and beyond its borders and outside of Canada itself. The 
focus of the thesis is on the effects specific to the province of Alberta and the indigenous 
peoples there, but to fail to mention the furore surrounding the proposed pipeline to transport
QT • •tar sands oil deep into the US would be remiss. As well as the effects caused by the seismic 
lines and roads resulting from the exploration for potential tar sands extraction sites, and 
assessments of the economic and practical viability of confirmed subterranean reservoirs, the
92 Wasser, S.K, Kleim, J.L, Taper, M.L, and Lele, S.R. ‘The influences o f  w olf predation, habitat loss, and 
human activity on caribou and moose in the Alberta oil sands’ (2011) 9(10) Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment 546, 550
93 Concerns have been raised as to the safety, and economic and social impacts o f the pipeline.
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pipelines, essential to the continued extraction, refinement and ultimately, sale of synthetic 
crude oil derived from the tar sands, impose a unique form of damage to the wildlife on 
which the indigenous people rely.
Whereas the seismic lines, roads and direct deforestation to extract tar sands by strip 
mining cause loss of habitat, increased population density, scarcity of preferred food and 
habitat for caribou, and higher exposure to predators, the pipelines also create a tangible 
physical barrier for the animals. Intentional and direct deforestation and that as a result of 
seismic mapping and road construction impose merely an open area over which animals, such 
as caribou are unwilling to cross, but still capable of doing so, and whilst causing serious 
effects in itself, pales in comparison to a barrier running through habitat which in some cases 
cannot be crossed for miles. The height at which pipelines are suspended above the ground 
ranges dependent on the terrain, but the height rarely exceeds 0.8 metres above the ground,94 
whilst the average caribou stands at 1.2m at the shoulder,95 and an animal which weighs over 
of 3001bs96 is neither particularly adept at passing through small spaces nor built for large 
increases in distance travelled per day to source sustenance. The effects of pipelines include 
reduced food sources and habitat, and increased exposure to predators like the seismic lines, 
roads and direct deforestation but these are amplified by the non-permeable nature of the 
barrier they represent.
To an extent caribou will become accustomed to the seismic lines and roads through 
their territory, as they can be passed, albeit with considerable reluctance, but pipelines cannot
94 The Cooperative Save the Caribou: Stop the Tar Sands. (2010) ,8 < http://www.co- 
operative.coop/upload/ToxicFuels/docs/caribou-report.pdf > Accessed 13th December 2011. Accessed 13th 
December 2011
95 Transport Canada, Wildlife Control Manual.: Deer and other Ungulates (2011)
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/publications/tpl 1500-sectioni-sectioni2-1774.htm> Accessed 18th April 
2011
96 ibid. This is a low female weight, males may reach 7001bs.
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conceivably be adapted to in their current form. The continued expansion of tar sands 
extraction operations, and, ‘new developments will similarly create a ‘spiders web’ of 
pipelines carving up the forest over a huge area and will effectively destroy that forest as
• • 9 7
caribou habitat.’ Thus as a potentially damaging influence on movement and feeding 
patterns in the caribou of the province, and consequentially on reproduction and the 
continuation of the woodland caribou sub-species in the region of the tar sands developments, 
the pipelines are arguably the most harmful of the seismic lines owing to their unique effects 
on the ecosystem.
2.33 Tailings Ponds
The visible scarring caused by open pit or surface mining of the tar sands, and the 
bare patches carved from surveys and the construction of pipelines and well sites for the 
alternative method of attainment, in-situ extraction, are all well documented visual impacts of 
the extraction processes. Equally, if not more stunning in terms of visual impact however are 
the ‘tailings ponds,’ vast lakes of the by-products of the extraction and refinement of the tar 
sands raw material. The physical size and colour of the ponds has provided ironically 
beautiful images, vast in scale and range of colours, of what is in fact a considerably harmful
QO
result of the processes outlined. The term ponds has become widely used parlance for these 
means of storing by-products across extraction industries and is by no means reserved to the 
extraction of oil alone." Indeed the term is used widely to represent the bodies in which left
97 The Cooperative Save the Caribou: Stop the Tar Sands. (2010) ,8. < http://www.co- 
operative.coop/upload/ToxicFuels/docs/caribou-report.pdf > Accessed 13th December 2011. Accessed 13th 
December 2011
98 Images provided at Annex 7
99 See for example: Beeston, M.P. van Elteren, J.T. Slejkovec, Z. and Glass, H.J. ‘Migration o f  arsenic from old 
tailings ponds- A case study on the King Edward Mine, Cornwall UK.’ (2008) 108(1) Environmental Research 
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over materials are stored after the extraction and refinement processes of any material which 
was contained within an ore or other complex mixture of materials.
These misleadingly named ‘ponds’ are controversial for a variety of reasons, firstly 
their scale, consuming considerable areas of natural ecosystems, primarily boreal forest, to 
store these products. Secondly the potential and actual risk posed by leakage from these 
ponds into the surrounding terrain, and of the greatest concern, the water table. Thirdly the 
danger of the ponds to wildlife, especially native bird species reliant upon bodies of water, is 
well documented. 100 Finally a great deal of heated debate surrounds the notion of 
reclamation, the return of the land used to its original state, or as close thereto as is possible. 
All three of these factors impact negatively upon the indigenous peoples of the region of the 
north east of Alberta where tar sands industrial projects are at their most prevalent. As such 
all three can also be argued to form the basis for a case against the licensing of such projects 
brought about upon the contention that the impacts are severe enough to breach established 
human rights principles. Before these arguments can be presented however, some elaboration 
upon the nature of the tailings, the effects they are suggested to have, and the debates 
surrounding them is required.
As the Canadian Association of Petrol Producers admits on its own website, as, ‘just 
20 per cent of oil sands deposit can ever be produced by mining, the tailings ponds created 
are large and impact the landscape.’ 101 The remaining 80 per cent of the extracted raw 
material is therefore the basis for the contents of the tailings ponds, along with the copious 
volumes of water utilised to refine the original raw material into bitumen able to be
100 Timoney, K.P. and Ronconi, R.A. ‘Annual Bord Mortality in the Bitumen Tailings Ponds in North Eastern 
Alberta, Canada’ (2010) 122(3) The Wilson Journal o f Ornithology 569. Images are also provided in Annex 8.
101 Canadian Association o f Petroleum Producers (CAPP), Tailings Ponds (2013)
<http://www.capp.ca/environmentCommunity/land/Pages/TailingsPonds.aspx> Accessed 13th July 2014.
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fractionally distilled into saleable crude oil derivatives. Indeed research into the water 
consumption of various methods of energy production in the USA revealed that, ‘On average, 
1.5 bbl of MFT [mature fine tailings]102 is generated per bbl of bitumen produced.’103
Mature fine tailings are the most concerning aspect of the tailings ponds as it is this 
mixture of by-products which takes the greatest length of time to solidify and become 
conducive to reclamation. Unassisted the ‘settling’ as it is termed of this layer in the tailings 
ponds is suggested to take up 40 years, and even the most optimistic estimates for 
reclamation using technological advancements place this figure at over 5 years. Seemingly 
innocuous, the paste like mixture of the mature fine tailings is the source of almost all of the 
impacts listed above attributed to tailings. Should the mixture take less time to settle, land use, 
impacts to wildlife, leakage and the period taken to return the land utilised to its original state, 
or as close thereto as is possible, would all be significantly reduced. For these reasons almost 
all of the major companies involved in the extraction of tar sands have devoted resources to 
reducing the length of this settling period, both for public relations, legal and cost reasons.
The time taken for these ponds to settle to a degree facilitating reuse is not the only 
concern arising from the tailings however, their chemical makeup is also a source of 
considerable debate and criticism. Chief amongst the chemical components causing concern 
is naptha, and the potential formation of napthenic acids and their seepage into the natural 
water table, potentially harming species reliant upon it. Concerns have also been raised 
however in relation to alkyl-substituted polyaromatic hydrocarbons, known to cause 
deformities in fauna and even death in birds, and to the impact of methanogenic bacteria,
102 Mature fine tailings is the term given to the mixture o f water, clay and other by-products o f  the refinement 
process which is found between the sand which quickly sinks to the base o f the ponds, and the water which rises 
to the surface.
103 Argonne National Laboratory, Energy Systems Division, Consumptive Water Use in the Production o f  
Ethanol and Petroleum Gasoline (2009) <http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/947085> Accessed July 30n 2014
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which produce methane and alter the concentration of other harmful substances in the tailings 
mixture. In spite of the acknowledgement of these impacts, the focus o f the piece will be 
upon the reclamation and land use, and the effects of seepage from these ponds, with 
consideration of chemical impacts being largely dedicated to those resulting from the naptha 
and napthenic acid content of the mature fine tailings. In this regard a note should be made 
that the impact of the tailings ponds which has received arguably the most media coverage is 
the death of birds having landed on the ponds.
Various species of aquatic birds, land upon the surface of the pond and gather the 
excess bitumen on their feathers which has not been successfully removed by the refinement 
process. The weight of the bitumen and effect upon the aerodynamic efficiency of the wings 
as a result of sticking the feathers together prevents the birds from being able to take off 
again. As a result o f both the excess weight added by the bitumen and exhaustion, the birds 
drown. Public and industry awareness of this issue was highlighted by the publication of a 
number of images o f birds either on the ponds in north eastern Alberta, or shortly after having 
been removed from them, 104 being published by individuals and non-governmental 
organisations, and later by mainstream media outlets. 105 In response tar sands mining 
companies have invested heavily in measures to deter birds from landing on or near the ponds, 
the use of scarecrows and air cannons being the most popular methods adopted. Whilst the 
death of native bird species is undeniably tragic and abhorrent, beyond the broad connection 
to nature that the First Nations peoples have, their ability to continue to exist in terms of
104 Images are provided in Annex 9.
105 See for example: Brooymans, H. and Farrell, J. ‘Syncrude faces scrutiny after ducks land on toxic pond’ The 
National Post (2008) <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=482931> Accessed June 28th 2010.
Tait, C. ‘Syncrude triples number o f  dead ducks in tailings pond’ The Financial Post (2009) 
<http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=1448397> Accessed 20th June 2010.
Henton, D. ‘Dead ducks in a tailings pond -  how it happened’ The Edmonton Journal (2010) 
<http://www.edmontonjoumal.com/business/Dead+ducks+happened/3177628/story.html> Accessed 25th June 
2 0 1 0 .
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sustaining themselves and expressing their culture in the manner to which they are 
accustomed, a key factor in the piece, would not be impacted upon.
In a similar manner to the seismic lines caused by the survey process, pipelines, wells 
and open pit mines the ponds disturb considerably the migratory patterns of boreal woodland 
caribou, their predators, and their preferred food source, lichen which grows largely in 
established boreal forest. The ponds themselves occupy large areas of land, estimates at their 
surface area being measured in the hundreds of square kilometres,106 and are created by the 
felling of considerable area of that ecosystem, whether created from exhausted open pit
107mines, or constructed. The considerable length of time between the deposit of tailings and 
its availability for attempted reuse after reclamation, ranging from 5 up to 40 years, 
effectively removes their surface area from the ecosystem for that time period, impacting 
upon all trophic levels reliant upon it.
Such impacts are not however restricted to the surface area of the ponds, bare land 
intimidates fauna used to the cover afforded by the thick vegetation of the boreal forest such 
as caribou and similar prey animals and their shared predators, increasing the likelihood of 
predation beyond that which would be expected in an unhindered ecosystem. Added to this 
the increased human and industrial presence and disturbance which accompanies the 
establishment of such a tailing pond would further exacerbate this deterrent effect on non­
aerial fauna. As tailings ponds have to be reclaimed as soon as possible, and indeed it benefits 
companies to do so, if only in terms of public relations, they have an interest in maintaining a 
presence to achieve this aim. For example, surface water from the ponds which can be
106 Alberta Government, Oil Sands Environmental Management: Quick Facts (2013)
<http://www.oilsands.alberta.ca/FactSheets/Quick_Facts_FSht_85xl l_Nov_2013_Online.pdf> Accessed 30th 
July 2014
107 Where possible companies fill former open pit mines, from which all accessible tar sands raw material has 
been extracted, with tailings to avoid further consumption o f land which has not already been damaged.
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recycled continuously being removed and utilised elsewhere in the refinement process, results 
in the constant presence of a workforce and requisite machinery, communications routes and 
causes considerable noise pollution. Thus as well as the physical deterrent of the presence of 
the ponds themselves, and associated facilities and personnel, the noise created by their 
actions would act as a deterrent with a far wider scope, the range of the hearing of native 
species being greater than that of their eyesight.
The length of time which the tailings remain liquid in form, coupled with the vast
quantity of the material has posed considerable issues with regards to containment for the
companies exploiting the natural resources of bitumen contained within the tar sands. Even
the most conservative and positive of government papers admit, ‘Leakage from tailings ponds
1 08into the surface waters may have occurred.’ As a result the governmental authorities have 
aligned themselves with extraction and refinement companies, ‘to develop dry tailings 
technologies that will significantly change the impact of tailings ponds on the local 
environment.’109 They, ‘have also undertaken isotopic fingerprinting research to distinguish 
between natural and anthropogenic contaminants in groundwater in the vicinity of tailings 
ponds.’110 In spite of this and, ‘containment dykes and groundwater monitoring facilities in 
order to capture and recycle run off,’111 the Government of Canada aims only, ‘to minimize 
seepage,’112 tacitly acknowledging that absolute elimination of this harmful process is not 
achievable. Although acknowledged at a federal level therefore, if somewhat indirectly, the 
provincial authorities are less forthcoming with regards to any such recognition.
108 Alberta Environmental Monitoring Panel, A World Class Environmental Monitoring, Evaluation and 
Reporting System fo r  Alberta The Report o f  the Alberta Environmental Monitoring Panel (2011) ,76. 
<http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/8381.pdf->. Accessed July 30th 2014.
109 Alberta Government, Lower Athabasca Regional Plan 2012-2022. Approved August 22nd 2012. Page 2. 
<https://www.landuse.alberta.ca/Documents/LARP%20Lower%20Athabasca%20Regional%20Plan%202012- 
2022%20-%20Approved%20-%202012-08.pdf> Accessed 30th July 2014. (LARP)
110 ibid.
111 Government o f  Canada: Department o f Natural Resources, Oil Sands: A strategic resource fo r  Canada,
North America and the w orld  market: Tailings Ponds (Natural Resources Canada, Ottawa, 2011) 1
1,2 ibid.
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The Lower Athabasca Regional Plan published by the provincial Government of 
Alberta, which, ‘sets the stage for robust growth, vibrant communities and a healthy 
environment within the region over the next 50 years,’113 failed to mention leakage from the 
tailings ponds, concerning itself solely with their volume and the reduction thereof. This was 
especially indicative of a lack of consideration for the potential for this to occur given that the 
framework suggests a, ‘Surface Water Quality Management Framework for the Lower 
Athabasca River,’114 detailing, ‘Limits and Triggers,’115 to facilitate its operation. The plan, 
when implemented at the national level in March 2011, indicated a greater willingness to 
consider the potential impacts and possibility of seepage from the ponds, dedicating an entire 
chapter to, ‘Surface and Groundwater Water Quality Monitoring,’116 setting objectives to 
answer a number of questions, including, ‘Is there groundwater seepage from tailings ponds 
and/or other oil sands industrial operations entering the surface water system?’117 Thus there 
is evidently a degree of disagreement between the provincial and federal authorities as to the 
extent of such seepage, and whether it is deemed worthy of consideration as part of 
framework designed to monitor and limit any adverse impacts of industrial developments 
upon water quality in Alberta.
Despite the differing approaches of the governmental authorities debate has raged in 
relation to leakage from the tailings ponds and accusations made that its true extent is not 
being revealed. The issue here is that whilst the Environmental Protection and Enhancement 
Act,118 along with the specific licensing agreements issued to extraction companies in the
113 LARP (n l09)
114 ibid. 51
115 ibid. 51
116 Environment Canada: Lower Athabasca Water Quality Monitoring Plan Phase 1, 22 March 2011 at Page 28
117 ibid. 28
118 Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12,
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province, require the provision of detailed reports on the leakage of tailings pond contents
into groundwater and surface water bodies, ‘very few published data are available on the
dynamics of groundwater flow and the fate of process water contaminants in the
impoundment structure; therefore these processes remain largely unknown.’119 Whilst the
seepage rates can vary from project to project dependent upon the material in which the
tailings are contained, proximity to groundwater and surface water bodies, and gradient
variations amongst other factors, Environmental Defence120 estimated that some llm illion 
• 121 •litres per day of tailings ponds contents (referred to as oil sands process affected waters or 
OSPW in a number of reports) leaked from that containment.
Although this figure was disputed as inaccurate to an extent by the Royal Society of 
Canada owing to the fact that they fail to take into account measures to mitigate leaks once 
they have occurred by companies,122 they concede that this is largely as the reports legally 
required of companies are not made publicly available. As such, considering the 
precautionary principle espoused throughout environmental law, and factoring in the lack of 
publication of figures to the contrary by interested parties in industry and the government, 
this startling estimate represents one of the few indications as to the extent of seepage from 
tailings ponds and the disregard with which it is treated.
Whilst the volume of seepage is a highly prominent environmental concern, the 
content of said seepage is arguably a greater source of apprehension for the indigenous
119Royal Society o f  Canada. Expert Panel Report on the Environmental and Health Impacts o f  Canada’s Oil 
Sands Industry (December 2010), 122 <http://rsc-
src.com/sites/default/files/pdf/RSC%200il%20Sands%20Panel%20Main%20Report%200ct%202012.pdf> 
Accessed 30th July 2014 (EPR)
120 A Canadian NGO focused on improving environmental and human health.
121 Environmental Defence, II  Million Litres a Day.The Tar S and’s Leaking Legacy (2008) 
<http://environmentaldefence.ca/reports/l l-million-litres-day-tar-sands-leaking-legacy> Accessed 30th July 
2014
122 EPR (n 119) 124
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peoples of the regions exploited. Given that 70 to 80% by weight of tailings material is
123water, and a large proportion of this is reused at other stages within the refinement and 
extraction processes, it is the other by products which pose the greatest potential for 
environmental damage, and chief amongst these are napthenic acids. These acids, ‘are of 
particular concern because of their apparent toxicity to aquatic organisms.’124 This ‘toxicity’ 
has been found to take a number of forms, impacting adversely upon reproductive capacity,
1 ^  c
fin and scale structural integrity, and inducing tumours in some cases.
Tailings produced in the last decade contain less than 2% of the napthenic acids found 
in tailings released up to 1998. However, it is the tailings contained within the vast ponds 
produced between the 1980s and late 1990s, which will potentially take 40 years to fully 
settle ready for reclamation and contain the highest levels of these acids and which are 
suggested to leak most profusely, as along with leaps in efficiency with regards reducing the 
levels of napthenic acids in tailings, so to have advancements been made in containment 
methods for them. Studies have shown older tailings ponds to contain double the
127concentration of such acids required to have, ‘completely inhibited spawning’ in some 
indigenous aquatic species. One of the primary dangers in relation to napthenic acids is the 
lack of knowledge regarding them. The Royal Society of Canada report on the Environmental 
and Health Impacts of Canada’s Oil Sands Industry observes;
‘There is no absolute, all-inclusive scientific definition of NA (napthenic acids) because they 
were first named to describe a broad, complex and uncharacterized class of water-soluble




127 Kavanagh, R.J. Frank, R.A. Oakes, K.D. Servos, M.R. YOug, R.F. Fedorak, P.M. MacKinnon, M.D.
Solomon, K.R. Dixon, G. and Van Der Kraak, G. ‘Fathead minnow (Pim ephalesprom elas) reproduction is 
impaired in aged oil sands process-affected waters’ (2011) 101(1) Aquatic Toxicology 214
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acids found in petroleum which were initially most noteworthy because they caused corrosion 
in refineries and were subsequently found to be a source of fish toxicity.’128
Definitions have since been proposed and numerous studies initiated into the varying 
impacts of this group of acids, though knowledge of how to, ‘separate, then characterise 
individual NA’ is far from complete, or indeed a desirable level. The rate and level at 
which these acids are produced and stored, the volume of seepage from ponds is falling as 
technological advances, and media and social pressures increase. However, the well 
documented incidences of adverse effects on aquatic ecosystems in the region would indicate 
that as the Royal Society of Canada states the, ‘release of untreated OSPW to the local
1 O A # #
aquatic ecosystem is not acceptable,’ in any volume, and yet it persists.
Studies into the impacts of the oil sand production water (OSPW) upon amphibians 
native to the boreal forest ecosystem of north east Alberta have indicated that similar affects 
to those seen in fish species inhabiting the water courses of the region are felt by this order of 
fauna. Specimens kept in OSPW showed, ‘significantly reduced growth and prolonged 
developmental time,’ 131 when compared to control subjects kept in uncontaminated 
surroundings. Given that growth and development, like reproductive capacity are controlled 
to a large extent by hormone regulation, the likelihood is that capability to actually reproduce 
as well as raise young effectively would also be dramatically curbed. In depth assessments as 
to the impact of napthenic acids further up food chains within the ecosystems of the region 
have not been conducted, but the scientific evidence in other highly similar instances would





indicate a bioaccumulation model would develop, resulting in significantly greater impacts 
upon the species occupying the higher trophic levels of said ecosystems. Similarly 
assessments as to the penetration of such acids into fauna reliant upon the water courses and 
aquifers into which seepage is shown to be occurring have also not yet been completed. Thus 
the impact to species reliant upon them such as caribou, and in turn wolves, and First Nations 
peoples cannot be quantified, though the, ‘bioaccumulation of toxic substances within the 
food web,’ 132 and, ‘aboriginal use,’ 133 are highlighted as key issues surrounding tailings 
ponds by an independent consultancy body134 contributing to the report of the Royal Society 
of Canada.
As such whilst the evidence regarding the impact is weaker than that relating to 
species dwelling within aquatic ecosystems, the likelihood of impacts to the wider ecosystem 
reliant upon the water being contaminated is undeniable, and evidence of bioaccumulation in 
similar situations would suggest potentially equally as severe, if not more so. To disregard the 
potential for such impacts would therefore be remiss, but suggestions with regard to the aim 
of the piece, the construction of a case against tar sands extraction projects based in human 
rights law, will take into account this factor in the context of evidentiary burdens.
A final note in relation to the tailing ponds should be taken that the effects of land 
usage having already been discussed in the chapter relating to impacts to wildlife, 
predominantly the boreal woodland caribou, and the impacts of the consumption of land by 
the tailings ponds, outside of their harmful chemical nature, are in no way different. The same 
impacts to flora and fauna are caused by the use of land for tailings ponds as for well sites for 
in-situ extraction, refinement plants, open pit mines and seismic survey damage. As such the
132 ibid. 131
133 ibid. 131
134 Clearwater Environmental Consultants. < http://www.clearwater-environmental.coin/>
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discussion will focus on the legal implications of the impacts resulting from specific negative 
affects arising from the harmful makeup of the tailings material and their leakage into the 
ecosystems of the regions exploited to access and refine the tar sands.
2.4 The Indigenous Peoples in the Province of Alberta, Canada
In the cruellest sense, it was ironically the very indigenous peoples who introduced 
the tar sands and their potential to European colonial traders, whose way of life is now most 
threatened by the massive scale of extraction to which they are subject. The earliest 
examples of interaction with the indigenous peoples of Canada, although this will have been 
predominantly on the east coast, can be seen in late fifteenth century. The beginnings of the 
modern relationship between the indigenous peoples of Alberta and European colonial traders 
occurred in the late seventeenth with examples of prolonged and sustained trade, and even 
co-habitation of regions being recorded by the early eighteenth century. Evidence of the 
existence of human population in the province however, dates back as far as 13,000 years,135 
their direct ancestors to around 8000 BC136 and their utilisation of the unique ecosystem 
currently prevalent in the province for sustenance, trade, and as an integral aspect of their 
culture is evidenced as early as 500 BC.137
The late eighteenth century brought the encouragement of indigenous peoples to 
integrate with the European settlers and to adopt their culture. This marked the beginning of a 
common legal jurisdiction for the indigenous and colonial peoples with the Royal
135 Ives, J. ‘13001 Years A go’ in Cavanaugh, C.A, Payne, M, and Wetherell, D.G. (eds.) ‘Alberta Formed, 
Alberta Transformed, Volume 1 ’ (University o f Alberta Press, Edmonton, 2006) at 7-8
136 See in this regard: <http://alberta.ca/history.cfm> Accessed 30th July 2014
137 See in particular the discussion o f the settling o f the dominant indigenous cultures o f Alberta which occurred 
as a result o f  the encroachment o f boreal forest into regions previously dominated by a plains ecosystem and the 
opting to utilise more permanent domiciles:
<http://www.historymuseum.ca/cmc/exhibitions/archeo/hnpc/npvol29e.shtml> Accessed 30th July 2014
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Proclamation of 1763.138 Calloway elucidates the text is exalted as giving rights to the 
indigenous peoples of Canada, whilst also criticised for preserving the power of the European 
settlers and the Crown.139 The latter half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth, hailed 
the arrival of specific legislative approaches to governing the indigenous people of Canada, 
and to enforced integration with Western European culture. These included provisions in 
relation to common education, and the identification and classification of the indigenous 
peoples of Canada to prevent the abuse of rights afforded to them by those not recognised as 
beneficiaries of said rights by law.140
Most significantly in relation to the rights afforded to the indigenous peoples in the 
province of Alberta, the last three decades of the nineteenth century brought the negotiation 
and acquiescence to the so-called ‘numbered treaties’ between them and the Crown. In 
relation to the tar sands projects in the Athabasca and Cold Lake fields, and therefore the 
thesis, the most noteworthy of these are Treaties Six and Eight. The treaties outlined the 
agreement between the Crown and indigenous groups with regards to a geographical area and 
rights associated with that reserve land. Treaties 6 and 8 are of the greatest concern with 
regards to the thesis as they outline the reserve lands, and rights attached thereto, which 
coincide with the northern half of Alberta where the tar sands industry is at its most intense. 
The treaties were negotiated by representatives of the Queen on behalf of the Canadian 
government following the realisation of the need to determine legal rights of the indigenous 
populace following the Royal Proclamation of 1763,141 though their true purpose is somewhat
138 Royal Proclamation o f 1763R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1,
139 Calloway, C.G. ‘The Scratch o f  a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation o f  North America (Pivotal Moments in 
American History) ’ (OUP USA, New York, 2007)
140 Indian Act R.S., 1985, c.I-5(having replaced the heavily amended Indian Act 1876). The Act demanded the 
registration o f bands o f Indians, and under it those who were neither Indians, or descended from them, and those 
who did not live within reserves as defined by the Act, were not entitled to Native rights afforded under the 
Royal Proclamation o f  1673.
141 Royal Proclamation o f 1763R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1
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debated. Chronologically the cause was undoubtedly the construction of a railway across 
Canada to facilitate the movement of goods from west to east.142 Some see them however as 
a means of clarifying title over the land whilst maintaining peaceful co-existence, others a 
natural resource grab and some a method of bringing a particular lifestyle and means of 
subsistence.143
Their methodology is quite simple, reserved land was set aside for signatory nations 
upon agreement to ‘cede, release and surrender’ all other claims to title over land in Canada. 
This was achieved through the provision of both annuities and equipment as well as offers of 
assistance with transferring means of securing food from traditional practices to arable 
farming in conformity with European societies. Neither the prevalent ecosystem nor the 
cultural beliefs of the indigenous populace however fit with this reality. In practice all of 
these aims were likely considered by the negotiators, as all promoted the railroad and allowed 
for the establishment of outposts along its route. Reserve sizes were based upon population of 
the nation or nations with which a treaty was being signed, though this neglected to account 
for those groups who opted not to sign the treaties.
The texts are now considerably outdated and not reflective of the current relations 
between the federal government and indigenous peoples. The legal relationship between the 
two has evolved over the century since the last of their number was signed with constitutional 
documents and precedent alike moulding the often fractious relationship between settler and 
aboriginal. They do however retain considerable legal significance, still determining the 
geographic limits of reserves and giving rise to often idiosyncratic obligations upon the state.
142 Penikett, T. Reconciliation: First Nations Treaty Making in British Columbia (Douglas and McIntyre, 
Vancouer, 2006) 62-63
143 Calliou, B. 1899 and the Political Economy o f  Canada’s North-West: Treaty 8 as a Compact to Share and 
Peacefully Co-Exist in Cavanaugh, Payne, Wetherell. (n 135) 303-304
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The most famous of these being the ‘medicine chest clause,’ a provision of Treaty 6 which 
necessitated the agent for reserves established by the treaty to keep a medicine chest for the 
basic needs of Indians dwelling therein. This has since been held to necessitate the 
maintenance of basic medical services free of charge for Indians who live on reserve and are 
a member of Bands which signed the original treaty, much to the disgruntlement of the 
provincial governments it affects. The treaties overall are often viewed negatively, indeed a 
Royal Commission report described the relationships they formed as being ‘mired in 
ignorance, mistrust and prejudice.’ 144 The specific legal obligations it imposes upon the 
federal and provincial governments are debated to this day. However, the establishment of a 
basic fiduciary relationship145 in relation to reserve lands and the demand that they be 
maintained fit for the purpose for which they were initially reserved, the continuation of 
traditional practices, is assured.146
For the purposes of the piece, the treaties relevant to the area in which tar sands 
industrial activity is at its heights can be said simply to ensure constitutionally protected 
rights to hunt, trap and fish on reserved lands. These texts therefore identify culturally 
specific links to particular environmental features and in turn impose domestically 
enforceable legal duties on the state. The connections underpin the legal challenge against tar 
sands licensing, based in human rights law, outlined in the methodology for the piece. The 
provisions of these treaties and the requirements placed upon an individual to be registered as 
an ‘Indian,’ for the purposes of Canadian domestic law, and consequently as a member of one
144 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Report o f  the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1996) 38
145 Webb, J. and Stevenson, M.G. Just another stakeholder? First Nations and Sustainable Forest Managements 
in Canada’s Boreal Forest in Burton, P.J. Messier, C. Smith, D.W. and Adamowicz, W.L. Towards 
Sustainable Management o f  the Boreal Forest (National Research Council o f Canada, Ottawa, 2003) 73
146 R. v. Isaac (1975) 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460, 9 A.P.R. 460 (N.S.C.A.)
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of the ‘Bands’ party to the them to be able to enforce them, will similarly be discussed in 
later chapters.
2.5 Terminology
A note should be made that in light of the legal definition of the indigenous peoples 
which are the subject of this research being, ‘Indians’ in Canadian domestic law under the 
Indian Act 1876 (and later 1951),147 this terminology shall be utilised throughout the research 
in reference to the indigenous peoples of Alberta, especially in relation to Canadian domestic 
law. Specific reference however will be made to the concept of indigenous peoples in later 
chapters as the international legal provisions concerning them utilise this classification. As 
such throughout the two should be thought of for the most part as synonyms of one another 
and as encompassing the same subject matter in relation to the arguments put forward. This is 
namely that of the indigenous people of the province of Alberta, Canada, who are able to 
enforce the rights provided by the historic treaties pertinent to that territory.
Similarly the term, ‘aboriginals’ is commonly used within the Canadian media, soft 
law provisions, political documents, and writings on the history of the subjects of this work, 
and as such should also be considered to be synonymous with the aforementioned terms. The 
thesis will not discuss indigenous peoples classified as ‘Inuits,’ or ‘Metis’ within Canada as 
they are not capable of enforcing the rights provided under the ‘numbered treaties’ of the late 
nineteenth century to which the research is inextricably linked. Also in the case of the ‘Inuit’
147 Indian Act 1876 (repealed by Indian Act R.S., 1985, c.I-5)
6 0
peoples, their numbers in the province of Alberta are miniscule,148 as their traditional lands 
are in the far North of Canada.
A brief comment regarding the collective term for the Indian peoples of Alberta and 
Canada generally is also worthy of inclusion. The term ‘First Nation’ is one of the most 
commonly used collective noun for the description of Indian groups, identified by the 
numbered treaties, and certainly the most appropriate to encompass the various groups which 
the research will consider. In reference to indistinct groups though, the term ‘nation’ is the 
most widely used in literature concerning these subjects and as such will also be used in this 
research. ‘Cree’ is often used as a suffix to the title of a group to denote what could otherwise 
be described as a nation, this is however a reference to the specific tribal ancestry of that 
group being the ‘Cree Indians.’ In the case of this research for example, one of the most 
active groups in protesting against the damage inflicted by the tar sands in the province of 
Alberta, is the Beaver Lake Cree, or in full the Beaver Lake Cree First Nation. To refer to 
them as a ‘nation,’ in spite of more widespread use of the term ‘cree’ as a collective noun in 
reference to them in many publications, is not incorrect. Thus in order to avoid confusion, the 
most appropriate term for them for the purpose of the research where referring in general to a 
collective groups of Indians is, and will be ‘nation,’ although where referring to them 
specifically their full title will be utilised.
The present day descendants of the Indians of Alberta first encountered in the early 
eighteenth century by European settlers, now form 5.8% of the population of Alberta, or just 
over 97,000 in terms of number. This is a relatively small proportion in relation to the 16.1%
148 Only numbering 1,610, as compared to the 97,295 Indians, and 85,495 Metis people recorded in the 2006 
census. Statistics Canada 2006 Canadian Census(2006) 
<http://wwwl2.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/hlt/97-
5 5 8/pages/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&Code=01 &T able= 1 &Data=Count&Sex= 1 & Age= 1 &StartRec= 1 &Sort
=2&Display=Page> Accessed 30th July 2014 (Full Table at Annex 9).
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of Canada’s overall population recognised as ‘aboriginal.’149 Note should be made, however, 
that the percentage of Canada’s population represented by indigenous people is skewed 
somewhat by proportionally high percentages of the populations of the provinces of the 
Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon being ‘aboriginal.’ Alberta’s figure is around the 
average in comparison to the other provinces bordering the U.S. at the colloquially termed 
‘49th parallel.’150
As is the case throughout Canada, the Indians of Alberta vary widely, with some 
integrating heavily with modern Western culture where reserves border, or are indeed within 
the limits of developed cities. The Stony Plain Reserve #135151 for example is contained 
within the provincial capital of Edmonton and is inhabited by the Enoch Cree. By contrast 
other groups maintain more traditional lifestyles and ties to the historical culture of the Native 
Americans from whom they are descended, sharing a common ancestry with many American 
Indian tribes in the U.S. These more traditional groups are those most at risk from the adverse 
effects of the prosperous tar sands development and the ever increasing pace with which it 
occurs. Those groups to be discussed in the thesis are predominantly located within the plains 
and boreal forest ecosystems of Alberta, which encompass the tar sands. The bulk of the 
discussion will however focus on impacts to the boreal forest ecosystem as it is this which is 
both more difficult to reclaim post-extraction and which is most heavily impacted upon by it.
The history of the indigenous peoples of Canada as a whole is a source of great debate 
as little evidence is available predating the earliest records provided by European settlers and 
traders of their existence and culture. As Payne, Wetherill and Cavanaugh state, ‘Knowledge
149 ibid.
150 The colloquial term for the American-Canadian border, so called as the actual border line follows the 49 
degree line o f latitude to within a few hundred metres along its length.
151 A registered reserve under the Indian Act 1985 and thus also home to a recognised Band.
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of this first period is often uncertain, fragmentary and circumstantial, which makes clearer 
identification of its historical evolution difficult.’ 152 Thus making statements on their 
development prior to this is somewhat difficult. Notable however is the consistency of a 
subsistence lifestyle amongst all the nations encountered by the aforementioned settlers. The 
indigenous peoples are repeatedly commented upon as being masters of their natural 
environment and surviving solely on that which they could attain from that environment, 
relative to its components in a particular geographical location. As Collins and Murtha 
comment, ‘members of Aboriginal communities engage in subsistence and/or commercial 
resource activities such as hunting, fishing, and trapping, which place them in a direct 
relationship of dependence on land and resources.153
For example those nations whose lands were by rivers were great boat-builders and 
fishermen. Those living close to or within boreal forests were considered master hunters of 
caribou, and those inhabiting plains had developed great skills in relation to the hunting and 
butchery of bison as a source of sustenance and numerous materials integral to their lifestyle 
and culture. The arrival of European settlers throughout the seventeenth century and into the 
eighteenth altered this to some extent as nations of First Nation Indians sought to exploit the 
benefits the settlers brought, involving themselves heavily in hunting for the fur trade. 
Evidence also suggests provision of guides and diplomats to help find new areas to exploit 
and to negotiate arrangements with other nations.154 This rush to profit from these arrivals
152 Cavanaugh, C.A, Payne, M, and Wetherell, D.G Looking Back on Alberta History : Reflections in a Rear- 
View Mirror in Cavanaugh, Payne, Wetherell. (n l35) 770
153 Collins, L.M. and Murtha, M. ‘Indigenous Environmental Rights in Canada: The Right to Conservation 
Implicit in Treaty and Aboriginal Rights to Hunt, Fish, and Trap’ (2010) 47 Alta. L. Rev. 959, 960
154 Berry, S. and Brink, J Aboriginal Cultures in Alberta: Five Hundred Generations (University o f  Alberta 
Press, Edmonton, 2004) 33
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however has shaped the structure and culture of many indigenous nations within Canada, and 
aided in the formation of an entirely new one, the Metis.155
Previously the distinct cultural groupings within the First Nations indigenous peoples 
of Canada, such as the Cree and Chipewyan, were far easier to identify. Geographical 
location within Canada had been a clear mark of the particular nation or lineage to which 
individuals belonged, this is however no longer the case as a result of European settlement.156 
The rewards of the fur trade promoted expansion and the need to secure prime hunting 
grounds and trade routes amongst the First Nations. Arguably the role the nations played in 
the fur trade also preserved their individual heritages as otherwise the settlers would have 
been inclined simply to overrun them or attempt to assimilate them into their own culture as 
was seen in the US in their relations with the indigenous Indian populace. Finkel goes so far 
as to suggest they became, ‘social actors, not victims like Natives elsewhere in the Americas 
who had become slaves or landless and confined to small reserves.’157
Thus the nations moved to more economically advantageous locations and sought to 
do the bidding of the settlers who controlled the prosperity and resources they sought. Each 
nation took on new skills to survive and adapted to new locations, breaking with the 
traditions which had once identified them. As a result the nations shifted from their 
traditional roots but remain defined by their environment, having, ‘retained many of their
155 An indigenous group, formally recognised, who trace their origins to combined European and First Nation 
sources.
156 Indeed Jennifer Brown goes so far as to describe the impact o f the fur trade as a centrifuge which dispersed 
previously rooted familial groups along trade routes. See in this regard her translation o f  her own article: Brown, 
J. ‘Noms et metaphores dans l’historiographie metisse: anciennes categories et nouvelles perspectives’ [2008]
37 Recherches amerindiennes au Quebec 7
157 Finkel, A. The Fur Trade and Early European Settlement in Finkel, A. ‘Working People in Alberta: A 
H istory’ (Athabasca University Press, Edmonton, 2012) 24
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• 158 • • •core beliefs,’ hunting bison on the plains, caribou in the forests and fishing in river basins, 
regardless of their initial heritage.
The Cree First Nations within Alberta to be discussed within the thesis almost 
exclusively belong to one of the numerous subdivisions of Cree in existence within Canada, 
the Woodland Cree. Those nations in the north of Alberta are largely Woodland Cree, and are 
based within the unique ecosystem of the boreal forest. This is the sole habitat supportive of 
the boreal woodland caribou on which such tribes use to sustain themselves, both in terms of 
food but also with clothing and other materials necessary for cultural practices and traditions. 
The Woodland Cree have also been recorded utilising fishing as a means of sustenance and to 
express cultural values. Again however this is heavily dependent upon geographical location 
proximity to a river system able to support such practices.
The Cree people were originally from the James Bay region of eastern Canada, but 
spread upon becoming hunters and guides for the French and English settlers and their fur 
trade. The term ‘Cree’ is itself etymologically derived from French and was applied to the 
indigenous peoples of the region by the settlers.159 This history is somewhat disputed though, 
as is much of the history of the indigenous peoples of Canada generally, having been diluted 
to such a great extent by the arrival of European settlers and being recorded prior to this 
purely in the oral tradition.160 Consensus was that the Cree spread from James Bay, though 
some argue that the Woodland Cree of areas such as northern Alberta were present there long 
before that arrival.161 Similarly the conflict between the Chipewyan Indians and the Cree
158 ibid.
159 Rodriguez, J.P. The Louisiana Purchase: A Historical and Geographical Encyclopedia (ABC-CLIO Inc,
Santa Barbara, 2002) 89
160 Morantz, T.E. The White Man's Gonna Getcha: The Colonial Challenge to the Crees in Quebec (Mc-Gill 
Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2002) 10
161 Magocsi, P.R. (ed) Encyclopaedia o f  Canada’s Peoples (University o f Toronto Press, Toronto, 1999) 43
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which supposedly raged in the mid-seventeenth century and the culmination of which is 
argued to have been negotiated and agreed towards its end is disputed amongst historians and 
ethnographers researching the indigenous peoples of Canada.162 The opposing argument is 
that European settlement, specifically resultant disease,163 towards the end of the seventeenth 
century, and rife especially amongst the Cree and Chipewyan groups, resulted in their current 
geographical spread. This is said in turn to have determined the practices and traditions of the 
specific First Nations and reserves that make them up, to a far greater extent than any 
historical influence which has been highlighted. In particular Scott et al suggest that it was 
this that finally ended any nomadic traditions amongst aboriginal peoples in the province and 
developed their current social hierarchies.164
Similar problems occur when attempting to define the Chipewyan group, their name 
itself means ‘pointed skins’ and is a reference to the pointed hoods of parkas their ancestors 
wore. The people themselves however often regard this as a derogatory term, believing it was 
conceived during times of conflict between the various groups of indigenous peoples in 
Canada.165 Beyond this however their development, as that of the Cree, is also an area of 
some dispute. The subdivision of the group resident in Alberta is that of the Athabaskan 
Chipewyan, a reference to the base of their local dialect, as opposed to that of the Cree 
language which is Algonquian. Thus their subdivision is based again on geographical
162 Contrast the writing o f  Daschuk describing brutal, indeed military conflict with that described by Brumbach 
and Jarvenpa o f wary and cautious yet generally peaceful interaction, where conflict was based on cultural 
idiosyncrasies rather than resource sovereignty : Daschuk, J. Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics o f  
Starvation, and the Loss o f  Aboriginal Life (University o f  Regina Press, Regina, 2013) 17 and Jarvenpa, R. and 
Brumbach, H.J. Circumpolar Lives and Livelihood: A Comparative Ethnoarchaeology o f  Gender and 
Subsistence (University o f  Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2006) 48
163 Although the vast majority o f  deaths during this period were attributed to smallpox, large outbreaks o f  
influenza, and the spread o f  sexually transmitted infections are also eluded to in historical accounts.
164 Scott, D.E. Scott, S. Dixon, K. Okoko, J.M. and Dixon, R. Indigenous Principals’ Perspectives on 
Leadership Development in Slater, C.L. and Nelson, S.W. Understanding the Principalship: An International 
Guide to Principal Preparation  (Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, 2013) 334
165 Kendrick, A. Lyver, P.O.B. and K ’e, L ‘Denesoline (Chipewyan) Knowledge o f  Barren-Ground Caribou 
(Rangiferus tarandus groenlandicus) Movements’ (June 2005) 58 (2) Artie 175, 176
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location, which they chose in order to trade with the European settlers. The divisions are so 
indistinguishable in fact that recent studies have found that the ‘Athabaska’ referred to by 
settlers and explorers in Alberta writing during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
were actually o f Cree lineage.166
Such definitions are also difficult as in some nations, such as the Fort McMurray First 
Nation, the Cree and Chipewyan share a reserve, with no separation between the two cultural 
backgrounds; hence their subsistence based lifestyle takes precedent and forms the basis of 
their culture. A note should be made however of a greater focus historically on the arts in the 
Chipewyan culture (famed for their affinity for decorative clothing and music). As with the 
Cree, the lack of knowledge and records of the existence of the indigenous peoples of the 
province of Alberta, and indeed Canada as a whole, prior to the earliest European explorers 
makes being able to argue with absolute certainty whether or not the Chipewyans were native 
to the regions in which they now reside before the influence of the fur trade almost 
impossible. Timoney refers to them simply as nomadic in nature prior to European contact, 
followers of the very caribou on which they now rely to continue to express their culture.167
The Chipewyan came later to the fur trade than the Cree, as first contact with 
indigenous peoples was made around James Bay with the Swampy Cree subdivision of the 
Cree group. They played much the same role as the Cree did in their relationships with the 
settlers, namely that of guide and hunter, essentially profiting from their traditional expertise. 
Records also show the Chipewyan acting as intermediaries between the settlers and
166 Indeed Patricia Clark goes so far as to list both an Athabaka Cree and Athabaska Chipewyan group in her 
seminal list o f  the tribal names o f North American Indians so as to ensure complete coverage o f  all groups 
referred to in period texts: Clark, P.R. Tribal Names o f  the Americas: Spelling Variants and Alternative Forms, 
Cross-Referenced (McFarland and Company Inc, Jefferson, 2009) 29
167 Timoney, K.P. The Peace-Athabasca Delta: Portrait o f  a Dynamic Ecosystem (University o f  Alberta Press, 
Edmonton, 2013) 297
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indigenous groups in the east and others in the west in the fur trade.168 Expansion of the trade 
post network into these regions in the later decades of the seventeenth century all but 
eliminated the need for this role.
The dilution of the culture of the indigenous peoples of the region is also seen in the 
incredibly high levels of conversion to Christianity amongst the Chipewyans recorded in the 
early twentieth century, arguably illustrating a lack of an inherent religious belief system 
within the culture, and indicative of an almost unbridled focus on subsistence. In this regard 
the lifestyles of the various nations of Chipewyans within the province of Alberta, like those 
of the Cree, vary according to geographical location.169 Northern nations based in the boreal 
forest will hunt caribou, trap smaller mammals and fish where appropriate and those further 
south and to the east living on the plains will exploit the more available bison and again fish 
where it is pertinent to do so.
In relation to the thesis the distinction between Chipewyan and Cree is of little use, 
instead the focus will be on geographical location and the resulting environment inhabited by 
particular nations of Indians, regardless of their lineage. This is of far greater importance as it 
is the effects upon these environments as a result of the tar sands projects which will affect 
their culture and lifestyle directly and most severely. As such the largest distinction in the 
groups which can be drawn is provided by the Cree divisions of woodland (boreal forest) and 
plains, and it is these distinctions on which the thesis will draw most often.
168 ibid. 299
169Timoney again provides descriptions o f the varied impacts upon the indigenous peoples o f  Alberta o f rapid 
European settlement and equally hasty subsequent abandonment o f  the fur trade, all o f  which occurred within a 
century: ibid. 297-301
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Although it will be largely these groups of Indians with which the research is 
concerned, to say that those groups with weaker ties to their ancestral heritage, or who have 
adapted to their more developed surroundings are unaffected would be inattentive to say the 
least. Despite differing developments over the centuries since European settlement, a 
commonality is shared in the harm incurred as a result of tar sands development.
A similar note is needed at this juncture in relation to the debate surrounding the 
terms ‘tar sands’ and ‘oil sands.’ Both terms are utilised in the debate surrounding the 
extraction of the same material. Activist discourse has adopted the term tar sands, whilst 
industry and science prefers the term oil sands. Whilst the thesis will strive to remain 
impartial with regards to the conclusions drawn, and take full account of the immense 
potential benefits of the extraction of this material for Alberta and Canada as a whole, the 
prevalence of the discourse and literature with which the thesis will concern itself utilises the 
term tar sands. However, the term oil sands will also be utilised throughout, and in this regard 
it should be noted that the terminology should in this context be considered synonymic.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter was to afford to the necessary background information to 
support the legal arguments to follow. In particular there was a need to establish the 
inextricable nature of the relationship between the indigenous populace of the regions 
exploited to access the tar sands and the ecosystems they inhabit. In order to support the 
discussion to follow the threats to particular features of those environments and the severity 
of the resultant impact this might have upon the First Nations had to be illustrated. From the 
context afforded above the peculiarly acute nature of the impacts to indigenous peoples are
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3. 1 Introduction
A variety of domestic instruments and ratified external provisions, as well as non­
binding but influential texts, comprise what might broadly be termed as Canadian human 
rights law. As has been discussed the thesis will consider regional and international legal 
instruments in later chapters of the work. Before assessing specific domestic rights 
applicable to the focus of the piece, the restriction or cession of tar sands extraction with 
deleterious environmental impacts, a brief overview of this broad corpus is necessary. This 
will both narrow the scope of texts to be considered but also provide an insight into the roles 
and approaches of the Canadian judiciary and the provincial and federal legislature in relation 
to human rights law. Domestic legislation pertinent to the aims of the piece will then be 
highlighted and will be scrutinised with regards that aim. As a result an assessment will be 
made of their utility in the construction of a viable basis for an action against the authorities 
approving tar sands extraction projects in spite of resultant breaches of rights afforded to the 
indigenous populace caused by environmental harms.
3.2 Human Rights in the context of the Canadian Legal System
Canada and its government have established a dualist position with regard to legal 
provisions originating beyond the borders of the State.170 The reasoning for this is varied, and 
very specific in relation to the regional provisions under the auspices of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) as will be eluded to later, but the position remains constant. Thus the 
influence of provisions conceived outside the jurisdiction of the Canadian legislature and
170 Whilst there have been cases where this has not been upheld as staunchly as it might, more recent decisions 
have maintained this overbearing position. Contrast the relatively monist decision in Baker v Canada (Minister 
o f  Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, and that o f  a more dualist nature in Suresh v Canada 
(Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] SCC 1.
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executive rarely exceeds that of source of interpretation for its judiciary. Although the same 
cannot be said for customary international law, which Canadian courts have shown willing to 
incorporate without legislative action into the domestic legal system of the state and federal 
divisions, the thesis will not consider any such laws.171 As such, it is pertinent to discuss, in 
brief, the interpretative attitudes towards human rights within the Canadian domestic legal 
system, as this is the most probable starting point for any legal challenge to the tar sands 
projects.
There are three core human rights texts within the Canadian system, the Canadian 
Human Rights Act,172 the Canadian Bill of Rights,173 and finally the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (CCRF).174 The focus however shall be on the provisions of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is as the Charter contains those rights 
considered by some scholars175 as of primary status, and referred to as civil and political 
rights in the international legal context. Within the international legal sphere the two strands 
of rights are regarded as indivisible, as demonstrated in the preamble to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)176 and reiterated in the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action,177 and yet the Canadian legal system adopts an opposing approach.
171 The position o f Canada, and thus its federal divisions is thus a mirror o f that in the United Kingdom and the 
English common law method o f  applying international law, following the dualist approach with regards to 
treaties law and the monist approach in relation to customary international law. In this regard see, Van Ert 
‘Using Treaties in Canadian Courts’ (2000) 38 Canadian Yearbook o f International Law 3
172 Canadian Human Rights Act RS., 1985 c.H-6 (CHR Act)
173 Canadian Bill o f Rights S.C. 1960 c.44
174 Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, Part I o f the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c .l 1.
175 Alston, P. Goodman , R. and Steiner, H. ‘International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, M orals’ {3rd 
edn, OUP, Oxford, 2007) 263
176 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 23rd March 1976. (ICCPR)
177 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 A/Conf. 157/24
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As Lugtig and Parkes illustrate, ‘Canadian courts have steadfastly maintained that 
social and economic rights are not rights at all; they are merely policy goals to which Canada
5 178aspires.’ Lugtig and Parkes present the argument that this approach is a result largely of 
another characterisation of human rights into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ rights. Under this 
approach, those which, ‘protect people from the coercive power of the state’179 are the latter 
and the former, ‘require government action and expenditure.’180 In their estimation economic, 
social and cultural rights are largely speaking ‘positive’ by these definitions and civil and 
political rights conversely ‘negative,’ citing this as the reasoning for the application of the 
latter within the domestic legal system of Canada and opposition, both political and judicial, 
to the former. This is despite the acquiescence of the state to international agreements 
protecting both categories of right regardless of their labelling.
Manfredi argues that this reluctance is largely born out of an inherent desire within 
the constitutional structure of Canada to preserve the separation of powers between the 
executive and judiciary. He suggests that the enforcement of such ‘positive’ rights would 
encroach upon, ‘the presumption that democratically accountable decision-makers should
1 0 1
exercise principle responsibility for substantive policy decisions.’ In spite of this Manfredi 
suggests a progression towards a more ‘positive’ judicial approach has already begun. He 
argues that, ‘the remedies necessary to vindicate minority-language educational rights will 
revolutionise Canadian constitutional jurisprudence by requiring courts to make positive 
declarations about government obligations.’182 As Donald Smiley elucidated when he made,
178 Lugtig, S. & Parkes, D. ‘ Where do we go from here? ’ (2002) 15(4) Herizons 14, 16
179 ibid. 17
180 ibid. 17
181 Manfredi, C.P. ‘Appropriate and just in the Circumstances:” Public Policy and the Enforcement o f Rights 
under the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms’ (1996) 27 The American Political Science Review 4, 463
182 ibid. 455
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‘The Case Against the Charter of Human Rights’183 in Canada before its enactment in 1969, 
‘the scope of human rights and the priority given to the various kinds of human rights 
undergo constant change.’184 He goes on to state that an argument against the notion that the 
prominence of economic, social and cultural rights has grown significantly in influence and 
recognition internationally and at all levels of legal enforcement would be difficult to support.
Thus although the Canadian judicial approach to human rights continues to evolve, 
and indeed has done for some time, the recognition and enforcement of so called, ‘secondary’ 
or ‘positive’ rights, remains almost non-existent, beyond those existing in domestic law in 
other forms, often not enforced as rights as such. This is not to say that Canadian domestic 
legal provisions provide no recourse for the damage done by the tar sands project to the 
indigenous peoples of Alberta. Indeed as has been referred to previously a case concerning 
Treaty 6, between the Canadian state and a number of First Nations, is ongoing, but there is
t o e  ,
no inherent constitutional right to ‘necessities of life for all people,’ represented in the core 
provisions relating to economic, social and cultural rights.
With respect to the central focus of the thesis this presents a significant issue, in that 
there is a lack of explicit protection for the damage done by the tar sands projects to 
economic, social and cultural interest of the indigenous peoples. As such, and as has been 
seen in a number of Western legal systems,186 such rights must therefore be enforced via 
broad judicial interpretation of the rights more immediately available to the indigenous 
people of Canada. A similar situation might be true in relation to the regional system
183 Smiley, D. ‘The Case against the Canadian Charter o f Human Rights’ (1969) 2 Canadian Journal o f Political 
Science 3, 277
184 ibid. 281
185 Lugtig & Parkes (n l78) 16
186 Seminal cases in which such an approach has been taken within the European legal sphere, which will be 
discussed in greater detail later in the piece are: Hatton v United Kingdom  (2002) 34 EHRR 1; (2003) 37 EHRR 
28, Lopez Ostra v Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277.
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enforced in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and governed by the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 187 to which the Canadian state is not a signatory. 
Consequently Canada has also declined to sign the additional protocol in relation to economic, 
social and cultural rights.188 The complex issue of Canadian membership to the organisation 
and adherence to its legal provisions arising from its stance with regards to abortion laws will 
be discussed later in the piece. The purpose of the following chapters is to establish the rights 
protected within both the regional system protected by the American Convention, 
internationally under various treaties to which the Canadian state is party, and in the 
Canadian domestic system by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which might form the 
basis for a legal challenge to the damage done by the tar sands.
The foundation for this argument will be the rights guaranteed to the indigenous 
peoples of Alberta by Treaties 6189 and 8,190 which the Beaver Lake Cree First Nation argue 
have been breached in their Statement of Claim against the Province of Alberta and the state 
of Canada. Corresponding human rights protected at the three levels of legal enforcement will 
be attributed to the practices to which rights were granted under the Treaty and said to have 
been broken as a result of the industrial extraction and processing of crude oil from the tar 
sands. The effects of the tars sands upon the indigenous peoples of Alberta can therefore be 
related to specific duties on the part of the Canadian and Albertan governments arising from 
the human rights highlighted which are inextricably bound up with their culture. This 
approach will provide both a limit to the rights encompassed by the thesis, whilst also
187 American Convention on Human Rights O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force 
July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.l at 25 (1992). (ACHR)
188 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area o f Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights ( ‘San Salvador Protocol’) O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.l at 67 (1992). (AP-ACHR)
189 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
190 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
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maintaining a connection to the specific issues facing the Indians occupying land affected by 
the extraction projects. In turn this will be consistently relative to their individual culture and 
heritage beyond the effects to health and well being felt by all persons in proximity to the 
projects. Such an approach will also highlight the basis for a legal challenge against the tar 
sands overlooked in the Statement of Claim issued by the Beaver Lake Cree Indians.191
The methodological approach is admittedly reliant upon a significant element of 
innovative judicial interpretation by the Canadian judiciary at various levels. Although such 
judicial interpretation within the Canadian legal system is not unfounded owing to the 
specific nature of the domestic legal system of Canada, progression can prove to be
1 O ')something of a battle. The constitutional law of the state, of which the CCRF is in itself a 
constituent part,193presents some barriers to interpretation, and yet significant strides have 
been made and indeed fundamental principles of interpretation laid down. Similarly case 
precedents and conventions have been established and to an extent entrenched in case law 
over the relatively short period since its enactment.
The Constitution Act 1867194 provided the Canadian Parliament with the power, ‘to 
make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters 
not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures
191 Beaver Lake Cree Statement o f  Claim against the Province o f  Alberta and the Attorney General o f  Canada. 
2008. < http://www.beaverlakecreenation.ca/upload/documents/statementofclaim.pdf >Accessed 13n December 
2011
192 See in this regard the overview o f  judicial interpretation o f the CCRF by Frank Iacobucci: Iacobucci, F. 
Judicial Review by the Supreme Court o f  Canada Under the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms: The 
First Ten Years ’ in Beatty, D.M. (ed.) Human Rights and Judicial Review : A Comparative Perspective 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell MA, 1994) 93
193 CCRF (n l74)
19'' T h e  C o n s t i tu t io n  A c t,  1867 (U .K .) ,  30 & 3 1 V ic tor ia ,  c. 3.
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of the Provinces.’193 This power, qualified within itself by the provincial structure of the 
Canadian legal and political systems, is further qualified by judicial interpretation of those 
same provisions which form its basis. The interpretative role of the judiciary was cemented 
in the seminal case o f Edwards v A-G Can.196 in which the widely accepted ‘living tree 
doctrine,’ of Canadian constitutional law was conceived. This doctrine supposes that the 
constitution of Canada is not a fixed concept, but is, ‘a living tree capable of growth and 
expansion within its natural limits.’197
The case was seminal in its precedent for the Canadian legal system, but also in its 
more widespread progression of constitutional jurisprudence at the time. As well as this it 
provides an integral basis for the following arguments in the thesis in that it facilitates the 
interpretation of established Canadian law beyond a literal and narrow interpretation, and
1QO
even beyond any interpretation previously conceived. This approach to the constitutional 
law of Canada generally, was made applicable to the niche of that field represented by human 
rights law, in the case of Que. v. Blaikie.199 The case itself considered the language rights 
protected under a section of the Constitution Act 19 8 2200 not considered part of the CCRF. 
However, obiter dicta the court upheld that rights should be given, ‘generous 
interpretation suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and
901freedoms referred to,’ as stated in the case of Minister o f  Home Affairs v, Fisher. This 
principle has been applied and reinforced in relation to the rights protected under the Charter,
195 ibid.
196 Edwards v A-G Can.[ 1930] A.C. 124, 136
197 ibid. 136
198 The elaborative footnote (note 78) o f  Joyal, S. Conclusion: The Senate as the Embodiment o f  the Federal 
Principle in Joyal, S. (ed.) Protecting Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew  (Mc-Gill Queen’s 
Press, Kingston, 2003) 312
199 A.-G. Que. v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 SCR 1016
200 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c .l 1.
201 Minister o f  Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319, 328 per Lord Wilberforce.
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itself a constituent part o f the aforementioned act, in numerous subsequent cases. 202 As such 
it has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) that interpretation of the 
human rights protected under the constitutional law of the state is both possible and indeed 
integral to the assurance that such rights are enforced and applied as intended and in 
accordance with the spirit in which they were created.
The chronicling of the establishment of this principle is necessary as the interpretation 
of established human rights within the Canadian legal system is fundamental to the 
arguments to be put forward throughout the work. Indeed the notion of the Canadian 
Parliament’s power to legislate, ‘for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada,’203 
and that this law is subject to interpretation by the judiciary of the state will form one 
requirement for the breaches of human rights to be proposed to overcome. This is as all law 
created at the federal level must meet this criteria. As such so must any proposed 
interpretation of human rights legislation suggested in the conclusion of the piece as forming 
a viable basis for a case against the current approach to the licensing of tar sands projects. A 
number of interpretative approaches have been considered by numerous jurists in relation to 
the Canadian judiciary, and indeed vast swathes of obiter dicta could be quoted in this regard. 
However, the principle established by the cases of Edwards v A-G Can 204 and Que. v. 
Blaikie205 that the rights protected are necessarily subject to interpretation is sufficient for the 
purposes of the arguments the piece hopes to put forward. A constant consideration will 
therefore be the immense economic benefit of tar sands extraction to both Alberta and
202 See Law Society o f  Upper Can. v. Skapinker [1984] 1 S.C.R. 375 regarding the right to remain in Canada, 
Hunter v.Southam [1984] 2 S.C.R 375 regarding the right security from unreasonable search or seizure, and Re. 
B.C.Motor Vehicle A ct [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486  regarding the right to life, liberty and the security o f the person.
203 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.S.91
204 Edwards (n l96)
205 Blaikie (nl99)
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Canada as a whole, and whether this can outweigh the harm done in order to access the raw 
material generating it.
The second boundary to the proposals to be put forward in the conclusion will be 
formed by the same limitations placed upon any laws attempting to subvert the rights 
enshrined in the CCRF by the domestic legal system of Canada. These are found within s.l of 
the Charter itself,206 and expanded upon by subsequent case law. The seminal case in this 
regard is that of R. v. Oakes207 before the SCC, in which the court laid down the test for the 
justification of the limitation of the human rights protected by the Charter. The first section of 
the CCRF was intended to eliminate the possibility of rights conflicting with laws essential to, 
‘a free and democratic society.’208 An example might be the obvious conflict between laws 
regarding defamation and the right to freedom of expression.
The Oakes209 case established a justification test for any limitations placed upon 
Charter rights. The contention that any action is not for the peace, order and good 
government of Canada owing to inhibition of the fundamental freedoms might thus be 
rebutted using this test on the grounds that it is, ‘demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society.’210 The test, based on the text of the constitution, demands;
‘respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and 
equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and 
faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups 
in society.’211
In order to establish a legitimate breach the court in Oakes demanded that two conditions be met. 
Firstly, the reason for breaching a right must be, ‘of sufficient importance to warrant overriding
2Ub CCRF (n l74)
207 R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R 103
208 CCRF (n l74) s. 1
209 Oakes (n207)
210 CCRF (n l74) s. 1
211 Oakes (n207), 64
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a constitutionally protected right or freedom.’212 Secondly the measure must be deemed 
proportional based on three criteria. These are that it must be designed to achieve the objective 
set, have the least impact upon rights and freedoms achievable, and the limitations caused must 
be proportionate to the aim to be achieved.213
The decision in Oakes has become a seminal facet of Canadian constitutional law, and 
regarded as one of the most influential cases in Canadian legal history. Hogg describes the 
judgement as having, ‘taken on some of the character of holy writ.’214 The test establishes 
whether a legal provision (and thus the administrative processes and bodies they create) which is 
suggested as inhibiting rights enshrined within the CCRF does so reasonably. The test is 
undoubtedly pertinent to the action proposed by the thesis, given that it suggests a failing on the 
part of the federal and provincial governments to consider the impacts to the indigenous peoples 
of Alberta caused by tar sands extraction and refinement. Three elements are assessed in judging 
the reasonableness of a provision; rationality, minimal effect/intrusion, and proportionality.
The rationality criteria determines whether the purpose for the limit on the rights of the 
individual is of, ‘sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or 
freedom.’215216 The economic benefit to Canada and the province of Alberta of extracting the tar
217sands is undeniable, and the case of Singh v Minister o f Employment and Immigration 
suggested that prohibitive costs to compliance with Charter rights might be deemed a legitimate 
breach thereof. Ritter J. accepted that situations, such as that arising in this instance from the 
debate over the tar sands,
‘requires balancing sensitive environmental concerns with general economic well 
being and social needs of the Province of Alberta. None of environmental concerns, 
economic benefits or social development is an invariable trump card. By its very nature 
balancing of factors will mean that sometimes one factor will gain ascendancy and sometimes 
another. In some cases environmental concerns may receive less attention because the 
economic and social benefits outweigh the deleterious environmental effect(s). In other
212 R  v. Big M D rug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352.
213 Oakes (n207), 69
214 Hogg, P.W. Constitutional Lavi> o f  Canada: Student Edition (Carswell Thomson Professional Publishing, 
Scarborough, Ontario, 1999), 728
215 Oakes (n207), 138
216 A test o f causation or a ‘rational connection’ between the law implemented and the objective is also possible as 
part o f the Oakes test, but here the connection between legislation outlining the permitting process for tar sands 
projects and the administrative authorities which do in fact permit them is sufficiently apparent to negate the need 
for further discussion in this regard.
217 Singh v Minister o f  Employment and Immigration [ 1985] 1 S.C.R. 177
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instances economic advantages may be lost entirely because the impact on the environment 
measured against the economic advantage is greater. In some cases compromises may be 
possible which address both environmental effects and economic or social advantages 
associated with the proposed development. Some cases will be close calls so that the 
ascendancy of more than one factor could be reasonable.’218
Indeed as Hogg notes, the declaration absolutely of inadmissibility of legislative objectives is 
rare. Indeed at the time of writing in 1999, he pointed out that, ‘there has so far been only one 
case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has unequivocally rejected the legislative 
objective.’219 As such to suggest that the Canadian courts might reject the economic benefits 
of the tar sands projects as an objective not of ‘sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom’ would be remiss.220
99 1The adoption of the ‘least drastic means’ in terms of the impairment of rights and 
freedoms caused by a measure deemed to have a rational connection to its aims is also assessed 
under the precedent in Oakes. This component is the most common basis for a challenge to the 
validity of legislation or the administrative procedures it imposes as the other criteria of the test 
are rarely upheld as not having been met by the courts. Minimum impairment is however 
difficult to ascertain, and as such the judgement of measures has much become one of legitimate 
justification. This was apparent in the case of Hill v Church o f Scientology222 in which the law of 
defamation was deemed a least drastic means to protect the dignity of individuals despite not 
being the least drastic inhibition of the freedom of expression of others. In the context of the 
extraction of tar sands the question must therefore be regarded as whether the current licensing 
approach is the least drastic means of obtaining the crude oil potential of the tar sands, rather 
than the minimum impairment of the various rights discussed in the thesis. The current 
mechanisms would therefore have to be shown to inhibit excessively the rights discussed in the 
piece. Causal connections would suffer somewhat in this regard as establishing that a licensing 
authority had failed to account for a potential impact with currently unascertainable extent
218 Castle-Crown Wilderness Coalition  v. Alberta (Director o f  Regulatory Assurance Division, Alberta 
Environment) [2005] ABCA 283,55
219 Hogg (n214), 735-736. This was an instance o f discrimination on the basis o f sexual discrimination in the 
case o f Vriend v Alberta  [1998] 1 SCR 493
220 Oakes (n207), 60
221 The term afforded by eminent Canadian constitutional lawyer Peter Hogg to this concept o f minimum 
impairment o f rights by a justifiable legal measure.
222 Hill v Church o f  Scientology [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130
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would be difficult. This is especially true in instances such as the consumption of water from 
natural courses, where the permitting procedure already imposes perpetual reductions in water 
usage and recycling.
The proportionality of the licensing of the tar sands is also questionable, though is 
basically assessment of risk which can easily be assessed utilising the precautionary principle 
and the justifiable level of harm given the available benefits. Essentially the question would be 
whether the environmental risks of tar sands extraction, in light of the measures undertaken by 
the authorities to assess them within the licensing procedures in place, were accounted for 
sufficiently and are thus outweighed correctly by the economic benefits offered. The Oakes test 
merely requires a justifiable consideration of the effects of measures and the goal they achieve. 
Put simply that the risk or harm undertaken is proportionate to the goal achieved. Lamer C.J. 
summarised the concept succinctly in relation to the focus of the thesis in Dagenais v. CBC ~ 
stating that the necessary hurdle to overcome was, ‘proportionality between the deleterious and
'J 'J  A
the salutary effects of the measures.’ An assessment of the tar sands licensing procedures 
would thus turn on the sufficiency of their consideration of, and action in response to, the actual 
and potential environmental impacts of permitted projects as well as any reasonably foreseeable.
In relation to foreseeable impacts therefore the assessment in relation to proportionality 
in this regard would likely follow any decision made in relation to the least drastic means. 
Should an environmental harm not be foreseen the least drastic means to obtain the tar sands raw 
material and the most proportionate means of extraction would likely be deemed identical owing 
to the inherent uncertainty involved. The assessment with regard to ascertainable and agreed 
harms resulting from extraction however might be different. The least harmful means of 
obtaining the raw material and one which is proportionate to the aim would not necessarily be 
one and the same. To illustrate, the risk of the bioaccumulation of contaminants in water courses 
is unknown and given the need for monitoring of tailings seepage which is imposed upon 
extractors,225 suggesting that measures put in place were either disproportionate or did not 
represent the least drastic means of storing tailings would be difficult. This is in contrast to the 
consumption of water from courses in the north east of Alberta which is both measurable and the
223 Dagenais v. CBC  [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835
224 ibid. 889
225 The monitoring o f  tailings is a necessary element o f  all licences granted to date, ensuring compliance with 
the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12.
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potential impacts of which, if excessive, are known.226 As such any suggestion of a 
disproportionate inhibition of rights in order to obtain the oil contained within the tar sands 
would have to be made on the basis of the established impacts thereof.
The measurement of the effects of tar sands extraction is, as has been discussed, 
heatedly debated. The indirect effects discussed in the piece add to this fervent speculation as to 
the true potential for environmental harm resulting from the extraction of this inimitably 
valuable resource. Many of the impacts discussed herein will inevitably occur, but it is the extent 
to which they do so which is not agreed upon. Accurate statements as to the effectiveness of 
attempts to combat said impacts are also therefore not forthcoming. The proportionality of the 
potential inhibitions of Charter rights arising from environmental impacts in relation to the aim 
of tar sands extraction is as a result also difficult to ascertain. Indeed Hogg suggests for 
reasons akin to this that this aspect of the Oakes test is ‘redundant’ and has, ‘never had any 
influence on the outcome of any case.’227 He proposes that the question of proportionality is, 
as has been considered, already established by other aspects of the Oakes test. Regarding the 
environmental impacts of tar sands extraction, this assessment is certainly accurate. To 
suggest that unaddressed potential environmental impacts are at their least drastic, and that 
the attainment of the aim of the gargantuan economic benefits of the tar sands is a sufficiently 
important objective for Canada, but that the two were not proportionate would be absurd. 
Quite simply the court would be hard pressed to suggest that an unascertainable cost 
outweighed such a considerable benefit, and it is this which Hogg suggests on the basis of
n 229precedent is key. As is suggested in the case of R. v. Pennington, the courts ‘are not
230concerned with wisdom but only with the absence of capriciousness or arbitrariness.’
Thus the application of the Oakes test to the case at hand would suggest the validity of 
the broad approach to the permitting of tar sands extraction at present in Alberta might only be 
challenged on the basis of a contention that the means permitted to do so was not the least 
drastic. Meeting the burden of proof for such a suggestion may however inhibit it to being of 
only limited and certainly speculative utility in relation to the aim of the piece. One final
226 This is in spite o f  the difficulties as regards the ascertainment o f the impacts to fish reproduction conceded by 
the regulatory authorities. The fact negative impacts will occur is known, it is their extent which is not. Ayles, 
G.B. Dube, M and Rosenberg,D. Oil Sands Regional Aquatic Monitoring Program (RAMP) Scientific Peer 
Review o f  the Five Year Report (1997-2001), 14 (RAMP)
227 Hogg, (n214), 750
228 ibid. 750
229 R. v. Pennington (1981) ABCA 190
230 ibid. 14
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contention might be made however, and that is an accusation of inactivity on the part of the 
regulatory authorities with regard to potential environmental impacts to features of significance 
in relation to the expression of culture. In the face of incontrovertible evidence of impacts such a 
suggestion would be valid, and represent a regulatory approach which did not represent the 
‘least drastic means’ of permitting the obtaining of crude oil potential of the province. Such a 
suggestion in relation to debated or as yet undeveloped impacts such as those to the boreal 
woodland caribou would arguably be supported by the precedents set in Brooks v. Canada 
Safeway Ltd231 and reiterated in the case of Vriend v. Alberta232 In both cases the question of 
whether inaction on the part of the legislature, federal or provincial, could result in a breach of 
section 1 of the Charter under the test in Oakes. Both cases concerned instances of alleged 
discrimination and in both the principle that, ‘Under inclusion may be simply a backhanded 
way of permitting discrimination’233 was upheld. As such to not act in the face of a clear 
breach of rights espoused under the Charter is a potential basis for a challenge to the current 
regulatory framework in Alberta.
Each of the Oakes criteria has of course been extensively discussed by jurists across a 
broad range of competencies, and to discuss each in any depth would require a thesis of its 
own.234 However, on a basic level these criteria will be considered stringently against any 
argument proposed within the following chapters in the conclusion of the piece as a whole. 
Thus the bounds of any proposal on which the conclusions of the piece are based will be 
bound by established Canadian constitutional law principles. Firstly the purpose of any 
supposed breach of human rights and thus the discontinuation or limitation of the tar sands 
projects must meet the requirement of ensuring, ‘the Peace, Order and good Government of 
Canada,’235 whilst being bound also by the limitation that any breach is not capable of being,
‘ demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’236 The aim of these restrictions is 
twofold, firstly, in physical terms, it will prevent excessive expansion of the thesis and the 
arguments within it. Secondly, it will ensure that any conclusions are set within the 
framework of the Canadian legal system so as to avoid them being based purely in theory 
whilst also ensuring feasible arguments which therefore might be of use beyond the academic
231 Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219
232 Vriend (n219)
233 Brooks (n231), 1240
234Hogg as the seminal writer on Canadian constitutional law is arguably the most approachable in his handling 
o f these criteria, and even in his widely used textbook on the Canadian system separates these out for individual 
discussion. Hogg, (n214) 728-751
235 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.at s.91
236 CCRF (n l74) s.l
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sphere alone. Also the application of these criteria will highlight which effects of the tar 
sands projects will give rise to the strongest claims for a breach of enforceable human rights 
and highlight any potential issues with arguably weaker claims.
As specific rights are considered, and especially those common to the national, 
regional and international systems, such as the inherent right to life of all people, specific 
limitations placed upon their application will also be considered. These criteria will be based 
upon established judicial precedent and decisions of the courts protecting those rights. An 
example of this is found in the application of the right to private and family life to instances 
of environmental damage. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in Lopez Ostra v. 
Spain that only where said damage was preventable and resulted in the environment 
becoming incapable of supporting healthy human habitation, the right was breached and the 
government liable to compensate those injured. The significance of the European regional 
system for Canadian law will be explained in the chapter concerning regional provisions, 
however it can be stated that there is a recognised jurisprudential connection between the two 
systems.
Thus the bounds of a government failure and an incapability to sustain human 
habitation would be placed on any proposed application of this right within a legal challenge 
to the damage caused by the tar sands projects based on human rights. Where appropriate 
such criteria, which might influence the likelihood of their successful practical application 
will be outlined when a particular right is argued to be being breached by an adverse effect of 
the tar sands project. Thus the aforementioned example might be discussed in greater detail in
237 Lopez Ostra (n l86). Note should be made that the SCC has used the jurisprudence o f  the European human 
rights system and its court as an interpretative aid on a number o f occasion as will be discussed later in the piece 
in relation to the potential role o f regional provisions in the aim o f the piece.
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relation to water pollution caused by tar sands extraction developments, as the Lopez Ostra 
case also concerned analogous effects.
3.21 The Influence of Canadian Provincial Law
The Canadian legal system is, like the US system, federal, consisting of a central state 
legislature, and various provincial legislatures. In the case of Alberta this legislature is the 
Legislative Assembly (LAA). Created by the Alberta Act239 in 1905, like all the provincial 
legislatures in Canada, the Assembly has the power to ‘make provision for the constitution 
and administration of any such province, and for the passing of laws for the peace, order and 
good government of [the] province.’240 This encompasses those matters listed under sections 
91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867,241 with legislative competency over all other matters 
remaining in the hands of the Canadian Parliament. This is contrasted to the federal systems 
of the US and Australia, in which the powers of the federal legislature are defined and all 
residual matters are the remit of the respective provincial bodies.
In both cases the structure is intended to ensure any matter on which legislation might 
be passed is done so by a competent authority. With respect to human rights the legislative 
competency for Canada rests with the Canadian Parliament, at a federal, rather than 
provincial level. This ensures that all legislation both federal and provincial is compliant with 
its provisions and that rights within Canada are universal to all. The Human Rights Act of 
Alberta,242 and similar provisions from other provincial legislative bodies, concern solely 
matters regarding discrimination. This reality is designed to prevent discrimination in relation
238 Lopez Ostra (nl 86)
239 Alberta Act, 1905, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 3
240 Preamble to Alberta Act, 1905, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 3
241 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.at s.91 and s.92
242 Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-25.5 (AHR Act)
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to specific provincial legislation, and administrative regulations. As discussed in relation to 
the Canadian Human Rights Act,243the provincial act therefore has little, if any, bearing on 
the thesis.
The boundaries set with regard to all assertions of potential bases for a legal challenge 
to the tar sands projects originating in human rights provisions are pertinent to both the 
federal and provincial legal settings. Also any challenge to administrative measures or 
emanations of the state, on the basis of human rights would be possible regardless of them 
being federal or provincial in nature as a result of human rights law in Canada being derived 
from the federal level and forming part of the constitutional law of the state itself. As such the 
limits of ‘peace, order and good government,’ and ‘justification in a free and democratic 
society’ are equally relevant and applicable to all levels of enforcement within the Canadian 
domestic legal system and can be used in assessing the validity of the suggestions made in the 
work without need for further clarification. Such an approach also increases the likelihood of 
said recommendations having a viable practical application based on conformity with 
established precedents.
3.22 The Influence of Regional/Multinational Law
The Canadian position with regard to international law has traditionally been highly 
dualistic, with most treaty obligations being preserved outside of the Canadian domestic legal 
system via a staunch refusal to transform them through the enactment of a statute to that 
effect. In relation to the Organisation of American States,244 Canada has taken convoluted
243 CHR Act (n243)
244 A multinational organisation with membership comprising North and South American states whose self 
appointed purposes are the achievement and maintenance o f peace, security, democracy and human rights in 
across the two continents.
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approach to enforcement and transformation of legal provisions. This position is as a result 
primarily of disputes concerning a single fundamental principle of the human rights body 
established under the umbrella of the organisation.
Canada is a fully ratified member of the organisation and its charter.245 However, in 
relation to the American Convention of Human Rights,246 (ACHR) and the court overseeing 
its enforcement, the American Court of Human Rights, Canada is morally blocked from 
acquiescing to the extent it might otherwise wish to. This is owing to the drafting of a single
747provision, Article 4, which concerns the right to life. The article is drafted in such a 
manner as to prohibit abortion, legal under Canadian domestic law, with the words, ‘from the
748moment of conception.’ This provision is a result of the predominance of Catholicism as 
the naturalistic basis for the rights and their drafting emanating from the Latin American 
states in the organisation. These States outnumber the more liberal North American states, 
and thus Canada has simply refused to even sign the convention.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to which Canada is subject as a 
member of the OAS, is able to issue recommendations, including proposing compensation, 
based upon the broader American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRD),249 
to which Canada is a ratified party. These however are not legally binding, and besides 
political and media pressure, have no tangible enforcement mechanisms. Thus, except where 
the Canadian legislature and executive choose to adopt the recommendations of the 
Commission, the role of the American Declaration is at best an interpretive instrument for the
245 Charter o f the Organization o f American States, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force December 13, 1951
246 ACHR (n l87)
247 ibid. Art. 4
248 ibid. Art. 4
249 American Declaration o f  the Rights and Duties o f  Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth 
International Conference o f American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights 
in the Inter- American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.l at 17 (1992). (ADRD)
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Canadian domestic legal system. As such in relation to the thesis the provisions of the
250 •ADRD will form an interpretive aid to established, and thus enforceable, Canadian 
domestic law provisions. The opinions of the Commission and provisions contained within 
the Declaration will therefore be cited as interpretive approaches to enacted Canadian human 
rights provisions within the bounds of ‘peace, order and good government’251 on the one hand 
and justifiability in a ‘free and democratic society’252 on the other. Similarly assessments as 
to the likelihood of the suggestions made being upheld in practice will also be considered 
based on established precedents from binding fora.
3.23 The Influence of International Law
The position of the Canadian legislature and executive in relation to international law 
operational beyond the confines of the OAS is clearer, though still retains one ambiguity to 
the generally dualistic approach of the state. Canada is a signed and ratified party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 253 (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights254 (ICESCR), but has transformed neither
255into its domestic law. As a ratified party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR ‘ 
however, the Canadian government has permitted its citizens to take complaints to the 
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations (UNHRC). Decisions of this committee 
however, like those of the Inter-American Commission, are not legally binding, though 
arguably wield considerably more political pressure than the regional equivalent.
250 ibid.
251 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.s.91
252 CCRF (n l74) s.l
253 ICCPR (n l76)
254 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A /6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. (ICESCR)
255 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A /6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force 23rd March 
1976. (OP-ICCPR)
90
Thus much like the American Declaration on Human Rights, 256 and the 
recommendations of the corresponding commission, the provisions of the twin covenants and 
Views of the UNHRC are of use solely as interpretative measures of established Canadian 
domestic law provisions. As such, their application to the thesis will be akin to that of the 
multinational provisions and procedures under the OAS. Any basis for a legal challenge to 
the tar sands projects suggested as potentially resulting from them in the conclusion to the 
piece will therefore also be bound by the criteria of being for the purpose of ‘peace, order and 
good government,’257 whilst being ‘justifiable in a free and democratic society.’258 Added to 
this will be the continuing assessment of the likelihood of said suggestions being upheld in 
practice by the fora proposed as the most appropriate for such a challenge in that conclusion.
3.3 Harms Against the Person Prohibited By Canadian Human Rights Law
3.31 Section 7 CCRF 
Right to Physical and Mental Wellbeing of the Individual
In legal systems at all levels, the ability to access clean water for the purposes of 
sanitation and nutrition is inextricably bound up with human rights concerning the basic 
physical integrity of individuals.259 Limitations to such rights are far less likely to be
256 ADRD (n249)
257 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.s.91
258 CCRF (n 174) s.l
259 Canada is no exception to this, see: Government o f Alberta, Environment and Water Ministry, Water 
Webpage http://environment.alberta.ca/01157.html (Last accessed 4th April 2012). This position is also 
supported by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see: Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The Right to Water (Twenty-ninth session, 2003), 
U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2002/11 (2002)
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permitted by the Canadian courts owing to the fundamental moral foundations of human 
rights preserving the individual against such abuses by the state. These primarily relate to the 
physical and mental wellbeing of the individual, and ensure that threats to the health of an 
individual, of either nature, should not result from the actions of the government or aligned 
authorities. Undoubtedly the most significant of this group of provisions is the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person protected under section 7 of the CCRF.260 The link between 
water and life is a well-established one, with bodies at all levels of influence identifying the
' j / r  i
resource as essential to, ‘ensure a healthy environment and high quality of life.’ The 
position of Canada with regards to any tangible right to water at a regional and international 
level is a source of some controversy amongst jurists and activists as will be discussed later. 
Thus, domestically at least, it is primarily through the suggestion of a breach of the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person, arising from the excessive extraction of the resource 
from the water courses of the province that any ‘right to water’ akin to that recognised 
regionally and internationally might be enforced.
Whilst the provincial authorities governing water resources have accepted that, 
‘Water is not only a resource, it is a life source,’262 proving a link to the aforementioned 
domestic ‘right to life, liberty and security of the person,’263 has been the source of some 
debate. Arguably however, considering precedents set by the Canadian courts, the lack of 
provision of adequate water to support the most basic of purposes could breach all three 
elements of this right. A view supported by the judicial clerk to the Court of Appeal in
CCRF (n l74) s.7
261 Water Act, RSA 2000, c W-3 Part 2 s.2(a)
262 Government o f  Alberta, Environment and Water Ministry, Water Webpage 
http://environment.alberta.ca/01157.html (Last accessed 4th April 2012)
263 CCRF (n 174) s.7
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Ontario, and former environmental campaigner, James Harnum.264 The Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) has conceived a two part test in order for any breach of the right protected by 
section 7 of the CCRF to be upheld. Firstly, on the balance of probabilities that the alleged 
breach has in fact occurred, secondly that the breach is an affront to the principles of
265 •fundamental justice. More specifically this relates to natural justice principles as well as 
principles established by more orthodox procedural means.266 Thus it goes without saying 
that any proposed basis for a case against the tar sands developments founded on an alleged 
breach of the right to life, liberty and security of the person would consequentially have to 
pass this test.
In instances of restricted access to water the ‘life’ element of the section 7 right, is 
prima facie the most obviously breached element of the right, water being recognised 
universally as key to survival.267 However, the burden of proving that the lack of access to 
water has reached a sufficient level as to constitute a breach of such severity as to threaten 
‘life’ is potentially the most difficult. The burden of proof is arguably the highest of the 
elements of section 7 of the Charter. However, if upheld a breach would undoubtedly give 
rise to the greatest impact, necessitating as a minimum the cession of particular extraction 
projects as well as altering dramatically the licensing policy for the industry as a whole.
For the indigenous peoples of Canada access to water for the basic purposes most 
developed nations take for granted is not as forthcoming as might be imagined in such a 
developed nation. Indeed over 100 First Nations tribes have consistently been subject to
264 Hamum, J. ‘Deriving the Right to Water from  the Right to Life, Liberty and Security o f  the Person: Section 7 
o f the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms and Aboriginal Communities in Canada ’ (2010) Review of  
European Community and International Environmental Law 19 (3)
265 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] SCC 44, at 47
266 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (n202)
267 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The Right to Water (Twenty- 
ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2002/11 (2002)
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‘advisories’ concerning drinking water issued by the Health Canada department of the federal 
government, ‘to protect public health from waterborne contaminants that could be, or are 
known to be, present in drinking water.’ 268 Whilst the implications of pollution to water 
sources bear clear and provable links to the health and in severe cases life of indigenous 
peoples, there has been no suggestion as yet that the quantity of water removed from the 
water courses of Alberta by the tar sands developments has a direct impact on the health of 
the peoples themselves. This is largely as today most First Nations bands are supplied with 
more than adequate quantities of water to fulfil their requirements as regards sanitation and 
thirst by modern means such as pipelines and man-made wells.
With regards to the ‘life’ element of section 7 of the CCRF’ therefore it would be 
required that the impacts to fish populations in the regions affected by frivolous water 
licensing on the part of the provincial government removed the ability of the indigenous 
peoples to sustain themselves to such an extent that they were at risk of starvation. 
Historically such an eventuality might have been a possible result of industrial impacts of the 
scale seen in Alberta as a result of the rapid development of the tar sands. However, even the 
most remote of indigenous tribes today are not reliant solely upon fishing for their sustenance. 
Even where the majority of their nutritional intake is from fish, none would use solely 
traditional methods to catch the numbers of fish required to support the considerably larger 
modern tribes. A considerable wealth of case law in this regard suggests that once such 
practices become ‘commercial’ or non-traditional in nature, they are no longer subject to the 
protections afforded by the numbered treaties.269 As such they would have to be considered 
as breaches of human rights with no consideration given to indigenous rights, and thus could
268 As o f  February 2012 this number was 112 First Nations, and this does not take into account the numbers o f  
Inuits and Metis tribes also affected. Figures and quotation obtained from Health Canada website: 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fhiah-spnia/promotion/public-publique/water-eau-eng.php#how_many (Last accessed 4th
April 2012)
269 Established in the case o f R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771
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not give rise to injunctive relief against the governments of Canada or Alberta.270 Thus, 
whilst the impact to their way of life is potentially a significant one, their plight is not 
applicable to a claim based upon a breach of the right to life linked to the numbered treaty 
rights negotiated in the early development of the Canadian state. Thus this contention is of 
little use in relation to the discussion of water consumption in the thesis as a basis for a legal 
challenge.271
The lack of any element of incarceration as a result of the impacts of the tar sands 
developments on the environment upon which the First Nations rely would prima facie also 
eliminate the ‘liberty and security’ component of the section 7 right afforded under the CCRF 
from being of any potential use in a case of the type proposed by the thesis. Historically, the 
application of section 7 to allegations of breaches of liberty and security has been interpreted 
as revolving almost solely around infringements to the concepts in the context of criminal 
proceedings.272 Their focus has been predominantly aimed at ensuring freedom from unfair 
proceedings or treatment, coercion and any semblance of arbitrary power. An initial 
assessment of this reality would understandably lead to the conclusion that the provisions of 
section 7 are of little utility in relation to the construction of a case against the licensing of tar 
sands developments in Alberta. This position however fails to take into account the inherent 
links to the specific reserved lands which the First Nations tribes have and which are 
constitutionally protected under the numbered treaties. Such notions have also received some, 
if restricted, application in cases within the Canadian legal system.
270 ibid.
271 This is in contrast to the approach o f the UNHRC in the communication o f Poma Poma v Peru 
Communication No. 1457/2006 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 in which the Committee permitted 
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272 See the discussion o f  the impact o f the legal rights afforded under the Charter upon federal criminal statutes 
by Frederick Vaughan: Vaughan, F. Judicial Politics in Canada in Howe, P. and Russell, P.H. Judicial Power 
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In the case of Corbiere v Canada (Minister o f  Indian and Northern Affairs), 273 the 
Supreme Court held that the decision whether to live on a reserve land was of, ‘particular 
cultural and social significance,’274 and went further to hold this was one of fundamental 
importance to band members. Water quality was the primary issue in the case, and it was 
found that the inhibition of basic necessities of life, such as clean drinking water, which 
would encourage band members to leave the reserved lands could constitute a breach of the 
right to liberty as protected by section 7 of the Charter, an argument posited and advocated 
again by Harnum.275 The ratio decidendi of the case was that failure to provide water of a 
sufficient quality removed the free choice of the indigenous peoples to decide objectively 
whether to remain on the reserved lands and enjoy the benefits of doing so.
Were the same principles to be applied to the impacts felt by the First Nations peoples 
of Alberta in the regions impacted upon by the tar sands developments, a potential basis for a 
case based upon the breach of the right to ‘liberty’ under section 7 could be suggested. The 
inability of these peoples to express themselves through traditional fishing methods, also 
protected under the numbered treaties, in a manner of particular ‘cultural and social 
significance,’276 would by extension constitute a breach of section 7 as it had in Corbiere111 
As an established interpretation of the rights afforded under section 7 of the CCRF, this basis 
for a case against the tar sands, despite being dependent upon proof of the severe inhibition of 
fish stocks and as a result health, would represent arguably the strongest of the potential 
claims against the developments linked to water quantity. The necessity of, and uncertainty 
relating to evidence demonstrating this impact is however equally as likely to ensure no case
273 Corbiere v. Canada (Minister o f  Indian and Northern Affairs) [1999]  2 SCR 203
274 ibid. at 62
275 Harnum (n264) 309
276 Corbiere (n273) 62
277
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could be brought, regardless of its jurisprudential potential for success.278 Equally the 
provision of water for the basic needs of drinking and sanitation by conventional means to 
most First Nations bands as has been alluded to would prevent any case being brought on this 
more direct basis, except where movement from reserved lands was necessary, not merely 
opted for.
The ‘security’ component of the section 7 right whilst potentially offering another 
viable basis for such a case when considered in the light of established precedent from the 
Canadian Supreme Court is of less use than it might at first appear. The case of Chalouli v
7 70Quebec (Attorney General), held that impacts to human health caused by the actions and 
decisions of government organs could give rise to a breach of the right to security of the 
person protected under section 7 of the Charter. Again however, the need for evidence of this 
could potentially prove an unavoidable hurdle to overcome. This is owing to the debate 
regarding the harm caused by the provision of an insufficient quantity of water potentially 
preventing this forming the basis of a case against tar sands developments in the north east of 
Alberta. The difficulty can be identified as resulting largely from the fact that First Nations 
peoples of the region are generally provided with quantities of water more than capable of 
meeting that necessary for their basic and social needs.
The question therefore would arise as to whether the provision of water need be 
culturally relevant, and indeed this would arguably be the key issue in relation to suggesting a
278 This is illustrative o f  the double edged nature o f the lack o f uncontested scientific research in this regard 
conceded by Alberta Environment Fisheries And Oceans Canada. The lack o f evidence is equally as damning 
for a demand o f cession as it is for continuation. Thus provided adequate precaution based on existing 
knowledge is proven, suggested impacts would not halt extraction. See: Alberta Environment Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada Water Management Framework: Instream Flow Needs And Water Management System For The 
Lower Athabasca River , February 2007, 31.
<http://environment.alberta.ca/documents/athabasca_rwmf_technical.pdf> Accessed 30th July 2014.
(WMSLAR)
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case against the tar sands developments brought on the basis of the impact of water 
consumption. Failing to prove the need for a particular type of water provision would result 
in any challenge to the developments on this basis being easily rebutted by the establishment 
of a sufficient water infrastructure on the reserved lands of the indigenous peoples of Alberta. 
This assessment being clearly supported by the precedent set in Corbiere280 Despite asserting 
that non-fatal damages to health necessitating relocation could breach section 7, the case 
placed this development within highly restrictive parameters demanding no other reasonable 
option be available to avoid the damage incurred.281
Whilst the case of R v. Morgentaler282 established the belief of the Supreme Court 
that the concept of ‘security of the person’ provided by section 7 of the CCRF could be 
breached by risk to the health of an individual, the extent of this ruling is unclear in relation 
to the impacts of the tar sands. Whilst direct threats to health are considered breaches, as was 
made clear in the case of Morgentaler28A the impacts of the reduction in water of a particular 
form are far less direct and can be avoided on a basic level via the provision of water from 
another source. As such the risk to health could be both averted, and arguably reduced, as far 
greater quality water can be provided to the First Nations peoples via the use of modern water 
infrastructure technology. Similarly the risk to mental health of the indigenous peoples of the 
regions affected by the developments, whilst in theory a viable basis for a case opposing their 
continuation, as suggested by the case of Mills v. the Queen285 would be difficult to establish 
as having been caused by the developments. Again this would require an indirect link 
between the water consumption of the developments leading to a particular form of water
280 Corbiere (n273)
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provision being removed and a consequential deterioration in the mental health of the Indians 
being upheld by the courts.286
Potentially the most significant obstacle for this suggested basis to overcome however 
is the reluctance of the SCC to consider fundamentally economic considerations in relation to 
the provisions of section 7.287 The position of the SCC, largely dictated by the reticence to 
repeat issues which arose in the legal system of the USA in the early 20th Century,288 has 
been restrictive in relation to any alleged breach of section 7 which is not directly linked to 
the physical liberty and integrity of the individual. Specifically the provision has 
predominantly been applied, as one would expect, in relation to incarceration as a result of 
criminal proceedings. In particular, ‘Canadian courts have steadfastly maintained that social 
and economic rights are not rights at all,’ and this position shaped the drafting and 
development of the Charter.289 Thus in relation to the issue at hand, the suggestion that a 
reduction in fish stocks would necessitate either relocation or the abandonment of traditional 
practices would constitute a breach of the Charter, the lack of a direct impact to human health 
which could breach this restriction,290 could negate this contention. This assessment however 
fails to take into account the special status of the indigenous peoples of Canada within their
291legal system and indeed the Constitution and Charter specifically.
286 Note should be made that the distress caused by relocation might be the only possible contention in this 
regard, but the ‘mobility rights’ afforded under the CCRF are more appropriate provisions to consider as a basis 
for a case in this regard.
287 CCRF (n l74) s.7
288 Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45 held, until being overturned in 1937, that minimum wages, 
maximum work hours and health and safety standards would not be mandatory as they infringed the ‘economic 
liberty’ o f industrialists. As a result the term ‘property’ was omitted from section 7 o f the CCRF to avoid a 
reproduction o f  such a decision being delivered in Canada, and hence only the life, liberty and security o f  the 
person are afforded.
289 Lugtig & Parkes (n l78) 14
290 This is given both the reluctance to afford economic rights highlight by Lugtig and Parkes (ibid.) and the 
decision to not afford lex specialis protection to indigenous practices which had taken on a cultural natures in 
the case o f Badger (n269)
291 Constitution Act (n200) s.35 and 291 CCRF (nl74) s,27
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In the instance of an indigenous populace, or ‘aboriginals’ as the Charter defines them, 
section 25 of the Charter,292 adds to this position by protecting established aboriginal rights 
from being detracted from in any way by the other rights contained within it. This provision 
therefore removes any potential negative impact of the implementation of rights contained 
within the Charter on the reserved lands provided under the numbered treaties293 between the 
Crown and the First Nations negotiated almost a century earlier. Similarly section 26 of the 
Charter affords a similar protection to all rights applicable in Canadian law, preventing the 
text being, ‘construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in 
Canada.’294 Thus unless it can be proven that the nature of the practice is commercial, to fail 
to take into account the particular context of an indigenous peoples and their traditions as a 
governmental authority would itself potentially be a breach of the Charter. However, the lack 
of a direct harm to physical integrity, and the rebuttable nature of the only basis on which that 
integrity might be threatened, namely the lack of nutrition and sanitation, remain considerable 
hurdles to overcome. This obstacle suggests that the ‘security of the person,’ protected under 
section 7, would not be likely to be held as having been breached by the licensing of 
arguably excessive consumption of natural water courses in the province of Alberta.
The severity of the potential impacts to flora and fauna of the province would require 
connection to a particular right afforded under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.295 This is owing to the fact that rights enshrined within the text are protected for
296citizens of Canada, and there is no specific right to an environmental standard therein. As 
discussed, the impacts of both land usage and water quantity might be mitigated to an extent
292 CCRF (n l74) s.25
293 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
294 CCRF (n l74) s.26
295 CCRF (n l74)
296 The non-proprietary nature o f the rights sought by the First Nations and enshrined within the numbered 
treaties discussed in the piece remove the desire on their part to apply Canadian Land Law, and indeed if they 
did so, title historically would rest with either the Crown (federal government) or the province.
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satisfactory to the judicial authorities to avoid breaching the most fundamental of these rights. 
This might be achieved by, for example, supplying water for drinking and sanitation via 
pipelines, or funding relocation to areas of a similar ecosystem without underlying tar sands 
raw material. By contrast should the impacts of the seepage of tailings ponds, and specifically 
harmful contaminants contained within them transfer to human inhabitants of the areas of 
Alberta exploited for the bitumen within the tar sands, thus affecting them directly, mitigation 
would be far less easily achieved if at all possible. Any such direct impact to the health of any 
citizens of the province, not just the First Nations peoples, would be of immense significance 
as it would potentially breach the provisions of section 7 of the Charter.297 The provision, 
whilst being derogable in respect of ‘security’ and ‘liberty,’ would necessitate a specific and 
severe circumstance to permit such a derogation. The effects of water quantity reductions in 
natural water courses, and land use would arguably not breach this provision therefore. As 
such they would likely be deemed justifiable limitations upon derogable rights on the basis of 
the massive economic and political benefits of the tar sands industry to not only Alberta itself, 
but also Canada as a whole.
Such factors would not however be able to limit the Article 7 right, particularly not in 
relation to the rights to ‘life,’ and ‘security’ in the context of physical security or health. The 
likelihood of effects to human health is minimal to say the least, the only suggestion of any 
such direct impact arises from tailings contaminants. Concerns in this regard are represented 
by the suggestion of increased rates of cancer in communities downstream from extraction
298and refinement projects, which were the subject of considerable controversy. However the 
potential alone, if verified scientifically, for such impacts would be of considerable weight in
297 CCRF (n l74) s. 7
298 Contrast the conclusions o f a study by the University o f Alberta, <http://www.ualberta.ca/~avnish/rls-2009- 
02-06-fort-chipewyan-study.pdf> Accessed 30th July 2014 with those o f Alberta Health Services,
<http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/poph/hi-poph-surv-cancer-appendix-i-fort-chip-2014-02-07.pdf>
Accessed 30th July 2014
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itself. Essentially the contention would be that the risk to human health was too great to be 
outweighed by the benefits, economic and political, of extracting and refining the tar sands 
raw material using current methods and without greater knowledge of the implications for the 
local populace.
Uncertainty with regards to the extent, if any, of the impacts suggested as having the 
potential to result from the continuation of operations as they are undertaken at present is 
common amongst the suggested bases for a case against the licensing of such projects.299 
However, the difference in relation to the seepage of tailings is the unavoidable nature of the 
impact. Whilst alternatives can be provided to potential damage to the life and security of 
individuals, indigenous or otherwise caused by reduced wildlife numbers or water quantity in 
the region which would mitigate damage done to such a degree as would be deemed 
reasonable by the courts, this is not the case in relation to tailings leakage.
In this instance the damage is potentially done by an addition or contaminant to the 
natural ecosystem. Excessive water usage, or disturbance of native wildlife and its habitat by 
contrast both involve the removal to some degree of a naturally occurring feature. As such the 
provision of alternatives, or equivalents is not an available method of mitigating damage, nor 
is utilising other means of fulfilling the demand for inputs to the extraction and refinement 
process.300 This fundamental difference between the impact of tailings and those of water 
consumption and wildlife disturbance, and generally between consumption and 
contamination, especially in the context of impacts to human health and life, is key in relation 
to the construction of a case opposing the licensing of tar sands projects based in human 
rights law. The inability to mitigate contamination considerably and quickly by any means
299 WMSLAR (n278)
300 In this case recycling water or increasing usage efficiency.
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other than direct reduction of production considerably constricts options to rebut the 
argument put forward. Coupled with the finality of the impacts felt, the result is as strong a 
basis for a case against the tar sands extraction and refinement projects of north east Alberta 
as has been suggested thus far.
Proving this impact is however a significant issue in relation to this contention as 
effects to human health would be highly contentious and need to be conclusive beyond any
reasonable criticism. Given the current debate surrounding the carcinogenic impact of
• • • •projects to aquatic species in the region and humans in one instance , the likelihood of
attaining irrefutable evidence of such impacts is small. The provisions of Article 7 of the
i n i  •
CCRF afford potentially one of the strongest bases for a case against the tar sands projects 
in terms of the potential outcomes for extraction projects should impacts be deemed a breach 
of this non-derogable and fundamental right.304 The proof of such a breach however is 
required to be equally as strong, which with present knowledge it is incapable of being.
301 Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and Misikew Cree First Nation, Environmental and Human Health 
Implications o f  the Athabasca Oil Sands fo r  the Mikisew Cree First Nation and Athabasca Chipewyan First 
Nation in Northern Alberta Phase Two Report, <https://intercontinentalcry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Executive-Summary-Fort-Chipewyan-Env-Health-Report-July-2014-Media.pdf> 
Accessed 30th July 2014. Note should be made that this report was funded entirely by the First Nations 
suggesting the adverse impacts to the environment in proximity to extraction projects.
302 Alberta Health Services, Appendix I
Fort Chipewyan Update Feb 7 2014  <http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/poph/hi-poph-surv-cancer-appendix- 
i-fort-chip-2014-02-07.pdf> Accessed 30th July 2014
303 CCRF (nl74)s. 7
304 Such outcomes would include, as a minimum, a temporary injunction on harmful activity until satisfactory 
evidence o f safety and adequate precaution had been provided.
305 See for example: WMSLAR (n278).
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3.32 Section 12 CCRF
Cruel and Unusual Treatment Resulting From Environmental Impacts
The potential for impacts to human health also allows for the suggestion of a breach 
of Article 12 of the Charter.306 A number of seminal cases would support the assertion that 
impacts to human health are considered far more highly than those to the wider ecosystem in 
the estimation of the courts.307 Where such impacts have not, or could not have, caused death, 
or were not deemed to have had a significant enough adverse effect they would not breach the 
personal security of the individual protected under section 7 of the Charter.308 However, 
persistent adversity faced by the indigenous populace as a result of leakage from tailings 
ponds in particular309 could be argued to constitute, ‘cruel and unusual treatment.’310 Such a 
suggestion would have to again be supported by considerable and verifiable empirical 
evidence of an impact capable of constituting such treatment.
Given the traditional conception of provisions akin to this across various jurisdictions 
and at all levels of legal enforcement as being applicable to torture establishing the impacts of 
seepage of contaminants from tailings ponds had caused such harm would be a substantial
311 •undertaking. The case of Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) in the Supreme 
Court of Canada however increased the potential utility of this provision by loosening this 
conceptual connection somewhat. The case suggested that, ‘“treatment” within the meaning
306 CCRF (n 174) s. 12
307 Hatton (n l86)
308 CCRF (n l74) s. 7
309 This is owing to the aforementioned lack o f direct impact to human health afforded by adversity faced 
primarily by flora and fauna o f a non-human nature, and the ability to avoid impacts owing to water 
consumption via the provision o f water via pipelines.
310 CCRF (n 174) s. 12
311 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519
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of section 12 may include that imposed by the state in contexts other than penal or quasi- 
penal, ... There must be some active state process in operation, involving an exercise of state 
control over the individual.’312 Thus in order to propose that the licensing of projects was 
harmful enough to indigenous peoples to breach the rights afforded under section 12 of the 
Charter, a two stage test must be overcome. Firstly the action causing the alleged harm must 
be deemed ‘treatment’ as loosely defined in Rodriguez,313 and secondly said treatment must 
be proved of a cruel and unusual nature.
The notion of treatment remains relatively undefined, beyond that it must involve 
being subject to the state administration or justice system in this context.314 In this particular 
instance, it is suggested that the administrative process involved in the licensing of tar sands 
extraction projects is ample to constitute the ‘active state process’ as espoused under the 
Rodriguez definition. The difficulty would come in establishing whether this process 
involved the ‘exercise of control over the individual.’ Whilst the licensing process is not an 
example of direct control over the individual in a manner akin to incarceration, it does have 
undeniable impacts upon the populace with which the piece is concerned. An issue here 
might be the contention that the protections afforded under section 12 are construed only as 
applicable to the individual, thus demanding that the alleged impact be felt by an individual. 
However as numerous individuals could bring the same case in this particular context, such
315an argument would be rebutted.
312 ibid. 612 per La Forest C.J.
313 ibid.
314 ibid.
315 Such an eventuality was considered by the UNHRC in the communication concerning the Lubicon Lake 
Band, though their then leader, Bernard Ominayak was permitted to bring a case in his name alone on their 
behalf. Lubicon Lake Bandv. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/45/40) at 1 (1990).
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The contention would be a valid one were the proposed breach an impact felt only 
where an individual was a member of the group and was in no other way different. In this 
instance the suggestion would have to be therefore that a non-indigenous person who sought 
his livelihood and sustenance from the specific ecosystem of the region would not feel the 
impacts of the extraction projects as he was not a member of a First Nation. Such a 
suggestion clearly would be seen as farcical in this instance, as an individual who had also 
continued to seek his livelihood from traditional practices in the manner that the First Nations 
do so, would be impacted upon identically. The issue therefore is that the provisions of 
section 12 does not prima facie account for the cultural significance of acts.316 Thus whilst 
the concept of treatment under section 12 was expanded by Rodriguez and is of undeniable 
utility to the piece in allowing the suggestion of a breach, the broad construction presents 
potential issues of its own.
Unlike the broad definition applied to the concept of treatment however, there is an 
established test for whether ‘cruel and unusual,’ nature, namely the question as to whether it
• ”317is ‘so excessive as to outrage standards of decency.’ The consistent nature and degree of 
harm would likely be key to such a suggestion. As such the inhibition of reproductive
o i o
function in humans such as that seen in aquatic species such as frogs and fish would be a
316 This assessment fits with established precedents in this regard, with the focus being the severity o f  harm, 
though the consideration o f impacts which cannot be medically ascertained was considered in a case concerning 
section 7 o f the CCRF where it was deemed that impacts need only be, ‘greater than ordinary.’ New Brunswick 
(Minister o f  Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 SCR 46, 60
317 Miller et al. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 SCR 680, 681 per Laskin C.J.
318 Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and Misikew Cree First Nation, Environmental and Human Health 
Implications o f  the Athabasca Oil Sands fo r  the Mikisew Cree First Nation and Athabasca Chipewyan First 
Nation in Northern Alberta Phase Two Report, <https://intercontinentalcry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Executive-Summary-Fort-Chipewyan-Env-Health-Report-July-2014-Media.pdf> 
Accessed 30th July 2014. Note should be made that this report was funded entirely by the First Nations 
suggesting the adverse impacts to the environment in proximity to extraction projects.
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potential breach of this provision.319 Similarly continuous and restrictive or painful and 
severely uncomfortable impacts having physical or psychological effects might also breach 
the right afforded by Article 12.320 The breach of the threshold of outraging standards of 
decency may prove difficult where impacts are not as direct as in the traditional conception of 
cruel and unusual treatment as being akin to torture.321
In this context the case of Rodriguez is again of particular relevance as here it was the 
suggestion that ‘a mere prohibition’322 could not be deemed treatment, but that an actual 
denial of autonomy and decision making for the individual coupled with physical 
ramifications might be deemed as being treatment of a ‘cruel and unusual’ nature. The case 
concerned the prohibition of assisted suicide and it was deemed that the provision itself could 
not constitute treatment and thus breach section 12, but that a positive action on the part of 
the state could. Thus the obiter dicta comments of Justice La Forest allow for the use of 
section 12 in the context of the piece by expanding the concept of cruel and unusual treatment 
beyond merely potential instances arising in the pursuit of criminal sanctions to include 
broader contexts affecting the liberty of the individual.
The difficulty again would lie in the significant burden of proof attached to any 
suggested breach of articles bearing such implications of harm to humans. Whilst impacts to 
human health have been suggested, the veracity of these claims has been subject to 
unresolved media debate, and uncontested and confirmed scientific studies regarding such 
concerns are not available. The lack of evidence of such impacts might simply be owing to
319 Such an impact would undoubtedly, ‘outrage standards o f decency’ as prescribed in M iller et al. v. The 
Queen, [1977] 2 SCR 680, 681
320 CCRF (n 174) s. 12
321 The concept o f ‘greater than ordinary’ impact (New Brunswick (Minister o f  Health and Community Services) 
v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 SCR 46, 60) might be suggested here, but again the requisite severity and immediacy o f harm 
is somewhat lacking.
3“  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 522
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the delayed impacts of contaminants to species higher within food webs and chains, as a 
result of the need for said substances to build up within those species lower in the chain 
before their impacts are felt within its higher echelons.323 In the case of the indigenous 
populace of the north east of Alberta, the sharing of traditionally hunted food within the 
social group, and the hunting of such species only in seasons where they are present on the
324land, would significantly increase the time taken for such impacts to be noticeable. 
Conversely however this unique utilisation would also, once any impacts had become 
apparent, add significant weight to any case proposed. The acute nature of impacts to the 
indigenous populace and thus heightened severity to them in comparison to other Albertans, 
would support the suggestion that they were treatment of a ‘cruel and unusual’ nature, not 
merely a prohibition.
These assertions are however considerably speculative, and although substances 
contained within the tailings ponds material are capable of having impacts such as those
one
described above, the likelihood of them occurring is at present unascertainable. The extent 
of seepage and its contents are certainly not accurately known and as such any suggestion as 
to the utility of this article for the construction of a case against the licensing of extraction 
and refinement projects on this basis must be treated with an equal measure of uncertainty. In 
a manner akin to the provision of section 7326 regarding life liberty and security of the person, 
this right is generally considered of a non-derogable nature.327 The strength of a case on the 
basis of a breach of this right would therefore be substantial. However, the burden of proof
323 A process known as, and hereinafter referred to as, bioacummulation.
324 The boreal woodland caribou is a wild and migratory species, and as such hunting them is only possible in 
seasons where they are present within the reserve lands o f the First Nations.
325 See for example: WMSLAR (n278)
326 CCRF (n l74) s.7
327 Theoretically Article 1 o f  the Charter allows derogation from all articles o f  the text, though precedents o f the 
Canadian courts would suggest that this is not the case in relation to a handful o f provisions.
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required to be shown by the court to afford the significant protection and highly restrictive 
outcome to the government enshrined by the provision, would likely be too great.
Similarly, whilst the suggestion obiter dicta in the case of Rodriguez that ‘treatment’ 
could be constituted by actions other than penal or quasi-penal in nature,328 this has been 
restrictively applied. As such, the vast majority of precedents in this regard undeniably 
concern actions of such a nature. From the perspective of a legal representative constructing a 
case such as that suggested by the piece, based on the breach of established human rights as a 
result of the licensing of projects, this gives rise to another concern. A case brought on the 
basis of cruel and unusual treatment would have to cross two interpretative hurdles. Firstly 
that the damage incurred as a result of the seepage of permitted tailings ponds and other 
impacts constituted treatment, and secondly that the impacts arising were so severe as to be 
deemed cruel and unusual in nature. Whilst such a suggestion does not detract from the 
validity of the legal argument presented here, given the aim of the piece to construct a basis 
for a case against the licensing of the tar sands in human rights law, the practical issues of 
any suggested bases must also be considered where of significance. The burden of proof 
attached to the provision concerning cruel and unusual treatment,329 owing to its links to 
concepts of torture and inhumane harm, would be likely to inhibit its potential use given the 
lack of incontrovertible evidence to suggest harm of a requisite severity as has been discussed.
328 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 522
329 CCRF (n 174) s. 12
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3.4 Suppressions of Abilities Protected bv Canadian Human Rights Law
3.41 Section 6 CCRF
Right to Pursue the Gaining of a Livelihood
Upon a cursory examination of the provisions of the CCRF, the mobility rights 
afforded under section 6 may not be the first freedom suggested as protecting the securing 
of the most fundamental requirements for life through a means of one’s own choosing. 
Indeed understandably section 7 of the CCRF protecting the right to life, liberty and security 
of the person331 would often be suggested in such circumstances as being the most 
appropriate provision. The principle being that it is a basic economic liberty to possess the 
unrestricted ability to choose a form of work, and to be able to work more broadly within 
reasonable bounds.332 However, as Hogg states in relation to constraints upon the notion of a 
right to work, ‘Despite some lower court decisions to the contrary,’ they, ‘should be regarded 
as restrictions on economic liberty that are outside the scope of s.7.’333 The liberty described 
therein is, though not absolutely, ‘mainly addressed to the rights of individuals in the criminal 
justice system,’334 as has been discussed.
Section 6(2)(a) of the CCRF however offers an alternative approach to the protection 
of environmental features upon which the traditional practices of the First Nations peoples of
330 ibid. s.6
331 ibid. s.7
332 Limits to such liberties are permitted under the strict criteria for limitations to rights prescribed by s.l o f the 
CCRF and the aligned case precedents expanding thereon.
333 Hogg, (n214) 903
334 ibid.
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the Alberta are reliant. The ‘mobility right’ affords protection to the ability, ‘to move to and 
take up residence in any province, and to pursue the gaining of a livelihood.’335 The issue of 
mobility however is not one with which most First Nations are concerned, indeed owing to 
their inherent links to particular geographical, ecological and topographical constants by 
virtue of their culture, the exact opposite is nearer the truth. The so-called ‘mobility rights’ 
enshrined within Section 6 were incorporated into the text of the CCRF to facilitate 
movement between provinces, and avoid the restriction of such practice to the benefit or
detriment of one province over another. The policy this represents is highly akin to that of the
1-1/'
free movements of persons and work within the context of European Union Law. The 
provision thus reflects a desire to avoid exploitation of the federal structure by the citizen and 
the state alike through the protection of the rights therein themselves.
The discussion of the utility of this provision will therefore surround the ability it 
affords to remain, and to take up particular activities to provide for oneself and family. 
Specifically the impacts of the tar sands extraction projects upon the efficacy of remaining on 
traditional lands and using established cultural practices to secure a livelihood, or aspects 
thereof will be the central focus. The reasoning for this focus is the established precedent that, 
‘The Charter has never before and still does not protect economic liberty or property 
rights.’337 As such the suggestion of a breach must be based upon an impact of the requisite 
severity to deter establishing in a particular geographic region, or to promote relocation from 
one, obviously the more relevant impact to the focus of the piece.
CCRF (n l74) s.6(2)(a)
336 Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning o f the European Union [2012] OJ C 326 /47 
Art. 45
337 Archibald  v. Canada (T.D.) [1997] 3 F.C. 335
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The notion of livelihood encompasses not only a more traditional conception of 
financial self-sufficiency, but, ‘a means of securing the necessities of life.’ 338 Caribou 
represent such a ‘necessity of life’ for indigenous peoples in the province, especially in the 
north eastern region of Alberta, home to the Beaver Lake Cree First Nation. In their legal 
challenge to the granting of numerous extraction licences, they refer to the reduction in, ‘the 
abundance and diversity of wildlife species,’ ‘the available wildlife habitat,’ and, ‘the access 
to key hunting....areas’ and add that the developments have the effect of, ‘compromising the 
ecological, cultural and/or spiritual integrity of the Core Traditional Territory.’ 339 The 
challenge was brought, however, on the basis of the breach of the constitutionally protected 
aboriginal rights provided under the numbered treaties and no mention of any applicable 
human rights provisions is made.
The effect to caribou and other wildlife numbers in the province, especially in its 
north eastern quarter, is one on which such a challenge might be mounted as a result of this 
relatively liberal application of domestic human rights provisions with respect to individuals 
rather than structural issues by the various levels of the Canadian judiciary.340 A study into 
the recent decline in numbers of boreal woodland caribou in the ‘Core Traditional Territory’ 
of the Beaver Lake Cree First Nation, which covers approximately 39000 square kilometres 
of the north east of Alberta, where it borders Saskatchewan, has found their population to 
have been reduced ‘ten-fold from historical numbers,’ and predicts that at the current rate of 
decline this type of caribou will be locally extinct shortly after 2040, with the species
338 A definition common across dictionaries, and also that utilised by the Red Cross (UK) and numerous aid 
agencies as well as academic authors. See for example: Morse, S. and McNamara, N. Sustainable Livelihood 
Approach: A Critique o f  Theory and Practice (Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, 2013) 8
339 Beaver Lake Cree Statement o f  Claim against the Province o f  Alberta and the Attorney General o f  Canada. 
2008 at 7. <http://www.beaverlakecreenation.ca/upload/documents/statementofclaim.pdl>  Accessed 13th 
December 2011
340 Galabuzi, G-E. Equalizing Social and Cultural Rights: Approaches to Equity Across Ethnic and Racial 
Groups in Heyman, J and Cassola, A. (eds.) Making Equal Rights Real: Taking Effective Action to Overcome 
Global Challenges (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 173
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reaching a level deemed ‘non-recoverable’ by 2025.341 Reasons other than the tar sands 
developments can be cited as contributory to this decline, such as the growth of agriculture in 
the province, as this causes significant habitat loss. However, the decline has accelerated 
beyond levels which could reasonably be attributed to this. As such the habitat loss and 
increased mortality owing to the tar sands developments in the ranges of the herds of north 
eastern Alberta are suggested to be largely to blame for this decline towards unsustainable 
numbers.342
Despite this clear decline in woodland caribou numbers and similar disturbances to 
other wildlife in the region, tar sands development projects continue apace, and are approved 
and permitted by the governmental authorities of Alberta. The lack of recognition for, and 
continuation in spite of, the damage wrought to the ecosystem so inextricably linked to the 
indigenous peoples of the province as to threaten their way of life and continued existence is 
suggested by the piece as being the basis for a human rights law challenge to the government. 
The numbered treaties contain provisions allowing for use of the land reserved for the 
indigenous peoples of Alberta by the Crown in certain instances, as is the case the other 
numbered treaties concerning the provinces forming Canada. Both Treaty 6 and Treaty 8 
contain very similar provisions protecting the right to, ‘hunting, trapping and fishing, 
throughout the tract surrendered .... excepting such tracts as may be required .... for settlement, 
mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.’343 The SCC has held however that the use of 
aboriginal land for such purposes, ‘must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the
341 The Cooperative Save the Caribou: Stop the Tar Sands. (2010) < http://www.co-
operative.coop/upload/ToxicFuels/docs/caribou-report.pdf > Accessed 13th December 2011. pp. 2. Note should 
be made that this report was funded by the Cooperative, and although conducted by an academic and scientific 
expert, was sought by them to support an ongoing campaign opposing tar sands extraction projects in the 
regions outlined therein.
342 ibid. 6
343 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
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attachment to the land which forms the basis of the particular group’s aboriginal title.’344 
Hogg uses the practice of hunting as an illustration of the practical implications of the ruling 
in Guerin v. The Queen,345 stating that, ‘land occupied for hunting purposes could not be 
converted to strip mining, for example.’346
In the territory of the Beaver Lake Cree, and other nations in Alberta, however, vast 
swathes of land have been strip mined in order for the tar sands to be extracted before 
refinement into highly lucrative crude oil. Note should be made that not all land affected by 
the developments is subject to the reservations for the indigenous populous as their specific 
dwelling sites are not within a reasonable proximity of those projects, nor can it be shown to 
be hunting grounds for caribou, potential or actual. Similarly considerable debate surrounds 
not the results of the scientific studies into caribou herds, but the solutions or policies 
suggested by them. The response of some tribes has in some instances been to forego their 
traditional ways in order to secure legally enforceable employment quotas and shares in 
extraction companies, 347 and even to establish their own companies in the industry. 
Undeniably however, even the less visually apparent use of in-situ mining as a means of 
extraction where such open pit mining is not viable is severely restrictive on the utility of the 
land for the purpose of hunting caribou as has been discussed.348 Thus the land surrendered to 
the Crown under the numbered treaties is protected from any action which would inhibit the 
purpose for which it was reserved, one of which is the ability to sustain those inhabiting it
Hogg (n214) 592
345 Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335
346Hogg, (n214) 592
347 See in relation to the projects the Syncrude Canada corporation: Anderson, R.B. Economic Development 
Among the Aboriginal Peoples o f  Canada: The Hope fo r the Future (Captus Press Inc. Concord, Ontario, 1999) 
97-128
348 Industry acceptance o f  such impacts is arguably evident from considerable investment in projects aimed at 
reducing such effects, sometimes beyond that required by the criteria placed upon the permitting o f their 
projects.
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through such practices, a right also protected under human rights provisions in the domestic 
law of Canada.349
The weight of physical and thus largely irrefutable evidence in relation to this issue, 
such as the studies into the impacts on specific and significant wildlife in the province, which 
bears inextricable links to the indigenous peoples themselves, is however almost unique in 
the debate surrounding the tar sands. Many elements of evidence presented by the opposing 
interested parties are often disputed, and mirrored by contradictory claims and evidence as is 
to be expected, but this is not the case in relation to much of the data concerning the effects 
upon caribou specifically. Indeed there is even agreement across tar sands support and 
opposition groups that impacts are felt by the ecosystem as a whole, their degree and the most 
appropriate response to them is the main bone of contention.
Difficulties in proving the adverse effects to caribou arise however owing to the 
efforts to prevent such environmental damage by extraction companies. Added to this is the 
reality that the migratory nature of the species ensures it is problematic to illustrate the 
extinguishment of the ability to hunt them effectively. As a result the likelihood of a judicial 
body ruling that said damage outweighs the considerable economic benefit of the tar sands is 
significantly reduced. In spite of this, the unique consensus on the damage wrought and its 
highly visible nature makes rebutting concerns over the impacts by citing the economic 
benefits of the extraction projects more difficult than in relation to less apparent effects. As 
such to entirely disregard this as forming at least a potential aspect of a human rights based 
challenge to the tar sands developments would be remiss to say the least.
349 CCRF (n l74) and Treaties 6 and 8 (n68).
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The right to gain a livelihood350 could also be argued to have been breached by the 
excessive extraction of water from the watercourses of the province. However, a clear impact 
of that extraction on fish health and numbers, or a lack of sufficient consideration for the 
potential for such impacts would have to be shown. In this regard connecting the right to 
‘hunt, trap and fish’ afforded under the numbered treaties351 to the right to gaining a 
livelihood in the CCRF would be reliant solely upon establishing the link between river flow 
levels and fish populations. This is as no physical barriers per se352 are imposed upon the 
First Nations peoples who continue to fish using traditional methods. A number of difficulties 
arise in relation to establishing this impact, most prominently that even the scientists tasked 
with ascertaining those impacts are unsure as to the potential adverse effects, if indeed any of
i n
note would be felt. Whilst the reduction in the flow rates of water courses to levels 
incapable of supporting the physical space required for fish migration and spawning might 
constitute a breach of the aforementioned rights, there is no suggestion that this is likely, and 
would be avoided using the current monitoring and licensing approach.
The key factor is whether the withdrawals of water, both current and those planned 
for which licences have already been applied, would reduce river flow rates to such a level to 
have an adverse impact significant enough to prevent or severely limit the ability of the few 
First Nations who continue to do so to fish using traditional methods. Numerous studies have 
attempted to ascertain at what level such impacts would be felt, though few have established 
any findings capable of supporting an agreed policy.354 The variability in the climate of the 
boreal forest and opposite seasonal changes from northern to southern Alberta are most often
350 CCRF (n l74) s .6
351 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
352 In itself.
353 As illustrated by the statement o f the provincial government relating to fish stocks impacted upon by water 
consumption in the tar sands industry. WMSLAR (n278)
354 ibid.
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highlighted as the reasoning for this. As Andrew Nikiforuk, a journalist, author, and prolific 
opponent to the tar sands developments, states, ‘To date, nobody can say with any certainty 
whether the province’s promiscuous permission-granting has left enough water in the 
Athabasca for the fish.’355
The authorities governing the ‘Water Management Framework’ for the Lower 
Athabasca River, the portion predominantly affected by the tar sands developments, have 
openly admitted that, ‘Methods for directly determining the impact of reduced water 
availability on the aquatic ecosystem are not available for the lower Athabasca River and to 
our knowledge are rare in the international scientific literature.’356 Nikiforuk goes further 
than implying mere lack of knowledge however, suggesting that, ‘except for members of the 
Alberta government and one industry group...most observers now recognise that current
I f  *7
water usage on the Athabasca River is recklessly unsustainable.’ Whilst quantitative 
evidence cannot at present fully support either side of this crucial debate, it would appear that 
Nikiforuk’s assertion that most parties are aware that some changes need to be made to 
ensure tar sands extraction and processing is more sustainable is correct.
Despite these acceptances, extraction continues unabated, indeed within the Alberta 
government’s own ‘Water for Life’ Action Plan designed to ensure water quality and quantity 
in the province, the establishment of a new licensing framework is not scheduled until 
2015.358 Whilst this reform might avoid the current position whereby industry is to some 
extent incentivised to withdraw all the water permitted under their license, current levels of 
usage and projected expansions in the years between now and then may result in irreparable
355 Nikiforuk, A. Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future o f  a Continent (2010, Vancouver, Greystone Books) 65
356 WMSLAR (n278)
357 Nikiforuk, A. Tar Sands: D irty Oil and the Future o f  a Continent (2010, Vancouver, Greystone Books) 68
358 Government o f  Alberta, ‘Water fo r  L ife’ (2009) <http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/8236.pdf>  at 
page 15(Last accessed 2nd April 2012)
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damage to the ecosystems supported by the rivers affected before such a reform could be 
implemented.
Whilst sections 6(1) and 6(2)(b) are prima facie of reduced utility in relation to 
contaminant seepage than to the other impacts discussed, the provision of section 6(2)(b) 
regarding the right, ‘to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province,’360 is worthy of 
further consideration. Unlike the aforementioned provisions, section 6(2)(b) might be 
breached prior to the impact of the leakage of tailings ponds becoming irreversible, or beyond 
a point at which taking legal action for the purposes of protection of the environment would 
be futile, and would instead be based upon seeking compensation. This is due to the subject 
matter of the article, and its potential applicability in relation to non-human factors. As has 
been clarified above, the damage required to compel the indigenous populace of the regions 
exploited to vacate or deter them from inhabiting their lands would be considerable, 
potentially to the point of being irrevocable. This would undermine the aim of the piece to 
protect, not to compensate for, those environmental features inextricably linked to the 
cultures of the First Nations peoples.
The level and nature of contamination which would inhibit the ability of the 
indigenous populace, ‘to pursue the gaining of a livelihood,’361 or an element thereof would 
be lower and take less time to develop than direct harms to human health. This is owing to 
the process of bioaccumulation through the food chains of the ecosystem. Note should be 
taken that, as has been discussed, the concept of a livelihood requires the attainment of
359 See in this regard the report o f the Pembina Institute outlining the flaws present in the current approach to 
licensing water withdrawals in the industry: Pembina Institute Troubled Waters, Troubling Trends: Technology 
and Policy Options to Reduce Water Use in Oil and Oil Sands Development in Alberta. May 2006 
<http://www.pembina.org/reports/TroubledW_Full.pdf> Accessed 30n July 2014.
360 CCRF (n l74) s.6(2)(b)
361 ibid.
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rewards or benefits of a pecuniary or alternatively a non-pecuniary nature.362 In the case of 
the First Nations inhabiting the boreal forest ecosystems where tar sands extraction is at its 
most prevalent in Alberta, the hunting of caribou, trapping of smaller mammals, and fishing 
are all used as a means of both securing sustenance and also as an expression of culture 
through traditional practices. As such effects felt in species below humans in the food chain 
of the ecosystem in question might arguably breach the rights afforded to any citizens of 
Canada opting to exploit those species in the pursuit of a livelihood enshrined within section 
6(2)(b).
Any suggestion of a breach of section 6 in its entirety, though especially in the case of 
section 6(2)(b), would be supported significantly by the status of the boreal woodland caribou, 
on the list of species highlighted as areas of concern within the Species at Risk Act 1985. 
The suggestion could be made that the impacts of a limited amount of tailings pond seepage 
was reasonable under the precedent of the Oakes364 case owing to having been sustained in 
pursuit of economic and political rewards. Such a proposition would however be significantly 
weakened if not rebutted entirely by the added concern to the continuation of the species 
affected. Thus impacts to the boreal woodland caribou are amplified both due to their already 
low numbers and by the reliance on them to facilitate the cultural expression of the First 
Nations. The inextricable links between species native to the region and the culture of the 
aboriginal populace of the same territory, undeniably strengthen the argument that the 
seepage of tailings ponds threatens those links as a result of the reality that one of the key 
species in question is itself already a scarce resource. From the perspective of the utility of
362 The notion o f a ‘standard o f  living’ within the section 6 right as opposed to particular features thereof 
supports this assertion as does precedent, particularly in the field o f divorce law. See the consideration of 
components classified as an aspect o f a ‘standard o f living in: Droit de lafam ille  - 111526, 2011 QCCS 2662
363 Species At Risk Act 1985 S.C. 2002 c.29
",64 Oakes (n207).
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• 365 •section 6(2)(b) it is the combination of both the nature of the potential damage of the 
seepage from tailings ponds and the ‘at risk’ status of the species which add considerable 
influence.
The potential for the impact to eradicate, not just force the relocation of the 
indigenous fauna on which their culture is predicated, eliminates the capacity of the 
governmental authorities to negate the impact by facilitating relocation of tribes or providing 
reserves elsewhere. Was this not the case, relocation would preserve the status quo and add to 
the contention of reasonableness of the projects given the substantial economic rewards 
conceivably on offer. Add to this the precarious position of a highly significant species 
amongst those potentially affected also reducing the likelihood of any impact thereto being 
deemed reasonable, and the contention of the continued licensing of projects being a 
justifiable balance of all outcomes and effects begins to appear a very weak one indeed. The 
utility of this article for the purposes of establishing a basis for a case against the licensing of 
tar sands extraction projects owing to the impacts to water quantity and direct land 
consumption by means of disturbance is, though comparatively far less than in relation to the 
contamination caused by seepage from tailings ponds, is certainly not negligible.
The finality of the potential effects of contaminants to the flora and fauna of north 
east Alberta, where extraction, and as a result tailings ponds are at their most prevalent, 
coupled with the lack of predictability of those impacts under present measurement regimes, 
suggests that they would potentially be deemed to have breached the ability of First Nations 
to, ‘pursue the gaining of a livelihood.’366 The only caveat to this being that the lack of 
scientific monitoring of the impact of tailings leakage and the extent thereof is the epitome of
365 CCRF (n 174) s.6(2)(b)
366 ibid. s. 6(2)(b)
a proverbial double edged sword. This is as the inherent risk of ignoring the potential impacts, 
is easily parried by the contention that also they cannot be easily proven. Thus whilst the 
impact of the tailings leakage is potentially the most damaging of the impacts assessed to the 
ability of the First Nations to express their cultural heritage through hunting and fishing using 
traditional techniques, it is ironically also one of the hardest to prove.
3.42 Section 15 CCRF
Equality of Consideration of Impacts in the Licensing Process
The majority of the breaches proposed by the piece concern a failure in the licensing 
process to implement measures to avoid adverse impacts, or a lack of consideration of the 
risks of extraction. However failing to consider correctly impacts acknowledged as occurring 
which have particularly acute and onerous effects upon a particular subset of the populace 
might give rise to a breach of the rights of those peoples to special consideration. The impacts 
of the tar sands projects are highly visible and in some way impact upon a considerable 
proportion of the population of Alberta, whether positively or negatively. This reality inhibits 
some arguments made in the piece, as said impacts must be weighed and balanced by 
governing authorities. The level of harm specifically to the indigenous populace of Alberta 
specifically as a result of adverse impacts from tar sands extraction remains however of 
considerable utility.
The potential impacts of tailings pond leakage, excessive water consumption and land 
usage would affect all peoples of the regions exploited in the pursuit of oil reserves. However, 
it could be said that greater effects are felt by the First Nations peoples as a result of these 
impacts. The leakage of contaminants from tailings ponds would also have impacts felt solely,
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and most pointedly, by the indigenous First Nations population of the north east of Alberta, 
which may go otherwise unfelt by those not following and practising the cultural traditions of 
those peoples. This distinction in the manner in which the impacts are felt, rather than their 
severity specifically is key to the contention that an instance of discrimination arises upon an 
assessment of the licensing process used for tar sands projects.
In relation to section 12 the severity of said impacts supported the contention that 
they would constitute ‘cruel and unusual treatment.’ 367 However, in this instance, the 
suggestion is that the increased and specific impacts to the indigenous populace are worthy of 
particular consideration within the licensing process, in order to take account of their 
peculiarly acute nature. As such it is the failure to consider potential heightened impacts to 
these peoples above and beyond those felt by the general populace of affected regions that is 
key. At present where impacts are ascertainable, such as those of deforestation, they are taken 
into account. However potential impacts, such as those from seepage of tailings fluid 
which are not yet fully ascertainable, where taken into account are not assessed for their 
heightened effect upon the proximal indigenous populace.369 Similarly requirements for the 
monitoring potential impacts are not necessitated by current legislation. Federal and 
provincial governments are bound to take such impacts peculiar to the indigenous peoples
CCRF (n l74) s. 12
368 See the guidelines for completing the required Environmental Field Report component o f an application for a 
license to extract oil sands in Alberta: http://esrd.alberta.ca/forms-maps-services/forms/lands-forms/guides- 
forms-completion/documents/EnvironmentalFieldReports-Instructions-SurfaceDispositions-May2008.pdf 
Accessed 30th July 2014.
369 Even in the case o f the specific First Nations Oil and Gas Moneys Management Act SC 2005 c48 and 
annexed First Nations Oil and Gas Environmental Assessment Regulations, SOR/2007-272 under which First 
Nations can manage industrial projects physically occupying their own reserve lands, traditional and community 
knowledge does not have to be taken into account in environmental impact assessments. Under existing 
measures, those applying for a licence to extract need only consult with First Nations regarding environmental 
impacts, as required by the Environmental Field Report aspect o f their project approval. See the guidelines for 




and their lands into account.370 As such, this failure to consider is suggested as giving rise to 
an instance of discrimination and breach of section 15 of the CCRF371 and provincial 
legislation prohibiting discrimination in the conduct of public administration, including 
licensing procedures.
The reason for this is the idiosyncratic connection these peoples have with the 
particular environment which they inhabit, and specifically their sourcing of foodstuffs 
primarily, if not solely, from the ecosystem on which their culture is based. All peoples of 
Alberta might eat fish taken from the rivers and other water courses of the regions impacted 
and, as has been eluded to, indigenous populations relying on this source alone are few in 
number. The difference between the cultural backgrounds is found in the consumption of 
larger fauna, in this instance the boreal woodland caribou.372 By eating the fauna of the 
region, in which over time the contaminants seeping into natural watercourses would build up, 
the First Nations hunting boreal woodland caribou as a source of sustenance would become
o n ' l
exposed to said contaminants themselves via a process of bioaccumulation. Similarly the 
exhaustion of natural water courses, whilst not preventing access to water should pipelines be 
installed, removes the ability of First Nations to fish, and would likely deter native wildlife 
from surrounding areas. As such the impacts to them would be considerably greater in this 
regard than to other sections of communities of the regions where existing tars sands
370 Under their duty to consult and accommodate aboriginal peoples in decision making processes espoused in R 
v Van der Pee t [  1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 and reiterated in the case o f Haida Nation v BC  [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, [2004] 
S.C.C. 73
371 CCRF (n l74) s. 15
372 The First Nations regularly hunt and trap other animals than the boreal woodland caribou as has been 
outlined. However, the volume o f  meat taken from a caribou, its distribution amongst communities, as well as 
the focus o f scientific research into the impact o f  the tar sands on fauna being upon this species make it the most 
relevant animal to discuss in the context o f the piece.
373 Defined by Alberta Environment as, ‘A widespread term that describes a process by which chemical 
compounds are taken up by terrestrial and aquatic organisms from the medium directly and through the 
consumption o f contaminated food’ in their ‘Glossary o f  Reclamation and Remediation Terms Used in Alberta: 
Alberta Environment. G lossary o f  Reclamation and Remediation Terms Used in Alberta
7th edition May 2002 < http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/6843.pdf>. Accessed 30th July 2014.
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operations are active and new projects continue to be licensed. The particular nature and 
degree of these impacts or the possibility thereof, if not taken into consideration when 
licensing projects despite impacts of more universal influence being so, could also be argued 
to constitute discrimination against the First Nations peoples.
Until relatively recently such a suggestion would have faced a number of obstacles 
which have only recently been removed by a progression towards the granting of absolute 
equality with regards to legal rights to the aboriginal peoples of Canada.374 First Nations, and 
especially those whose bands had signed the numbered treaties375 had been restricted with 
regards to their ability to suggest they had been discriminated against under the Canadian
' i n f .
Human Rights Act. Specifically this was in relation to the provision of services by 
governmental authorities where they were born out of powers under the Indian Act 1985 .
The Indian Act governs the legal rights of Indians in relation to a wide range of issues, 
including the recognition and definition of the term Indian itself. Thus the ability to claim its 
provisions for those to whom it applied or was being so incorrectly due to ‘discriminatory 
practices’378 was of paramount significance. This exemption was due to the wording of 
section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act379 which stipulated that, ‘Nothing in this Act 
affects any provision of the Indian Act or any provision made under or pursuant to that 
Act.’380
374 Assembly o f  First Nations. Canadian Human Rights Act Applies to First Nations Governments May 2011
<http://www.afn.ca/index.php/en/news-media/current-issues/canadian-human-rights-act-applies-to-first-nation-
govemments-on-june-.> Accessed 30th July 2014.
375 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
376 CHRAct (n243)
377 Indian Act R.S.C. 1985, c.1-5
378 Defined in detail in section 5 o f the CHR Act (n243)
379 CHR Act (n243) s. 67
380 ;U; ,
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Only in 2008 were First Nations peoples resident on reserve lands afforded under the 
numbered treaties able to have standing on the basis of discrimination against the federal and 
respective provincial governments in relation to any actions based on the powers afforded to 
them under the Indian Act.381 This was in spite of their being subject to the legislation and 
administration they laid down as Canadian citizens owing to the provisions of the same Act. 
Not until 2011 however, were such peoples able to bring cases accusing discrimination 
against First Nations as government bodies were granted period of exemption to apply 
necessary reforms.382 In relation to any case against decisions regarding tar sands licensing 
and regulations relating to the construction and management of tailings ponds such a case 
would be brought against the federal government. Thus such a case has only recently been 
possible should it be contested that the services provided by the provincial government in this 
regard were afforded in a discriminatory manner. Prior to this, however such an action was
'X &Tpossible under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This divide in the potential 
avenues for the construction of a case in relation to discriminatory practice is due to the 
Canadian Human Rights Act384 being focused primarily on the protection of individuals in 
relation to employment and public services. The consideration here must be made as to 
whether the licensing of tar sands projects, regulation of the tailings ponds, and monitoring 
thereof, constitute services.
• • 385Similar issues must also be considered in relation to section 15 of the CCRF, 
which on a restrictive prima facie reading only protects discrimination, ‘before and under the 
law,’386 though more expansive approaches established in case precedents387 would suggest a
381 Indian Act R.S.C. 1985, c.1-5
•509 '
Assembly o f First Nations. (n349)
383 CCRF (n l74)
384 CHR Act (n243)
385 CCRF (n l74) s. 15
386 ibid. s. 15(1)
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far broader protection than this might suggest is afforded. As a result of the potential utility of 
both instruments in the pursuance of a viable basis for a case against the permitting of the tar 
sands extraction projects based in human rights law, they will both be considered in the piece 
in relation to the use of powers exclusively possessed by the federal government. Where the 
services in question are attributable to powers exclusively possessed by the provincial 
legislatures of Canada, in this case Alberta, the piece shall consider the provisions of the 
Alberta Human Rights Act 20 00,388 though these are for the purposes of the piece almost 
indistinguishable to those of the federal legislation governing the same issues.389
The federal390 and provincial391 human rights instruments concerning the provision of, 
‘services...that are customarily available to the public,’392 are highly restricted in their use in 
relation to the construction of a case against the licensing of tar sands projects. Such an action 
must be brought against a federally regulated organisation or against a measure authorised by 
federal statute. Protection from the adverse impacts of tailings pond seepage into the natural 
water courses and bodies of the north east of Alberta, and maintenance of water levels might 
well be described as such a service. Other impacts such as excessive water consumption, or 
land usage are not afforded to the First Nations directly, the impacts to them are merely 
corollary393 to a service, licensing, to which they are not a party.394
387
Law v. Canada (Minister o f  Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 and R. v. Kapp  [2008] 2 
S.C.R. 483
388 AHR Act (n242)
389 CHR Act (n243)
390 ibid.
391 AHR Act (n242)
ibid. s. 4(a) and found in a mirror provision in the CHR Act (n243) s.5(a).
The assumption here being that a supply o f water other than that existing in the natural sources is afforded by 
way of replacement to rebut claims made on this basis.
Whilst First Nations are entitled to some forms o f consultation in relation to the licensing process, any 
contention o f lack o f  access to a role in the process would be far more appropriately based on a breach o f access 
to justice and fair trial, rather than a suggestion o f discrimination. Unless however it could be shown that the 
First Nations alone were restricted from such roles.
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For the purposes of the Acts, said service must be unavailable or inaccessible to one 
of the four groups outlined in the text of the Employment Equity Act,395 of which the First 
Nations are included as an example of the broader grouping of aboriginal people. At present 
the imposition of monitoring upon companies engaged in the extraction of tar sands raw 
material and the refinement thereof, is the only service as such provided by the governmental 
authorities in this context. The prohibition on the establishment of barriers to services 
afforded under the Acts396 could be suggested therefore to afford some protection to the 
indigenous peoples of the regions affected should monitoring be deemed inadequate in 
addressing the potential impacts felt by them specifically.
For example by contaminating the lands utilised by the indigenous peoples of the 
region and thus the wildlife thereon there is arguably a direct inhibition of their ability to, 
‘pursue the gaining of a livelihood,’397 in the culturally expressive manner which they have 
practiced for centuries. This is as hunting boreal woodland caribou, trapping smaller native 
mammals and fishing in the natural water courses of their traditional lands would be 
significantly more difficult as a result of such impacts. Such services therefore, if applied 
without due consideration for the increased impact to First Nations peoples could be 
suggested as having been done so in a discriminatory nature. This suggestion is however 
tenuous at best, and far from the best basis on which to construct a case against the licensing 
process.
395 The four listed groupings in the Employment Equity Act S.C. 1995, c.44 are; women, aboriginal peoples, 
persons with disabilities and members o f  visible minorities, though precedents concerning the CHR Act (n243) 
and AHR Act (n242) are not strictly limited to these groups.
396 CHR Act (n243) and AHR Act (n242)
397 CCRF (n 174) s. 6 (2) (b)
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The restrictions as to the utility of the Acts,398 arising from their definition of services, 
is however not the most limiting aspect of the contention of discrimination as a result of a 
lack of recognition of the acute impacts of tar sands extraction upon the First Nations of 
Alberta. Although not an aspect of the legal argument put forward by the piece as such, the 
distribution of powers between the federal and provincial Parliaments, and thus 
administrative authorities, may present a significant obstacle to the contention at hand. Note 
should be made at this stage that whilst Canada operates an ‘asymmetrical federal 
structure,’399 thus not all divisions of the federal power have identical powers and rights, 
there being both ‘territories’ and ‘provinces.’
As Alberta is itself a province, it is purely this category, and the powers vested therein 
with which the piece shall be concerned. The federal structure of the Canadian legal and 
political system, as highlighted in the introduction to the piece, operates in an inverted 
manner to that of its geographical neighbour, the United States of America, Australia and 
indeed the bulk of federal States in existence. To simplify, under this approach all matters on 
which legislation (and administrative decisions resulting therefrom) can be made are deemed 
to belong to the federal government unless outlined within sections 91, 92 A(3), and 92A (6) 
of the Constitution Act 18 67.400 This approach has been curtailed somewhat, and where 
powers are not explicitly assigned, the competency of the Canadian Parliament on a matter 
must be shown to belong to a gap in the drafting,401 be necessitated by an emergency,402 or 
have a national dimension.403
398 CHR Act (n243) and AHR Act (n242)
399 Tarlton, C. D. ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements o f Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation’ (1965) 27 
(4) The Journal o f Politics 861
400 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3
401 Known as the ‘gap branch’ and arising from the general provision o f the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) 30 &
31 Victoria c.3 s.92 granting the Canadian Parliament powers to create legislation for the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ o f Canada, which has been held to include the filling o f any gaps in the distribution o f powers 
between federal and provincial legislatures, as supported by the precedent in Re. Regulation and Control o f  
Radio Communication in Canada [1932] A.C. 304
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In relation to the case at hand, this gives rise to a potential issue regarding the 
respondent to any case constructed. Due to the distinction between matters on which the 
federal and provincial legislatures are able to legislate, and thus create binding administrative 
structures within their jurisdictions, certain issues in relation to the curbing of tailings pond 
leakage are governed in practice by separate authorities and different levels within the federal 
structure. For example, matters concerning Indians and Indian reserves, inland fisheries, 
quarantine (if required), and works connecting provinces or to the advantage of Canada or 
more than one province, all of which are arguably relevant to the seepage of contaminants 
from stored tailings and maintenance of water levels and quality, are recognised as being 
within the purview of the Parliament of Canada.404 By contrast, the Legislative Assembly of 
Alberta possesses exclusive powers in relation to the management and sale of public lands 
belonging to the province, should the ponds not be on reserved land under the numbered 
treaties, but have impacts upon such territory.405 Following the Constitution Act 193 0,406 the 
province also controls issues concerning natural resources contained upon or within said 
lands, a provision now enshrined within the consolidated constitution also.407
402 The test for the ‘emergency’ branch was first suggested in the Board o f  Commerce [1922] 1 A.C. 191 case 
though the term o f  an ‘emergency’ was not used explicitly, and now is seen largely as a temporary measure 
borne out o f necessity to alter the relationship between federal and provincial legislatures for a limited period as 
established in Re. Anti-Inflation Act [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 by Justice Beetz.
403 The ‘national concern doctrine’ can be traced back as far as the case o f Russell v. The Queen (1882) 7 App. 
Cas. 829, though the name arose as a result o f the Canada Temperance Federation [1946] A.C. 193 case and 
was most recently, o f  note, applied in R. v. Crown Zellerbach [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 in which marine pollution 
was deemed as being o f  a nature giving rise to ‘national concern.’
Parliament o f Canada Our Country, Our Parliament 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/Education/OurCountryOurParliament/html_booklet/division-powers- 
e.html.> Accessed 30th July 2014
405 Note should be made that under the First Nations Oil and Gas Moneys Management Act SC 2005 c48 groups 
living on reserves can opt to manage projects on reserve lands themselves, subsuming the role o f the provincial 
authorities in this regard.
406 British North America Act 1930 20-21 Geo. V, c.26 (U.K.)
407 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 at s.92(A)
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As a result, dependent upon the actual impact in question any case suggested by the 
piece on the basis of discrimination as a result of lack of consideration of the effects pertinent 
to the First Nations specifically, arising from the provisions of the Canadian and Alberta 
Human Rights Acts,408 or the Charter,409 might be divided into two, or more, separate actions 
against the relevant federal and provincial authorities. Given the existing potential breadth for 
the adverse impacts of the leakage of tailings material containing harmful substances and 
excessive water consumption, the bifurcation of any case suggesting discrimination through 
non-consideration, an interpretative leap in itself, would undoubtedly limit its strength. 
Added to this would be the need for the cases to be further divided dependent upon whether 
or not the land initially affected was reserve in status,410 as these lands are within federal 
jurisdiction. Also from a pragmatic standpoint, the likelihood of First Nations bands 
generating the level of funding required for such a series of cases is minimal.411 As such the 
utility of this already speculative basis is reduced almost to the point of absolute inefficacy, 
and whilst discrimination of the form suggested might be occurring, proving said practice 
would, in the face of considerable legal, practical and financial obstacles, be nigh on 
impossible.
The suggestion of discrimination under the Charter provision would arguably have the 
greatest chance of success given its universal application to federal and provincial authorities 
alike, negating the need for divided litigation efforts. However, even this narrow basis would 
be subject to a balancing on the part of the judiciary against the considerable benefits of the
408 CHR Act (n243) and AHR Act (n242)
409 CCRF (n 174) s. 15
410 Whilst there is the potential for an issue o f  internal administrative trans-boundary harm o f an environmental 
nature, this is not the concern o f the piece and will not be considered.
411 This is evident from the requests for donations to fund the aforementioned action o f the Beaver Lake Cree, 
who are incapable o f financially backing the process themselves. See: Respecting Aboriginal Values and
Environmental Needs Trust (RAVEN Trust) How You Can Help 2014
<http://www.raventrust.com/beaverlakecree/howcanyouhelp.html.> Accessed 30th July 2014.
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extraction projects to Alberta and Canada as a whole. Given the ever growing concerns 
internationally in relation to energy security, the contention that the exploitation of the tar 
sands would ensure this for Canada for generations to come would be a persuasive one. This 
is especially true in the face of a prima facie less convincing argument that the failure to 
consider the heightened impacts to the indigenous populace was tantamount to discrimination. 
As such were consideration deemed to not have taken place, successfully opposing the view 
that energy security outweighed effects to the First Nations would likely also have to be 
successfully achieved before partial cessation of projects or an increased effort to assess and 
mitigate damage was ordered by the courts.
Similarly, consultation processes have been undertaken by the provincial authorities, 
and within the most recent Lower Athabasca Regional Plan the Alberta Government has 
committed itself to the, ‘engagement of Alberta’s aboriginal communities.’412 As a result it 
has facilitated the setting up of stewardship schemes such as the Richardson Initiative 413 The 
aim being to afford the aboriginal peoples, ‘their constitutionally protected rights’414 and 
ensure that, ‘input from such consultations continues to be considered prior to the 
decision.’415 Thus to say that the provincial and federal governments had failed in their, ‘duty 
to consult and accommodate,’ as first intimated in the case of Van Der Peet,416 would be 
remiss and certainly be unlikely to be upheld by a court until sufficient time had passed to 
suggest evidence such initiatives were merely facades. The courts have stipulated that such 
consultation and accommodation is required, ‘and indeed is an essential corollary to the
412 LARP (n l09) 34
413 Such schemes are essentially power sharing arrangements with regards to land and/or resource management 
between the aboriginal peoples and the relevant government agencies. There is considerable variation between 
such arrangements dependent upon a number o f factors, and concerns remain as to the efficacy and equity o f  
such arrangements.
4,4 LARP (n l09) 34
415 ibid.
416 R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 and furthered in the case o f Haida Nation v BC [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 
[2004] S.C.C. 73
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honourable process of reconciliation.’417 The presence of programs such as the Richardson 
Initiative however, and the inclusion of such processes in the plan for the development of the 
region would, at present, would meet any measures which might be reasonably be expected 
of such authorities at this time by the courts. This assertion is supported by the decision in 
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v. Alberta (Minister o f  Energy), in which it was held that, 
‘the degree to which conduct contemplated by the Crown would adversely affect the treaty 
rights so as to trigger the duty to consult,’475 should be considered. As such only where severe 
impacts of tar sands extraction were proven would an absolute duty to consult arise. Thus 
suggesting a failure to consider the acute impacts to First Nations potentially arising from tar 
sands projects amounting to an instance of discrimination, would be difficult, if not remiss.
The scientific uncertainty with regard to the extent or specific nature of any impacts 
with regards to tailings contaminant seepage would further decrease the utility of provisions 
relating to discrimination. This is as the stewardship initiatives outlined above would meet 
any duties with regards to consultation, and accommodation of peculiar impacts to the First 
Nations would arguably not be required to be fulfilled owing to this same lack of knowledge. 
Until the gaps in that understanding were filled, not only would it be unreasonable to expect 
action to further mitigate damage and account for heightened impacts to particular societal 
minorities, but that action might also add to the impacts in itself. As such the contention of 
discrimination of the First Nations peoples of the north east of Alberta, where tar sands 
extraction and refinement projects are at their most intense is of little utility as a basis for a 
case against the licensing of the projects by the relevant provincial and federal authorities.
Haida Nation v BC [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, [2004] S.C.C. 73 at para. 38
418 Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v. Alberta (Minister o f  Energy) [2009] ABQB 576 at 70
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The duty to accommodate the specific needs of the aboriginal peoples and consider 
the heightened nature of impacts to them imposed upon said authorities, which has a firm 
precedent in Canadian case law,419 must be founded on evidence of specific needs and 
adverse effects resulting from the lack thereof. Without incontrovertible evidence as to the 
nature and extent of the impacts to the flora and fauna of the region, or human health, such a 
case would be significantly weakened. Also in the face of established consultation procedures, 
or plans to establish them, the suggestion of discrimination by virtue of non-consideration in 
the authorising of tar sands projects would be even more difficult to prove and have upheld.
Thus whilst the nature of the potential impact of the leakage of contaminants into the 
ecosystem of Alberta is significant, and prima facie one of the strongest bases for a case such 
as that outlined as the aim of the piece, it is clouded by a vicissitude of uncertainties. The 
exact impacts of such seepage from the tailing ponds and the extent thereof are at present 
unknown, and not likely to be fully ascertainable in the short term. Thus legal action may 
regrettably only be taken with confidence once the only remaining aim is seeking 
compensation from the authorities and industries concerned with the projects, and their 
cessation is no longer viable.
Whilst some effects have been measured, the science behind them has been contested 
as inaccurate or too narrow in scope to form the basis of a contention that projects ought to 
cease entirely or consideration of such impacts taken in their licensing to a greater degree 
than they already are.420 Similarly the spread of such impacts to the human populace of the 
region, through bioaccumulation is equally as speculative an assertion. Harm to aquatic
419 See R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, Haida Nation v BC  [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, [2004] S.C.C. 73 and the 
general principle o f  protection o f aboriginal peoples from discriminatory, unconsidered or malign use o f  
provincial legislative power established in the case o f R v. Sparrow  [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
420 WMSLAR (n278)
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species in the event of seepage is undeniable; it is the direct attribution of this to tailings 
contaminants on a level satisfactory to dissuade the scrutiny of the scientific community 
which is at issue. Even the highly critical report of the Royal Society of Canada42indicates 
that;
‘Only a few published studies present seepage measurements and track groundwater 
contamination from tailings ponds. These studies indicate seepage rates highly depend on 
local geological materials, including those underlying dykes, and transport of NA [napthenic 
acid] in groundwater is poorly characterized.’422
Therefore the validity of utilising the impacts of the seepage from tailings ponds is 
undermined as a basis for a case suggesting a breach of the prohibition of discrimination 
under the CCRF for failing to consider them in administrative processes. The inability to 
attribute damage through the use of evidence to such leaks for the foreseeable future, 
certainly to a level sufficient to breach the burden of proof required to enforce action on the 
part of companies to avoid such occurrences in the licensing process is apparent. An action to 
cease or restrict existing projects, and those planned for the future would therefore not benefit 
from this assertion, until the impacts outlined had already been felt and were likely beyond 
repair or control. As such as a basis for a case for the indigenous populace the suggested 
breach of provisions relating to discrimination is of negligible utility.
Equally as heated scientific and political debate surrounds the reclamation of land 
used to store the tailings material. The same report suggests that, ‘The unresolved challenge 
of demonstrating long-term reclamation success of wetland landscapes poses a concern for
421 EPR (nl 19)
422 ibid. 285
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groundwater regimes.’423 The initial impacts of the failure of reclamation are akin to those of 
land usage outlined earlier in the piece. However, it is where limited or slow progress is made 
in relation to the reclamation of tailings ponds that the potentially most harmful impacts to 
the indigenous peoples in proximity might occur. The growth of non-native flora and 
ecosystems where there had previously been established boreal forest of significant age and 
development is the focus of concern. This is owing to the widespread impact to all species 
previously resident within that ecosystem as it will necessitate either relocation or significant 
adaptation on their part. Where habitat or species numbers are already deemed as being at 
alarming levels this is a potentially devastating outcome of supposedly successful 
reclamation.
Impacts are also foreseen as being severe where industries are unable to reclaim land 
at a sufficient rate to counteract that at which it is being utilised to extract or refine the tar 
sands raw material. Such slow rates of reclamation to previous capacity have resulted in the 
implanting of ecosystems which are more quickly established as described above, facilitating 
positive media campaigns showing prosperous flora and fauna for the extraction firms, but 
undermining native species.424 The reclamation of exploited land to a standard fit to inhabit, 
rather than to the ecosystem previously in-situ is of little consequence to most Canadians or 
Albertans. The alteration however has a particularly acute and devastating impact to the 
indigenous populace who have inextricable historical and cultural links to the naturally 
occurring ecosystem as a result of which they rely upon it to some degree for a portion of the 
necessities of life.
423 ibid. 285
424 See for example the reclamation o f Wapisiw Lookout and the surrounding area: Suncor Energy Wapisiw 
Lookout Reclamation 2010 < www.suncor.com/wapisiw> Accessed July 30" 2014.
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Whilst the handful of successful reclamation projects highly lauded by the federal and 
provincial authorities and industry alike have achieved the reinstatement of a natural 
ecosystem, it is not that which was once present, boreal woodland.425 First Nations peoples of 
the regions affected are culturally and historically inextricably linked to that ecosystem which 
has not been successfully reclaimed, and indeed given the time needed for established boreal 
woodland to regrow, will not be so in time to avoid irreversible impacts to them specifically. 
The immediate impacts to aquatic and land dwelling species alike, both in terms of 
contamination and relocation as a result of the creation and accumulation of tailings ponds, 
are by far the most grave as they threaten the continued existence of indigenous cultures in 
their present form, and as a result the heritage of Canada itself.
The reclamation of the land used for the storing and drying of tailings to a standard 
capable of supporting wood bison was achieved in the case of a project undertaken by 
Syncrude, one of the largest extractors of tar sands, in conjunction with the Fort McKay First 
Nation.426 Wood bison427 were however not native to this region prior to its exploitation to 
attain bitumen for refinement, though are a native species of Alberta. As such the heritage of 
First Nations tribes in that region was not founded upon bison hunting, but upon boreal 
woodland caribou, which actively avoid the type of ecosystem ‘reclaimed’ from the tailings 
pond in this instance. This policy of allowing extractors to return reclaimed land to an 
‘equivalent capacity’ rather than to a state as close to that once present as is possible is 
arguably indicative of the lack of consideration for the indigenous populace in the licensing 
process, which it is suggested constitutes discrimination.
Te ibid426 This project was reported upon in highly differing manners by various bodies, in the interest o f balance, 
following are examples o f a positive and negative report: Alberta Oil Magazine. Syncrude Canada pioneers 
unique land reclamation in oil sands. 1st October 2009 <http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2009/10/back-to- 
life/> Accessed July 30th 2014. Parkland Institute. Reclamation Illusions in Oil Sands Country. 2009 
<http://parklandinstitute.ca/post/story/reclamation_illusions_in_oil_sands_country/>Accessed July 30th 2014.
Latin name: bison bison athabascae
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By way of explanation, the state of ‘equivalent capacity’ is of ambivalent effect to the 
majority of the Albertan population, few would visit or utilise areas including a reclaimed 
pond. By contrast the indigenous populace are both more likely to interact with the residual 
ecosystem and are reliant upon it either being in that form, or not detracting from the 
capability of the surrounding area to support their culturally significant lifestyle. One aspect 
of which is the proposals of extractors for land reclamation following the completion of the 
project for which a licence is sought. The failure to consider this peculiar connection in the 
licensing of projects is by extension a failure to consider the realities of the indigenous 
populace in a manner equal to that of the other inhabitants of the regions impacted upon. 
Were such impacts felt by the population of the oil sands fields as a whole, greater 
consideration would undoubtedly be paid by the administrative process to said effects. As 
such, the difference in consideration of repercussions of the licensing of projects, and the 
disposal of their by-products, represents it is suggested discrimination against the indigenous 
populace in the procedure affording such permissions.
Thus the lack of consideration for the inextricable relationship of the First Nations 
inhabitants of exploited lands and the naturally occurring boreal forest ecosystem within both 
regulatory and licensing procedure for extraction projects and in the imposition of 
reclamation requirements, would be the basis of a contention of a breach of established 
human rights to non-discrimination in domestic Canadian law. The failure to, as a minimum, 
consider the restriction of the ability of those peoples to perform culturally significant 
practices already enshrined in the constitutional law of Canada under the numbered 
treaties,428 would it is suggested constitute such a breach. The heightened impact to the
428 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
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indigenous populace of potential impacts of tailings seepage, and failings of the current 
legislative framework in relation to reclamation, preserving the established ecosystem on 
which they rely so heavily is at the core of this contention. Thus it is suggested that domestic 
human rights afford a heightened level of protection to these environmental features, namely 
those comprising boreal forest, on their behalf where said features are inextricable from the 
continuation of indigenous cultural practices. This contention is at its most relevant in 
relation to the unforeseeable and progressive effects of poor tailings management and 
containment owing to existing knowledge of the significance of those features and concerns 
regarding them, but a lack of specific consideration of them in measures addressing tailings 
and reclamation in the licensing processes.429
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The consideration of the human rights provisions of the domestic Canadian system 
has highlighted immediate evidential distinction between rights termed by the piece as 
pertaining to harms against the person, and those relating to the suppression of abilities. 
Breaching provisions pertaining to harms against the person have been highlighted as 
necessitating a degree of evidence not immediately available to the indigenous populace of 
Alberta, or indeed the scientific community inextricably involved in the heated debate over 
the safety of tar sands extraction. By contrast provisions relating to the suppression of 
abilities need only establish an inhibition of ability to perform activities necessary to the 
maintaining of a livelihood in a traditional manner. This void in evidentiary burdens
429 This contention is supported by the acknowledgement o f the need to consult First Nations peoples who might 
be impacted by tar sands extraction projects within the environmental report which must be submitted by 
prospective extractors in order to attain permission to begin an operation. See the guidelines for completing the 





immediately places such rights as the preferential approach to an action such as that 
suggested as possible by the piece. This is owing to the current unavailability of 
incontrovertible evidence of severe harms to human health arising from tar sands extraction 
and refinement.
Provisions relating to the suppression of abilities in the domestic context are found in 
two broad rights, that to the securing of a livelihood and that of equality of consideration in 
administrative and legislative procedures. Equality of consideration in proceedings as 
discussed affords only ex post facto430 protection, and would not guarantee a role influential 
enough to achieve the aims of the piece within said proceedings. As such the protection 
afforded to the securing of a livelihood, interpreted as including the choice to do so by 
traditional means, emerges as the most appropriate provision to securing the cession or 
restriction of tar sands extraction projects in the domestic legal context.
430 After the fact.
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Chapter 4
Regional Human Rights Mechanisms and the Tar Sands
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4.1 Introduction
Beyond the obligations imposed upon the federal and provincial governments by 
domestic human rights provisions, the regional legal spheres of both the Americas and 
Europe afford, as a minimum, interpretative insight into their application. The Inter-American 
system also offers an alternate forum for a litigious action of the type suggested by the piece, 
though non-binding in nature. As such the provisions contained within the human rights 
instruments concerning these geographical areas will be analysed for their utility in relation 
to the restriction or cession of tar sands extraction operations in Alberta. This will be assessed 
both in terms of the interpretative additions afforded to the domestic rights discussed above, 
and also in their potential application directly within in the Inter-American system where 
relevant.
A note is required at this point to justify the separation of the discussion of 
international and regional legal instruments. The reasoning for this is approach is twofold. 
Firstly, the strained relations between the Canadian state and the regional mechanism to 
which it, geographically at least, belongs. The Inter-American human rights mechanisms 
offer similarly drafted, though not identical, rights to those found at the international level. 
Aside from the interpretative nuances even these minor variations offer the piece, they also 
present the reasoning for the failure of Canada to ratify any binding instrument in that 
jurisdiction which will be discussed in more detail in the chapter concerning the mechanism 
and that of Europe. At this point it suffices to state that the unique relationship this has 
created between Canada and the authorities of that system warrants its separate analysis.
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Secondly, the precedents of cases and communications within the two jurisdictions 
originate from differing bodies. The Views of the United Nations Committees to be discussed 
and the precedent of cases before the Inter-American Court and Commission and the 
European Court of Human Rights have varying degrees of interpretative applicability within 
the Canadian domestic legal system. This is owing to the nature of Canada as located within 
the American regional system geographically, but having greater jurisprudential connections 
with the European context owing to its colonial history. This has in turn affected the 
interpretation of domestic human rights obligations with regard to those arising in the 
international sphere. Again this will be discussed in greater detail in the respective chapters 
concerning these jurisdictions. However, the Canadian judicial approach to the application of 
its own and external human rights law is representative of this bifurcation of geography and 
jurisprudence and on this basis their separate discussion is again necessitated.
Finally, the approach of the two regional systems discussed in the piece, that of 
Europe and that of the Americas, differs in relation to the application of human rights to 
environmental protection. In turn therefore they will be seen to differ somewhat from the 
international approaches illustrated by communications brought to committees within the 
United Nations under the auspices of optional protocols to the treaties to be discussed. To 
combine discussions of the instruments would be to falsely suggest uniformity in the 
application of rights with similar drafting to the issues raised in the piece. As will be shown 
precedents suggest this is not the case, and with regards to the aim of the piece these 
variations are crucial in establishing the most appropriate forum in which to suggest an action 
against the tar sand developments might be undertaken.
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4.2 Harms Against the Person Prohibited By Regional Human Rights Law
4.21 Article I ADHR 
Right to Life
The right to life contained within the Convention431 remains the subject of 
controversy between the Canadian government and the other members of the Inter-American 
regional system of human rights protection. The provision within the non-binding text of the 
Declaration which affords this right432 is broader in its drafting and does not overtly stipulate 
an opposition to the practice of abortion. The former provision guards the right of every 
person, ‘to have his life protected...from the moment of conception,’433 whereas as the more 
broadly drafted article of the Declaration affords protection of, ‘life, liberty and security of 
the person.’434 The binding Convention does, it should be noted, protect the physical security 
of individuals within other provisions of its text, but as has been outlined the piece will 
concern itself solely with the Declaration.
These issues stated, there is undeniably a protection of the physical integrity of the 
individual afforded at a regional level under the Inter-American system. However, the 
controversy surrounding the interpretative breadth of the right to life in the drafting and 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American regional system, significantly reduces the utility of the 
article in relation to the aim of the piece. Crucially in this regard, the presence of a near 
identical, binding, and effectively enforced provision within the domestic Canadian human
ACHR (n 187) Art. 4
432 ADRD (n249)Art.I
433 ACHR (n 187) Art. 4(1)
434 A D R D  (n 2 4 9 )A rt . I
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• i • 435 • •rights instruments, containing protection of both ‘life’ and the ‘liberty and security’ of the 
person also all but eradicates a considerable portion of the value of this article within the 
piece.
The progressive approach to environmental protection extending from fundamental 
rights afforded under the regional system by both the Inter-American Court and Commission, 
rights mirrored within the domestic Canadian system, is however worthy of note, especially 
in relation to the particular potential impacts of tailings ponds. The case of Yanomami v. 
Brazil436 concerned both the construction of a bulk road through traditional lands of the 
Yanomami people, and the authorisation of extraction of various natural resources from them. 
The tribe contested that the developments breached their right to life and the Inter-American 
Commission ruled in their favour. However this was primarily owing to the indirect impact of 
the presence of non-indigenous people within the regions affected. This presence brought 
with it a number of diseases and illnesses to which the Yanomami were particularly 
susceptible, having had little contact with the outside world beyond their traditional lands. 
The influence of members of a comparatively developed society into the traditional social 
context of the Yanomami also brought unforeseen impacts, such as prostitution and the 
questioning of traditional beliefs.437
There is no suggestion that a similar effect might be felt by the First Nations tribes of 
Alberta to that of the Yanomami. Certainly there could be no contention that the mere 
presence of more people and urban development in the previously undisturbed regions of 
Alberta was having as severe an impact as was felt by the Yanomami. The suggestion that the 
Yanomami case offers a direct precedent for the case at hand or indeed more broadly
435 CCRF (n l74) s. 7
436 Yanomami Case, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Res. No. 12/85, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10, rev. 1, 24 (1985)
437 Such social impacts are not however suggested as breaching the right to life afforded under the ADHR.
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therefore would be remiss.438 Firstly it should be noted that the Yanomami case was held 
before the Commission of the Inter-American system and is therefore not legally binding in 
nature. Similarly the recommendation of the Commission suggesting a breach of the Article I 
right to life focused heavily upon the relatively uncontacted nature of the Yanomami people, 
suggesting that this connection was brought about only as a result of this particular context. 
The recommendations however specifically stated that the government of Brazil should, ‘take 
preventative and curative measures to protect the lives and health of Indians exposed to 
infectious or contagious diseases.’439 Thus the Commission based the suggested breach, or 
potential therefore, upon the impacts felt as result of the action sanctioned by the government 
of Brazil without recognition and limitation of the impact of said action.
As such whilst not a binding precedent, the Commission established an interpretative 
approach that impacts directly attributable to environmental alterations and damage incurred 
can, where deemed of the requisite severity to be potentially, or have actually, proven fatal, 
breach the right to life afforded under Article I of the American Declaration.440 The impact of 
tailings ponds however is questioned within the scientific community, and the extent, if any, 
of the effect of these storage facilities upon human health is not yet known and is unlikely to 
be accurately ascertained through any means other than its own realisation. Whilst this reality 
would support the suggestion that a degree of precaution ought to be applied in line with the 
jurisprudence o f environmental law to which Canada has acquiesced,441 a suggestion of a 
breach of the right to life of the First Nations populace of the north east of Alberta would be 
unlikely to succeed for this very reason.
438 Such a suggestion would undoubtedly give rise to an overwhelming wave o f  similar cases in this, and other 
jurisdictions where cases with similar facts might give rise to suggestions o f  breaches.
Yanomami (n436)
440 ADRD (n249)Art.I
441 See the definition o f the precautionary principle within the Rio Declaration on Environment and
D evelopm ent (1 9 9 2 ) ,  U N  Doc.  A /C O N F .  151/26 (vol. I) , 31 IL M  874.
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The excessive consumption of water potentially could reduce levels to such a degree 
that insufficient water was present in the province to provide for the most basic needs of 
nutrition and sanitation for the indigenous inhabitants. The majority of said peoples have 
piped water, and both the European and Inter-American systems have iterated in a number of 
instances that the right to life, owing to its non-derogable nature, can only be breached where 
water is knowingly and actively not provided in any form congruent to supporting life.442 
Within the Inter-American system the right to life has been said to include, ‘not being 
prevented access to conditions that may guarantee a decent life,’443 but does not elaborate 
upon the cultural relativity of those conditions. A less expansive approach in the European 
court has held that the right to life demands states, ‘take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives of those within its jurisdiction,’ 444 but again stipulates nothing beyond basic 
preservation of life. As such, to breach this right the water consumption would have to reach 
such a level as to prevent almost any water reaching the indigenous peoples of the regions 
affected, and for the government then to fail to provide any alternative source of water. For 
the purposes of the right to life therefore, no margin for appreciation with regard to the 
cultural relativity of the source of water is afforded in either regional system, instead the 
preservation of life and sanitation are the sole concerns of such binding provisions with 
regard to water.
This lofty threshold for displaying a breach of the right to life is also present in most 
domestic legal systems in relation to the provision of water and food. Indeed such a 
suggestion relating to food provision, in this instance impacts to the prevalence native fauna
442 See for example: Yakye Axa (n31) and Xakmok Kasek Indigenous Community v Paraguay Case 0326/01, 
Report No. 11/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser./L/V/II.l 18 Doc. 70 rev. 2 en 390 (2003).
443 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay Case 0322/2001, Report No. 12/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 118 Doc. 70 rev. 2 at 378 (2003) para. 153
444 L.C.B. v U.K. 29 EHRR 245, 36
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which the indigenous populace consume, would be even more tenuous. The relative rarity of 
regular consumers of these animals, coupled with the wide array of potential alternatives 
offering equal or improved nutrition would arguably make such a contention even less viable 
than that in relation to water provision. In relation to both food and water this is likely owing 
to the non-derogable nature of rights to these factors in all instances in which they are found, 
and as such is illustrative of both a concession of sorts to state sovereignty, subsidiarity with 
regards to the provision of food and water, and an acceptance of the economic and 
administrative limitations of states. As a result the right to life offers little to the construction 
of a case against the permitting of tar sands developments based upon the reading of regional 
human rights instruments into binding domestic provisions.
4.22 Art XI ADHR 
Health and Well Being
The utility o f the declaration for the formulation of a case such as that suggested by 
the piece is limited to an interpretative capacity. As such only those rights provided in the 
declaration which have clear links to legally binding and enforceable provisions within the 
Canadian domestic legal system, including also therefore those international provisions 
which the executive has ratified and the legislature transformed, might be utilised. Such 
rights contained within the declaration can then be justifiably said to have interpretative 
significance in relation to binding provisions by way of providing insight into the intentions 
of the executive and legislature when drafting or acquiescing to binding human rights law in 
Canada.445 Within the declaration there are a number of provisions with some relevance to
445 A statement supported by the expansive approach to the interpretation o f human rights established in 
Edwards (nl87), 136 and cemented in Blaikie (n l90) and Minister o f  Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319, 
328 per Lord Wilberforce.
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the damage to the wildlife of Alberta wrought by, and directly attributable to the tar sands, 
most notably Articles XI, XIII, XIV and XV.
Article XI provides that, ‘Every person has the right to the preservation of his health 
through ... social measures relating to food, ... to the extent permitted by public and 
community resources.’ 446 This article affords two interpretative insights into similar 
provisions enforceable within the Canadian domestic courts. Firstly the inextricable link 
between food and health is reaffirmed, thus opening the possibility of a link to the right to life 
in extreme cases of malnourishment. This viewpoint though is somewhat embryonic in 
academic debate and applied generally only in cases of intentional malnourishment of those 
incarcerated by the state, the right to life is simply put, ‘not a right to an appropriate standard 
of living.’447 Secondly the introduction of a social element to a right to the preservation of a 
basic standard of health is especially beneficial in the development of an argument relating to 
indigenous communities. Through the recognition of the role of ‘social measures’ and ‘public 
and community resources’ in the protection of this right the declaration allows the 
interpretation of rights to health and well being to acknowledge that in order for all the 
‘necessities of life’ encompassed by the right to ‘pursue the gaining of a livelihood’448 to be 
met, communal as well as individual rights and resources must be ensured. Whilst the 
provision was clearly intended to place a duty upon States to provide basic sustenance, the 
preservation of existing social structures which afford said resources would undeniably be an 
example of such measures which the authorities, provincial or federal, would be under a duty 
to protect or replace.449
446 ADRD (n249)
Menghistu, F. The Satisfaction o f  Survival Requirements in Ramcharan, B.G. (ed.) The Right to Life in
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985) 64 
44® CCRF (n l74) ss. 6 and 7.
This would o f course be subject to a margin o f appreciation with regards to the economic capacity o f the state 
in question. However, this is less o f a concern for a relatively developed and prosperous state such as Canada.
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In relation to the indigenous peoples of Alberta, and the damage to the native wildlife 
of the province this recognition bears some significance when considered in light of the 
integral role the hunting of caribou plays for many in the provision of sustenance on a 
communal level. The practice ensures the continued existence of the culture not only of those 
individuals who actively hunt but those for whom they themselves provide, and 
consequentially the indigenous nations as a whole. This alone could not be argued to suggest 
a collective right to a specific food, which would undeniably be breached by the damage 
caused by the tar sands developments in Alberta. However, reading the domestic human 
rights provisions of Canada contained within the CCRF in light of the provisions of the 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,450 in this context arguably does. Such an 
interpretation conceivably suggests the significant damage to an essential food source of 
individuals, and a community, would breach the right to pursuance of ‘a livelihood’ by virtue 
of the consequential inhibition of access to that which ensures the ‘necessities of life’ and 
‘preservation of health.’451 In this regard it is the social connection which the specific food 
sources afford which is key. Were the projects merely removing a source of food with no 
other significance and replacing it with a constant supply of food of equal or higher nutritious 
value, the suggested contention would easily be rebutted.452
Despite offering another basis for the case against the tar sands developments, Article 
XI of the Declaration453 suffers from many of the same issues as the right to inviolability of 
the home afforded under Article IX to be discussed. The ‘right to the preservation of health
450 ADRD (n249)
451 CCRF (n l74) ss. 6 and 7.
452 See in this regard the discussion by Menghistu o f rights ensuring life as not being culturally relative, but an 
imposition o f minimum requirements, primarily survival: Menghistu, F. The Satisfaction o f  Survival 
Requirements in Ramcharan, B.G. (ed.) The Right to Life in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1985) 64
453 ADRD (n249) Alt. XI
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and to well being’ afforded under the Article like Article IX is not directly mirrored in the 
domestic Canadian Charter. The closest interpretative link would be found in section 7 of the 
CCRF and the notion of ‘life, liberty and security of the person.’454 The threshold for proving 
a breach of this right, which would have to be overcome in order to permit an expansive 
interpretative approach such as reading Article XI into the text, is understandably high. This 
is owing to the strict approach to any suggested derogations adopted by the Canadian 
courts.455
In relation to the impacts of the unsustainable consumption of water by industrial 
projects in the tar sands fields, establishing a breach of this necessarily onerous threshold 
would prove highly difficult. The need to show a threat to life, or physical integrity on a basic 
level has shown itself to be necessary in the eyes of the Canadian courts.456 Thus there is little, 
if any, room to suggest that culturally relative factors ensuring these rights ought to be 
preserved under this provision. This is especially true as the significance of the form of water 
for the purposes of health and wellbeing is negligible. Focus is instead upon the provision to 
meet basic biological needs 457 In the context of food obtained through hunting, the reality of 
the resource, the caribou, being shared communally after being hunted by a select few places 
a social significance on that specific form of sustenance which would deter a switch to 
another source entirely. In spite of a cultural and spiritual connection to rivers in some 
instances,458 and as such the potential to make a similar case on the basis of the inhibition of
454 CCRF (n l74) s.7
455 See in particular the decision in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (n202) and the majority discussion o f breaches o f  
section 7 being justifiable only in the most exceptional o f circumstances.
456 In spite o f the expansive approach taken in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 
519 noted above, the section7 right was still stated to concerns harms to basic human dignity, physical and 
psychological integrity and the right to make choices none o f which would be breached by an alternate form of  
water provision.
457 Menghistu, F. The Satisfaction o f  Survival Requirements in Ramcharan, B.G. (ed.) The Right to Life in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985) 64
458 See the discussion o f  the need to control natural resources in the Case o f  the Saramaka People v.
Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. IACHR Series C No 185 (2008) para. 141.
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the ability to fish in rare instances where such practices support a discernible proportion of 
communal sustenance, there is no equivalent social aspect to water for the purposes of 
quenching thirst and cooking. Thus the constructed culturally relative interpretation possible 
in relation to food sources is not available in regards to water consumption.
Essentially, as has been discussed the expansive interpretation of the domestic right to 
life, liberty and security of the person, in light of the right to the preservation of health and 
well-being, affords only that this most basic of rights be protected in the most serious of 
circumstances.459 As such the right would likely be held to require only that sufficient water 
for the purposes of sanitation and the quenching of thirst be provided, with little regard as to 
its form. Consequentially the case against the tar sands would almost undoubtedly fail if 
based solely on the contention that this provision had been breached by excessive water 
consumption. The expansive approach to the suggested ‘right to water’ put forward by 
various NGOs would stipulate that water protected for such purposes be culturally relative.460 
In practice however where courts have applied rights to ‘life’ and aligned concepts to 
situations in which water is not provided to an individual or group, the overwhelming 
majority of successful cases have been concerned with circumstances where water has been 
withheld in attempts to intentionally harm or coerce a victim, or with the knowledge actions 
restricting access would do harm.461 Thus were the provincial authorities of Alberta to ensure 
access to clean and safe water for the purposes of sanitation and basic nutrition, whatever the
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519
460 Most notably the UNSCESCR in a general comment on the issue, which although lacking in binding force 
has influenced considerable debate on the efficacy o f such an approach: Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The Right to Water (Twenty-ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/2002/11 (2002)
461 Ramcharan states that this is as, ‘if  a State deliberately withholds food [and water] from parts o f  its 
population, or knowingly acquiesces in such withholding, and this results in deaths, then it would be a serious 
violation o f the right to life. However, beyond this proposition, there are different views with regard to a 
‘survival requirement.’ Ramcharan, B.G. The Concept and Dimensions o f  the Right to Life in Ramcharan, B.G. 
(ed.) The Right to Life in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985) 8.
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form of that access, any argument that they had breached rights pertaining to life or physical 
security of an individual would likely be effectively rebutted.
The Yanomami case462 before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
considered the provisions of Article XI of the Declaration concerning the, ‘Right to the 
preservation of health and to wellbeing.’463 A similar result to that in relation to the right to 
life under Article I464 was reached, with the contention of the tribe being upheld by the 
Commission. The burden of proof required to be deemed constituting a breach of the right to 
life is understandably and necessarily high. By contrast, the standard of evidence and level of 
damage incurred by individuals or groups needed to establish a similar breach of the right to 
health and wellbeing is a lower threshold, and one with greater room for subjective 
consideration on the part of the Inter-American Commission. In relation to the suggestion of 
a breach of human rights resulting from the environmental impacts of the tailings ponds 
therefore, whilst the level of scientific scrutiny to which the assertions would be subjected 
would be the same, the damage incurred would not have to be so great in order to be deemed 
a breach. The suggested reparations 465 for the Canadian authorities for breach would 
admittedly be lower than those achievable for a breach of the right to life. However, as the 
aim of the piece and indeed the indigenous peoples of the region is predominantly the cession 
or restriction of operations which inhibit their ability to live in a manner to which they have 
become accustomed and which is representative of their cultural beliefs, this would be of 
little concern as a similar result in this regard could be achieved ex post facto.466
462 Yanomami (n436)
463 ADRD (n249)Art.XI
464 ibid. Art. I
465 Given that the case would have to be held before the Inter-American Commission and not the Court at the 
regional level, owing to the complex relationship o f Canada with the regional system outlined at length earlier in 
the piece, any outcome would take only the form o f  suggested action.
456 This is as establishing harm and seeking compensation after the fact would be far easier under the auspices o f  
Tort Law than suggesting the extraction projects present such a risk o f harm in the future that they should be 
halted now on the basis o f human rights breaches. Were financial recompense the only goal o f the First Nations,
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An arguably more significant hurdle would however remain, that of proving an 
impact to human health and wellbeing. The leaking of contaminants from tailings ponds 
created as a result of the use of open pit mines to extract tar sands raw material has been 
highlighted as an area of concern. Thus an impetus has been placed on progress by industry 
and campaign groups alike, despite a lack of knowledge as to the existence or extent of any 
detrimental effects upon human health.467 Whilst the notion of ‘wellbeing’ allows for 
consideration of factors beyond physical health, the dominant consideration would inevitably 
be in relation to a medically ascertainable and quantifiable affects. Thus whilst of potentially 
greater utility in the formation of a case against the tar sands developments than the right to
• 468 •life, the continued scientific debate surrounding the impacts to human health, when 
compared to the obvious effects seen in the avian and aquatic life of the region, would also 
reduce its efficacy to an undesirable degree for the purposes of the piece.
such a reality would be satisfactory, but as this is neither their objective, nor that o f  the piece it is o f little 
consequence.
467 This is evidenced by the creation o f Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (previously the Oil Sands 
Tailing Consortium), a body comprised seven companies, which have opted to share technology and resources 
on the management o f tailings in order to ensure continuing improvements in their storage, disposal and 
reclamation. See: Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance <http://www.cosia.ca/> Accessed 30th July 2014.
468 ADRD (n249) Art. I
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4.3 Suppressions of Abilities Protected bv Regional Human Rights Law
4.31 Article VIII ADHR 
Right to Residence and to Remain.
Rights being common to all human rights texts, binding or otherwise is not surprising, 
with most being based on shared moral principles common to all cultures.469 Their 
interpretation and the extent of their application however is far less consistent across the 
different regions and states internationally. The aforementioned case of the approach to the 
right to life in the Inter-American system which has precluded Canada’s ratification of its 
core binding texts is a clear example of this. The very same differences in relation to other 
rights however offer the potential for innovative interpretations of such common rights within 
the Canadian domestic legal system in respect of the indigenous populace. The right to 
residence and movement470 afforded under the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, is one such instance of this potential utility to be found in the differing 
interpretative and drafting approaches to rights concerning the same subject matter. Some 
interpretative variations arise as a result of minor dissimilarities in wording, and this is the 
case in relation to the right to residence and movement.471 Whilst Section 6(a) of the CCRF472 
is drafted in a manner somewhat lacking in elaboration as, ‘the right to enter, remain and 
leave Canada,’473 the mirror provision of the American Declaration affords by contrast;
469 The very purpose o f their creation being to ensure ‘inherent dignity,’ preserve the ‘conscience o f mankind,’ 
and a ‘common understanding o f these rights’ as espoused in the preamble to the UDHR: UN General 
Assembly, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III)
470 ADRD (n249) Art. VIII
471 ibid.
472 CCRF (n l74) s. 6 (a)
473 ibid.
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‘the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state of which he is a national, to 
move about freely in such territory, and not to leave it except by his own will.474’
The inclusion of the concept of ‘will’ in this formulation is of great significance in relation to 
the indigenous peoples of the regions affected by the tar sands developments in Alberta.
‘Will’ implies an element of choice, thus preventing States from forcing individuals to 
leave their residence. Indirectly causing individuals to be unable to continue their residence in 
a particular location is however fraught with issues. Pure economic issues, such as 
unemployment and high living costs necessitating the abandonment of residence would be 
unlikely to constitute a breach of the right. Pollution, or the removal of aspects of a particular 
ecosystem or community by contrast are more easily avoided through administrative and 
executive prudence. The reasonable expectation of effective control over these indirect 
effects from the State has been shown to be key in a number of cases with specific reference 
to indigenous peoples.475 The Inter-American Court ruled to this effect in the case of the 
Saramaka people of Suriname, stating that for indigenous peoples, ‘the right to use and enjoy 
their traditionally owned lands necessarily implies a similar right with regards to the natural 
resources that are necessary for their survival.’476
Water by definition is one such natural resource necessary for survival, but further to 
this in the case of the First Nations tribes of Alberta, and indeed indigenous peoples across
474 ADRD (n249) Art. VIII
475 The case o f Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 
(2001) before the Inter American Court is one such seminal case, both in the context o f property rights, and 
broadly that o f  indigenous peoples law. However, in relation to the case at hand its utility is severely inhibited. 
The decision in the case centred on the issues o f territory delineation and access to justice. The indigenous 
peoples o f Canada considered by the piece however have no such issues. Their territory is clearly delineated by 
the Numbered Treaties discussed at length in the piece, and access to complaint and judicial proceedings is not a 
contested issue in relation to First Nations peoples. The considerations within those proceedings are the focus of 
the contentions herein, restricting the utility o f the Awas Tingni case in this instance.
Saramaka (n458) para. 141.
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Canada, North America and the world, links to specific water sources, or types thereof, are 
fundamental also to the continuation of their cultures. With this approach to the interpretation 
of the right to lands afforded to indigenous peoples, such as those reserved under the 
numbered treaties,477 it is apparent that unsustainably consuming the natural resources of a 
region to the detriment of those peoples to the extent that their continued residence, or 
expression of culture is threatened would constitute a breach of established human rights 
provisions.
In relation to the First Nations specifically this might occur as a result of the reduction 
of natural water courses to levels incapable of sustaining traditional fishing, or be owing to 
the knock on effect of low water flow rates. The reduction in the prevalence of water in the 
regions impacted would alter the ecosystem, deterring flora and fauna upon which practices 
used to express culture are based. In turn this would necessitate, in extreme cases, their 
abandonment or the relocation of the group in order to preserve said culture. In such cases a 
breach of the rights discussed could be suggested as it is through no uninfluenced decision 
that such actions might have to be taken. Thus the ‘will’ of the individual or group would not 
be relevant outside of these two choices each bearing considerable negative ramifications. 
Applying this to the Canadian domestic provision mirroring this right to residence, the 
obligations of the provincial and federal authorities to the indigenous peoples of Alberta 
would undoubtedly include the avoidance of consumption of natural resources which might 
force their exodus from their lands, or extinguish their ability to express their culture on 
them.478
477 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
478 Discussion o f specific cultural beliefs in the piece has been avoided owing to the variation in the spiritual 
bases for the connection to environmental features amongst the First Nations occupying regions impacted upon 
by the tar sands. For example the Blackfoot, Algonquin, Cree and Dene Chipewyan all pass on different creation 
myths predominantly through oral storytelling. As such even bands living in relatively close proximity and 
sharing ethnic roots can have differing interpretations on the spiritual element to their connection to the land. 
Overbearing beliefs in a creation myth heavily based upon the symbiotic nature o f man’s relationship with 
nature are present in all variations however, and thus it is on this basis that discussion o f inhibitions o f cultural 
expression are based rather than on a specific belief system.
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The concepts of land, property and the home have arisen as key in the protection of 
environmental quality as an aspect of the human rights afforded under the text as has been 
discussed. A number of articles479 in the Declaration represent the protection of these 
concepts afforded therein and illustrate its significance. The broad notion of the, ‘right to 
residence and movement,’480 prescribed under Article VIII is prima facie possibly the least 
useful of the provisions, owing to its narrow interpretation outlined above. The article though 
is worthy of consideration primarily in relation to the notion of ‘residence,’ and the impacts 
of the tailings ponds upon the indigenous populace of Alberta. Under the article, ‘Every 
person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state of which he is a 
national.. .and not to leave it except by his own will,’481 and it is the drafting of this provision 
which affords the ability to suggest an interpretation of worth to the case at hand.
As has been discussed, the increased presence of humans, and the disturbance created 
by the activities necessary to meet the legal requirements with regards to monitoring the 
settlement of tailings ponds, as well as the physical footprint of these vast man-made lakes, 
would all significantly disrupt or deter the presence of indigenous flora and fauna from this 
habitat. Should the species upon which the First Nations tribes rely to express their culture, as 
a food source and for a number of other purposes, be forced or dissuaded from frequenting 
their habitats and regular roaming or migratory grounds, they too would be forced to relocate. 
Such an inevitable relocation in the face alternatively of the abandonment of traditional 
values and practices, would, it is suggested, potentially breach the provisions of Article VIII 
of the Declaration.
Specifically Articles VIII, IX, and XXIII, all o f which will be discussed herein.
480 ADRD (n249) Art. VIII
481 ibid.
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This impact is largely secondary in nature it has to be conceded, however, should the 
First Nations be left no alternative than to move to survive, or preserve a basic quality of life 
as a result of more severe impacts then such a suggestion would be of considerably greater 
weight. As a result, the efficacy of the article as a basis for litigation would be predicated 
upon the ability of industrial projects to reclaim the land in which the ponds were situated. 
The reintroduction of any ecosystem capable of supporting the self-sustaining lifestyle of the 
First Nations, though not necessarily their specific traditional methods, would be likely to be 
held as having rebutted the contention that the ponds forced relocation from an area of 
residence. Such an interpretative approach would also be likely to be adopted as it would 
reflect the domestic mechanisms already in effect in relation to the reclamation of tailings 
ponds enforced by the provincial government. At present the requirement is merely the 
reinstatement of, ‘equivalent land capability,’482 not its original form.483 Article VIII of the 
Declaration would therefore only be of use as a last resort in the event of blatant disregard for 
any environmental impact of extraction and refinement projects by industry and government 
alike.
4.32 Art XIII and Art XV ADHR
Cultural Life, and the Cultural Benefit of Free Time
The severity of the limitations of the Declaration owing both to its similar drafting to 
domestic provisions and non-binding effect on the Canadian state organs does not preclude 
its utility in relation to the aim of the piece as has been shown. The regional instrument is of 
particularly high value in relation to its use and protection of the concept of culture, and
482 Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12, Art. 146(b)
483 Given that a margin o f appreciation (zone o f discretion) is afforded to the state within Canadian law in R. v. 
Edwards Books and Art Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 the provision o f equivalent capability o f  land in light o f the 
technology available to extractors and the economic benefit to Alberta and Canada would likely be deemed
jus t if iab le  in the  face  o f  o n ly  se c o n d a ry  impacts .
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extensions thereof in relation to other fundamental rights. Although the Charter protecting 
such rights domestically elucidates a ‘catch-all’ provision demanding that all interpretations 
protect the multicultural heritage of Canada,484 this is somewhat unspecific in its application. 
In this regard, the Declaration becomes beneficial for the purposes of the construction of a 
case against the licensing of tar sands developments. Article XIII of the Declaration affords 
an unambiguous, ‘Right to the benefits of culture,’485 and goes on to elaborate upon this 
granting a basic notion of intellectual property, and protection of participation in the 
communal aspects of a culture. Thus although phrased as an individual right, concerning as it 
does ‘every person,’ the article encapsulates the collective nature of culture demanding the 
ability of individuals to, ‘take part in the cultural life of the community,’ and, ‘to enjoy the
486arts,’ expressing their culture. This has the obvious implication of the right potentially 
being upheld collectively, but also suggests the view of the jurists involved in the drafting of 
the provision, and thus potentially one to which the state could be argued to have acquiesced, 
that culture is an integral aspect of the community.
The cultural significance of hunting caribou to the Indian nations of the province, is 
well documented, having formed part of their identity since modern records of their existence 
began when European settlers first encountered them. The expertise of the indigenous 
population in the hunting and trapping of the fauna of the region was noted and exploited in 
the early development of the fur trade and has been argued to have ensured the survival of 
their culture instead of it being subsumed into that of the settlers.487 There is some macabre 
irony in the fact that it is the pursuit of another hitherto unparalleled economic gain which 
now threatens the existence of that very same culture. The role of the caribou in the ‘cultural
484 CCRF (n 174) s. 27
485 ADRD (n249)Art. XIII
486 ibid. at Art. XIII
487 Finkel, A. The Fur Trade and Early European Settlement in Finkel, A. ‘Working People in Alberta: A 
H istory’ (Athabasca University Press, Edmonton, 2012) 24
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life of the community’ of many Indian nations in Alberta is undeniable, providing as it does 
both sustenance and a long established link to the traditions of those communities living in or 
in proximity to their boreal forest habitats. The link between culture and community life and 
the recognition in principle of the potential for these two elements of a society, regardless of 
size, to be entwined to the extent that they are almost symbiotic is crucial. Such a connection 
would add great weight to the argument that the damage being wrought to the indigenous 
wildlife of the province threatens also the continued existence of its indigenous peoples.
In relation to the excessive consumption of water by the extraction projects, it is the 
elaboration provided with regards to the ‘right to the benefits of culture’ which potentially 
afford greater protection via interpretation of the Declaration into the domestic Charter, than 
might be granted from the application of the domestic provisions alone. According to the 
elaborative statement of the core right, ‘Every person has the right to take part in the cultural 
life of the community.’488 The reduction of the flow levels of the regional water courses to 
levels incapable of supporting fish stocks on which the cultural life of some First Nations 
relies arguably inhibits the ability of those peoples to take part in the cultural life to which 
they had become accustomed, and indeed is necessary to ensure the continuation of that 
culture. This was recognised in the Maya Belize case by the IACHR which ensured that, ‘the 
use and enjoyment of the land and its resources are integral components of the physical and 
cultural survival of the indigenous communities.’489
The numbers of First Nations still reliant upon fishing, who practice it as an element 
of expression of their culture is however small. Indeed many such tribes in regions 
exceptionally close to tar sands developments have chosen to align themselves with the
488 ADRD (n249) Art. XIII
89 Maya Indigenous Communities o f  the Toledo District Case IACHR 12.053, Report No. 40/04 (Merits) (2004) 
para. 154-6
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developers, foregoing their fishing heritage and profiting instead from aiding the corporations 
impacting upon their traditional lands.490 Such tribes have courted both high praise and 
vociferous criticism from opposing sides of the debate on the issue 491 Thus impacts to the 
culture beyond that to fishing would have to be proposed to support the argument that the 
reduction of flow rates adversely affects the ability of the indigenous peoples of the province 
to, ‘take part in the cultural life of the community.’492 As a result of these factors, the utility 
of the article to the aim of the thesis is reduced to a degree approaching inefficacy in relation 
to the practice of fishing by traditional means.
The fundamental nature of water to the various aspects of life has however been 
highlighted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on a number of occasions. 
More specifically it was stated in the Yakye Axa case that, ‘in the case of indigenous peoples, 
access to their ancestral lands and to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources found on 
them is closely linked to obtaining food and access to clean water.’493 There is acceptance 
therefore on its part o f the heavy reliance upon the natural world common to indigenous 
peoples the world over. This is equally true of the First Nations of Alberta, and water is 
crucial to all aspects of those ecosystems to which their culture is inextricably linked. Lower 
water flow rates impact not only upon aquatic flora and fauna, but indirectly on all life to 
which water is essential and the comments of the Commission recognise this reality.494 The
490 Snyder, J. ‘Five Aboriginal Firms Find Success on the Oil Sands’ (Alberta Oil Magazine, 3rd March 2012) 
<http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2012/03/rising-up/> Accessed 30th July 2014.
See for example the case o f the Fort McKay First Nation, who have opted to provide services to extractors 
and not extract on their own land, yet have still received significant criticism: Cattaneo, C. ‘Fort McKay 
Aboriginals Take ‘Good with the Bad’ o f the Oil Sands’ (Financial Post, 22nd March 2013) 
<http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/22/fort-mckay-aboriginals-take-good-with-the-bad-of-the-oil- 
sands/? Isa=cl79-ec8b> Accessed 30th July 2014.4Q9 - ----  J
^  ADRD (n249) Art. XIII
493 Yakye Axa (n31) para 166.
494 The Inter-American Commission opted to grant precautionary measures to the indigenous peoples inhabiting 
a region impacted by mining for silver and gold owing to the wide ranging impacts o f  water extraction and 
contamination, not merely direct impacts to human health. Communities o f  the Maya People (Sipakepense and
161
wildlife upon which the First Nations rely to express their culture, especially the boreal 
woodland caribou whose uses include the production of food, clothing, and ornaments 
amongst others, are equally as reliant on healthy water flow rates in the courses of the north 
east of the province. Similarly the aspects of the ecosystems present in that region which 
maintain their presence there are dependent upon the current balance of natural elements.495
The boreal forest is an ecosystem unique to a small number of locations almost 
exclusively contained within Russia and Canada and along a specific latitude. Thus even 
minute changes to the factors which comprise the balance upon which it hinges can have 
catastrophic impacts. For the specific sub-species of caribou which frequents the regions 
exploited to attain tar sands raw material (unique to only two locations in Canada 
themselves), the lichen which grows most favourably in those conditions is a preferred source 
of sustenance. Thus should impacts to water levels in the region reduce flows to levels 
incapable of supporting the drinking needs of the caribou, or should they be sufficient to 
adversely affect the growth of lichen, the caribou might also be deterred from their traditional 
habitat ranges, which coincide with the reserved lands of the First Nations of the region. As a 
result, the indigenous peoples of the region would have to leave their reserved lands to be 
able to continue the practice of hunting caribou496 and thus preserve their culture. Otherwise 
they would have to forego it entirely and retain the legal benefits afforded to them on those 
lands specifically designated under the provisions of the numbered treaties.497
Mam) o f  the Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan Municipalities in the Department o f  San Marcos, Guatemala 
IACHR PM 260-07 (2010)
495 Note ought to be made that boreal woodland caribou are a migratory species and herds are therefore used to 
relocating and changing location to benefit from the best feeding grounds.
496Such practice would however be subject to federal and provincial restrictions on hunting the species as a 
result o f their ‘at risk’ status, and not being subject to the exemptions afforded on reserved lands and too the 
indigenous peoples o f  Canada.
97 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
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The implications of forcing such inescapable decisions which bear considerable 
implications have been considered by the IACHR in the Yakye Axa case. In the action, the 
court iterated that the failure to recognise the title of indigenous peoples to their lands, thus 
requiring restitution through the granting of alternative land, ‘could affect other basic rights 
such as the right to cultural identity and the very survival of the indigenous communities and 
their members.’498 As such failing to recognise said connections to particular land would 
itself preordain a breach of these rights. Knowingly licensing water extraction to facilitate tar 
sands projects which result in these decisions having to be made would therefore constitute a 
breach of the right to the benefits of culture on the part of the governmental authorities.
Tailings ponds whilst not directly inhibiting the ability of the First Nations to express 
and benefit from their culture, also impact upon elements of the regional ecosystem 
inseparably involved in that expression. Land usage is a perpetual impact of the tar sands 
extraction projects, the sheer physical presence of extraction sites and allied processing 
facilities is disruptive to the regional ecosystem, and the footprint of the tailings ponds is no 
exception. Alterations to migratory patterns of indigenous wildlife, specifically boreal 
woodland caribou, as a result of damage to the boreal forest on which they as a species are 
dependent for their preferred food source of lichen, undoubtedly restrict the ability of the 
First Nations, ‘to take part in the cultural life of the community.’499 The issues with regard to 
land usage for tailings storage differ little from those discussed earlier in relation to this 
species however, and as such will not be discussed here again. The return of that land to its 
original form however, is worthy of note.
Yakye Axa (n31)
499 ADRD (n249) Art. XIII
163
The reclamation of land used to store tailings is, as has been discussed, a source of 
significant controversy especially in relation to the nature of the reclamation required by the 
licensing authorities. Current regulations require only an equal capability to that which was 
once present, not a direct replacement of that which has been disturbed.500 Such reclamation 
removes the environmental features upon which the First Nations culture is predicated, 
restricting as a result the ability of members of Indian bands in the regions from taking, ‘part 
in the cultural life of the community’501 in which they live. The potential for seepage of 
contaminants into the water courses of the region, although the extent of this is also 
contentious, may result in bioaccumulation through aquatic fauna and flora. Consequentially 
this will impact more severely on species higher up the food web of the region, which 
includes the caribou. Such an eventuality would also further restrict the ability of the First 
Nations to express their culture. Links between the indigenous populace and the environment 
of the north west of Alberta on which their culture is predicated are accepted as being 
inextricable. The submission of the Canadian state itself relating to the admissibility of the 
petition of the Hul ’qumi ’num Treaty Group conceded the significance of traditional lands in 
this regard saying that First Nations ought to be able to, and in its opinion could, ‘secure the 
lands necessary to preserve their culture and their way of life.’502 The choice of First Nations 
to move to areas unaffected by the tar sands projects, or struggle to preserve their culture and 
heritage but remain on their traditional lands over which they have constitutionally protected 
rights in the domestic legal sphere would fundamentally disregard this accepted connection.
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12, Art. 146(b)
501 ADRD (n249) Art. XIII
502 Hul ’qumi ’num Treaty Group v Canada Report No 105/09 Petition 592-07 Admissibility (30th October 2009) 
17
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The indigenous status of the First Nations peoples is legally reliant upon their 
registration with a band, and a number of rights afforded by such status necessitate living on 
the reserves attributed thereto. Relocation would therefore also require the foregoing of legal 
rights and benefits as well as participation in cultural and historically significant activities. 
The questionable aspect of this contention as the basis for a case is whether the indirect 
impacts of the tailings ponds on the ability of these peoples to partake in cultural activities 
would be upheld as breaching Article XIII 503 by the Inter-American Commission or 
domestically through interpretation of the CCRF in line with regional provisions. A number 
of obstacles would have to be overcome for the success of such a claim. Firstly a right within 
the CCRF would have to be suggested as having been breached and into which Article XIII 
might be interpreted. Any scientific contentions with regard to the impacts of tar sands 
projects upon cultural expression would have to be addressed also. Finally the arbitrary 
nature of decisions being made in spite of knowledge of the impacts and their consequences 
for the indigenous populace would have to be proven. For the construction of a case against 
the licensing of extraction projects, and the tailings ponds they produce, reliance upon such 
suggestions is undesirable, given the need to reduce or block such operations to preserve the 
culture and potentially very existence of the First Nations peoples in the regions exploited.
In relation to the protection of culture and the avoidance of such uncertainties, Article 
XV of the Declaration is of potential utility. Although the title of the right protects the, ‘right 
to leisure time and the use thereof,’504 it is the expansive articulation accompanying this brief 
outline which is of significance in relation to the piece. Specifically, Article XV of the 
declaration suggests that the leisure time of an individual should include the, ‘opportunity for
ADRD (n249) Art. XIII
504 ibid. Alt. XV
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advantageous use o f his free time to his spiritual, cultural and physical benefit.’ 505 The 
application of the right in this manner is not unfounded, though rare. This is largely owing to 
the fact that in instances where a breach such as that suggested in relation to the tar sands is 
proven, the broader protection of culture afforded by Article XIII is the preferred means by 
which petitions are submitted to the Commission. The utility is however worthy of note, and 
is accepted as a premise in the Ache Indians case in which a potential breach of Article XV 
was accepted owing to the construction of a settlement to which indigenous peoples were 
forced to congregate and inhabit, amongst other supposedly assimilatory practices.506 The 
right afforded under Article XV has no direct comparator in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,507 and instead offers a unique interpretative aspect to domestic legislation in 
relation to a contention that the effects of the extraction projects breach established human 
rights law. As has been stated previously the use of the hunting of caribou and fishing as a 
sole or primary source of sustenance for First Nations people is rare and ever decreasing. 
Thus the strength of the suggestion that inhibition of the ability undertake these activities due 
to environmental impacts gives rise to insufficient food sources is itself also constantly 
shrinking.
The practice of hunting caribou no longer represents a main source of sustenance for 
most Nations, but the cultural expression of the act of hunting continues unabated and as such 
is arguably more appropriately protected by this provision than by others pertaining to 
specific actions or resources. This would add again to the proposition that the cultural 
significance of the caribou of the province should be protected as well as its role as a provider 
of sustenance to the indigenous people dwelling there. Without this emphasis on the dual role 
of the animal in the lives of the indigenous nations of Alberta however, the basis for a
505 ibid. Art. XV.
506 Ache Indians v. Paraguay IACHR Case 1802, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc. 21, corr. 1 (1977)
507 CCRF (n 174)
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challenge arising from human rights law might be rebutted by the suggestion that the 
Government of Alberta and the companies extracting the tar sands from the earth there need 
only ensure adequate sustenance for these people. Article XV alleviates this potential rebuttal 
by recognising the role of cultural practices beyond the provision of the necessities of life for 
which many were often originally conceived.
Such a connection is not widely discussed in broad regional and international human 
rights discourse owing to the existence of binding rights specifically aimed at cultural 
preservation. In this context the need for an interpretative insight to this effect owing to the 
peculiar construction of Section 27 of the CCRF508 is afforded by Article XV and supported 
in statements regarding the role of leisure activities, especially in relation to the cultural 
development of children. Indeed the significance of passing on traditional activities and their 
preservation for future generations is highlighted in a General Comment of the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. The Committee stated in relation to the ability 
of children from indigenous and minority groups that the, ‘Connection to nature through 
gardening, harvesting, ceremonies and peaceful contemplation is an important dimension of 
the arts and heritage of many cultures.’509 The significance of the role of leisure time in the 
preservation and perpetuation of cultures is thus acknowledged by international human rights 
institutions, and specifically the importance of environmental connections is mentioned, 
furthering the relevance of this perception in relation to the focus of the piece.
The level of scientific certainty demanded in relation to the suggestion of breaches of 
other rights is somewhat predicated on the assertion that practices ensure nutrition. As such
508 CCRF (n l74) s. 27
509 Committee on the Rights o f the Child, General Comment No. 17 The Right o f the Child to Rest, Leisure,
Play, R ecrea t iona l  A c t iv i t ie s ,  C u l tu ra l  Life and the  Arts (Art.  3 1) C R C /C /G C /1 7  (2 0 1 3 )  40
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avoiding the implication that access to sustenance is affected is desirable in the formulation 
of a case as it would lower the burden of proof expected to demonstrate a breach. This is as 
the onerous implications for the state, or province in this case, suggested as being in breach 
would be far greater, and the potential ramifications a more considerable cost. The restitution 
suggested in such instances of breaches often require positive restitutional and protectionist 
acts of inherently greater cost rather than the simple requirement to desist from a particular 
action. In this regard Article XV attains considerable significance. In the modem era such 
practices reflect an expression of culture practiced in order to preserve heritage and pass on 
traditional knowledge to younger generations rather than a means of accessing the 
‘necessities of life.’ The right of every individual to the, ‘advantageous use of his free time to 
his spiritual, cultural and physical benefit,’510 is reflective of the reality of the role of 
traditional hunting and fishing in the regions of Alberta exploited to obtain tar sands raw 
material, and used to store the tailings produced as a by-product. As a result it avoids 
procedural and scientific demands placed upon other rights which do not accurately reflect 
the motivations for engaging in certain traditional practices.
The recognition of the significance of culture and its representation within standalone
rights under the Declaration is a key contribution of the regional mechanism to the
formulation of a case against the tar sands. The domestic provision relating to culture in the
CCRF511 amounts to a general interpretative consideration of all rights in line with
preservation and enhancement of Canada’s multicultural heritage, and is arguably not binding
in itself. Indeed Hogg went so far as to suggest it would act as, ‘a rhetorical flourish rather
than an operative provision.’512 Instead the section requires attribution to a substantive right
within the text, which presents some difficulties in relation to the aim of the piece. The
510 ADRD (n249) Art. XV
^  CCRF (n l74)
Hogg, P.W. Canada Act 1982Annotated {Carswell, Toronto, 1982) 72
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connection between traditional acts and indigenous culture highlighted by Articles XIII and 
XV of the Declaration513 bears considerable weight in relation to the basis for a case against 
the permitting of tar sands projects. With regards to the contention at the core of this case 
being that environmental impacts to the specific ecosystems and features thereof to which 
First Nations culture is inextricably linked breach the basic human rights of those peoples as 
a result, their potential significance is evident. Articles XIII and XV of the Declaration 
represent provisions through which this suggestion can be presented succinctly and without 
the contentions plaguing other proposed approaches, and as such are highly significant 
aspects of the text in the context of the thesis.
The inextricable link between the specific ecosystems of the reserved lands and 
aspects thereof and the cultures of First Nations514 dictates the very existence of Indian 
culture not only in Alberta, but across Canada. Any adverse impact to those ecosystems is 
therefore a threat to that culture and would undoubtedly restrict the ability of the indigenous 
populace of those regions affected, ‘to take part in the cultural life of the community,’ 515 
breaching the corresponding right afforded by the Declaration. The reading of these 
provisions into the domestic provisions of the Canadian legal system is affected by the lack 
of directly corresponding rights in the Charter. As such there is a need to interpret rights with 
a prima facie alternate subject matter in light of this provision, thus requiring the assertion 
that the subject matter of that right is key to the ability of the complainant, ‘to take part in the 
cultural life of the community,’516 and attaining the benefits of doing so.
513 ADRD (n249)Arts. XIII and XV.
514 Specific First Nations will have distinct cultures and practices from others, even where they are in relatively 
close proximity geographically, as such practices are heavily linked to the ecosystems which they inhabit. 
Therefore a reserve close to a water course is more likely to fish as an aspect o f their culture, whereas one 
within the depths o f  the boreal forest will be more reliant on the hunting o f caribou to express their culture and 
attain the benefits gained by doing so.
515 ADRD (n249)Art. XIII
5,6 ibid.
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In the creation of a case against the tar sands developments of north eastern Alberta 
therefore the lack of a mirror right in the domestic sphere relegates Articles XIII and XV to a 
supporting role in relation to one afforded and enforced by the Canadian courts. This would 
allow the significance of certain acts or practices integral to the preservation of culture to be 
taken into account rather than specifically protecting the culture itself. However as such an 
explicit stand alone right to culture is lacking, as has been discussed, this is unlikely to be 
upheld in any litigious action as a valid line of reasoning. Thus Articles XIII and XV become 
of less potential utility for the aim of the piece than rights common in some conception to the 
domestic Charter, unless such a connection can be convincingly presented. Following the 
decision in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,517 obligations to which the Canadian 
state has acquiesced are to be interpreted, where possible, into domestic legislation by the 
judiciary. As such the provisions of Articles XIII and XV affording protections to cultural 
beliefs might be suggested as being fundamental to the mental well-being of the individual 
secured by the CCRF. Thus although limited in their direct applicability, the interpretative 
significance of two provisions in offering a connection specifically to the significance of 
culture to an individual, especially those belonging to minority cultures, is arguably 
inimitable in regional mechanisms applicable to Canada.
17 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056-7.
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4.33 Art XIV ADHR
Right to Work
Whereas the domestic legislation of Canada provides a right, ‘to pursue the gaining of 
a livelihood in any province’518 within the CCRF, the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man illustrating the principles underlying the inter-American system provides the less 
expansive, ‘right to work.’519 At first glance this provision would appear to be of far less 
significance to the formulation of a case against the permitting of tar sands developments 
based in human rights. The notion of ‘work’ conjures only the image of financial gain, and in 
relation to the hunting of caribou or fishing, this is relatively insignificant as despite 
providing a form of sustenance, the caribou hide and other components bear little economic 
value when compared to their historical worth and traditional fishing is decreasingly 
prevalent. As such their value is largely non-pecuniary and based in social, cultural and 
developmental significance to the Indians alone. Indeed even caribou meat is of little value 
outside their communities and the quantity of fish caught is too low to facilitate any 
commercial venture. The purpose behind the ‘work’ to which a right is given however 
highlights the utility of this right in the interpretation of the domestic Canadian provisions.
Whereas the use of the concept of ‘gaining of a livelihood,’ in domestic Canadian 
legislation ensures a non-pecuniary interpretation of the vocational right, the inter-American 
system provides that an individual’s right to work should, ‘assure him a standard of living 
suitable for himself and for his family,’521 under Article XIV of the Declaration. The
518 CCRF (nl74) s.6 
^  ADRD (n249) Art. XIV.
This is however beneficial as traditional rights afforded under the numbered treaties are exempted from 
protection by the rights afforded therein if the traditional activity they protect becomes commercial in nature
following the case o f Badger (n269)
521 ADRD (n249)Art. XIV
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addition of this reasoning for the inclusion of the right to work within the declaration could 
provide an interpretative insight into the ‘necessities of life’ protected under the concept of a 
‘livelihood’ under the domestic legislation of Canada, by adding a communal element to the 
right. Thus the provision ensures not only the right to an occupation to sustain oneself, but 
also to provide such basic amenities for one’s family.
In relation to the development of the tar sands projects within Alberta, and the 
resulting damage to the wildlife of the province to which the indigenous people there are 
inextricably linked, this inclusion of the family unit as a consequential subject of the right to 
work allows for the inclusion of a broader range of evidence of effects upon them. Thus the 
impacts of excessive water consumption, alterations to the inherent ecosystem, disturbances 
to flora and fauna and the seepage of tailings might all be suggested as breaching the right 
should their impacts be felt by the family unit as a whole, or a member thereof, and not 
simply the provider of the main source of income. As such this would add weight to the 
contention that the aforementioned effects are significant enough to constitute a breach of 
human rights law. Otherwise the loss of the livelihood of an individual, where no tangible 
health impacts were felt by them, might conceivably be outweighed on the basis of public 
interest given the considerable financial benefits offered by tar sands extraction. This 
threshold of inhibiting family life has been considered in many jurisdictions and precedents, 
yet has not often been overcome despite having been eluded to by numerous jurists and 
recognised as being a potential avenue for the expansion of human rights law in relation to 
the environment.522
522 The European regional system has been particularly adherent to this approach holding on many occasions 
that environmental damage can constitute a breach of human rights law. For a discussion o f the jurisprudence o f  
the European court see: Loukis Loucaides, ‘Environmental Protection through the Jurisprudence o f the
E uropean  C o n v e n t io n  on H u m a n  R ig h t s ’ (2 0 0 5 )  75 British Y e a rb o o k  o f  In terna tiona l  L aw  24 9
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The Inter-American institutions have however not followed the significant weight of 
jurisprudence emanating from the European context in this regard.523 Indeed as Lixiniski 
states that the Commission, ‘seems to reject the connection with private and family life, 
characteristic of the European system,’524 and its approach to cases akin to the focus of the
525piece. The approach of the Inter-American system instead is focused heavily upon two 
branches. Firstly threats to health are considered under the auspices of jurisprudence 
concerning the rights to life and physical integrity. Secondly the focus of broader impacts is 
centred on those affecting spiritual connections to the environment including cultural and 
religious connections. In relation to the family therefore the connection between individual 
subjects is generally recognised by virtue of a collective belief structure rather than familial 
bonds and this accounts for a lack of case law concerning the family unit in this regard. In 
spite of the difference more broadly in the approaches to human rights protection of critical 
environments, there remains a common recognition of the reliance of individuals upon others 
within a group and that inhibiting an environment to which they have become accustomed 
has effects upon the individual directly but which consequentially impact heavily upon the 
group to which they are connected.
This recognition of social ramifications of environmental impacts prima facie only 
affecting an individual directly connected to them by virtue of their livelihood is key. An 
individual right is given wider context reflective of the realities of family and communal life. 
Regardless of the form of connection recognised, familial or spiritual, it is this contextual
523 This will be discussed in greater depth in the chapter pertaining to the potential influence o f  the European 
system on Canadian jurisprudence in this regard.
Lixinski, L. ‘Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court o f Human Rights: Expansionism at the 
Service o f the Unity o f  International Law’ (2010) 21(3) European Journal o f International Law 585, 595 
5 Again greater discussion o f this will follow, but the cases o f Communities o f  the Maya People (Sipakepense 
and Mam) o f  the Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan Municipalities in the Department o f  San Marcos, 
Guatemala IACHR PM 260-07 (2010) and Maya Indigenous Communities (n464) are particularly relevant and 
bear significant similarities in relation to the impacts felt by the First Nations of Alberta.
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recognition of reliance which is fundamental to its practical application. In the Inter- 
American system whilst the focus of rights based environmental protection has been on the 
spiritual, its conception of the right to work as an interpretative aid through its recognition of 
the importance of work for a family unit provides similar protection.526 Certainly in relation 
to the case study at the heart of the piece the result is the same, it is the wider impact of a loss 
of an individual livelihood connected to a specific ecosystem which is of interpretative 
benefit by virtue of its addition to domestic provisions. This construction however also allows 
for consideration of the ability to provide rather than the protection of a single cultural belief 
system which can be difficult owing to the fragmented nature of such systems in the First 
Nations of Alberta, and Canada as a whole. Thus the connection to the smaller family unit is 
arguably more useful as it circumvents any potential issues with regard to the proportion of 
communal sustenance afforded by traditional hunting, and the variations in cultural practices 
and beliefs which can occur in relatively small regions.527 As such whilst the right was 
drafted to provide family protection, this construction provides an interpretative addition to 
the case which might avoid some of the potentially problematic idiosyncrasies of First 
Nations culture in the legal context whilst still protecting it as a consequential result.
The inclusion of a social aspect to the right would also connect to the right to a culture 
protected under Article XIII of the declaration and such an interpretation would conform with 
the requirement of Article 27 of the CCRF that the text, ‘shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of
526 See for example the consideration o f the right to freedom of religion in the face o f the construction o f a dam 
in: Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroiza et al. v. Chile IACHR, Report n. 30/04, Petition 4617/02, Friendly 
Settlement (11 Mar. 2004)
27 See in this regard the discussion by Bakker o f the blending o f cultures and languages and the sharing of 
reserves in this region which occurred during and following the most intense century o f the fur trade: Bakker, P. 
A Language o f  Our Own: The Genesis o fM ich if the Mixed Cree-French Language o f  the Canadian Metis 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) 44
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528Canadians.’ Thus prima facie the right to work outlined as a principle of the Inter- 
American system might appear to add nothing of significance to the basis for a case against 
the damage wrought to wildlife and consequently the indigenous peoples of Alberta as a 
result of tar sands developments. However, the opportunity it provides via a more expansive 
interpretation of the legally binding domestic rights to overtly include dependents as well as 
the individual, is highly significant. The introduction of the concepts of a dependent family 
and the suitability of their living standard to their cultural identity, including inextricable 
aspects thereof, to considerations of effects to the individual evidencing a breach of a right 
potentially allows for a non-pecuniary benefit arising from work to be read into any 
interpretation of the domestic legislation protecting the right to do so.
As Article XIV of the Declaration529 has a mirror right in the CCRF,530 it is of 
considerably greater utility in the creation of a case against the developments based in human 
rights law than others in the text. The near identical core subject matter of the two rights 
facilitates a less tenuous progression of the enforceable, yet narrower, right under the CCRF 
to include the broader notion iterated in the Declaration. Whilst the CCRF in Article 6(2)(b) 
protects the right of citizens and permanent residents of Canada, ‘to pursue the gaining of a 
livelihood in any province,’531 the Declaration suggests that, ‘Every person has the right to 
work, under proper conditions, and ...assure him a standard of living suitable for himself and 
for his family.’ 532 A suitable standard of living, proposed by the Declaration would 
undoubtedly include safe and clean water for the purposes of hydration and sanitation,
CCRF (n l74) s. 27 
529 ADRD (n249) Art. XIV 
” ®CCRF(nl74)s.6(2)(b)! i b i d -
532 ADRD (n249) Art. XIV
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however, the ability of the indigenous peoples to work or gain a livelihood does not in itself 
afford such water.533
The lack of water in the regions affected by the tar sands development, whether 
through excessive consumption or contamination owing to tailings seepage, could by contrast 
impact upon the efficacy of continuing traditional means of pursuing the gaining of a 
livelihood. This impact would not merely be to the few First Nations who still rely on 
traditional fishing methods for a portion of their sustenance, and as an expression of their 
cultural heritage. The presence of the boreal woodland caribou, far more widely exploited as 
a source of sustenance and various aspects of cultural expression, is also heavily reliant on 
the preservation of the near unique ecosystem of the region, itself inextricably linked to 
undisrupted flow rates in its water courses.
Thus by permitting the excessive consumption of water from the natural sources in 
the region and the continued use of tailings ponds to store by-products, the Albertan and 
national governments are, it could be contested, breaching human rights provisions relating to 
‘work.’ These processes are restricting the protected ability of the indigenous peoples of the 
province from being able, ‘to pursue the gaining of a livelihood,’534 capable of supporting ‘a 
standard of living suitable for himself and for his family.’535 The key addition provided by the 
Declaration in this regard is that of the ‘standard of living’ not present in the domestic 
provision concerning the same subject. As has been discussed the notion of work is often 
concerned primarily with the securing of remuneration in safe conditions, and indeed for the 
majority of peoples these are the sole concerns of such activities. Linking the concept of work
533 Though it could be argued successfully that via sufficient remuneration this could be achieved the levels o f  
remuneration required would be substantial and beyond that which indigenous cultural professions are capable 
of producing.
334 CCRF (nl74) s.6(2)(b)
35 ADRD (n249)Art. XIV
176
with that of the attainment of a standard of living allows for the consideration of the standard 
of living relevant to the individual in question, and dependents thereof, beyond a simple 
assessment of pecuniary requirements. In the instance of the indigenous peoples of Alberta, a 
key aspect of the standard of living sought, and therefore reflected in the work they choose to 
undertake is the expression and preservation of their culture. The breadth afforded to the 
domestic provisions of Canada with regard to work through interpretation in line with the 
principles established in the ADHR therefore would add significantly to the utility of the 
domestic right in relation to a case against the adverse impacts to the indigenous populace of 
tar sands developments in Alberta.
4.4 Protections Afforded by the European Context
4.41 Right to Private and Family Life
Environmental issues have been the subject of a number of seminal hearings in the
Inter-American regional system, both in the Court and the Commission. Whilst as in its
European counterpart there is strictly speaking no precedent created by such cases as they are
only binding upon the States party to them, and in the case of the Commission have no
binding effect, it is rare petitions concerning the same or highly similar subject matter are not
dealt with in the same manner.536 Thus the decisions of both the Inter-American Commission
and Court can be taken as viable interpretative tools in establishing a right to particular
environmental features arising from established human rights and applicable to the damage
being wrought by the tar sands development projects in Alberta. The breadth of interpretative
536 Petkova, B. Three Levels o f  Dialogue in Precedent Formation at the CJEU and ECtHR in Dzehtsiarou, K. 
Konstaninides, T. Lock, T. and O’Meara, N. (eds.) Human Rights Law in Europe: The Influence, Overlaps and
Contradictions o f  the E U  and the ECHR  (R ou t ledge ,  O xon  2 0 1 4 )  75
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inspiration utilised by the Canadian Supreme Court537 does not however end with the Inter- 
American system and international human rights provisions which the Executive of the State 
has signed.
The Supreme Court has cited the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in 
its interpretation of the provisions of the sister text538 to the American Convention on Human
539 •Rights applicable to that geographical region. The dissenting opinion of Belzil, L.J. in the 
case of R v Big M  Drug Mart,540 cited as the embodiment of this approach, states;
‘the Canadian Charter was not conceived and born in isolation... It is part of the universal 
human rights movement. It guarantees that the power of government in Canada shall not be 
used to abridge or abrogate the fundamental rights to which every Canadian, as well as every 
other human being in the world, is entitled by birth.’541
The opinion of Belzil concerned the interpretative influence of the ICCPR, and the further 
expansion of the approach to the European Convention on Human Rights542 came in the case 
of R v Rahey,543 The case considered the European jurisdiction particularly in this case owing 
to the shared bilingual nature of the texts at the core of human rights protection in their 
jurisdiction. In considering whether a delay in the time taken for a trial to reach its conclusion 
justified a staying of the conviction in its entirety the French variant of the domestic right to a 
fair trial was considered. In order to justify this interpretative approach, and in line with the
CCRF (n 174)
538 Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR)
539 ACHR (nl87)
540 Big M  Drug Mart Ltd. (n212)
541 ibid. 655
542 ECHR (n538)
543 Rv. Rahey  [1987]  1 S .C .R .  588, 78 N .S .R .  (2d)  183.
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‘living tree doctrine’ established in R v Big M  Drug Mart,544 Justice La Forest turned to the 
case of W ernhoff45 in the European court, and as such established specifically the utilisation 
of this jurisdiction under the auspices of the doctrine.
Where there is such a lack of clarity in the provisions of the CCRF, this approach is 
particularly favoured and is of great significance as highlighted in the case of Re Mitchell and 
the Queen.546 These regional jurisdictions, considered sources of influence on Canadian law 
by the Supreme Court, offer a greater breadth of case law and judicial interpretation than that 
available domestically. As a result, the ability to build a case against the tar sands is 
considerably improved as established legal principles from other jurisdictions can be used 
rather than merely suggesting novel interpretative approaches to domestic legal provisions.
The European human rights system is arguably ‘the most developed judicial international 
human right protection system’547 in terms of longevity, case law, and enforcement. The 
focus of the majority of cases brought against States concerning environmental impacts in the 
European regional system, has been on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the right to private and family life.548 Also the familial elements of a number of 
domestic rights might be utilised in opposition to adverse environmental impacts akin to the 
application of Article 8 of the ECHR in the European regional system. The lack of directly 
comparable rights in the European Convention549 and Canadian Charter550 in some instances 
restricts the utility of the case law from within that jurisdiction as an interpretative aid.
544 Big M  Drug Mart Ltd. (n212)
545 Wernhoff v Germany (1979) 1 EHRR55.
546 Re. Mitchell and the Queen (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 449.
547 Brems, E. The Margin o f  Appreciation Doctrine o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights: Accommodating 
Diversity Within Europe in Forsythe, D.P. McMahon, P.C. (eds.) Human Rights and Diversity: Area Studies 
Revisited (University o f  Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2003) 81
548 ECHR (n538) Art. 8.
549 ECHR (n538)
550 CCRF (n 174)
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Article 8 of the European text is one such prima facie omission from the Canadian Charter, 
providing as it does the individual with the, ‘right to respect for his private and family life.’551 
This having been said the, ‘right to life, liberty and security of the person,’552 the closest 
comparator within the domestic Canadian instrument, has been interpreted as including 
limited rights in respect of the family of an individual, especially in relation to children, as a 
result of the case of B.(R.) v Children’s Aid Society o f  Metropolitan Toronto. 553 This 
acceptance of a familial element to the domestic right is crucial in its provision of an avenue 
through which the interpretative influence of the more explicit European right and case law 
discussing its breadth can be applied.
Should the impacts of the tar sands extraction projects be deemed to have the potential 
to force the relocation of the indigenous peoples of the region to another area, and at a 
significant financial cost as they do not own their own land per se, the case of Dubetska and 
Others v. Ukraine554 would be of particular relevance. Here the Ukrainian government was 
ordered to pay damages to two families impacted upon by the ‘spoil heap’555 of a coal mine 
in the proximity of their homes. The court deemed the government to have, ‘failed either to 
facilitate the applicants’ relocation or to put in place a functioning policy to protect them 
from environmental risks associated with continuing to live within their immediate 
proximity.’556 Clear parallels to this case can be drawn in relation to the adverse impacts of 
the situation in Alberta and focus of the work generally.
551 ECHR (n538)Art. 8
552 CCRF (n 174) s. 7
553 B.(R.) v Children’s A id Society o f  Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315
554 Dubetska and Others v Ukraine Application no. 30499/03 (ECHR, 2011.02.10)
555 A collection o f  the waste product from the extraction and refining processes.
556 Dubetska (n 5 5 4 )  154
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Similarly in the case of Ivan Atanasov v Bulgaria,557 the land of a farmer was heavily 
polluted by leaks and run off from tailings ponds containing the waste products of a copper- 
ore mine. Despite losing his case, owing to his failure to provide evidence that the land had 
been devalued, the principle found in the Dubetska case558 was affirmed. The government 
was expected to have avoided or mitigated to the greatest possible extent the clear and often 
foreseeable damage caused, and thus had to compensate for it retrospectively. In both cases 
however the damage to the land was measured in pecuniary terms, assessing the extent of 
said damage by its decrease in market value. Following this any claims for non-pecuniary 
damage assessed on a subjective basis relative to the case at hand.559 The Dubetska case560 
also saw the court rule that in spite of measures on the part of the government to attempt to 
mitigate the damage done, the failure of those measures to achieve any tangible reduction in 
impact equally failed to lift the duty of care for citizens placed upon them owing to their 
position of authority. The principles established in the two cases offer a key element to the 
basis for a case against the licensing of such projects under human rights law when read 
alongside domestic Canadian human rights provisions, the impacts of the tar sands 
developments and attempts to mitigate them.
The European court required that where the home of an individual or group is 
damaged or they are forced to relocate entirely by the impacts of a state approved industrial 
project that they ought to be compensated if they remain in danger, or all reasonable 
measures be taken to cease the damage where this is appropriate or achievable. For the First 
Nations impacted upon by the tar sands developments the Dubetska561 ruling, especially 
comments concerning the inadequacy of the provision of clean water in mitigation, offers a
557 Ivan Atanasov v Bulgaria Application no. 12853/03 (ECHR, 2010.12.02)
558 Dubetska (n554)




potential to demand the cession of developments in critical areas. Ownership of the land is 
not however analogous to the principles of the cases in the European system which Canadian 
domestic law could be interpreted in light of. The reserved lands under the numbered
5 62treaties are the property of the Crown, and administered by the Canadian government. 
Thus the loss of market value is irrelevant to the First Nations inhabiting the land, as they 
cannot access that value and could in no way benefit from it.563 Instead emphasis would have 
to be placed on the cultural value of the land and the links between the heritage of the First 
Nations and the specific reserves they were granted over a century ago.
Whilst this would require another interpretative leap on the part of the Canadian 
judiciary, this notion would appear to come well within the bounds of interpreting all 
provisions of the CCRF in pursuit of the preservation of the multicultural heritage of Canada, 
as stipulated in section 27 of the Charter. Arguably the recognition of cultural value achieved 
by this would further rebut any suggestion of full pecuniary compensation being achievable 
owing to the inimitable and irreplaceable links to the specific lands and ecosystems damaged. 
Thus the consideration of established principles with regards to the environment from the 
European system supports the notion that the very existence of the indigenous cultures of 
Alberta which is inextricably linked to the specific ecosystems threatened by the tar sands 
extraction projects should be preserved.
Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
563 Note should be made that the First Nations can opt under the numbered treaties to ‘sell’ the rights to their 
land and secure conventional title thereto on an individual basis. However this is not o f  concern to the thesis as 
avenues to compensation in such instances could be achieved using established principles o f environmental law 
and tort law in Canadian law, and would not need to concern themselves with the cultural inimitability o f the
peoples  affected .
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The cultural links of the First Nations peoples of Alberta to the specific ecosystems of 
the boreal forest and the lands granted to them under the numbered treaties564 deters, if not 
prevents, relocation to avoid the adverse effects of the tailings ponds. The visual impacts of 
the tailings ponds, and their deterrent effect upon wildlife however may not be sufficient to 
breach the limitations permitted by Article 8 of the European text,565 which are mirrored in 
the Canadian domestic provisions and case law,566 as illustrated in the case of Kyrtatos v. 
Greece,567 The case concerned a construction projects on the island of Tinos, a popular tourist 
location, and it was contended that the development reduced the scenic beauty of the area, 
and the levels of wildlife present, including protected species. The court decided against the 
applicants, stating that they had failed to prove a direct link of sufficient gravity between the 
effects of the project and their own wellbeing as protected under the convention.568
In relation to the First Nations peoples of Alberta therefore, the contention that the 
rights afforded to them under the domestic Charter569 are breached by the visual deterrent to 
culturally key species for those peoples is burdened by needing to be based upon a direct 
impact to themselves, and their wellbeing. The key issue here is therefore whether the ability 
to partake in culturally significant activities, such as fishing or the hunting of boreal 
woodland caribou constitutes an aspect of their wellbeing. Precedent would suggest in the 
European courts that the concept of wellbeing is heavily focused upon physical health, the 
majority of cases akin to that of Kyrtatos, Lopez Ostra and Dubetska570 having succeeded on
Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
565 ECHR (n53 8) Art. 8 (2)
566 The right to life, liberty and security afforded in CCRF (n l74) s. 7 was held as applying to the family unit in 
Children’s A id Society (n553)
557 Kyrtatos v. Greece [2003] ECHR 242
568 Kyrtatos v. Greece [2003] ECHR 242, para. 53
569 CCRF (n l74)
570 Kyrtatos v. Greece [2003]  E C H R  242 ,  and Dubetska (n554)
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this basis, with other impacts being outweighed by political or economic considerations as in 
Hatton.571
The successful breach of this burden of proof through high reliance upon 
environmental features in the manner in which the First Nations people are is unprecedented 
in the European context. This is owing largely to said reliance not being based upon an easily 
quantifiable or illustrated basis, that of cultural expression. The case of G and E  v. Norway572 
is crucial in this regard, as it was the first instance in which the European court held that the 
Article 8 right included traditional practices within its auspices. However, in the case, which 
concerned the flooding of lands of the indigenous Sami people for the construction of a 
hydroelectric project, the impact was deemed as not of requisite scale and severity to 
constitute to breach the right protected. In relation to the construction of a case against the 
tar sands projects therefore the lack of certainty arising from a lack of a successful precedent 
on such a basis would understandably make such a suggestion an unattractive proposition.
Whilst the setting of a precedent of respect for culture as an aspect of human 
wellbeing by the courts in Canada and internationally is highly desirable, this case has 
tangible implications. As a result the desire on the part of the First Nations as applicants 
would be to base their arguments upon contentions with a realistic and, where possible, 
predictable likelihood of success. The contention that cultural life is an aspect of the right to 
private and family life under the European human rights system has been upheld in theory in
571 Hatton (nl86). Here the economic value o f night time flights into and out o f Heathrow airport was deemed to 
outweigh the impacts to house prices and auditory disturbances they inevitably caused.
572 G an dE v. Norway (1983) 35 DR 30
573 This case would also act to circumvent the issue o f First Nations with reserves not owning the reserve lands, 
but instead having a fiduciary relationship with the state giving them a caveated ins fructis over it, as the Sami 
had a similar arrangement with the Norwegian state.
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the G and E  case.574 However, the suggestion that this is reflected in the Canadian context via 
a right implicitly affording the same protection, given the lack of a directly comparable right, 
is an untested and as such excessively precarious one on which to base a case of such 
magnitude.
Arguably the most seminal case concerning the notion of environmental protection 
afforded by human rights law in the European system,575 is the case of Lopez Ostra v
f  7/
Spain. The case concerned the human health impacts of a waste treatment plant, and 
considered the contention by the State that the economic benefit of the plant outweighed any 
obligations that might be construed as extending from Article 8.577 Having considered the 
contention the Court held in favour of the applicants stating that;
‘the State did not succeed in striking a fair balance between the interest of the town’s 
economic well-being - that of having a waste-treatment plant - and the applicant’s effective
• • 578enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and her private and family life.’
Had the waste being treated been of a nature crucial to human sanitation and therefore life, 
such as a drinking water treatment plant, or human waste treatment plant,579 it has been
• 580 • •contested that the decision may not have been made in the manner that it was. This is as
G a n d E v .  Norway (1983) 35 DR 30
575 The case is suggested as being o f this stature in a elaborative footnote regarding environmental protection 
under the auspices o f human rights law in various jurisdictions in The Oxford Handbook on International 
Adjudication. See: Dupuy, P-M.and Vinuales, J.E. The Challenge o f  ‘Proliferation An Anatomy o f  the Debate 
in Romano, C.P.R. Alter, K.J. and Shany, Y (eds) The Oxford Handbook o f  International Adjudication (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013) 150
576 Lopez Ostra (n l86)
*77 ECHR (n538) Art. 8
Lopez Ostra (nl 86) at para. 58
579 The plant in question treated industrial waste water from leather treatment plants for re-use in other industrial 
processes.
580 See the discussion o f the necessity o f the plant to solve an existing issue o f  pollution from tanneries and
actions taken to mitigate harm caused: Lopez Ostra (n 186) paras. 50-58
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the benefit would have extended beyond the monetary to one of the health and well-being of 
the populace of the State, also enshrined as a potential limitation to the Article 8 right under 
sub-section (2 ),581 and a benefit afforded far greater weight in the balancing of the 
environmental impacts with the social and economic rewards of an industrial project by the 
Court.
The significance of the case was however in its status as the first occasion on which 
the severity of impact had been held by the Court to have outweighed a considerable 
economic benefit to the general public of a State or region.582 In relation to the construction 
of a case against the adverse health and environmental impacts of the tar sands extraction 
projects, and specifically of direct impacts such as tailings ponds and water consumption, 
this case represents a respected interpretative source for the Canadian courts. The case also 
is comparable to that forming the focus of the piece in that it considers the balancing of a 
considerably economically beneficial industrial project with impacts to human health. A 
caveat to the influence of this case would however be the recognised and proven direct causal 
link between the illness of the daughter of the applicant and the operations of the waste 
treatment plant. This was a significant factor in the decision and one which a number of 
similar cases in the European court have fallen foul of.584 Similarly it is a continually 
contested suggestion in relation to the effects of extraction projects in Alberta.
ECHR (n538) Art. 8 (2)
582 Hatton (n l86)
583 See in this regard the comment o f  Anna Riddell on the significance o f the case: Riddell, A. New Perspectives 
on Connecting Human Rights and International Environmental Law in Sancin, V. International Environmental 
Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges (GV Zalozba, Ljubljana, 2012) 135
584 The case o f Tatar (n31) para 88 was originally brought on the basis o f an Article 2 (right to life) claim
which failed owing to the lack o f  a causal link between the tailing produced by a o f a gold mine and adverse 
health effects felt by the applicants. The case was however eventually decided in their favour on the basis o f an
Article 8 breach.
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Thus whilst the utility of the Lopez Ostra case585 as an interpretative aid in the 
construction of a case against the tar sands is potentially massive, a clear and severe 
disruption to the, ‘private and family life,’ of the applicants must be proven. The demand that 
this be of sufficient gravity to outweigh any limitation which might be deemed, ‘necessary in 
a democratic society in the interest of national security’ or crucially in this instance, ‘the 
economic well-being of the country,’586 is a significant hurdle, given the immense capacity 
for generating financial wealth that the tar sands affords both Alberta and Canada as a whole. 
As such the interpretative expansion afforded by the case is something of the proverbial 
‘double edged sword,’ providing potential for both the outweighing of economic benefits by 
human health impacts, and the exact opposite. In such a situation the considerable benefits of 
the project at hand would likely allow its continuation within certain restrictions to limit the 
adverse effects felt.587 In the context of the indigenous peoples of Alberta, such a result 
would be devastating as extraction projects having adverse impacts upon culturally 
significant ecosystems would continue in all but the most extreme cases of unavoidable 
harms to human health.588
The protection afforded under Article 8 of the European Convention is not directly 
mirrored in the CCRF. However, a number of aspects to which courts have applied the 
convention would be considered actionable under the auspices of provisions of the domestic 
text. One such instance is the issuing of permits by the Canadian and Albertan authorities to 
new oil sands projects and the expansion of established installations. The human rights 
implications of the permitting of various projects and events have been considered on various
«oc
Lopez Ostra (n l86)
ECHR (n538) Art. 8 (2)
As was the case in Hatton (n l86)
588 WOuld follow the judgement in Tatar (n31) in which a connection o f fumes to asthma in the son o f the 
applicants was not evidenced sufficiently to be upheld by the court as being the reason for a breach o f the rights 
of the Convention.
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occasions by the European court, with similarly varied outcomes. The cases of Taskin and 
Others v. Turkey589 and Zammit Maempel and Others v. Malta590 provide opposing poles of 
the potential applicability of European human rights law in this regard. Both cases concern a 
suggested breach of Article 8 of the Convention affording the right to private and family life, 
and yet resulted in vastly differing outcomes.
The claim of Taskin591 concerned the permitting of a mining project which polluted 
local aquifers and the ecosystem locally as a result. The appellant successfully contested the 
lack of enforcement of the end of the permit, and also the lack of warning and information 
provided to mitigate any potential damage of the risks at this juncture. Contentions against 
the noise resulting from the fireworks displays permitted by the Maltese authorities in the 
Zammit Maepel case were by contrast unsuccessful on the grounds that they had not shown 
any damage to personal integrity and that reasonable measures had been taken by the 
authorities to protect private property. Thus a balancing act is apparent in the rulings of the 
European court in relation to permitting. Resultant limitations and an acceptable and 
unavoidable degree of impact will not be held as breaching the rights afforded under Article 
8. However, where human health is impacted upon, or property affected to the extent that 
ordinary family life is prohibited by a permitted activity, a breach will be upheld.
Permits issued by the Albertan authorities to continue with open pit tar sands 
extraction projects will inevitably result in the construction of tailings ponds, and impacts to 
human health or restrictions on traditional practices of a sufficient degree to be held as 
breaching this right. The lack of direct comparator right in the Canadian context is again
co n
Taskin v. Turkey, 42 EHRR (2006) 50
590 Zammit Maempel and Others v. Malta [2011] ECHR 1964
59‘ Taskin v. Turkey, 42 EHRR (2006) 50
59~ Zammit Maempel and Others v. Malta [2011] ECHR 1964
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however an issue, as applying the precedent of the European courts within the domestic 
context of Canada would require such a link through which such interpretative influence 
might flow.593 Only a feeble assertion of a breach of the rights to ‘remain’594 and ‘liberty of 
the person’595 could be suggested. The right to remain does not include specific conditions 
beyond the decision to relocate being arbitrary. The only instance outside direct 
administrative decisions this might be likely to be upheld against is if impacts were, not being 
severe enough to harm human health, breached the more accessible right to life liberty and 
security of the person.596 Remembering the all-encompassing provision of Article 27 of the
C Q 7
CCRF requires interpretations of the Charter to be made in line with preservation of 
multicultural heritage, the right to the liberty of the person,598 including their family unit,599 
would appear the most appropriate avenue for a case utilizing the precedents of the European 
system.
For such a case to be successful, the various impacts of extraction projects would 
have to be shown to inhibit the ability of the First Nations peoples to partake in traditional 
activities to such a degree as to be unavoidable. This would also have to overcome any 
suggestion of a reasonable limitation to the rights based upon the economic benefit of the 
projects and the sufficiency of measures to mitigate damage and inhibitions. This 
interpretative influence upon the Canadian domestic provisions is arguably one of the most 
useful for it allows for adverse effects to non-human factors to be taken into account. Impacts 
to human health are predicated by an understandably high burden of proof, and are subject to
593 In the seminal case or R v. Rahey [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 78 N.S.R. (2d) 183. in this regard, this took the form 
of an approach to interpreting language within the texts o f the core instruments utilising the French variant o f  
the right in question.
594 CCRF (n l7 4 )s . 6 (1)
595 ibid. at s. 7
596 ibid. at s. 7
597 ibid. at s. 27
598 ibid. at s. 7
599
Children }s A id  Society  (n 5 5 3 )
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considerable scientific rigor. However, the suggestion that the operations affect wildlife in the 
region is supported by evidence which is plain to see, from the physical impact to the 
landscape to the well-documented instances of tailings seepage and bird deaths.600 Similarly 
the protection of the right to hunt, trap and fish on the lands granted under the numbered 
treaties,601 afforded constitutional protection602 adds great weight to the suggestion that an 
inhibition thereof is a breach of this right to individual liberty.
The impacts caused to native wildlife species upon which the indigenous culture of 
First Nations is predicated are not a viable basis for a case suggesting either forced relocation 
or the abandonment of culture in the European context. Firstly these impacts are not direct 
and as was considered in the Zammit Maepelm  and Kyrtatos604 cases, such impacts are not 
likely to be held as outweighing the economic benefits of tar sands extraction. Added to this 
lack of direct effects to the human populace is the nature of the primary species unique to the 
boreal woodland forest, caribou.605 The sub-species is inherently migratory. As such 
contending that relocation was forced by the removal of a supporting ecosystem would be 
faced with an opposing contention that their migratory existence already necessitated 
considerable movement within traditional territories. Thus without the loss of an ecosystem 
in its entirety or the necessitating of a relocation across provincial borders, which would 
result in a loss of other legal rights,606 such a contention would be highly unlikely to be 
upheld by the courts.607
600 Timoney, K.P. and Ronconi, R.A. (n75). Images are also provided in Annex 8.
601 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
602 Constitution Act (n200) s.3 5
603 Zammit Maempel and Others v. Malta [2011] ECHR 1964
604 Kyrtatos v. Greece [2003] ECHR 242
In particular the boreal woodland caribou sub-species.
605 Though this is highly unlikely to take the form o f any variance in legal rights which would support such a 
contention, the variance in the rights afforded under the numbered treaties, such as in the provision o f
healthcare, could be suggested as being a burden o f  proportions onerous enough to breach established rights.
607 This is supported by the decision in Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 
[CAN] in which it was stated that relocation to another province avoid a disadvantage brought about by
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The potential uses of the precedents and provisions of the European jurisdiction in the 
context of the thesis are numerous. This is primarily as the Canadian courts have suggested a 
philosophical and jurisprudential affinity with the system,608 greater arguably than that shared 
with the Inter-American system for both historical and pragmatic reasons.609 The most 
considerable benefit they grant is an interpretative approach which circumvents the demand 
for direct human impacts to form the basis for breaches of human rights, which is firmly 
established within Canadian precedents.610 This has also been the basis of contention of 
supporters of tar sands extraction projects that their non-human impacts are outweighed by 
their considerable benefits.611
Whilst human health impacts will inevitably be the primary concern of human rights 
law when used to protect fundamental aspects of the environment for individuals,612 to halt at 
this juncture would be lackadaisical on the part of jurists. This attitude is reflected in the case 
law of the European court, and whilst a high threshold both in terms of evidence and severity 
has been set, its existence and potential application is undeniable. Domestic Canadian 
precedents would suggest a restrictive approach of the application of human rights to protect
legislation in another could be held as discriminatory and a breach o f section 6 o f the CCRF, but that relocation 
within a province may not.
608 See the comments o f Justice Belzil in relation to Canadian society and the influences thereon: Big M D rug  
Mart Ltd. (n212), 30
609 Until the latter half o f  the 20th Century, the Canadian legal system was regarded by many as subservient to 
that o f its colonial origins in English common law. Bushnell traces the historical development o f  the Canadian 
legal system into an independent body o f  law, which whilst now no longer bound by English legal principles, 
continues to bear its hallmarks: Bushnell, I. Captive Court: A Study o f  the Supreme Court o f  Canada (Mc-Gill 
Queen’s Press, Montreal, 1992) 291-295.
610 See for example the decision to allow the consideration o f the arguments in Tatar under Article 8 as no 
direct link between fumes and asthma could be proven to construct a viable claim under Article 2: Tatar (n31)
611 This is one o f the major points made by Ezra Levant, prolific media commentator on the tar sands and the 
benefits o f Canadian oil to the economy as well as its ethical superiority over alternative sources o f the resource: 
Levant(n25)
612 Taylor discusses the merits and dilemmas presented by an anthropocentric approach to environmental 
protection under the auspices o f human rights, but concedes that a focus predicated first and foremost upon 
ensuring human health is an unavoidable reality: Tayor, P. Ecological Approach to International Law: 
Responding to the Challenges o f  Climate Change (Routledge, London, 1998) 232-236
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against pollution affecting individuals directly in terms of their health, or indirectly by 
affecting factors integral to their private, social and cultural life. The burden of severity on 
these non-biological impacts is understandably high, and their ability to restrict or cease 
industrial operations is acceptably weighed against the wider public interest in their 
continuation. However, the mere acceptance of the ability for such factors to potentially 
outweigh those public interests by the European court is of inimitable benefit to the aim of 
the piece.
Without this interpretative influence the case would have to be predominantly based 
on scientific evidence of a widely accepted nature of human health impacts directly resultant 
from the tailings ponds, and seepage therefrom or water consumption and contamination. 
Given the political fervor surrounding the tar sands with both sides of the debate firmly 
entrenched, and the economic benefit constantly weighed against the environmental impacts, 
the likelihood of such evidence being uncontested or not contradicted by a study illustrating 
an opposing result is miniscule. Thus, should direct human health impacts of the tailings 
ponds remain the only basis for litigious action against the projects, the prospect of success 
would be greatly reduced if not non-existent, and it is in this regard that the potential 
influence of the regional human rights mechanisms of Europe on Canadian judicial 
interpretation is unparalleled.
4.42 Access to Information
In order to facilitate a case against the projects licensed by the governmental 
authorities, a plethora of evidence would be required to overcome the aforementioned 
considerable burdens of proof required to suggest rights breaches. A number of issues
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however make discussion of the right to access to such information in Canada and Alberta 
particularly complex. Firstly the federal nature of Canada requires two pieces of legislation 
governing the right, the federal text preserving the right in relation to federal institutions, 
information and decisions, and the provincial text concerning the same issues in relation to 
Alberta. These texts are entitled, the Access to Information Act613 and the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act614 respectively. Both texts consider a ‘right of 
access’615 and place great weight on the disclosure of information relating to ‘a risk of 
significant harm to the environment or to the health or safety of the public, of the affected 
group of people, of the person or of the applicant.’616 The jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights is of particular relevance to access to federal information, as the 
federal Act617 does not oblige the federal government to disclose information of potential risk 
to the public automatically as the provincial text does.618 Also the rulings of the Court in 
Strasbourg afford interpretative expansions of particular relevance to the construction of a 
case against the tar sands extraction projects, and the permitting thereof.619
The case of Guerra and others v. Italy620 before the European court is the seminal 
case in this regard, and concerned an alleged breach of the right afforded under Article 10 of 
the European Convention, ‘to freedom of expression...freedom to hold opinions and to
613 Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A -l,
614 Freedom o f Information and Protection o f Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25
615 Access to Information Act (n588) Art. 4 (1) and Freedom o f Information and Protection o f  Privacy Act 
(n589) Art. 6 (1)
616 Freedom o f Information and Protection o f Privacy Act, (n589) Art. 32 (1)
617 Access to Information Act (n588)
618 Freedom o f Information and Protection o f Privacy Act, (n589) Art. 32 (1)
619 Note should taken that lands reserved under the numbered treaties are a federal concern, and whilst laws o f  
the province in which they are situated can apply within them (R v. Hill (1907) 15 O.L.R. 406 (C.A.) where it 
does not affect the purpose for which it was reserved (R. v. Isaac (1975) 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460, 9 A.P.R. 460 (N.S. 
C.A.)), their governance is generally within the competence o f the federal legislature. This is something o f  a 
simplification o f  the relationship between provincial legislation and reserve lands, though this relationship is of 
no consequence to the suggestions made herein.
620 Guerra v Italy, (1998) 26 E H R R  357
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receive and impart information...without interference by public authority.’621 Guerra and her 
fellow applicants successfully claimed that the failure of the government to inform them of 
the risks presented by a chemical factory operating in proximity to their homes, and to advise 
any suggested action in the event of an incident at the factory breached their rights under 
Article 10.622 In their judgement the Grand Chamber of the Court stipulated that;
‘Article 10 imposed on States not just a duty to make available information to the public on 
environmental matters, ... but also a positive obligation to collect, process and disseminate 
such information, which by its nature could not otherwise come to the knowledge of the 
public. The protection afforded by Article 10 therefore had a preventive function with respect 
to potential violations of the Convention in the event of serious damage to the environment 
and Article 10 came into play even before any direct infringement of other fundamental 
rights, such as the right to life or to respect for private and family life, occurred.’623
This decision affords a crucial interpretative expansion when read in conjunction with the 
domestic Canadian provisions by which the federal and provincial governments are bound in 
this regard. The ruling proposes that the right to access to information in circumstances where 
human health is potentially at risk obliges those authorities in possession of that information 
to issue a warning to those subject to that risk.
In relation to the potential impact of extraction projects and their tailings ponds, 
where evidence suggests a risk to human health is possible, Albertans who might be affected
ECHR (n538) Art. 10(1)
622 ibid.
623 Guerra (n620) at 349 per Judge Rudolf Bernhardt, President o f the European Court o f Human Rights (at the
time o f  the case)
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ought to be warned. The application of the principle espoused in Guerra624 to domestic 
provisions would also therefore prohibit the concealment of any such. Thus the provisions of 
the European Convention 625 elaborated upon by the case of Guerra 626 outline an 
interpretation of great use to the aim of the piece. The significance of the potential application 
of this interpretative approach is that Albertans, indigenous and non-indigenous alike, would 
have the right to have information in relation to any threat to their health resulting from 
environmental damage caused by tar sands extraction activities divulged to them as a matter 
of course.
Such information would be crucial in the construction of a case against said projects 
and the licensing thereof. The disseminated information would considerably improve the 
likelihood of overcoming evidentiary requirements in any case seeking the cession or 
restriction of extraction in certain regions and not merely compensation for the original 
failure to disseminate information.627 Thus in the construction of a case against the impacts of 
the tar sands extraction projects on constitutionally protected lands reserved under Treaty 6 
and Treaty 8, the interpretation of the federal Access to Information Act628 in line with the
fDQ • •precedent set in the European jurisdiction by the Guerra case would likely be crucial.
Thus the Guerra630 case would require the dissemination of information as to the 




627 The result o f this suggestion being successful would be the granting o f access to all scientific reports 
submitted during the licensing process.
628 Access to Information Act (n588) Company reports and other technical information might be afforded 




631 Tatar (n31) para 88
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precautionary approach underpinning said dissemination. Under this system, where the 
severity or existence of risk is unsure there is equally as strong a requirement to provide 
information to those potentially at risk, including how to mitigate it where possible. For the 
indigenous peoples occupying land in proximity to the tailings ponds however, the result of a 
breach would still be unsatisfactory, providing as it would only damages unless actual 
impacts were felt and proven to the standards described above. Similarly in specific instances 
of excessive water consumption the provision of information ex post facto  would do little to 
mitigate harms done and likely to perpetuate within the wider ecosystem by virtue of the 
integral role of water therein. The provision of such information would however facilitate the 
construction of a stronger case against the extraction projects which could potentially result 
in the cession of said activities in part, or in their entirety, in and around culturally significant 
ecosystems.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The regional sphere has again highlighted the pitfalls of utilizing rights affording 
protection from harms against the person in the context of the work. In particular the 
challenges of establishing sufficient proof of such harms curb their utility considerably. This 
is highly reflective of the position already seen in the domestic jurisdiction. In relation to the 
suppression of abilities as a result of the tar sands extraction projects however, three 
considerable additions to any action akin to that proposed as possible by the piece are evident. 
Firstly the explicit recognition of work as providing a standard of living rather than pecuniary 
reward is integral to suggestions of human rights affording protections to the ability to hunt 
and fish using traditional methods. Beyond this the purpose of work is also further expanded 
in the regional sphere to explicitly include benefits to the family, as contrasted to the
196
domestic context where this was added by judicial interpretation. Similarly the social benefit 
of work is also recognized in the provisions of the IACHR. These additions, whilst not 
directly enforceable against Canadian governmental authorities, are essential to supporting 
the central proposal of the piece that culturally relevant applications of other established 
rights offer protections from the impacts of the tar sands projects. This is especially true in 
relation to the ECtHR which the Canadian judiciary has cited directly as offering 
interpretative value to domestic provisions.
Separate to this assertion, it should be noted that the consistent application of the 
obligation to afford information, and access thereto, to those potentially harmed directly by 
any industrial action or its impacts upon the environment by the ECtHR is also of 
significance. Whilst rights to access to information are present in other human rights 
instruments globally, the pre-emptory element introduced by the European court is of 
considerable utility in the context of the piece. The obligation to afford data on suspected 
risks would not directly prevent the impacts upon indigenous culture, but said information 
might add significant weight to the other contentions made within the piece should an action 
akin to that suggested be brought.
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Chapter 5
International Human Rights Law and the Tar Sands
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5.1 Introduction
Having considered the potential utility of provisions from the regional sphere, the 
piece will now focus upon international human rights instruments. A plethora of binding and 
non-binding texts might be considered in this regard, however three have been chosen to 
formulate the discussion herein. Firstly the twin covenants of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) will analysed. Finally the Declaration on the Right of Indigenous 
Peoples will be considered owing to the specificity of its provisions to the context at hand 
within the piece. All rights discussed will be assessed both in terms of their direct application 
by the indigenous populace and any interpretative value they might add to assertions made 
under the auspices of other rights discussed in the piece. The utility of the texts as a whole in 
procedural terms will also be discussed owing to the inherently voluntary nature of 
jurisdiction within the international context.
As a recognised state, Canada has also signed and ratified a number of binding
international legal documents through which it has acquiesced to obligations to preserve and
defend certain fundamental rights of its citizens. Similar agreements without legally binding
effect have also been signed by the Canadian executive, as a representative of the Head of
State.632 Although these do not create enforceable legal obligations, they provide useful
indications as to the purpose and intention of the Canadian state and its organs in relation to
the aforementioned binding obligations as well as domestic provisions, and as such are
valuable interpretative tools for judicial bodies. The Supreme Court of Canada has made their
position on the application of binding international human rights instruments in Canadian law
632 Queen Elizabeth II remains the Head o f State o f Canada, though this role is largely ceremonial, and the 
ability to sign treaties on behalf o f the state is afforded to government ministers by the Governor General in her 
place.
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abundantly clear. In the case of Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) the 
court stated that the domestic Charter should be interpreted in a manner as a minimum affording 
the same protection afforded in international instruments to which Canada has ratified.653 This 
decision was reiterated in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,634 and established such 
instruments as a de facto minimum standard for human rights within Canadian law. The 
interpretation of said law in line with the provisions of such instruments is therefore assured 
by domestic precedent, regardless of their own progress with regard to direct applicability via 
transformation by the legislature. International law provisions and non-binding declarations 
therefore present another supranational avenue for a potential case to be made against the 
Canadian state regarding damage caused to the indigenous population of the province of 
Alberta by the continued development and extraction of the tar sands.
In order to achieve such an interpretation of domestic provisions a comparable right, 
sharing common objectives and concepts, in the Canadian law is required as has been 
discussed in relation to regional provisions. As such the potential for such an interpretation 
will also be measured according to the availability of such a comparator right. The lack of 
such a right is not to suggest that Canada does not still have obligations within the 
international legal sphere in relation to any rights without domestic comparators which might 
be enforceable therein. The suggestion is merely that the possibility of the interpretation of 
domestic provisions in line with them is significantly reduced.
Various treaties specifically concerning human rights have been developed and 
entered into force in the international legal sphere. As with the majority of international law 
agreements, these are most commonly constructed under the auspices of and, once in force,
633 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313., 349
634 Slaight (n517) 1056-7
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governed by, the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies. The ability of such bodies to 
enforce the measures to which the states have acquiesced has often been questioned, indeed 
enforcement mechanisms, and the requirement therefore for states to act with good faith in 
regard to their commitments has been a common criticism of international law as a whole 
since its inception. Before the modern bodies of international law were even conceived, Sir 
Henry Maine highlighted criticisms which continue to be levelled at the field of law to this 
day. Firstly Maine raised his concern that, ‘International Law was not declared by a 
Legislature, and it still suffers from want of a regular Legislature to improve and develop it,’ 
before going on to state, ‘International Law also suffers from the absence of any method of 
authoritatively declaring its tenor on some of its branches, and above all from the absence of 
any method of enforcing its rules, short of war or fear of war.’635 Such criticisms are echoed 
by contemporary jurists, whether academics or advocates, in legal systems the world over. As 
Steiner, Alston and Goodman elucidate, ‘international protection is weak in comparison with
• • 63 6the ordinary sanctions of national legal-political systems.’
International law is in spite of this however, agreed to embody a common ground 
among the peoples making up the international community, which has endured the test of 
time and remains to this day, namely, ‘a strong repugnance to the neglect or breach of certain 
rules regulating the relations and actions of states.’ 637 International human rights law is 
perhaps the most clear example of the need for protection in spite of the questionable efficacy 
of the system, and recognition of the desire to ensure such significant principles is all but 
universal. This is reflected in the unusually high number of ratified parties to the seminal
638binding human rights treaties of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
635 Maine, H. International Law (John Murray, London. 1888) 53
636 Alston, Steiner, Goodman (n l75) 673
637 Maine, H. International Law (John Murray, London. 1888) 51
638 ICCPR. (n!76)
201
and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights,639 a number which 
includes the state of Canada.640 The provisions of both texts afford a number of potential 
claims for breaches of the fundamental human rights enshrined within the text as a result of 
the damage wrought by the tar sands developments in the province of Alberta.
In contrast to the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) is both less highly regarded and less widely ratified.641 Protecting the so- 
called ‘second generation rights,’642 the ICESCR has been acquiesced to by fewer nations, 
but is ratified by Canada and as such can provide both interpretative and litigious alternatives 
for an action concerning breaches of human rights resulting from the effects of the tar sands 
developments in north eastern Alberta. Second generation rights have generally received both 
less media and juridical attention considering their shared birth with the more widely 
acknowledged, publicised and enforced civil and political, or ‘first generation rights’ 
protected within the ICCPR. Indeed this bifurcation is evident in legislation concerning 
human rights the world over. In spite of this however they encompass a number of issues 
which might otherwise require highly expansive interpretations of established civil and 
political rights. Such interpretations often result in high thresholds for breaches of rights 
which would be more easily accessible and utilisable were economic, social and cultural 
rights enforced more effectively.643
ICESCR (n254)
640 The Canadian government declared its accession to both covenants on 19th May 1976.
641 Contrast states party to and signatories o f the ICCPR in the United Nations Treaty Collection: 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no==IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en>
(Accessed 30th July 2014) and those o f the ICESCR:
<https://treaties.un. org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&m tdsg_no=TV-3&chapter=4&lang=en>
(Accessed 30th July 2014).
642 A term attributed in the first instance to Karel Vasak. See: Vasak, K. Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: 
the Sustained Efforts to give Force o f  law to the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights. UNESCO Courier 
30:11, November 1977.
643 This is certainly true o f the European regional context where the ECHR (n538) which embodies largely civil 
and political rights as we have seen in the previous chapter has had to be expansively interpreted to allow for 
considerations o f environmental impacts.
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Although these burdens of proof are not unwarranted, given the nature of the rights, 
the level of damage being demanded to uphold a breach highlights a concerning lack of less 
burdensome provisions with regard to the protection of fundamental aspects of life 
inextricably connected to the environment. For example food, accommodation, sanitation, 
water and cultural development, where restricted or not provided clearly result in damage to 
individuals but are not immediately life threatening. Thus, where civil and political rights 
breaches would often require severe and potentially irreversible damage to be wrought to the 
environment or a specific ecosystem and those reliant upon it, economic, social and cultural 
rights offer a more relevant, tailored and thus effective alternative approach.
A number of non-binding provisions regarding economic, social and cultural, even 
specifically environmental issues and rights, exist within the international legal sphere. 
However, the established nature of both juridical discussion and writing regarding the 
ICESCR, and the mechanisms and organisations governing it, set it apart from such 
provisions and other more issue-focused binding instruments. The implementation and 
monitoring procedures for the ICESCR in place under the auspices of the United Nations, and 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 644 provide a degree of 
implementation and arguably enforcement procedures not present in or available to 
instruments, binding or otherwise, concerning the same broad category of ‘second generation 
rights.’645 Thus the ICESCR provides not only provisions specifically drafted to consider the 
issues faced by the indigenous peoples of Alberta, but also allows access to an organisational
644 Established under: Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
GA Res. 832, UN GAOR, 63rd Session, UN Doc A/RES/63/117 (2008). (OP-ICESCR). Though it should be 
noted that Canada has not acquiesced to its jurisdiction to date.
645 The exception to this is arguably the Inter-American Court o f Human Rights though as has been discussed 
Canada is not subject to its jurisdiction, and the purview o f the Inter-American Commission is primarily civil 
and political and its decisions non-binding.
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and reporting structure, the United Nations, which would not be available through other 
provisions, or the domestic or regional legal mechanisms previously considered.
For a case against the tar sands based in human rights law to be successful in any 
legal sphere, but especially in the domestic courts of Canada itself, the expansive 
interpretation offered by the broader international provisions concerning the same subject 
matter, and expanding upon it, would have to be applied as if it were the intended effect of 
the original drafters of the more narrow provisions of the domestic law. In this regard the 
willingness of the domestic judiciary to apply such an interpretative approach to Canadian 
constitutional provisions shown by their commitment to the living tree doctrine646 is integral. 
Although not unprecedented within the Canadian legal system,647 such interpretation requires 
either a manifest injustice to be assured should broad interpretation not be applied, or for the 
provisions from sources external to the domestic legal system to be utilised for the purpose of 
realising the intention of the original drafters.
In the case of the tar sands developments, many of the rights considered here as 
pertinent to a potential case against the damage wrought to the environment of Alberta and 
the consequential effects to the indigenous population of the province are all derogable in 
nature under the auspices of Articles 4 of both covenants.648 As such the executive can 
choose to not uphold their obligations arising from these rights in limited, extreme 
circumstances. Although these circumstances do not include economic considerations on a
Edwards {n l96), 136
647 The seminal examples o f this being Re Powers to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations [1943] S.C.R. 208 which 
considered the interpretation o f  international law into domestic legislation generally, and the case o f R v Brydges 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 at 214 which dealt specifically with the ICCPR.
648 IC C P R  ( n l 7 6 )  Art.  4 and  I C E S C R  (n 2 5 4 )  A rt  4.
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restrictive consideration of the drafting, certainly not in the case of the ICCPR,649 the 
Canadian judiciary has held, in the case of Singh v. Minister o f  Employment and 
Immigration650 that such factors may be taken into account. In relation to the tar sands this 
interpretation of the ‘reasonable limitations’651 to the rights protected under the CCRF is 
potentially crucial.
The value of the tar sands developments is measured in trillions of Canadian dollars, 
and as such the allowance of some leniency in relation to their obligations would be unlikely 
to be held as an unreasonable expectation of the executive by the courts. Thus the damage to 
the wildlife of the region must be shown to be so considerable as to either outweigh the 
potential economic benefits, or give rise to a situation or possible outcome so unjust that it 
would be unthinkable for the judiciary to allow it to continue. The comparatively greater 
breadth and additional elements to the rights outlined, which the inter-American and 
international regimes afford in this regard, and the interpretation of kindred domestic 
provisions in light of them, is therefore fundamental. The additional breadth afforded reduces 
the potential for rebuttal of contentions in the face of the considerable economic benefits to 
extraction. Without these provisions therefore, the likelihood of success of any potential case 
against the licensing of tar sands developments based on the harm caused to environmental 
features in the aforementioned regions of Alberta and the suggested resulting human rights 
breaches to the indigenous people of the province would be significantly reduced.
649 The narrowly interpreted provisions o f Article 18(3) o f the ICCPR state that the rights contained therein may 
only be restricted, for the respect o f  the rights or reputations o f others or for the protection o f  national security or 
of public order, or o f public health or morals.
550 Singh {rai l)
651 CCRF (n 174) s .l.
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5.2 Harms Against the Person Prohibited bv the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
5.21 Articles 6 and 7 
Life and Freedom from Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
The provisions of common Article 1 (2)652 of the covenants are of little use in relation 
to the aim of the piece as existing jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee indicates a 
lack of willingness on the part of the body to deliver Views based upon alleged breaches of 
this provision.653 The provisions of Article 6654 and 7655 of the ICCPR although not plagued 
by the same admissibility issues, are seemingly condemned to a similar fate in that any case 
brought based upon them is easily invalidated. The articles declare that, ‘Every human being 
has the inherent right to life,’656 and, ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.’657 Their provisions almost mirror provisions afforded in 
Canada at the domestic level within the CCRF.658 A significant number of potential breaches 
arising from extraction projects and their by-products might be rebutted by the provision of 
water through pipelines or similar non-natural methods to avoid any threat to the nutrition 
and sanitation of individuals and thus their life. In a similar vein the debated issue of whether 
the knowing allowing of extreme thirst for its populace constitutes ‘inhuman and degrading 
treatment,’659 would be avoided with consummate ease.
ibid. Art 1(2)
653 See for example the case o f Poma Poma (n271) where the Committee heard the communication under Art.27 
having refused to do so under Art. 1(2).
654 ICCPR (n l76) Art. 6 .
655 ibid. at Art 7
656 ibid. at Art 6
657 ibid. at Art 7
558 CCRF (nl74) ss. 7 and 12
659 ICCPR (n 176). Art. 7
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The availability and potential for provision of alternate food sources would have a 
similar effect in relation to contentions based on these rights concerning the reduction in 
prevalence of traditional food sources. This would concur with other Views of the Human 
Rights Committee which would suggest that the obligations placed upon States to protect life 
are merely that deemed appropriate and adequate.660 Whilst the only considerations of the 
article have generally been in the context of prisoners, the emphasis is clearly on the basic 
provision of the necessities of life where a danger to said life is apparent or should have 
been.661 Similarly successful views issued in relation to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment have dealt with specific instances and prior knowledge of the actual or potential 
impact of authorised State actions. Such actions are also primarily concerned with detainees 
of the State, whether held lawfully or otherwise.662 Thus in the construction of the case 
outlined as the aim of both this chapter and the work as a whole, Articles 6 and 7 of the
663ICCPR appear to offer nothing beyond that already available and directly enforceable in 
the domestic Canadian legal system. Certainly any indirect impacts caused by effects to 
wildlife, water courses or features of cultural significance would not be o f evidentiary utility 
owing to the apparent lack of relativity in the application of the rights to life and freedom 
from poor treatment.664
660 Ms. Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v. The Russian Federation, Communication No. 763/1997, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997 (2002).
661 The communication o f E. H. P. v. Canada, Communication No. 67/1980, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 20 
(1984) suggested a breach o f  the right to life arising from radioactive waste disposal which the Committee was 
willing to hear though declared the communication inadmissible on the basis o f  non-exhaustion o f domestic 
remedies.
662 See for example: M oriana Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay, Communication No. 5/1977, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/ 1  at 40 (1984).
663 ICCPR (n l76) Arts. 6  and 7
664 As has been discussed the right to life is upheld as being a simple prohibition on the arbitrary or knowing 
cause o f severe harms to health threatening life or death, yet provides no right to a particular lifestyle. As 
Schabas notes the right is, ‘intangible in scope, and vexingly difficult to define with precision.’ Schabas, W. The 
A bolition  o f  the D e a th  P e n a lty  in In tern a tio n a l Law (3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 
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In both instances direct and unavoidable impacts to human health would be the only 
effects which might conceivably be deemed to breach the rights.665 This is in contrast to the 
lack of provision of the necessities of life, and immediately eliminates all but contaminant 
and pollution based impacts in relation to those rights. As a result the focus of discussion 
concerning these articles is restricted to the unsafe storage of tailings material. Such impacts 
would be highly difficult to prove given the issues of scientific evidence already discussed. 
The suggested remedy, should such an impact be illustrated however, could be cession of the 
action causing said damage for an indefinite period. The minimum duration being the time 
taken for a new approach to be adopted with reduced or no known adverse impacts, or a 
mechanism to be put in place to avoid such harm. The economic and social cost to the 
province of Alberta, and indeed Canada as a whole, resulting from an unfavourable ‘View’ 
issued in relation to breaches of these rights by the UNHRC could therefore be immense.
As has been discussed however, the burden of proof which would be required for a 
breach of rights of such severity to be upheld by the committee resulting in the imposition of 
a permanent cession of extraction would be a significant one.666 Almost indisputable 
evidence of direct human health impacts would be required in order for such a breach to be 
upheld at all. Given the purely documental nature of the proceedings before the Committee, 
such evidence would potentially have to be even more persuasive, and as has been discussed, 
neither side of the debate is able to provide such data at present.667 Thus the likelihood of 
achieving a beneficial and enforceable result, and within a timeframe which would be of use 
to those individuals and groups suffering the adverse impacts of the extraction projects is 
small.
665 See for example the consideration o f the remoteness o f harm in Mrs. Vaihere Bordes and Mr. John 
Temeharo v. France, Communication No. 645/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 (1996).
666 Indeed the committee does not have such an ability in terms o f enforcing such an action.
7 As illustrated by the statement o f the provincial government relating to fish stocks impacted upon by water 
consumption in the tar sands industry. See: WMSLAR (n278)
208
The application of the right to life and freedom from inhuman treatment in the 
international forum is highly similar to that seen in the European regional context. Only 
direct and severe harms to the individual are seen as breaches of such rights. The inability to 
prove a strong enough connection between industrial fumes and asthma in a child in the case 
of Tatar v. Romania668qxeluded the use of the right to life in the opinion of the European 
Court. From the obiter dicta in the cases of Oneryilidz669 and Budayeva670 it would seem that, 
as discussed only where an actual loss of life has occurred will a breach of the right to life be 
upheld by the ECtHR, though the case of Guerra671 suggests serious and foreseen risk may in 
extreme circumstances do so also. The two European regional and international fora can 
certainly be distinguished from that of the Inter-American jurisdiction in which these rights 
have been afforded to groups and given rise to demanded necessary precaution on the part of 
the state before undertaking potentially harmful action. This is clearly seen in the 
communication concerning the Yanomami672 people of Brazil, and is starkly contrasted to 
decisions at the European and international levels of enforcement.
The well documented length of time taken to consider a case owing to the workload 
of the committee, coupled with the nature of the ‘Views’ issued being non-legally binding, 
further reduces the utility of this mechanism almost to the point of total inefficacy with 
regards to the aim of the piece owing to the need for urgent action to halt the impacts being 
sustained.673 The number of States who have refused or failed in absolute terms to act in the 
face of an unfavourable view is small, however the fact remains that any response to such
6^8 Tatar (n31)
669 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, Application No. 48939/99 (ECHR 657, 30th November 2004)
Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Application No. 15339/02 (ECHR 20th March 2008)
1 Guerra (n620)6?2 v '
Yanomami (n436)
3 See in this regard the comments o f  Donnelly on the weaknesses o f the UNHRC: Donnelly, J. Universal
Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2mi Edition, Cornell University Press, New York, 2003) 133-135
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proclamations is ultimately consensual.674 Similarly the degree of compliance, as rarely is a 
remedy a singular act, is also subject to the whim of the State in question. Thus it is the 
gravitas alone of a favourable ‘View’ from the Human Rights Committee with regards to a 
breach of the Articles 6 and 7 arising from the effects of the tailings ponds upon First Nations 
peoples which would be pursued as a great step towards the end of said impacts.
The similarity in terms of drafting of a number of articles of the ICCPR to those found 
within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms675 in the domestic jurisdiction context 
also considerably reduces their efficacy as bases for a litigious action of the type outlined in 
that forum. The identical drafting or common integral features eliminates the interpretative 
value of the provisions in relation to the domestic law, except where jurisprudence 
concerning the provisions suggest a broader approach to the application of the principles 
enshrined within the text than that found at the domestic level. Under the Committee there is
676in theory no regard given to previous judicial decisions at other levels of enforcement. In 
practice however, the prospect of a successful outcome is not great in the face of a weight of 
domestic and regional precedents to the contrary, or existing awards and measures to mitigate 
any harms. Where such decisions are validly based on evidence, or the lack thereof this is 
especially true, as exhaustion and adequacy of domestic remedies is a primary concern of the 
Committee.677
Thus rights afforded under the Covenant with exactly mirrored or highly similar 
provisions in the domestic, and regional context are immediately of reduced utility in relation
0/4 ibid. 133-135
^  CCRF (nl74)
677 Whether regional, domestic or indeed other international tribunals.
See for example: Moriana Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay, Communication No. 5/1977, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 40 (1984).
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to the aim of the piece. As such rights such as Articles 6 & 7,678 which have provisions 
clearly designed to impose the same obligations, are of restricted utility for the purposes of 
the piece. By contrast Articles which offer novel or expanded interpretative approaches to 
established domestic rights provide alternative bases for a case against the tar sands projects. 
This is especially pertinent where impacts are incurred as a result of the lackadaisical storage 
of tailings material in unsecure ponds which might have the necessary direct impact to human 
health, but this is difficult to prove to a satisfactory standard.
5.3 Suppressions of Abilities Protected by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
5.31 Article 17 
Private and Family Life
The precedents of the European regional system in relation to the notion of 
environmental damage giving rise to breaches of fundamental human rights concern mainly 
Article 8 of the European Convention. The sheer weight, and in a number of instances similar 
facts of cases originating from that jurisdiction is of particularly significant utility with 
regards to the construction of a case against the adverse effects outlined above. This is true 
whether there are direct human health impacts or those to resources or abilities which would 
be considered part of, ‘private and family life.’679 The ‘right to respect for his private and 
family life,’ 680 however bears no direct comparator in Canadian or provincial Albertan 
domestic law. The Canadian Supreme Court has afforded the precedents of the European
679 (nl76)Arts. 6  and 7 
ibid. Art 17
680 ECHR (n538) Art. 8
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courts status as a source of valid interpretative aids to Canadian law,681 and has established
that the liberty and security of a family is also to be protected under the provisions of Article
6827 of the Charter. Despite this, the presence of an almost identical right in the International
683Covenant adds considerable weight to the contention that it is applicable via interpretation 
in Canada itself and creates obligations with regards to the tar sands industrial projects and 
the licensing thereof.
The text of the ICCPR has not been incorporated into the domestic law of Canada. 
However, the judiciary has on numerous occasions stipulated and reinforced its commitment 
to, ‘Canada’s obligations as a signatory of international treaties and as a member of the 
international community.’684 Specifically, there is clear precedent, ‘that the Charter should 
generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar 
provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.’ As such in 
relation to the precedents established under the European system, the presence of this 
identically drafted provision in the ICCPR ensures that the precedents of that system can be 
more persuasively read into domestic law with the same subject matter. Article 17 of the 
Covenant686 itself has limited precedents elaborating upon its drafting to be considered as a 
viable basis for a case against the permitting of tar sands extraction projects alone. However, 
the access this right to non-interference with family life grants to precedents both in terms of 
judicial decisions and interpretation concerning the impacts to dependents of individuals is 
invaluable.
Following the case o f  R v. Rahey [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 78 N.S.R. (2d) 183.
682In the case o f  Children’s A id  Society (n553) and expanding upon the CCRF (n l74) s. 7
|!83 ICCPR (n 176)Art. 17(1)
*84 R v. Hape [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 2007 SCC 26 at 53
Slaight (n517) 1056-7 quoting Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
313., 349
686 ICCPR (nl76)Art. 17(1)
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Interpretations in respect of the family unit have however been specifically raised by 
the Canadian courts. In the case of B.(R.) v Children’s Aid Society o f  Metropolitan 
Toronto,687 the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that section 7 of the CCRF688 providing, ‘the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person’689 should be, ‘given a broad interpretation to 
the concept of "liberty" and elevated the concept of the "integrity of the family unit."’690 The 
court went on to affirm that this included the, ‘right to bring up and educate children in 
accordance with their conscientious beliefs.’691 This judgement was heavily influenced by 
the case law of the United States of America, and indeed Lamer C.J. refers to, ‘the American
692experience’ in his judgement. Seeking numerous authorities to secure this principle as one 
of constitutional weight, the Court also referred to the regional instruments of Africa,693 
America694 and Europe695 in reaching its decision to apply this broad interpretation of the 
CCRF.
The ICCPR is itself referred to with Lamer C.J. suggesting that, ‘The approach that I 
am adopting also appears to me to be supported by the international human rights instruments 
on which the framers of our Charter drew extensively.’696 This connection is attributed to the 
expansive element of section 7 of the CCRF. The provision states that liberty should only be 
deprived, ‘in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice,’697 a threshold which the 
justification for deprivation in the case in B.(R.) v Children’s Aid Society o f  Metropolitan
687 Children’s A id Society (n553)
688 CCRF (n l74) s. 7
m  ibid>
Children’s A id  Society (n553) para. 11
691 ibid. Here Lamer C.J. referred to the cases o f R. v. Jones, [19861 2 S.C.R. 284 and Morgentaler (n257) in
which this notion had been conceived {Jones) and expanded {Morgentaler) to the formulation he applies.
Children’s A id Society (n553) para. 11 
93 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 217; 
21 ILM 58 (1982)
694 ADRD (n249)
695 ECHR (n538)
696  /  . t  *
Children s A id Society (n5 5 3 ) para. 38 
CCRF (n 174) s. 7
213
Toronto698 was deemed as not meeting. Thus from the precedent laid down in this judgement 
the Canadian domestic system has recognised that, ‘Family connections, in particular, give 
rise to special protections under the principles of fundamental justice, enshrined in the 
Charter, and under international human rights treaties, to which Canada is a Party.’699 The 
decision thus opens the possibility for the provisions of Article 17 of the ICCPR to be 
interpreted into domestic Canadian law as well as utilised under the individual complaints 
procedure established under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,700 which Canada 
ratified in 1976.701
Note should be made that the Human Rights Committee has in similar cases 
considered the complaints made under Article 17 (amongst others) collectively under the 
auspices of Article 27 concerning culture, an example being the view in relation to Poma 
Poma v Peru.702 This though does not preclude the validity of the contention in the case of 
the First Nations of Alberta. Numerous sub-divisions of culture are present in the province 
and as such protection of a single culture, as heterogeneous members of the Committee might 
perceive it, would not be possible. This therefore arguably necessitates the consideration of 
the issues under Article 17.703 As a potential basis for the case against the extraction projects 
therefore, the right to, ‘privacy, family, or correspondence’ within the ICCPR704 and similar
Children’s A id  Society (n553)
699 Bassan, D. ‘The Canadian Charter and Public International Law: Redefining the State’s Power to Deport 
Aliens’ (Fall 1996) 34(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 583, 624
790 OP-ICCPR (n255) Art. 2
701 Accession o f  Canada to the protocol is recorded as 19th May 1976 in the United Nations Treaty Collection 
Database. See: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=:IV-
5&chapter=4&lang=en Accessed 30th July 2014.
Poma Poma (n271)
3 This contention is reliant upon the notion that the alternative to an action brought by one individual 
representing all First Nations impacted would be a considerable number o f separate claims from numerous 
Chiefs of a variety o f  tribes raising the same issues on behalf o f their respective Nations. This was the case in 
the Lubicon Lake Cree v Canada (n729) view of the Committee where Bernard Ominayak represented his Cree, 
though to say this band practised the same culture as the Beaver Lake Cree despite similarities would be remiss.
704 ICCPR (n 176) Art. 17(1)
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provisions within the European convention, discussed above,705 are raised from being merely 
an interpretative aid to other established rights to a breached provision in its own right. Such 
a complaint would however be subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies concerning the 
same or similar right, and likely only be pursued in the event of a failure to do so. Similarly it 
would face the same jurisprudential contentions outlined above concerning whether a breach 
of the ability of an individual to provide for their family could be interpreted as incorporating 
the requisite degree of cultural relativity which is afforded explicitly in other rights. As such 
the discussion of the notion of an action in this legal forum separately is not necessary.
In relation to the indigenous peoples of Alberta in the regions impacted upon by the 
tar sands extraction projects, the recognition of the family unit when considering rights 
drafted originally for application only to individuals allows for the consideration of resultant 
breaches thereof against a dependent family unit. Thus, as in the case of B. (R.) v Children’s
HC\£k *7fi7Aid Society o f  Metropolitan Toronto, a breach of section 7 of the CCRF in relation to 
one member of a family might be considered greater should the impact also be felt by other 
members of that unit, and allows another member to enforce the obligations of the State on 
their behalf. The inability of an individual to pass on the knowledge of his ancestors to his 
own descendants, dwell on traditional lands or practice traditional techniques to provide for 
his family, owing to the destruction of factors essential in that endeavour might thus be 
deemed a breach of his, and their, rights.
The domestic Canadian human rights provisions embodied by the CCRF reflect this 
reality to an extent by declaring that all interpretations of the rights afforded in the Charter
706 ECHR (n538) Art. 8
Children’s A id Society (n553) 
CCRF (n 174) s. 7
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should be conducive to the preservation of the multicultural heritage of the nation.708 
However, no defined positive action is required, and as such elements of cultures to be 
protected must still be aligned to particular rights. In this regard the provisions of Article 17 
of the ICCPR709 are of potential utility in relation to the aim of the work. The article 
emphasises the significance of family, a concept absent in the rights provided under the 
CCRF,710 yet integral to the culture of First Nations Indians present in the regions affected by 
the tar sands extraction projects.711 The difficulty in relation to the expansive approach 
offered by Article 17 is found ironically in the very reason it is potentially so useful, its 
absence from the CCRF. This is however remedied by the approach adopted in the Children’s 
Aid Society case712 where impacts to the livelihood of the primary provider for a group of 
dependents were deemed as breaches of their rights also.
In the case of the tar sands extraction projects, the negative impact upon the 
availability or contamination of water from natural sources in the northeast of Alberta and 
resultant impacts to wildlife might conceivably restrict all of these culturally specific 
practices. Whilst the impact to family groups in general would undoubtedly add weight to 
any case brought against the tar sands developments, this is not the most promising avenue 
Article 17 provides. The recognition of the family in this context allows for it to be argued 
that the individual’s liberty is infringed by his inability to raise and provide for his family in 
the manner to which he has become accustomed.713 In the case at hand this would be
708 CCRF (n l74) s. 27
709 ICCPR (nl76)Art. 17
10Indeed the word ‘family’ is conspicuously absent from the entirety o f the CCRF and rights afforded under it,
though the significance o f  family has been raised by precedent founded in cases concerning those rights.
11 Carter and Hildebrandt present the significance o f ‘kinship’ in Native American culture and highlight how it 
was manipulated by European settlers, and in particular during the negotiations o f the numbered treaties: Carter, 
S and Hildbrandt, W. A Better Life With Honour in Cavanaugh, Payne, Wetherell. (n l35) 255-256 
7|2 Children’s A id  Society (n553)
Such an impact might be argued to, ‘outrage standards o f decency’ as prescribed in Miller et al. v. The 
Queen, [1977] 2 SCR 680, 681 in relation to the standard necessary to breach the freedom from ill-treatment of
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according to the traditional practices of the First Nations tribe to which he, and his family, 
belong. As such the interpretative elaboration afforded expands upon the domestic provisions 
most difficult for the Canadian government to justify derogation from, those protecting life 
and liberty. As a result the provisions potentially include recognition of the detrimental 
impact to indigenous families of the inability to express their culture and pass on their 
traditional knowledge. In the pursuit of the basis for a case constructed in human rights law 
aimed at the cession or restriction of the permitting of tar sands developments in regions of 
cultural significance to the indigenous peoples of Alberta, it is this link between their culture 
and the land they inhabit which must be established. Article 17 of the Covenant714 arguably 
adds such an interpretative progression to the domestic provisions of Canada under the 
CCRF.715
5.32 Article 27 
Enjoyment of Culture
Article 27 of the Covenant by contrast goes beyond the more traditional and 
widespread conception of the right to freedom of religion and belief. The article protects not 
only the right to be a part of a community, or to manifest and practice ones culture, but 
creates a link between, and as such enforces both of these fundamental rights as part of the 
same whole. The unique nature716 of Article 27 provides a broader approach than the 
domestic and regional texts discussed with regards to the concepts of community and culture, 
protecting, ‘the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
section 12 o f the CCRF,but also with the similar approach to the application o f section 7 adopted in Rodriguez v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
14 ICCPR (nl76). Art. 17 
7 CCRF (n 174)
Note should be made here that there is a lack o f a specific right concerning culture afforded in the European 
context.
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culture. There is recognition in this drafting of not only a collective element to the right, 
but also, in the instances of, ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities,’718 of the inextricable 
link between those groups and the culture they embody and practice.
The lack of a direct comparator right in relation to an explicit right to culture limits 
the applicability of Article 27 as discussed in relation Articles XIII and XV of the ADHR. 
However, the significance of communications before the Human Rights Committee 
concerning this right and the interpretative breadth they add to these highly similar provisions 
warrants the discussion of the article separately. In particular the strength of connection to 
particular environmental features which will be discussed, as opposed to with particular tracts 
of land accepted as belonging to a peoples in law is of great significance. The Inter-American 
system, as discussed, has focused on rights to ancestral lands in many decisions. However in 
relation to some First Nations the title to such lands is another legal dispute in itself. As such 
to rely upon such applications of these common rights would be to potentially introduce 
another jurisprudential hurdle to overcome for the litigation suggested as possible by the 
piece.
The link between environmental features and indigenous groups presented, or its 
interpretation into the domestic or regional provisions to which the Canadian state is subject, 
would be an integral element of the foundation of any action suggested by the piece. This is 
especially true where in such an instance, the damage wrought by said developments upon 
wildlife in the regions affected was argued to have such dire consequences for the indigenous 
peoples of that region that it would constitute a breach of binding human rights law. This was
ICCPR (nl76)Art.27 
18 ibid. Art. 27
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held to be the case in Poma Poma v Pen/,719 although the View raised the issue of free, prior 
and informed consent, the Committee did not apply the standard.720 Free, prior and informed 
consent, suggests the affording of a veto to indigenous peoples whose traditional lands are at 
risk owing to commercial developments. This is offered once the details of projects and their 
impacts are presented to such peoples. Whilst this concept is potentially applicable to the 
context considered in the piece, and would undoubtedly solve many of the issues discussed 
herein if upheld, its applicability in practice is questionable.721 Huseman and Short go further 
in this assertion in relation to the context of the piece, stating that, ‘To date there is no legal 
framework within the Constitution of Canada that recognises the international principle of 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent.’722 As such it would add another element of uncertainty to 
any potential action based upon the suggestions of the piece, especially as its full application 
in practice is largely unprecedented.723 As well as highlighting this principle however, the 
indigenous peoples of the region were said in the View issued by the Committee to have had 
their ability to partake in traditional activity inhibited by the State to the extent that the 
existence of their culture was also potentially placed in jeopardy.724 As such whilst not 
providing the most rigorous, enforceable or adhered to right for the basis of any attempt to 
demand the cession of tar sands developments, Article 27 provides a potentially crucial 
expansion upon the more narrowly drafted, yet more easily enforced, provisions found in the 
domestic and regional legal systems to which the Canadian state is bound.
Poma Poma (n271)
720 See in this regard: Goecke, K. ‘The Case o f Angela Poma Poma v. Peru before the Human Rights 
Committee: The Concept o f  Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the Application o f  the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights to the Protection and Promotion o f Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (2010) 14 Max 
Planck Yearbook o f International Law 3377-} i
" Anton, D.K. and Shelton, D.L. Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011)431  
72“ Huseman, J. and Short, D. (n l7), 228
723 Ward, T. ‘The Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights in 
International Law’ (2011) 10(2) Northwestern Journal o f International Human Rights 54
The case however focused on traditional ‘economic’ activity, which owing to the decision in Badger (n269) is 
not able to be protected under domestic Canadian law, the focus o f protection instead being upon the use o f
fauna as a source o f food.
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In relation to the construction of a case based in human rights law challenging the 
impacts of industrial projects on the traditional and reserved lands of the indigenous peoples 
of Alberta, the collective element of the right afforded is also of considerable significance. 
First Nations tribes express their culture collectively, sharing in traditional activities, with 
hunters sharing their spoils amongst the community and teaching children of the group 
indigenous practices and techniques, passing knowledge not only to their biological ancestors, 
but to those of their tribe or Cree. The drafting of Article 27725 allows for this reality and 
threats thereto to be taken into account when deciding whether the rights drafted for 
application to individuals have been breached.726
For the construction of a case challenging particularly the licensing of excessive water 
consumption by the extraction projects of the regions impacted, the consideration of the First 
Nations tribes of Alberta as groups sharing a common culture which they express through 
interaction with one another is key. The application of the rights afforded under the domestic 
human rights provisions of Canada, through interpretation in line with those of the ICCPR, 
arguably prevents the Canadian and Albertan governments from meeting any individual 
needs for water by routing pipelines to indigenous communities. This is achieved by 
demanding the consideration of the culture, and manifestations thereof, of the groups as a 
whole and thus the necessity of the use of natural sources of water to perpetuate practices and 
knowledge crucial to their continued existence in the consideration of the individual
7 ICCPR (n 176) Art.27
26 This was certainly taken into the consideration o f the Poma Poma communication where the continued 
existence o f the inimitable culture was significant in the View o f the Human Rights Committee. See: Poma 
Poma (n271)
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complainant.727 In this regard therefore the notion of collective manifestation introduced by 
the ICCPR, and clearly defined as fundamental to ensuring the freedoms afforded within 
Article 27, is crucial to avoiding any proposed margin of appreciation on the part of the State.
The right allows for the broader highly social manifestations of cultural expression 
practiced by the First Nations of Alberta to be recognised also. Thus, the provision of 
sufficient water to meet the needs of individuals alone, which could be fulfilled by the 
governmental and industrial authorities through culturally inappropriate means, would not be 
adequate to meet the obligations of Canada under the ICCPR. Such a subjective approach has 
been adopted in the cases of Poma Poma 728 and Lubicon Lake Cree Band729 (which 
specifically concerned Canada and its First Nations peoples) by the Human Rights 
Committee of the UN, where the potential for the extinguishment of an inimitable culture is 
present. Note should be made however that in both cases tangible barriers to traditional 
activities were required to be evidenced to the Committee, and undoubtedly such a 
requirement would be placed upon a communication such as that suggested by the piece. This 
requirement of tangible barriers precludes the use of indirect effects such as those of tailings 
not proven to directly affect individuals but inhibitive of wildlife key to cultural practices 
with regards to this contention. Similarly any other such disturbances discussed, such as those 
in relation to caribou concerning noise and physical impediments on migratory pathways 
would not be deemed as directly inhibiting the ability to manifest culture. The previously 
discussed issues with proving the existence of such barriers with undisputed scientific 
certainty would also undoubtedly again restrict this assertion.
727 In spite o f the individual nature o f communications, a representative o f a culture or identifiable group can be 
appointed to bring an action. See for example: Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 
(26 March 1990), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) (1990).
28 Poma Poma (n271)
729 Lubicon Lake Bandv. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/45/40) (1990).
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The communications of Lansman and Aarela and Nakkalajarvi submitted to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee are also worthy of note in relation to the degree of 
impact necessary to suggest a breach of provisions pertaining to culture, such as Article 27 of 
the ICCPR and Article 20 of the DRIP to be discussed. Both concerned reindeer husbandry 
and its role in the continuation of the culture of the Sami indigenous peoples of Finland. The 
impacts of the restrictions upon traditional reindeer herding were considered in both instances 
and the Committee discussed the severity of impact required to breach Article 27 of the 
ICCPR. Two concepts emerged, that of a ‘limited impact’ and that of ‘substantial 
interference.’ In both instances the View of the Committee was that an impact must constitute 
substantial interference with culture, and not be merely a limited impact upon it. Elaborative 
statements in both however suggested that the threshold for constituting a ‘substantial 
interference’ was a threat to the survival of a culture. Limited impacts were those deemed 
justifiable to achieve broader social goals, assuming no direct threat to life or physical 
integrity was present. Thus for the purposes of the thesis they offer little beyond the 
interpretative guidance afforded by the decisions in Awas Tingni730 and Saramaka,731 or the 
Views in Poma Poma732 and Lubicon733 which have been discussed. Whilst the terminology 
used alters, the consideration remains identical. Where a threat to life or the continued 
existence of a culture cannot be sufficiently proven, the outcome of an action will be 
determined by whether the economic benefits of the tar sands can outweigh the 
environmental harms caused in the opinions of the respective judicial body.
Awas Tingni (n475)
Saramaka (n458)
2 Poma Poma (n271)
Lubicon (n729)
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The wording of the right is of particular relevance to the First Nations peoples and 
their culture in this regard owing to the inclusion of the concept of their ‘own’ culture. To 
infer that the Canadian authorities would be permitted to force another culture upon the First 
Nations peoples had this drafting approach not been used would be remiss. The term ‘own’ is 
however of particular relevance to the reclamation of tailings ponds. The few ‘successful’734 
examples of reclamation of the tailings ponds have restored the land within which they are 
situated to alternative ecosystems, such as pastures fit for the grazing of bison.735 Under the 
regulatory system imposed by the provincial authorities of Alberta under the Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Act736 all land used for the storage of tailings is to be returned to 
‘equivalent land capability.’737 The meaning of this stipulation is the ability to, ‘support 
various land uses after conservation and reclamation,’ which must be, ‘similar to the ability 
that existed prior to an activity being conducted on the land, but that the individual land uses 
will not necessarily be identical.’738
The aim of the piece is, in part, to preserve the ability of the First Nations tribes 
resident on land impacted upon by the tar sands projects, directly or otherwise, ‘to enjoy their 
own culture,’739 and not a version thereof imposed by the land of ‘equivalent capability,’740 
arbitrarily left by the industry following reclamation. As such the ecosystem present in the 
region prior to extraction must be preserved, or restored to the capability to support their 
cultural needs, and not a mere equivalent.
734 The reclamation o f  land used to store tailings material to ‘equivalent capacity’ as is demanded o f  the 
companies involved in the extraction o f the tar sands by the provincial authorities o f Alberta, is one o f the most 
vociferously contested aspects o f the debate surrounding the projects by the First Nations peoples.
5 This was the case in the reclamation o f  a Suncor tailings pond, which is now heralded as an indication that 
full reclamation o f tailings ponds is achievable, though the health o f the bison placed on the land has been 
questioned.
6 Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12
I'M
ibid. s. 146(b)
738 ibid. s. 146(c)
™ ICCPR (n 176) Art. 27
E n v iro n m en ta l  P ro te c t io n  and  E n h a n c e m e n t  Act,  R S A  2000 ,  c E-12 at Art.  146 (b)
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Such considerations were undertaken in the cases of the Lubicon Lake Cree v. 
Canada,741 and Poma Poma v. Peru.742 Although these can be factually distinguished from 
the case at hand, it would appear from their jurisprudence that such an extinguishment of a 
culture as a consequence of industrial activity which has failed to consider or mitigate such 
impacts breaches the right in question. In the construction of a case against the licensing of 
the tar sands therefore the link to a specific culture, and by extension features with which it is 
inextricably linked afforded by this right is essential. Without this connection the current 
framework for restoring and protecting the environment following the exploitation of the 
region to obtain the tar sands raw material would ensure merely the restoration of a healthy 
and stable environment. In itself this aim is a laudable one, and far more demanding than 
regimes imposed upon industries in many natural resource extraction projects globally. 
However, the culture and society of the First Nations peoples is predicated upon interaction 
with the native environment spanning centuries, and which has given rise to indigenous 
knowledge inherited through numerous generations. Thus to restore an ecosystem which does 
not support this interaction would, as a consequence, eradicate any potential ability to enjoy 




743 ICCPR (nl 76) Art. 27
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5.4 Harms Against the Person Prohibited Bv The International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights
5.41 Article 12 
Environmental Hygiene
Article 12 of the Covenant suffers, like many in the text from definitional challenges. 
Affording a right to physical and mental health the provision places an onus on the ratifying 
state to improve, ‘all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene.’ 744 As has been 
discussed however, the drafting of the article protecting ‘environmental hygiene’ akin to 
‘equivalent capacity’ as is the case in the domestic regulations regarding the reclamation of 
land following extraction745 restricts its utility in relation to the aim of the piece. The 
inclusion of the notion of hygiene, and not capacity or safe and healthy conditions, implies a 
restriction of protection to an environment that is not harmful to the individual rather than 
one which is able to provide the most basic of needs. To paraphrase, a clean bathroom would 
not necessarily be supplied with running water for a person to bath, and it is this issue, albeit 
somewhat fastidious, which arises owing to the drafting of Article 12. As the obligation to 
strive to improve this hygiene is framed within the right to the enjoyment of ‘the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health,’746 it is immediately further constrained 
solely to quantifiable and undisputed impacts to health.
Article 12(2)(b) requires the state parties to the Covenant to take steps necessary for,
‘the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene’ in order to, ‘achieve
the full realisation of,’ the right to the standard of health specified in the previous subsection
™ ICESCR (n254) Art. 12(2)(b)
As stated in the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12 s. 146(b)
746 IC E S C R  (n254) Art.  12(1)
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747of the article. The inclusion of the environment as an aspect of physical and mental health 
standards is not explicitly present in the domestic and regional provisions concerning the 
same subject matter. Effects to the environment of the province, including its wildlife, 
including crucially the migratory patterns and numbers of the boreal woodland caribou 
outlined, would consequently affect the physical and mental health of the indigenous 
populous by reducing or potentially removing entirely a preferred source of food and cultural 
enrichment. In relation to a potential case against the tar sands developments in the province 
of Alberta, this provision has significance in relation to all the effects under consideration 
within the thesis. The provision is undeniably of far greater importance in relation to 
arguments pertaining to the effects on water and air quality in the region. However, the 
effects to the ecosystem in which the caribou (amongst other culturally significant species) 
dwell, and the indigenous population consequently hunt, are also covered within its scope.
To fail to mention the provision as a potential basis for a case against the 
developments on the grounds of effects to wildlife, given its almost unique unequivocal 
consideration of the environment, in spite of its inherent limitations would be remiss. This is 
as similar provisions at other levels of legal enforcement to which Canada is subject would 
require a favourable judicial interpretation of the quality of the environment as constituting a 
significant factor adversely influencing health or the ability to secure culturally relative 
‘necessities of life.’ Case law suggests the application of a low enough threshold to that
748connection for a breach to be suggested as the basis of a case may not be forthcoming. In 
this instance this is especially pertinent given the availability of other food sources to ensure
74 ibid. Art. 12(2)
The reluctance o f  the various judicial bodies considered to uphold breaches o f rights concerning the physical 
integrity and life o f  the individual is supportive o f this statement. Only where the impacts are grossly severe are 
such claims upheld. See Yakye Axa (n31)
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basic dietary requirements and the lack of an explicit association to culture in the drafting of 
the right.
Considering environmental impacts in terms of human health directly prevents the 
causal links discussed being suggested without a high level of scientific evidence to 
accompany them. No statements with regard to the effects on the health of the indigenous 
populace as a result of proven impacts to wildlife or water levels can therefore be assumed 
solely on the basis that traditional culturally significant practices rely upon them. Cases in a 
number of jurisdictions have illustrated that proof of a high quality and lacking in contention 
is required. In essence a direct and irrefutable link between the actions of an industry and 
health impacts in an individual must be shown.749 As such the requirement laid down would 
be two scientific studies proving the two separate stages in the progression of the adverse 
effects incurred. This necessity of connected scientific proof of impacts as a result of the 
focus on human health, rather than the environment which predicates it, is too great a 
financial and logistical burden upon the First Nations peoples of Alberta. The fact that the 
only legal action currently in progress against the tar sands projects in the province initiated 
by them is appealing to the public for donations to its funds for the action is clear evidence of 
this.750
To illustrate the issue of breaching the high burden of proof a particular consideration
of the impacts to water levels and quality in the regions exploited is pertinent. Thirst would
be one basis upon which this action might be considered to have restricted physical health as
an aspect of the security of the person afforded domestically. As has been discussed however
were this a credible contention the Canadian government would already have begun piping
49 This was clearly the case in : Tatar (n31) where no link between industrially produced fumes and asthma 
coaid be established by the claimant.
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water to even the most remote indigenous communities in order to meet this obligation and 
secure oil revenues for the foreseeable future. On this point also river flows are merely 
argued to have been severely reduced, water still flows through the water courses of even the 
most heavily consumed rivers of Alberta. This would rebut any potential contentions of 
health impacts based upon thirst, irrespective of access to man-made water sources. Impacts 
to health must therefore result from reduced, not non-existent flow rates, introducing yet 
another potentially contestable link to be established. As a result effects to flora and fauna 
beyond the human are the only avenue remaining in this regard.751
The effective and impartial monitoring of both water quality and quantity in the 
regions surrounding the tar sands developments has been one of the most debated issues in 
relation to the projects. How to effectively measure the impacts upon flow levels and the 
resultant impacts of any discernible change in them has been the subject of articles authored 
by politicians, scientists and journalists alike.752 Alterations to fish habitat in regions where 
water has been heavily consumed was one area of focus for the ‘Oil Sands Regional Aquatic 
Monitoring Program (RAMP) Scientific Peer Review of the Five Year Report (1997- 
2001)’753 into the water related impacts of the rapidly expanding industrial activity in north 
eastern Alberta. The review found that;
‘Given the extent of oil sands development in this region and their intensive use of water 
resources that all, ultimately, derive from the Athabasca River system, it may be necessary to
751 This was arguably the case in Poma Poma (n271) where the reduction o f water through natural courses 
generally would not have been upheld as a breach were alternate sources provided for health and sanitation 
purposes. Instead it was the threat to the existence o f an inimitable culture via the inability to farm llamas in a 
traditional manner under Art. 27 o f the ICCPR which was the rationae decidendi for the View.
52 See for example the review o f  water impacts o f the Pembina Institute: Pembina Institute Water Impacts 
<http://www.pembina.org/oil-sands/osl01/water> Accessed July 30th 2014. Contrast this to the statements o f  
the Alberta Government in this regard: Alberta Government A lberta’s Oil Sands: Water 
<http://www.oilsands.alberta.ca/water.html> Accessed July 30th 214
753RAMP (n226)
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monitor the Athabasca River in more detail. The cumulative impact on low flows from the 
aggregate of regional development could have significant impacts on fish
habitat.’754
Various projects have attempted to ascertain the exact impact of the tar sands developments 
both in terms of water quality and quantity in the areas supplied with water by the Athabasca 
River and its tributaries. However the overwhelming consensus is one of uncertainty. As the 
Alberta government’s own ‘Water Management Framework’ for the Lower Athabasca River, 
states, ‘Methods for directly determining the impact of reduced water availability on the 
aquatic ecosystem are not available for the lower Athabasca River and to our knowledge are 
rare in the international scientific literature.’755
This somewhat startling admission appears damning with regards to the licensing of 
levels of water consumption thought to have the potential to be harmful to the ecosystems 
reliant upon minimum flow levels in the river. In relation to any potential utility for Article 
12 of the ICESCR756 this reality is equally as harmful though not for the same reasons. The 
lack of scientific certainty as to the impact on fish habitat, or the aquatic ecosystems of the 
region in general resulting from water withdrawals, results in the inability to prove impact to 
human physical and mental health to a standard sufficient to meet that which would be 
required by the Canadian courts.757 Thus in relation to water quantity and quality, the 
interpretative breadth offered by Article 12758 would be of little use.
754 ibid. 14
755 WMSLAR (n278)
7^  ICESCR (n254) Art. 12
757 This is in part owing equally to an unclear constitutional arrangement as to who should be protecting various 
facets o f the environment and thus monitoring harms, potential or actual to it. In this regard see: Boyd, D.R. The 
Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution (University o f  British Columbia Press, 
Vancouver, 2012) 10-15.
758 ICESCR (n254) Art. 12
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Article 12 is undoubtedly useful for the construction of a case against the support for, 
and licensing of, tar sands developments by the Canadian and Albertan authorities. However, 
drafting necessitating burdensome evidence of impacts restricts its usage to ultimately being 
one aspect of a case brought against the government organs facilitating industries rather than 
the sole basis for a case in itself.
5.5 Suppressions of Abilities Protected by the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights
5.51 Article 7 
Favourable Conditions of Work
As Robin Churchill iterates, the Covenant, ‘contain(s) one express, albeit limited, 
environmental right.’ 759 With this comment Churchill is referring to Article 7 of the 
Covenant760 which whilst not including the word ‘environment,’ itself is widely regarded by 
jurists as concerning the concept due its clear discussion of all aspects of the surroundings of 
the individual. The provisions of Article 7 are of particular relevance to the legality of the 
damage incurred as a result of the ineffective storage of tailings material produced by the 
open pit extraction of bitumen. The article affords protection from unhealthy and unsafe 
working conditions, which are just and favourable for all aspects of life linked thereto, and 
specifically within this the significance of leisure and family is highlighted.
Churchill, R. Environmental Rights in Existing Human Rights Treaties in Boyle, A. and Anderson, M.R. 
(eds.) Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) 100
760 ICESCR (n254) Art. 7.
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As a result of this connection to broader factors, the right is often considered in 
discussions of affording a basic conception of a right to a healthy environment in its entirety 
not merely within the sphere of work.761 Such an approach is akin to that outlined in Article 
11 of the San Salvador Protocol to the Inter American Convention of Human Rights,762 and 
Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.763 The link to the notion of 
family in the conception outlined specifically within the Covenant is of particular 
significance with regard to the indigenous populace of the province, and the potential case 
against the licensing of extraction and refinement projects. This connection between safe 
conditions for work or the securing of a livelihood as it is termed in the domestic Canadian 
human rights provisions,764 and the maintenance of the family unit ‘in accordance with the 
provisions of the ... Covenant’765 more widely, allows for the consideration of the cultural 
significance of said work and not merely the economic benefit afforded by the practice.
The acceptance that the work protected under the provisions of the ICESCR can 
include that undertaken for non-pecuniary rewards,766 affords further opportunities within the 
text of the Covenant to challenge the adverse effects of the tar sands developments. As 
discussed, Article 7 of the Covenant concerns the, ‘right of everyone to enjoy just and 
favourable conditions of work,’767 and thus in the case of the indigenous peoples of Alberta, 
to hunt caribou, fish and engage in productive activities of any type in such surroundings. 
Although the relationship with the national and provincial authorities might not be deemed as
761 See for example: Shelton, D. Human Rights and the Environment: Substantive Rights in Fitzmaurice, M.
Ong, D. M. and Merkouris, P. Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar
Publishing, Cheltenham, 2010)266
62 AP-ACHR (nl 88) Art. 11
63 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) Art. 24
4 CCRF (nl74) s.6 
ICESCR (n254) Art. 7
Craven, M. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 230 
ICESCR (n254) Art 7
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one constituting employer and employee, the right could be argued to still apply given the 
acceptance of non-pecuniary rewards as a motivation for undertaking such work. Similarly
768the fiduciary nature of the agreements made under the numbered treaties would support 
this proposition. The practice of caribou hunting or fishing in this regard is instead akin to a 
form of self-employment which under the provisions of Article 7 could not be unreasonably
769restricted. Indeed the need to ensure the provision of sustenance, and the ability to continue 
to obtain a source thereof without perpetual assistance from the provincial and national 
governments, is considered within the numbered treaties.770
As has already been considered, this negotiation also paid respect to the preference of 
the Indians with regard to how such sustenance was obtained. Arable farming for example 
was an essential source of sustenance in Western Europe at the time of the colonisation of 
Canada owing to a higher population density as a result of urbanisation. The practice was 
however noted as being met with, ‘disinclination’ by the Indians, ‘as a means of livelihood,’ 
and that, ‘the more congenial occupations of hunting and fishing,’771 were still preferred. 
These notes, whilst being neither legally binding nor made within the modem context, 
provide useful insights into the purpose behind the drafting of provisions of the treaties, and 
the intended nature of the relationship they were to create.772 The note of concern with 
regards to the congeniality of the options proposed to the Indians, and the recognition that the 
most efficient source of sustenance will not necessarily be that adopted by the Indians is 
telling. The consideration of this fact indicates an awareness, and indeed acceptance of, the
768 Webb, J. and Stevenson, M.G. (n l70), 73
769 CCRF (n l74) s.7 when interpreted in line with the test in Oakes (n207) concerning justification o f  derogation 
from fundamental right under the Charter.
770 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
'A quote from the negotiation notes o f Treaty 8, <http://www.otc.ca/siteimages/Treaty8.pdf> (Accessed 12 
December 2011 ) 24.
2 This is supported by the inclusion o f the notes o f the Crown representatives to the treaty negotiations within
the text  o f  T rea ty  8 p r o v id e d  by  the  C a n ad ian  g o v e rn m e n t  on their  official w ebsi te .  T rea t ie s  6 and 8 (n68)
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cultural significance of the hunting of caribou. As such it provides a possible source of 
interpretation in relation to the Canadian state’s vision of the concept of ‘work,’ and rights to 
such work in order to attain a minimum standard of living.
The use of the term, ‘means of livelihood,’ to describe the hunting of caribou also 
represents tacit recognition of the practice as a form of ‘work’ for the purposes of human 
rights law. The purpose of work is regarded in numerous legislative instruments in the field 
as being to attain any of a number of synonymous concepts, such as a particular standard of 
living, a livelihood, sustenance, or a minimum standard of living.773 This acceptance of the 
practice as both culturally significant, and more importantly in relation to the provisions of 
Article 7 of the ICESCR, as a form of work, allows claims to be brought in relation to 
breaches of those rights protecting this concept within the Covenant, the article in question 
being the most significant. As such the duties relating to working conditions enshrined in 
Article 7 could, via judicial interpretation, be enforced in relation to the practice of caribou 
hunting by the indigenous peoples of Alberta, against the relevant provincial and national 
authorities.774 The nature of the ‘work’ of caribou hunting or fishing prevents the provision of 
all conditions stipulated under Article 7 being reasonably and realistically demanded, such as 
the enforcement of remuneration with regards to periodic holidays and remuneration for 
public holidays. However, some of its stipulations are relevant to the practice, and thus the 
specific effects of the tar sands developments on the caribou, and consequently the ability of 
the First Nations Indians to hunt them in ‘just and favourable conditions.’775
^  See for example CCRF (n l74) s .6 and ADRD (n249) Art. XIV.
Such a proposition would conform with the decision in Minister o f  Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319, 
328 per Lord Wilberforce, necessitating interpretations which meet the international obligations o f Canada with 
regards to human rights law.
5 IC E S C R  (n254) Art 7
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The overarching concepts of, ‘just and favourable conditions’776 within Article 7 are 
defined more specifically in the subsections of the provision. These expansions on the main 
body of the article are of considerable relevance in relation to the effects of the tar sands on 
the ability of the First Nations to hunt boreal woodland caribou and fish using traditional 
methods. Expansion upon the concept of such ‘favourable’ conditions within the subsections 
of the article provide pertinent interpretative guidance in relation to the application of the 
provision to the case at hand in a number of ways. Firstly Article 7(a)(ii) requires that the 
product of the work undertaken, must ‘as a minimum’ provide, ‘a decent living for 
themselves and their family in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant.’777 
The addition of protection for the living of the family as dependents adds cultural and 
communal elements to the right. This insight also further emphasises that pecuniary 
compensation for any loss of living, or inhibition thereof, would not suffice in alleviating the 
relevant authorities of their duties in this respect. This is as interpretation it is stipulated that 
the provision of the minimum ‘decent living’ under the article must be secured, ‘in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant,’778 and as such be culturally relative 
in accordance with Article 15779 to be discussed.
Unlike in the articles of the domestic and regional texts discussed applicable to 
Canada, which provide synonymous rights to work, just rewards for said work, and the 
conditions in which it should be undertaken, 780 this subsection allows the text of the 
Covenant as a whole to be read into this provision. The practice of creating a hierarchical 
structure of rights has generally been frowned upon by jurists as being a potentially
776 ibid. Art. 7
777
'bid. Art 7(a)(ii) 
ibid. Art. 7(a)(ii)
7gQ ibid. Art. 15
780 C C R F  (n  174) s.6 and  A D R D  (n 2 4 9 )  Art. XIV .
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dangerous precedent, with the common opinion being that rights should be read together as 
a body of law rather than individually.782 This is however rarely the reality, with judiciaries 
choosing which to apply or uphold on a case by case basis. Article 7(a)(ii) avoids this to some 
extent also by requiring that the concept of ‘a decent living for oneself and family’783 be 
applied in line with all other provisions of the Covenant, rather than allowing its balancing
• • • 784against competing interests.
In relation to any case which might be brought against the tar sands developments in 
Alberta regarding their adverse effects, such interpretation would be required in relation to 
the proposed bases for such litigation. Note should be made that it is for this reason that 
Article 11 of the Covenant would in this regard provide too tentative a basis for such a case. 
Despite providing a right to, ‘an adequate standard of living for himself and his family,’785 
the Article offers no more than the identical domestic rights which can be enforced in the 
domestic legal system. The drafting of Article 7(a)(ii) however guarantees interpretation, 
which might otherwise be ultimately at the mercy of those adjudicating any such case. As 
such the concepts of cultural development, and respect for culture, beliefs and property, to 
name but a few are to be read into the minimum standards regarding work and the 
remuneration of that work, pecuniary or otherwise.
Thus the indigenous peoples of Alberta would be able to contest that the minimum 
decent living guaranteed under the article must also be ensured with respect given to the 
cultural significance of traditional activities they freely choose to undertake as their means of
1 Brems, E. Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 2001) 423
2 As espoused in UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme o f  Action, 12 July 
1993, A/CONF. 157/23 Art.5




subsistence. This would both further ensure that the remuneration of work could not be 
measured in purely pecuniary terms, but would also add weight to the contention that the 
destruction of the boreal woodland, and the resulting reduction in fauna numbers in the 
region, would breach the right of the First Nations to enjoy ‘just and favourable conditions of 
work which ensure... as a minimum... a decent living for themselves and their family. ,786
As well as the remuneration, whether pecuniary or otherwise, for the work protected 
under the auspices of Article 7 of the Covenant, the conditions in which such work is 
undertaken are also protected. Article 7(b) requires that such work be allowed to be carried 
out in ‘safe and healthy working conditions.’787 More specific effects on the environment are 
discussed in depth in the thesis, though it suffices here to state it is well documented that the 
extraction of the tar sands and its refinement into highly profitable synthetic crude oil has a 
number of adverse effects to water and air qualities, and causes considerable physical damage 
to the land on which extraction is specifically undertaken and the surrounding area.788 Whilst 
many of these effects are limited to land leased legally to the oil companies, some afflict the 
indigenous peoples dwelling beyond the borders of those leases.
Air and water quality are arguably the most pertinent examples of this, and whereas 
precedent indicates a reluctance on the part of jurists generally to uphold that such damage 
could breach the rights to life, and private and family life except in the most severe of 
circumstances,789 when considered in relation to working conditions thresholds could be set
/8b ibid. Art 7
787 ibid. Art 7(b)
88 Such impacts are conceded by the introduction o f frameworks to limit them within the plan for the Lower 
Athabasca region in light o f  tar sands extraction: LARP (nl09) 27
See for example the judgements in following cases from the European system: Budayeva (n670) Lopez Ostra 
(n 186) and Guerra (n620)
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at the levels considered acceptable in domestic Canadian health and safety regulations.790 
Thus the likelihood of successfully breaching the required threshold for a violation of a 
human right would be far greater in relation to the provisions regarding working conditions 
for the indigenous peoples.
As such Article 7 provides a basis which in relation to a case against the permitting of 
the damage caused by tar sands extraction and refinement is arguably more likely to succeed 
than the bases provided by civil and political rights. However, to enable access to such a basis 
the more theoretical arguments surrounding the consideration of traditional activities such as 
fishing and hunting caribou as a form of work for the purposes of the Covenant would first 
have to be accepted by any judicial body considering the facts presented to them. Article 7 of 
the ICESCR791 therefore potentially provides a decreased threshold demanded to be 
considered a breach of a human right, but the application of this right to the specific case of 
the damage wrought by the tar sands extraction is reliant upon a somewhat less conventional 
interpretation pertaining to the nature of work protected under the Covenant. Such a 
problem admittedly does not afflict civil and political rights often utilised to challenge similar 
effects in spite of their higher thresholds for breach, owing to a wealth of precedents 
discussing their application to environmental concerns.793
The basis o f  which is to be found in: Canada Labour Code R.S.C.1985 c.L-2 Part II
791 ICESCR (n254) Art. 7
792 The need for a broader conception o f  work, beyond that prescribed to the homo oeconomicus, is outlined in: 
Saul, B. Kinley, D. and Mowbray, J. (eds) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 





The rewards gained from work have on numerous occasions been held as not 
necessarily being solely pecuniary in nature for the purposes of the law.794 Setting aside 
issues of taxation and fair remuneration with which the research is not concerned, this is a 
significant interpretation in relation to the indigenous peoples of Alberta, especially with 
regard to the hunting of boreal woodland caribou. As has already been eluded to, the hunting 
of caribou is not a viable source of income for the indigenous peoples of the province with 
the meat and hide of the animal being of little value, monetary or cultural, beyond the 
indigenous population. As such to access the protection the rights concerning occupation and 
the attaining of benefits from it, the acceptance of the non-pecuniary elements of a livelihood 
as being encompassed within their scope is essential. Despite being of little value to any not 
part of the Indian culture, and more specifically those First Nations which still practice 
traditional hunting methods and seek traditional prey as an aspect of that culture, the caribou 
undeniably provide a source of sustenance, livelihood and living as described and protected at 
the various levels of legal enforcement of human rights. Thus the means by which the caribou 
are hunted as an example of work, the caribou themselves as the source of a livelihood and 
sustenance, and the traditions of the First Nations as an example of a standard of living, are 
all arguably subject to the protection afforded by the aforementioned articles of the ICESCR, 
and domestic provisions interpreted in line with it.
794 The notion o f  a ‘standard o f living’ within the section 6  o f  the CCRF right as opposed to particular features 
thereof supports this assertion as does precedent, particularly in the field o f divorce law. See the consideration o f
components classified as an aspect of a ‘standard of living in: Droit de la fam ille  - 111526, 201 1 QCCS 2662
238
The connection between the domestic right to work in Section 6 of the CCRF795 and 
that espoused in the article of the same designation in the ICESCR have long been recognised. 
Indeed in Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson796 the parallels are explicitly 
highlighted by Justice Lamer, stating that the domestic right, ‘mirrors the provisions of 
several human rights instruments.’797 The comparisons are however based upon the mobility 
aspect of the right, on which the domestic protections indisputably focus. In this regard it is 
only through consideration of the domestic right in light of the international equivalent that 
the desired effect for the case at hand is achieved. Quite simply the domestic right assures 
beyond doubt only that there be no impact to occupation necessitating relocation. This
7QO
approach was emphasised in the seminal case of Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd which 
underpinned the development of the Section 6 right some 30 years later. More recently this 
approach to the implementation of Section 6 was emphasised by Justice Etsey in the case of 
Law Society o f  Upper Canada v. Skapinker In the judgement Etsey stated that it, ‘does not 
establish a separate and distinct right to work divorced from the mobility provisions in which 
it is found.’800 The international right represented by Article 6 adds the crucial component of 
that work being ‘freely chosen,’ rather than a freedom to locate oneself anywhere within 
Canada in order to work to gain a livelihood.
Article 6 of the economic, social and cultural Covenant concerning the right to work, 
which the hunting of caribou for sustenance could as discussed be deemed, provides that the 
living attained by an individual should be done so through work which he, freely
™ CCRF (n 174) s.6
797 Canadian Egg M arketing Agency (n607)
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (n607) 58 (per Lamer CJ
799 Winner v. S.M .T (Eastern) Ltd., [1951] SCR 887
800 ^GW ^oc‘e(y o f  Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357 
0 ibid. at 33 per Etsey. J
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801chooses. The monetary value of the caribou outside of the Indian culture is all but 
negligible, however the freedom to choose the means by which an individual, ‘gain(s) his 
living,’ ensures that, as a result of said choice, members of the indigenous communities must 
have their ability to hunt caribou and to utilise the products of that practice protected. This is 
true regardless of its pecuniary value within a wider economic context or the availability of 
alternatives.802
Suggestions have been made with regard to the practice of land reclamation, the 
provision of livestock, and its ability to prosper on reclaimed land, that alternatives have been 
provided to the practice of caribou hunting, or that the land reclaimed will support caribou 
habitation.803 With regard to the rights provided under the ICESCR however it is pertinent at 
this juncture to highlight that the right to freely choose the work by which the standard of 
living, livelihood, or sustenance is obtained staunchly rebuts any defence on the part of 
corporations, or the Canadian or provincial Albertan authorities that adequate alternatives in 
terms of financial and nutritional value have been provided.
Further expansion of the right provided under Article 6(1) and its utility in relation to 
the adverse effects is offered within its second subsection,804 which concerns the measures to 
be taken by state parties, ‘to achieve the full realization,’ of the right outlined in the previous 
subsection. Specifically the duty on the parties to implement, ‘policies and techniques to
ICESCR (n254) Art 6
802 See the consideration o f  components classified as an aspect o f a ‘standard o f living in: D roit de lafam ille  - 
111526, 2011 QCCS 2662
803 See the report o f  the Parkland Institute in this regard. Note should be made that the Parkland Institute is a 
research institute based in the University o f Alberta, which is non-partisan in nature, though has repeatedly 
suggested that prevailing economic and energy policy with regards to the oil sands is ill-founded: Parkland 
Institute. Reclamation Illusions in Oil Sands Country. 2009
<http://parklandinstitute.ca/post/story/recIamation_illusions_in_oil_sands_country/>Accessed July 30 2014.
804 ICESCR (n254) A rt6(l)(2 )
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achieve steady economic, social and cultural development,’805 to facilitate the aim of, ‘full 
realisation,’ is worthy of consideration. This right would undoubtedly be regarded as 
derogable in nature, and as such would be subject to reasonable economic and political 
considerations on the part of the state. The suggestion of the means by which a party is 
expected to uphold the obligations to which it has acquiesced however provides a potential 
added impetus and a model framework for those wishing to suggest those obligations have 
not been fulfilled. In relation to the effects of the tar sands developments in Alberta, it allows 
the consideration of decisions made by provincial and national authorities beyond merely 
permitting extractions and to how said decisions were reached in relation to those 
developments.
Assessment can therefore be made as to whether the right of an individual, ‘to gain his 
living by work which he freely chooses,’806 has been considered in the decision making 
processes and policies of the relevant authorities. Whether the reasoning behind them 
considered adequately their economic, social and cultural impact and its limitations of that 
right might also therefore be scrutinised. Thus these provisions place the organs of state 
parties under a duty to respect and not breach the right in the actions and decisions they 
undertake. Further to this they are also required to actively promote the right and avoid
807actions which inhibit the opportunity to gain a living through freely chosen work. In 
relation to the wildlife of Alberta, and particularly the boreal woodland caribou the knowing 
reduction of the numbers and inhibition of the migration of these animals could be argued to 
constitute a breach of the duties to which the Canadian state had subjected itself. As such, the 
excessive consumption of water reducing river flows, preventing indigenous peoples from 
fishing using traditional methods, and consequentially driving the native flora and fauna from
805 ibid. Art 6(1)(2)
806 , . Tibid. Art 6
See the discussion of positive and negative right in; Donnelly (n673) 30
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the reserve lands of these peoples preventing them from hunting traditional prey such as 
caribou, would arguably be allowed only in highly restricted incidences. This argument 
would be strengthened by the unique relationship the indigenous populous have with the 
caribou outlined above, a key point given the overall aim of protecting the non-pecuniary and 
culturally relevant living they represent.
The provisions of Article 6 allow the consideration of the livelihood, or sustenance 
protected in human rights provisions across the levels of legal enforcement to which the 
Canadian state is subject within a specific cultural context, and not solely upon a purely 
pecuniary or nutritional basis. Any case based upon this article, or the interpretation of 
similar rights at the other levels of enforcement in light of it would, owing to the derogable 
nature of such provisions, have to contend with the weight of economic potential the tar sands 
wields. However, to ignore the implications of the interpretative insight it provides in relation 
to the consideration of the cultural significance of the caribou would be foolhardy.
Links between both cultural development and other fundamental rights offering 
protections regarding the obtaining of means to meet basic needs for oneself and family are 
reflective of the realities of indigenous peoples across the world and in Canada. Thus, 
whereas prima facie the application of the right to work might otherwise be narrowly applied 
to the context of mobility, a broader interpretation is afforded under Article 6 of the 
Covenant808 to include the form of work. This aspect as has been discussed is not protected 
by domestic Canadian rights specifically, and is not only beneficial to the construction of a 
case against the impacts and licensing of the tar sands developments, but arguably essential to 
its very conception.




The significance of the family unit and the protections extended to include it, 
enshrined throughout the ICESCR,809 are furthered by Article 11 of the Covenant, which 
affords protection to the beneficiary, ‘himself and his family.’810 The subject matter of the 
right is far broader than that of Articles 6 and 7,811 as it protects the more general concept of, 
‘an adequate standard of living.’812 The right particularly pertains to, ‘adequate food, 
clothing and housing,’813 though as has been alluded to by the United Nations, water plays a 
crucial role in the realisation of ‘an adequate standard of living.’ 814 Whilst the 
aforementioned provisions concerning employment are of relative utility in the forming of a 
case such as that aimed at by the piece, the breadth of Article l l 815 has considerable potential 
usage. The concept of a ‘standard of living’ describes all essential aspects of the daily life of 
an individual, and their family, all of which are inextricably linked to the availability of water 
and the native flora and fauna in the instance of the indigenous peoples of Alberta and 
especially those living within the boreal forest ecosystems.
Reductions in flow rates of any significance would have adverse impacts on other 
ecosystem features reliant upon the water provided by the natural water courses of the
809 Articles 7 , 1 0  and 1 1  all afford their protections to the family unit as well as the individual, a considerable 
number given that only Articles 1 through 16 grant rights rather than impose obligations on state parties.
8 j° ICESCR (n254) Art. 11
811 ibid. Arts. 6  and 7
812 ibid. Art. 1 1
813 ibid. Art. 1 1
4 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The Right to Water (Twenty- 
ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2002/11 (2002)
815 ICESCR (n254) Art. 11
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province.816 Alterations in habitat owing to the death or receding of native flora, would have 
more severe impacts further up the food pyramids of which they formed the base. The peaks 
of the pyramids in this instance are the indigenous peoples of the regions affected, and the 
potential for breaches of human rights provisions arises from the causal links between effects 
to that flora and to them.
Caribou, already highlighted as of greater significance to the First Nations peoples in 
terms of numbers using them as a means of expressing their culture, would be particularly at 
risk. Reduced flow levels in rivers and low levels in static watersheds of the province in the 
form of underground aquifers817 owing to extractions by projects accessing the tar sands 
would impact adversely upon the flora upon which the caribou prefer to eat. Caribou have 
been recorded as relocating to areas where their preferred sources of sustenance are
010
available. As this preferred source is long established boreal forest supporting lichen, any 
negative impact might take decades to redress, and as such be exponentially increased from 
that seenprima facie at its source in water flow and volume levels.
The provisions of Article 11 of the ICESCR819 whilst not mentioning any aspect of 
cultural relativity to the obligations placed upon the state parties, must be read into the 
domestic provisions of Canada afforded under the CCRF.820 This is as the optional protocol 
to the Covenant821 has not been ratified by the Canadian government. Clear links between the
816 See in this regard the concerns o f the ‘Assessment o f Climate and Hydrology Component’ in the Peer 
Review o f the Regional Aquatic Monitoring Program Five Year Report: RAMP (n226))
817 Such aquifers are regarded as in effect non-renewable owing to the considerable amount o f time needed for 
them to replenish any reduction incurred by industrial extraction.
818 See the US. Forestry Service database description o f caribou migratory habits: Luensmann, P. on behalf o f  
the U.S Department o f  Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service. Rangifer Tarandus (August 2014) 
<http://www.fs.fed.us/database/feis/animals/mammal/rata/all.html> Accessed July 30 2014.
819 ICESCR (n254) Art. 11
820 CCRF (n l74)
821 OP-ICESCR (n644)
244
content of Article 11 of the Covenant822 and Sections 6 and 7 of the CCRF,823 in terms of 
subject matter are however apparent. As such, they represent the best avenue for the broad 
interpretation of domestic rights in line with the obligations under Article 11 by which the 
Canadian government bound itself by signing and ratifying the text. Once this link is 
established however and domestic rights afforded the broader interpretation offered by the 
ICESCR, they can equally be applied in line with Section 27 of the CCRF. The section which 
declares that the, ‘Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation 
and enhancement o f the multicultural heritage of Canadians.’824
As such the ‘adequate standard of living’ for an individual and his family should be 
protected in a manner resulting in the securing of the unique cultural idiosyncrasies of the 
First Nations tribes of Alberta. Thus an underlying principle of protecting the cultural 
diversity of Canada is demanded, and is key to ensuring that rights afforded generally to all 
Canadians by the organs of the State are adapted in their interpretation to reflect the realities 
of minority cultures. Thus the provisions of Article 11 of the ICESCR are moulded from a 
right to the basic necessities of life into one relative to the indigenous peoples of the regions 
affected. In the context of potentially creating a case against the developments causing the 
adverse environmental impacts described, it is this link which is crucial. This assertion is
825supported by the reference specifically to indigenous peoples in the General Comments 12 
and 15826 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The comments deal 
with the right to food and water respectively and refer to both Article 11 and indigenous
ICESCR (n254) Art. 11
823 CCRF (n l74) s. 6 & 7
824 CCRF (n 174) s. 27
825 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food (Art. 11 o f  the Covenant), U.N.Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999)
26 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The Right to Water (Twenty- 
ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2002/11 (2002)
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peoples in their texts. General Comment 12 highlights the, ‘particular vulnerability,’827 of 
indigenous peoples when denied access to lands traditionally utilised to source food. General 
Comment 15 makes a direct connection between access to water and, ‘securing the 
livelihoods of indigenous peoples, 828 ’ and goes on to highlight both their peculiar
829vulnerability and the need to access water sources on the aforementioned culturally
• • 830 • •significant lands. Whilst not binding in themselves upon the Canadian state, even in light 
of the decision in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.),821 they provide 
significant insight into the intentions of the drafters of the Covenant and the aspects of the 
elements of an ‘adequate standard of living.’ As well as supporting an interpretation in line with 
Article 27 of the CCRF therefore, they provide an approach to doing so and evidence crucial 
elements of said standard in a culturally relative manner.
As has been discussed obligations resulting from rights of universal application can be
more easily met by the Canadian executive.832 However, the requirement for an element of
cultural relativity to be applied in the fulfilment of those obligations prevents the method 
adopted for meeting the duties placed upon them from merely being the most simple or cost 
effective. In this regard it becomes apparent when rights afforded are not specifically given to 
minority or indigenous cultures that this link to those notions is key to the success of any case 
against the licensing of tar sands projects and their adverse impacts. This is undeniably the 
case in relation to any potential application of Article 11 of the ICESCR833 in this endeavour. 
Thus the efficacy of Article 11 for the purposes of the piece hinges upon a culturally relative
827 GC12 (n825) Art. 13
828 GC15 (n826) Art. 7
829 ibid. Art. 16
830 ibid. Art. 16(d)
31 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313., 349
32 Such as the provision o f  water by means o f a pipeline to negate contentions based on the reduction o f water 
in natural courses in regions impacted upon by tar sands extraction which has been suggested.
833 IC E S C R  (n254) Art.  11
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interpretation of the provision through the lens of Section 27 of the domestic Charter834 as 
well as into domestic provisions affording similar protections.
5.54 Article 15 
Taking Part in Cultural Life
Given that the unique nature of the culture of the First Nations peoples of Alberta is 
central to the suggested case against the government licensing of industrial tar sands projects, 
rights affording cultural protection specifically are of considerable significance. The domestic 
provisions of the CCRF afford only that, the, ‘Charter shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians.’ 835 As such rights originating in the regional and international legal systems 
relating a direct right to cultural practice, as opposed to the interpretation of non-specific 
rights, are of considerable utility. The recognition of the cultural idiosyncrasies of the First 
Nations of the region from the majority of the population of Canada, but also from the other 
tribes in the region, would arguably result in both their protection and that of the ecosystems 
on which their culture was predicated.836
This recognition would potentially ensure the protection of greater portions of the 
region and various ecosystems therein, as the First Nations in the north east of Alberta are 
vastly different to those of the southern half inhabiting the radically different plains 
ecosystems, and to some extent from those in the west inhabiting mountainous regions. Even 
neighbouring tribes in relatively close geographic proximity can have significant differences
CCRF (n l74) s. 27 
885 ibid. Art. 27
8 6 As was held in the communications o f the Lubicon Lake Cree Band: Lubicon (n729)
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in practices and lifestyle. One common feature to most tribes837 however is their links to the 
ecosystems which they inhabit, and thus in order to protect those peoples, they too must be
83 8protected and preserved. In this endeavour the interpretation of domestic Canadian human 
rights legislation in line with Article 15 of the ICESCR839 is of considerable significance.
The article requires state parties to, ‘recognise the right of everyone... To take part in 
cultural life,’840 and to take steps to realise this right which, ‘shall include those necessary for 
the conservation, the development and the diffusion of...culture.’841 The article, like others 
discussed, suffers from the lack of a direct comparator amongst the human rights afforded 
within the domestic Canadian legal system under the CCRF. This does not however restrict 
its utility to the degree that it does in other instances for a number of reasons. Most obvious 
amongst these is the non-scientific nature of the concept of culture. The physical and mental 
health of individuals can be measured scientifically and thus the courts rightly demand a 
burden of proof based upon more accurate methodologies, allowing for conclusive evidence 
being demanded in all instances. Culture by contrast is a far more subjective concept.842 As a 
result the interpretation of the obligations of the Canadian and Albertan governments under 
Article 15 into domestic human rights provisions is far more easily achieved, and less likely 
to be rebutted by conflicting scientific evidence.
The nature of Article 15 outlined above and that which it protects, ensures that its 
potential application through domestic interpretation is broad. Introducing the notion of the
837 A number o f tribes have retained their presence on lands which have now become absorbed into large urban 
areas and as such have vastly different lifestyles to the tribes with which the work is concerned.
838 This is reflective o f the approach adopted by the UNHRC in Poma Poma (n271) in relation to the potential 
for the extinction o f a culture owing to environmental impacts.
839 ICESCR (n254) Art. 15
840 ibid.
841 ibid.
842 Snyder, R. Williams, D. and Peterson, G. Culture Loss and Sem e o f  Place in Resource Valuation:
Economics, Anthropology and Indigenous Cultures in Jentoft, S. Minde, H. and Nilsen, R. Indigenous Peoples. 
Resource M anagement and Global Rights (E b u ro n  A c a d e m ic  Publishers ,  Delft  , 2 0 0 j )  107
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rights to remain, gain a livelihood,844 and have personal liberty and security,845 as being 
conducive to the ability of those peoples ‘to take part in cultural life’ is highly beneficial to 
the potential construction of a case against the licensing of the tar sands developments and 
their impacts. However, the recognition that the unique nature of the indigenous populace 
and their ability to express their culture is affected by them, thus requiring their licensing to 
be approached in such a manner as to ensure the continued existence of said culture, is key to 
the aim of this piece. All First Nations peoples would possess the domestic rights outlined 
above by virtue of their being considered Canadian citizens in the eyes of the law.846
• 847However, Article 15 allows for these rights to potentially be interpreted in a culturally 
relative manner.
The utility o f the article is also heavily based upon the aforementioned unique nature 
of the First Nations as a collective across Canada from the rest of the populace, but also as 
individual tribes from others. By way of illustration, the nature of physical and mental health 
is that its minimum requirements are, relatively speaking, universal. All individuals require a 
certain amount of water for basic needs, which can be calculated and provided in a culturally 
neutral manner, thus relieving the state party of its minimum obligations to preserve the 
nutrition and sanitation provided by water. By contrast the unique nature of the First Nations 
cultures, both nationally, provincially, and in some instances individually, can only be 
preserved by in turn preserving that which makes them unique. In the majority of instances 
the development of their idiosyncrasies is a result of their interactions with the ecosystems 
upon which they rely and reside. For example, tribes with fish laden rivers within their 
traditional territories might develop greater ties to the river and the fish which inhabit it. This 
is as opposed to tribes living within the migratory habitats of the boreal woodland caribou
843 CCRF (n l74) s. 6 (1)
“  ibid. at s. 6 (2) (b)
ibid. at s. 7
846 Canadian Citizenship Act, S.C. 1946, c. 15 s.9
847 ICESCR (n254) Ait. 15
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who might instead opt to source sustenance from them. Thus the cultural practices which 
develop in each instance do so in line with the fruits of the ecosystems most readily available 
to them.848
The individual cultural significance of the practices which are inhibited by the 
environmental impacts of the tar sands projects provide an immediate relevance and 
importance to any case brought based upon the suggestion that they breach Article 15 of the 
Covenant. The provision as discussed affords the right, ‘To take part in cultural life,’849 and 
to receive the benefits thereof, as well as imposing upon the States party to the text to take 
steps to achieve the, ‘full realisation of this right,’ 850 including those necessary for the, 
‘conservation, the development and the diffusion of ... culture.’851 The efficacy of a case 
concerning the impacts based on this right is however potentially questionable should a strict 
interpretative approach be taken. The notion of ‘taking part’ in cultural life and what 
constitutes a restriction upon this is potentially a broad one, dependent upon the position 
adopted by a judicial body.
A broad interpretation of the provision might recognise reductions in the population 
of caribou in the regions subject to tar sands extraction projects as a breach of the right to 
take part in cultural life by extension. This is as hunting them would become more difficult 
and the breadth of the participation in the culture and associated practices would potentially 
reduce.852 The same might be said for impacts to fish and the practice of fishing, or the
848 See in relation to the adaptation o f First Nations peoples to the environments in which they remained or 
relocated following the cession o f the fur trade: Finkel, A. The Fur Trade and Early European Settlement in 
Finkel, A. 'Working People in Alberta: A History ‘ (Athabasca University Press, Edmonton, 2012) 24
849 ICESCR (n254) Art. 15 (1) (a)
850 ibid. Art. 15 (2)
851
ibid. at Art. 15 (2)
2 This is arguably already evidenced by the foregoing o f traditional practices to undertake work in the oil sands
industry by  so m e  F irs t  N a t io n s .  A n d e r so n  (n 3 4 7 )  97-128
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prevalence of flora constituting boreal forest ecosystems and Indian activities more broadly. 
This may be as a result of strategic deforestation to provide access to the overburden 
supporting open pit mining operations and store tailings, through seismic impacts or the 
increased number of communications routes supporting the industrial growth of the region. 
All such impacts could arguably be curtailed under this broad approach to application of the 
right.
A narrow interpretation of the drafting by contrast would not necessarily hold that 
such breaches existed. The mere reduction in the aforementioned environmental features 
would not inhibit ‘taking part’ in culture in that it would not be a barrier to the individual 
participating in cultural practices in an overtly proactive manner. For example outlawing the 
hunting of caribou or fishing altogether, or specifically physically inhibiting the ability of an 
individual directly would obviously breach the provision. However, by reducing the extent of 
features which are involved in a culture alone would not restrict the individual from partaking 
in cultural practices per se.853 Given that the rights espoused in both covenants, stemming as 
they do from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, are afforded on the basis of 
inherent human dignity, it follows that only where that dignity itself is threatened will a 
breach occur.854 Demanding merely extra exertion might not be deemed as breaching this 
threshold.
As has been outlined the restriction on taking part in culture itself is arguably non­
existent, only the aspects used in cultural practices are restricted or reduced. In essence 
therefore any case brought on this basis would turn on the outcome of the question of whether 
the provision protecting the participation in culture includes the features inextricable from the
853 In itself
4 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Decembei 1948, 217 A (III) Preamble.
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culture itself. Whilst this is a seemingly minute, and meticulous difference and one which 
is not always easily established in practice, the degree of success of a case against the 
aforementioned impacts would rest upon the position taken in this regard by the judiciary. 
Whilst the Committee on Economic , Social and Cultural Rights has suggested a more 
expansive approach than a restricted reading of the article might suggest, to propose that it 
protects all features supportive of traditional practices without evidence it threatens the 
continued existence of said culture would be remiss.856 Given the gravity of the issue at hand, 
to allow a potential action to be brought on this basis alone would be foolhardy, especially 
given the breadth afforded in other alternative articles within the ICESCR regardless of those 
potentially of use in other texts. That having been said to exclude it from a group of 
suggested breaches, would be equally as remiss as the significance attributed to the 
preservation of cultures, especially those of a vulnerable nature such as those of the minority 
indigenous populations of which the First Nations of Alberta are, would not be considered.
The likely outcome would be something of a middle ground. Whether a restriction 
was deemed as having breached rights would be heavily based upon the severity of the 
impact incurred. Thus to contaminate water courses so severely as to make fish inedible, or 
reduce their stocks to such a degree that even fishing by traditional methods was no longer 
sustainable would be expected to breach the provision.857 The lack of jurisprudence with 
regards to the application of this article, given the relative recentness of the entry into force of
855 Arguably this is conceded by the Canadian courts in the case o f R. v. Isaac (1975) 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460, 9 
A.P.R. 460 (N.S. C.A.) in which it was stated the purpose for which numbered treaty lands were reserved could 
not be restricted by governmental actions permitted therein, including mineral resource extraction such as that to 
obtain the oil sands.
855 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General comment no. 21, Right o f  
everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para, la  o f  the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), 21 December 2009, E/C.12/GC/21
57 Such an interpretation would conform with the View o f the Human Rights Committee in the communication
of: Poma Poma (n271)
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the individual complaints mechanism for the ICESCR,858 is problematic. However, the likely 
approach to be adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can be 
inferred from two texts.
The first is the 23rd General Comment of the Human Rights Committee859 in relation 
to Article 27 of the ICCPR860 which is itself concerned with the protection of culturally 
idiosyncratic groups within States, and has been the subject of individual complaints.861 The 
text firstly affirms the link between cultural practice and natural resources, stating that the 
ability, ‘to enjoy a particular culture - may consist in a way of life which is closely associated 
with territory and use of its resources.’862 The Committee also suggests the link crucial to this 
aspect of the thesis in particular, the link between the ability to express culture through 
traditional practice and the very continued existence of that culture. Specifically the 
Comment espouses that;
‘Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in turn on 
the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture.... Accordingly, positive measures by 
States may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its 
members to enjoy and develop their culture ... in community with the other members of the
group.’863
In the context at hand this connection is vital to ensuring that the Canadian State and its 
organs are required to consider the impacts upon indigenous practices in decisions regarding
858 The optional protocol establishing the mechanism entered in to force in May 2013 having received the 
required number o f ratifications to do so. OP-ICESCR (n644)
859 Governing the sister covenant o f the text at hand, the ICCPR and created by the text o f that Covenant.
860 ICCPR (nl76). Art. 27
861 Most notably: Poma Poma (n 271 ), Lubicon (n729) and Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, 
Communication No. 547/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000)
862 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights o f  Minorities), 8 
April 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5 para. 3.2
63 ibid. para.  6.2
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tar sands projects. Although not affording protection of the broad nature described above, this 
affords protection beyond that of the narrow conception of the prohibition of absolute barriers 
to practice regardless of its potential for success.
The second text is General Comment 9 of the Committee on Economic, Social and
864Cultural Rights concerning the domestic implementation of the Covenant it was created to 
uphold. Although providing a broad insight into the Committee’s position with regards to the 
domestic application of the Covenant generally, paragraphs 5 and 9 are of particular 
relevance to the piece. Paragraph 5 indicates that judgements as to whether the actions of the 
State are in conformity with the obligations placed upon it by the Covenant will be based
O Z C
upon whether the means used are, ‘consistent with the full discharge of its obligations.’ 
Paragraph 9 adds that this discharge of obligations, and the defence against breaches arising
from a failure to do so, should be achieved in part by ensuring, ‘that all administrative
866authorities will take account of the requirements of the Covenant in their decision-making. ’
In relation to Article 15 of the ICESCR therefore there is a clear indication that the 
‘middle ground’ discussed above would be the most appropriate way of meeting the 
expectations placed upon States by the Committee with regards to the fulfilment of 
obligations via application in administrative decisions. The assessment of the severity of the 
potential and actual impact of environmental affects upon traditional practices could be 
accurately ascertained by the various administrative bodies involved in licensing tar sands 
projects. Such an approach would clearly ensure the fulfilment of State obligations to not 
inhibit the ability of the individual to take part in cultural life under Article 15. This approach
864 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9. The domestic 
application o f  the Covenant, 3 December 1998, E/C. 12/1998/24
865 ibid. para 5
866 ibid. para 9
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would also meet with the demands placed upon the protection of this right by the clear 
connection to minority group survival considerations which individual cultural rights entail as 
identified by the Human Rights Committee in relation to Article 27 of the ICCPR.867
The assessment of environmental impacts upon features of cultural significance could 
be made on the basis of ensuring traditional practices able to sustain a culturally bound 
community in proximity to the impact. Such an assessment could be made based upon the 
presumption that a connection between the complainant individual (and their community, or 
in this case First Nation)868 and the specific environmental feature, the foundations of which 
were to be found in a traditional practice, had been established. As a result a mechanism 
ensuring the protection of culturally significant environmental features could be established, 
which would give effect to both Article 15 and other international human rights provisions. 
This would give effect to the recognition of a connection between environmental features and 
traditional practices recognised by various international bodies, and as a result ensure the 
protection of fundamental human rights in respect of the First Nations of Alberta and their 
very survival as a culturally distinct group.
The significance of this recognition is easily illustrated. Without it, the right to pursue 
the gaining of a livelihood869 would offer less protection to the traditional caribou hunting 
practices of some tribes owing to its non-essential nature in respect of providing sustenance. 
The fact that the protection of this practice can be viewed as ensuring also the ability of that 
individual, his family and indeed other members of his tribe to continue to take part in
867 This has been communicated in the View regarding Poma Poma (n 271), and a general comment concerning 
Article 27: General Comment 23 (n837)
868 Note should be made that despite the communication procedure being a right for an individual o f a State 
party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR to uphold, the Committee has allowed an individual to 
represent an identifiable group who they can both be agreed to represent and which can be clearly identified.
This was held as the case for Bernard Ominayak in: Lubicon (n729)
869 CCRF (n l74) s. 6 (2) (b)
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cultural life however adds significant weight to any contention that this practice ought to be 
protected through the auspices of the prima facie narrow domestic provision. This link 
between the distinctive elements of indigenous cultures and the protections afforded within 
the domestic legal system of Canada to all its citizens in effect modifies those rights to 
include those elements in respect of the indigenous peoples. Thus the right to gain a 
livelihood becomes the right to gain a culturally relevant livelihood, regardless of its merit 
and economic validity in the eyes of the majority of Canadian society outside that culture. 
Rights applicable to all Canadians being applied to the specific context of the indigenous 
cultures of the First Nations is fundamental to the success of any proposed case against the 
adverse environmental impacts of the tar sands extraction projects. The likelihood of this 
approach being adopted in practice is undeniably significantly improved by the reading of 
domestic human rights provisions in light of Article 15 of the ICESCR.870
5.6 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The ICCPR and ICESCR undeniably represent the two most influential and 
noteworthy legally binding texts relating to human rights law in the international sphere. 
Indeed Shelton asserts that the creation of the covenants and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,871 was the beginning of modern human 
rights law stating that codification of the law in this regard in the three texts, ‘resulted in a 
vast body of international human rights law.’872 However there are a plethora of binding and 
non-binding legal texts which also might provide both interpretative and enforceable aspects 
to challenges to the contentious developments with which the thesis is concerned. The United
870 ICESCR (n254) Art. 15
871 International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res 2106 (xx) 
U.N.T.S. vol. 660 p .195 (21 Dec. 1965) entered into force 4 Jan. 1969.
“ Shelton, D. Remedies in International Human Rights Law (O xfo rd  U n iv e is i ty  Pi ess, O x fo id ,  2 0 0 6 )  8
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Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples873 (DRIP) is the most relevant and 
valuable of these in relation the preparation of a case against permitting of the tar sands 
developments and their effects upon the indigenous peoples of Alberta. The text contains 
many similar rights to those contained within the UDHR and the twin covenants discussed 
above, and even the domestic provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
most obvious example of this is in the drafting of the article relating to the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person which is almost indistinguishable.874
In a general sense the declaration also affords the right which the piece is focused 
upon, securing the ability of the indigenous peoples of Alberta to, ‘freely pursue 
their...cultural development,’ 875 in a manner consistent with their traditional practices. 
Beyond these rights common to the texts considered by the piece however the Declaration 
contains a number of rights which are of significance to the aim of the piece, namely the 
construction of a case against the governmental approval of tar sands extraction projects 
rooted in human rights law. Note should be made that the rights afforded under the 
declaration are not enforceable directly by the indigenous populous of Alberta, either in the 
domestic courts of Canada, or any international judicial body owing to its non-binding nature. 
However, its interpretative influence is significant and numerous precedents exist suggesting 
the willingness of the domestic Canadian courts, the Inter-American Commission and the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee to consider the provisions of this and other
876declarations and apply binding rights in line with the principles they espouse. The
8/j DRIP (n39)
874 DRIP (n39) Art. 7 and CCRF (n l74) s. 7.
875 DRIP (n39) Art. 3
876 Baker (n l70) para.71, Saramaka (n458) and UNHCR ‘Concluding Observations on Congo’s Initial Ninth
R eports  on Im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  the  I C E R D ’ (23 M a rch  2 0 0 9 )  U N  D oc C E R D /C /C O G /C O /9  at 8.
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declaration has even been said to assert and support existing customary international law,**77 
though this is itself a contested interpretation, 878 and therefore not one which would be 
worthy of inclusion in a case brief submitted to a judicial authority. The interpretative 
significance of the declaration is however apparent, and backed by precedent in all of the 
levels of legal enforcement available to the First Nations of Alberta.879 Thus to disregard 
completely its relevance to the impacts of the tar sands on the grounds of direct applicability 
would be remiss.880
Despite initial resilience to the declaration, preferring instead the domestic law of 
Canada for dealing with the rights of its indigenous peoples, the Canadian executive gave its 
approval of the text of the declaration in November 2010. The text was endorsed shortly 
following a statement that it was, ‘unworkable in a Western democracy under a constitutional 
government,’ and that in relation to Canada specifically it was, ‘inconsistent with our
• • R R 1constitution’ by the then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Chuck 
Strahl. The argument of the state had essentially followed the principle of subsidiarity,882 in 
that domestic legal provisions were the most appropriate and effective to deal with 
indigenous legal rights issues of Canada, an approach which was maintained for some four 
years until the eventual endorsement of the text. As a result of this acquiescence, the 
declaration can be used as an interpretative tool in relation to binding legal obligations on the
877 Anaya, J.S. The Right o f  Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era in Charters, 
C. and Stavenhagen, R. (eds.) Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights o f  
Indigneous Peoples (International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs,2009) 184
878 Xanthaki, A. ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments' 
(2009) 10 Melbourne Journal o f International Law 27, 36
R7Q
Baker (n 170) para. 71
880 See in relation to the significance o f the Declaration in spite o f its non-binding nature: Dorough, S. The 
Significance o f  the Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples and Its Future Implementation in Charters, 
C. and Stavenhagen, R. (eds.) Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights o f  
Indigneous Peoples (International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs,2009) 264
881 Canwest News Service. ‘Native rights declaration inconsistent with legal tradition: Strahl’ (2007)
<http://www.canada.com /nationalpost/news/story.htm l?id=23df9769-3423-4f43-b828-
a755725c2719&k=23677> Accessed 30th July 2014.
82 The argument o f the Canadian government was that domestic legislation afforded more appropriate 
pro tec tions to the  in d ig e n o u s  p e o p le s  o f  C a n ad a  than the  Declarat ion .
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Canadian state, despite not being of itself binding. This position was declared in a speech by 
the Governor General of Canada, 883 in which he stated Canada was to, ‘endorse this 
aspirational document in a manner fully consistent with Canada’s Constitution and laws.’884
The contentious nature of the endorsement of the declaration by Canada, along with a 
number of other major developed States,885 could potentially plague the applicability of the 
text within the domestic court structure of Canada and its provinces. The major concern in 
relation to the applicability of the text therefore is simply its untested nature to date. As such 
the text is again of use primarily as an interpretative aid to more narrowly drafted domestic 
provisions. As Ward suggests, ‘the idea behind a Declaration and other non-binding 
instruments is that they create norms that can guide the behaviour of States,’ and has been, 
‘referred to as an international standard.’ 886 Examples of such applications are however
, 007
infrequent, and thus the text is also to be considered in its role in adding weight to 
contentions of breaches of binding rights placing obligations on the Canadian state. The 
declaration therefore represents a potential source of interpretation by virtue of it embodying 
a piece of soft international law, which the Canadian Supreme Court has accepted as 
potentially possessing such gravitas in respect of both domestic and international legal 
obligations of the state.888 This is supported by the acceptance of the text by the Canadian
883 The representative o f  Queen Elizabeth II, the Official Head o f State o f Canada according to the Canadian 
Constitution.
884 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada Canada’s Statement o f  Support on the Unied Nations 
Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples (2010) < http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142> Accessed 30th July 2014
885 The United States o f America, Australia and New Zealand in particular were also vehemently opposed to the 
Declaration.
886 Ward (n698)
887 Ward suggests that this was the case in the Maya Indigenous Communities (n464) but this was only 
following considerable assertion on the part o f regional and international authorities. In Canada specifically 
Baker (n l70) para. 71 remains the seminal instance o f this approach to non-binding texts being utilised as 
interpretatively significant.
888 Baker v. Canada (M in i s te r  of C itizen sh ip  and Im m igra t ion ) ,  [1999] 2 S C R  817 para.  71
259
executive itself following the acquiescence to its core principles declared during the period 
leading up to and within its eventual endorsement of the text.
The drafting of the text places the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as 
the most utilisable sources of non-binding or ‘soft’ international law with respect to the 
proposed challenge to the licensing of tar sands developments. The specificity of provisions 
to the effects resulting from the tar sands developments in Alberta, and further in relation to 
the unique nature of indigenous peoples and their cultures in comparison to broader human 
rights provisions ensures that the declaration becomes inimitable in its utility to the proposed 
case. The aforementioned acceptance of the declaration as ‘fully consistent’ with Canadian 
law by the executive of the state precludes many arguments against interpretation of that law 
in light of the provisions of the Declaration. This has the effect of further elevating its utility 
in respect of any case concerning its objects, but especially with regard to the subject of the 
thesis. The inclusion of the text in this manner allows a more expansive interpretation of 
binding obligations on the Canadian state with which the piece is concerned than might 
otherwise have been possible.
5.61 Article 8 
Destruction of Culture
A number of provisions within the text afford incomparably specific rights and duties, 
not found in broader legally binding texts. These texts can now be interpreted in light of the 
declaration however, and thus are of great consequence to the province s indigenous 
inhabitants. Article 8 of the declaration for example concerns the, forced assimilation or
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destruction of ... culture, including, according to the elaborative subsections, ‘Any action 
which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their 
cultural values or ethnic identities.’890 The role of native fauna, such as caribou within the 
culture of the Indians of north-eastern Alberta, where tar sands developments are at their 
most intense and destructive, is integral to the maintenance of the distinction between it and 
other indigenous and non-indigenous cultures present in the province.
Matsui, in his discussion of the historic development of water rights in the regions 
now subject to tar sands industry expansion illustrates the fundamentally opposed approaches 
to natural resource utilisation which once characterised the conflict between indigenous 
peoples and the majority population. He suggests that in, ‘establishing...an agrarian society 
depended largely on effective exploitation of natural resources...by curtailing the power of 
indigenous peoples over their territories.’891 Thus, the key distinction between the cultures 
became the central point of opposition between communities with opposing cultural values. 
Historically this resulted in conflict, now it is protected as there has been a, ‘shift away from 
a global culture of assimilation.’892 This shift is embodied by the creation of texts such as the 
DRIP, which Manus suggests, ‘asserts the interconnectedness of indigenous cultural survival 
and environmental rights.’893 By continuing to utilise caribou as a source of food and clothing 
(despite it no longer commonly embodying the main element of the diet of a group) and using 
it in cultural ceremonies and practices, the First Nations of Alberta have chosen to preserve 
and distinguish their social group from those found throughout the rest of the province.
DRIP (n39) Art 8
890 DRIP (n39) Art 8 (2)(a)
891 Matsui, K. Native Peoples and Water Rights: Irrigation, Dams, and the Law in Western Canada (McGill- 
Queens University Press, Montreal,2009) 140
892 Manus, P. ‘Sovereignty, Self Determination, and Environment Based Cultures. The Emerging Voice of 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law.’ (2000) 23(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 553, 614
89j ibid. 603
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The aforementioned effects of the tar sands developments upon caribou numbers, 
migratory and feeding patterns and ranges impact heavily on the ability of the First Nations to 
hunt these animals in pursuit of cultural expression and preservation. The extraction of the 
tar sands material for the production of synthetic crude oil does not directly inhibit the 
participation in culture of individuals or the expression thereof. However, the influence felt 
by the caribou in turn have the equivalent, ‘effect of depriving them of their integrity as 
distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities.’894 In this respect the drafting 
of the provisions of the declaration coupled with a number of seminal applications of the text, 
represent, ‘authoritative interpretations of the substantive provisions.’ 895 As such they 
eliminate the need for significant and baseless interpretative steps to be made on the part of a 
judicial body considering a case against tar sands developments based on binding legal 
principles.
The narrower construction of binding legal norms such as those of the ICCPR, 
ICESCR, and the CCRF, protect only the right to cultural freedom. The aspects comprising 
cultural practices are not expressly protected, merely the freedom to perform them. Manus for 
example highlights the failings of the ICESCR in this regard stating that it does not, ‘address 
means through which traditional territories or natural resources may be preserved or protected 
for an indigenous peoples’ use.’896 As such they may not entitle First Nations to argue for the 
protection of the boreal woodland caribou of Alberta by virtue of it representing a 
fundamental element of their culture. This is in spite of the fact that their right to hunt caribou 
in the regions affected has been protected with constitutional strength under the provisions of
894 DRIP (n39) Art 8 (2)(a)
895 Kambel references in particular the Suriname decisions in the HRC, IACHR and CERD. Kambel, E-R. The 
Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples and Maroons in Suriname (International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, 
1999)153.
896 Manus, P. ‘Sovereignty, Self Determination, and Environment Based Cultures. The Emerging Voice of 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law.’ (2000) 23(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 55j , 580
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the numbered treaties, and specifically in Alberta, Treaties 8 and 6.897 A note should be made 
that this constitutional protection was limited severely by the Natural Resources Transfer 
Agreements898 given constitutional force themselves in 1930.8"  The agreements removed any 
commercial element of the rights afforded under the numbered treaties and replaced them 
with broad rights to hunt, trap and fish for the purposes of securing food on which the focus 
has been placed by the piece.900
The DRIP offers an indirect causal link between the effects on the native flora and 
fauna of significance, such as boreal woodland caribou and the resulting threat to the culture 
of the indigenous peoples of Alberta. The judgement of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights stated this connection clearly, referring to both binding legal texts and the Declaration 
and asserting that, ‘by violating the rights of a community to continue to subsist... a number 
of basic human rights are violated...[including the right] to survival.’901 Applied to the 
provisions of binding human rights instruments the rights would potentially be enforceable 
against the national and provincial authorities of Canada. This would however require 
considerably broad judicial interpretation, thus leaving the success or failure of the argument 
resting on the judgment of the existence of such a link. Whilst circumstances such as Poma 
Poma v Peru902 have suggested that such a link is not beyond the interpretative breadth 
afforded to such rights,903 focus has been placed upon economic activities, or the protection 
of particular tracts of land, as was the case in the Lubicon Lake Cree action.904
897
Constitution Act (n200) s.35
898 Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (Memorandum) 1930
899 Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982. 1982, c. 11. s.35
900 Baker (n l70) para. 71




903 Specifically in the Poma Poma case focus was placed upon Art. 27 o f the ICCPR instead o f Art. 1(2) under 
which the communication was submitted to the Committee.
904 Note should be made that the Lubicon Lake Cree action remains unresolved owing to the concessions made 
to the  fo rm  o f  m it ig a t io n  and  se t t lem en t  be ing  left to the parties to agree. Lubicon (n729)
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Neither o f these factors is of concern in the present case, which focuses upon peoples 
already granted reserve land,905 whose hunting is not undertaken for economic gain, and 
indeed would not be protected under Canadian law if it was.906 Article 8 of the DRIP 
provides a considerable interpretative stepping stone in relation to legal instruments with 
binding effect on the Canadian state and organs thereof, which could not otherwise be relied 
upon. Specifically it affords protection from the ‘forced assimilation or destruction of culture, 
or actions which might result therein. The omission of this interpretative insight would as 
such leave any potential case pivoting on a subjective decision concerning otherwise indirect 
links to flora and fauna.
With respect to the particular role of the boreal woodland caribou within the culture of 
the indigenous peoples of Alberta affected by the tar sands developments, the provisions of 
the DRIP also expand upon the protection potentially afforded by Article 8 outlined above. 
The provisions iterate that, ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalise their 
cultural traditions and customs,’907 a right which, ‘includes the right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures.’908 The use of caribou for 
a number of purposes, which persists despite the availability of more effective and readily 
available alternatives, alludes to the animal being of great significance as a continuing 
expression of the culture of indigenous Albertans and vital to its preservation. The 
significance of the caribou is therefore inherently linked to the notion of intergenerational
905 This was not the case for the Lubicon Lake Cree whose case also concerned their recognition as Indians 
within the Canadian legal system.
906 Owing to the restrictions placed upon the use o f natural resources on reserve lands under the Constitution 
Acts, 1867 to 1982. 1982, c.l 1. s.35 which codified the Natural Resource Trade Agreements and which were 
confirmed to relate only to the sourcing o f  food for the peoples for whom the land was reserved in the case o f  
Badger (n269).
907 DRIP (n39) Art 8
9 0 8 . , . ,  .
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equity,909 which as Judge Weeramantry stated in the International Court of Justice, ‘is an 
important and rapidly developing principle of contemporary environmental law.’910 As such 
to ignore the consequences of reduced caribou numbers beyond immediate and universal 
notions of the species as an aspect of subsistence would fundamentally undermine principles 
of both human rights law and environmental law. Whilst this connection is not strictly 
binding in nature, the consistent conflagration of the principles intimates the willingness of 
judicial bodies to consider it in practice.911
Article 8 of the Declaration also has particular relevance to the impacts of the tailings 
ponds upon the First Nations and their ability to express their culture. The provision requires 
as discussed that States do not subject indigenous peoples, ‘to forced assimilation or 
destruction of their culture.’912 The impacts felt by the First Nations would undoubtedly be 
‘acts which states must prevent or provide redress [for] when they fail to prevent,’913 which 
under the Article include, ‘dispossession of land, territories or resources.’914 The adverse 
effects of the tailings ponds outlined previously, including land use, disturbance to the 
inimitable flora and fauna of the boreal forest ecosystem, contaminant seepage and the issues 
surrounding reclamation of the ponds, might necessitate either an alteration or abandonment 
of indigenous cultural practices if unchecked. This might take the form of a geographical 
relocation from an area, with the added consequence of potentially foregoing the
909 ‘The principle o f intergenerational equity implies that the present generation owes a duty to future 
generations to leave earth and its environment in no worse a condition than when they received it.’ Tladi, D. 
Sustainable Development in International Law: An Analysis o f  Key Enviro-Economic Instruments (Pretoria 
University Law Press, 2007) 41
910 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253, 341
911 See in this regard: Weiss,E.B. In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony 
and Intergenerational Equity (Transnational Publishers, United Nations University, 1989)
912 DRIP (n39) Art. 8 (1 )
13 Vrdoljak, A.F. Reparation fo r  Cultural Loss in Lenzerini, F. (ed.) Reparations fo r  Indigenous Peoples. 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), 208
914 ibid. 208
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constitutionally protected rights afforded under the numbered treaties 915 which are 
inextricably linked to defined tracts of land. Relocation would therefore not only create 
difficulties with regard to readjustment to a new habitat, even if the features of the ecosystem 
were identical to those abandoned, but also result in the sacrifice of domestic rights 
negotiated to ensure the continuation of the First Nations peoples and their culture.
Another solution would be to alter practice, relinquish cultural practices linked to the 
boreal forest ecosystem, and instead pursue an existence more akin to that of the non- 
indigenous populous of the region. Such a choice has been made by a number of First 
Nations tribes whose lands either were not protected by the numbered treaties, or opted to 
ensure the continuation of their communities, even if it was not within the traditional cultural 
mould.916 Often the surrender of rights over lands is made in return for assurances from 
companies and authorities with regards to levels of employment in the extractive industries 
for members of their communities. Decisions and arrangements of this nature would 
undeniably not be made were the extractive industries not altering the native environment and 
features thereof with their operations. Thus a valid contention emerges that the relevant 
authorities of Alberta and Canada failed to, ‘provide effective mechanisms for the prevention 
of, and redress for... action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing [indigenous peoples]
917of their lands, territories or resources.’
915 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
916 Anderson (n347) 97-128
917 DRIP (n39) Arts. 8 (2) and 8 (2) (b)
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5.62 Article 20
Traditional Means of Subsistence and Development
Article 20 of the DRIP appears to mirror provisions provided in other texts to which 
Canada is subject, and concerns the right of peoples to the ‘enjoyment of ... means of 
subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and economic
• • •  918 • • •activities.’ This provision, or a highly similar drafting thereof, is common to all the 
international documents considered thus far under the auspices of self-determination.919 The 
article also highlights arguably one of the most significant hurdles over which the contentions 
of the piece must overcome. A broad range of elements common to indigenous cultures 
across the world, such as specific means of subsistence, the development of political, 
economic and social mechanisms, and free engagement in traditional activities are all to be 
protected by state parties to the Declaration under the article. The drafting of the provisions is 
however the area of concern, specifically with regard to the implied limitation it imposes. 
This is as it arguably undermines its utility to a significant enough degree in relation to the 
aim of the piece as to make its inclusion as an interpretative aid indefensible.
Firstly it should be noted that the focus of the piece is on the impact of environmental 
damage on the expression and existence of the culture of First Nations peoples. As such 
issues surrounding the maintenance and development of institutions protected as a right under 
Article 20 is not the concern of the piece and will not be considered beyond any ramifications 
in relation to participatory rights. As the numbered treaties920 establishing reserved lands, and
DRIP (n39) Art 20
919 Note should be made that, as has been discussed, the application o f the principle o f s e lf—determination in 
practice has been consistently avoided by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and especially by the UNHRC as it 
was in Poma Poma (n271) and Lubicon (n729)
"° Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
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921the Indian Act outline the recognised indigenous peoples, and the representatives thereof in 
their texts this aspect of the provision can be disregarded for the purposes of the thesis also. 
Similarly the right to ‘engage freely in all...traditional and other economic activities,’922 is of 
potentially limited utility dependent upon its application.
The notion of ‘free engagement’ if narrowly interpreted would require only non­
interference on the part of the state parties subject to the Declaration, as opposed to any 
positive obligation to support or promote engagement in culturally expressive practices. 
Indeed the ability to exist and express culture, ‘which includes a wide range of activities free 
from state interference,’923 is a key addition of the DRIP to international debates on the role 
of indigenous peoples within the broader framework of international law according to Abate 
and Kronk. Whilst the principle of the freedom to engage in one’s culture of choice is an 
admirable one, the obligation only not to interfere with this freedom affords less protection in 
reality. Direct actions inhibiting cultural expression, whether administrative or legislative are 
clearly forbidden if the state wishes to comply with this article. However, indirect impacts on 
the ability of indigenous peoples, or any person wishing to express a minority culture, are not 
overtly declared as incongruent with the provision.
The tailings ponds formed of by-products from the tar sands extraction projects are an 
illustrative example of the potential flaw highlighted above. Whilst the ponds are not directly 
restricting the ability of the First Nations peoples of the regions in proximity to them from 
expressing their culture, their impacts on the surrounding ecosystem have inhibitory effects.
921 Indian Act R.S., 1985,c.I-5
922 DRIP (n39) Alt. 20
923 Kebec, P. REDD+: Climate Justice o f  a New Face o f  Manifest Destiny Lessons Drawn From the Indigenous 
Struggle to Resist Colonisation o f  Ojibwe Forests in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in Abate, R.S. and 
Kronk, E.A. (eds.) Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples The Search for Legal Remedies (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013) 184
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By way of illustration, the relocation or culling of boreal woodland caribou to facilitate the 
construction of an extraction project would be held to be a clear breach of this right and those 
binding obligations with which it shares clear interpretative links.924 As boreal woodland 
caribou are however a migratory species such an action would not be necessary. The resultant 
effect upon the indigenous populous of the surrounding area would however be identical to 
that which is currently occurring it is suggested. Tailings ponds reduce the prevalence of 
caribou in proximal habitat both due to disturbing natural camouflage and cover, as well as 
reducing the occurrence of their preferred food sources. Potential pollution of the water table 
in the immediate vicinity o f the ponds owing to seepage of the materials contained therein, 
would arguably through bioaccumulation in the flora of the ecosystem have subsequent 
detrimental impacts upon larger fauna such as caribou. Whilst other rights discussed in the 
piece would arguably be breached by the secondary effects of the tar sands upon the First 
Nations of Alberta, the ‘free engagement’ in cultural practices is clearly not directly inhibited 
by the creation of tailings ponds.
A clear comparator here is the Lubicon Lake Cree action before the Human Rights 
Committee. Whilst the Committee delivered a View supporting the contention that the right 
to enjoy their own culture had been breached by the presence of industrial oil projects, it was 
reserved in elaborating what exactly had caused said breach. The Committee did not oppose 
the Canadian State’s argument that the Daishowa pulp mill did not pose any ‘serious adverse 
consequences, pointing out that the pulp mill, located about 80 kilometres away from the land 
set aside for the reserve, is not within the Band's claimed traditional territory.’ Indeed Mr. 
Nisuke Ando in his individual opinion suggested that Article 27 of the ICCPR was not the
924 The natural behaviour o f caribou and the approaches tailings pond construction process make such a 
suggestion almost farcical and its suggestion is merely by way o f illustration o f a potential issue o f drafting in 
relation to the case study on which the piece focuses.
925 Lubicon (n729) at 29.11
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appropriate provisions to couch the claim under at all, noting his, ‘reservation to the 
categorical statement that recent developments have threatened the life of the Lubicon Lake 
Band and constitute a violation of article 27.’926 His comments were based on the need to 
protect economic development and would intimate that only the expropriation of land 
altogether, the primary concern of the contest, should be held as inhibiting the enjoyment of 
culture. This individual opinion coupled with the sparse single paragraph on the violation 
which had occurred927 indicate a reticence to connect secondary or particular impacts to 
fundamental breaches, and instead a desire to suggest overall disapproval with a particular 
project or projects and their administration. Certainly in this instance land expropriation, thus 
preventing any expression of culture linked to land whatsoever, was evidently the primary 
concern of the Committee.
The right provided under Article 20 of the DRIP would appear to mirror this approach 
prohibiting only direct inhibitions. From its drafting, the Article is clearly intended to operate 
in a manner akin to rights protecting against discrimination,928 as a non-specific obligation 
not to act, rather than a more focused positive duty to prevent or promote.929 For the purposes 
of the construction of a case against the Canadian authorities for their licensing and 
permitting of projects which necessitate tailings ponds therefore, the provisions of Article 20 
are rendered ineffective. With no direct restriction on cultural practice resulting from the 
tailings ponds, only consequential impacts, the utility of Article 20 is reduced too greatly to 
warrant its inclusion as an element of the suggested action. This assertion is based upon the 
lack of consideration of the Committee in Lubicon of the non-proximal Daishowa pulp mill
926 ibid. Appendix 1
927 The paragraph outlined only historical inequities between the parties.
928 DRIP (n39) Art. 9
929 For examples o f  such positive obligations see Arts. 11(2), 14 (3) and 19 o f the same declaiation (ibid.)
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and its impacts on the indigenous populace, 930 which is indicative of only direct inhibitions 
giving rise to breaches. Such an approach would exclude all but the most poorly placed tar 
sands extraction projects from being challenged, which is not the aim of the piece. Similarly 
such an approach would not reflect the broad range of impacts that the industry has upon the 
First Nations resident in the regions exploited.
In relation to impacts to boreal woodland caribou habitat and those resulting from 
excessive water consumption, a direct inhibition of free engagement would be necessary to 
suggest a breach had occurred. With the exception of fishing by traditional methods,931 no 
direct inhibition of engagement in traditional activities has occurred as a result of extraction 
projects. Establishing links between industrial projects permitted by governmental authorities 
and direct inhibitions on the ability to engage in such practices is extremely difficult. By way 
of example successful actions involving similar impacts and which have referenced the DRIP 
have been based upon actions which absolutely prevent cultural activities, rather than 
inhibiting their efficacy. The Poma Poma932 action which prevented indigenous peoples from 
farming llamas by traditional methods as grazing lands and water sources were decimated; 
the Awas Tingni933 case where logging concessions levelled forest utilised for hunting, 
gathering and sourcing building and crafts materials; and the Saramaka934 case before the 
IACHR which in the court suggested that concessions to mining and logging industries 
threatened, ‘their survival as a tribal people,’935 are illustrative of the degree of impact upon 
engagement necessary to induce to a successful claim.
Lubicon (n729)
931 Note the scarcity o f  this practice and difficulties highlighted throughout in establishing the impacts o f water 
consumption upon fish spawning data.
932 Poma Poma  (n271)
933 Awas Tingni (n475)
934 Saramaka (n458)
935 ibid. para 129
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Whilst these cases did consider impacts having an equivalent effect to inhibiting free 
engagement, the cases were not based on suggestions of direct inhibitions to which there is no 
administrative redress the likes of which Article 20 prohibits. Instead they focused upon lack 
of participation, traditional conceptions of property rights, and the very survival of the 
peoples concerned. Prima facie therefore Article 20 is of use in relation to the restrictions 
upon free engagement in cultural activities which the impacts of the tar sands rise to. 
However, the inability to prove an absolute inhibition upon said engagement severely 
restricts its utility in relation to the aim of the piece in light of established jurisprudence.
5.63 Article 29 
Productive Capacity of Lands
The DRIP as discussed expands upon the broad and often unelaborated rights afforded 
by treaty texts which have frequently been interpreted narrowly, without reference to 
indigenous peoples specifically, and sometimes not at all in relation to individual claims in 
the international sphere.936 Charters describes the text as, ‘the most progressive of 
international instruments dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights,’ highlighting that its 
creation is a, ‘response to the international legal system’s long-standing neglect of indigenous 
peoples.’937 This is achieved by providing the security of the elements which compose 
indigenous cultures as well as the cultures themselves, and Article 29 provides a clear 
example of this. The provision offers a considerable addition to the argument that the impacts 
of tar sands projects breach the established rights of the indigenous peoples of Alberta by 
adversely affecting the environment to which their culture is inextricably linked. Article 29
936 Common Article 1 being exempt from the individual complaints procedure concerning the ICCPR and that 
now in force for the ICESCR established by optional protocols to the twin covenants.
937 Charters, C. Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: Global International Instruments and Institutions in 
Lenzerini, F. (n913) ,168
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iterates that, ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to conservation and protection of the 
environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources.’938
Article 29 provides an avenue through which a domestic judiciary might consider a 
broad range of effects upon the environment and productive capacity of lands of indigenous 
peoples in relation to legally binding provisions present in texts to which the Canadian state 
is party. Such provisions internationally rarely provide explicit rights concerning the 
environment in a broad conception. Instead said protection concerns more specific instances, 
for example a safe environment in which to undertake work939 as has already been considered 
within the domestic, regional and international legal spheres. Such an environment is not 
necessitated as being relative to specific needs, merely to be safe and fit for purpose.940 As 
such the interpretative opportunity provided by the provision is of some significance in a 
broader context beyond that considered by the thesis and even indigenous peoples generally. 
This aside however, its significance is also immeasurable in relation to the context of the tar 
sands specifically.
With reference to the preservation of the boreal woodland caribou as an element of 
the culture of the First Nations, the protection afforded by the article is arguably the most 
pertinent of any in the declaration, and indeed all of the international legal instruments 
considered. Similarly the ability to fish, where still practiced using traditional methods, and 
source water from natural courses, as well as the secondary impacts low flow levels or quality 
of water would have upon the wider ecosystem are encompassed by the drafting of the article. 
Preserving, ‘the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the
938 DRIP (n39) Art. 29
939 „  '  '
For example: ICESCR (n254) Art. 7.
940 Menghistu, F. The Satisfaction o f  Survival Requirements in Ramcharan, B.G. (ed.) The Right to Life in
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985) 64
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productive capacity of their lands,’941 the article provides what might be perceived as an all 
encompassing solution to the damage the tar sands are wreaking upon Alberta. Leib’s 
description of the article illustrates this clearly in asserting that as a result of the drafting of 
this provision and reading in line with the other articles of the declaration, ‘states are 
obligated to give legal recognition and protection to these lands and resources according to 
the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.’942 
However, as has been discussed, the provision can only be used in an interpretative capacity 
and merely obligates, but does not necessitate state action.
The ‘conservation ... o f ... the productive capacity’ of the land reserved for the Indians 
under the numbered treaties, would undeniably include the preservation of the suitability of 
that land to support the culturally significant species native to it. State parties to the 
declaration are required to, ‘establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous 
peoples for such conservation and protection.’943 In the case of the boreal woodland caribou 
this would entail ceasing or at least limiting disturbances to the ecosystem they inhabit. With 
reference to water quality and quantity, the right would require the maintenance of flow 
levels and pollutants which did not interfere with the ability to source culturally relative 
materials from the environment. Gilbert in this regard connects the provision of Article 29 to 
the comments of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 944 which 
highlighted that, ‘Indigenous peoples’ access to water resources on their ancestral lands is 
protected from encroachment and unlawful pollution.’945 Plans to restore land disturbed by
941 DRIP (n39) Art. 29
942 Leib, L.H. Human Rights and the Environment: Philosophical, Theoretical and Legal Perspectives (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordecht, 2011) 150
Qd.7
DRIP (n39) Art. 29
944 Gilbert, J. Indigenous P eop les' Land Rights Under International Law: From Victims to Actors 
(Transnational Publishing, Ardsley, 2006) 124
945 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The Right to Water (Twenty- 
ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2002/11 (2002) para 1(1)
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the tar sands developments have been proposed by oil companies and the Canadian executive 
alike,946 as have measures proposed to reduce the impact felt by the indigenous wildlife and 
the consumption of water in the regions affected. The commitment to reaping the economic 
benefits of extraction remains undeterred however, and caribou numbers, flow levels and 
water quality continue to fall in flagrant breach of the principles outlined above.
The article also considers the effects of hazardous materials deposited on the land of 
indigenous peoples as a result of the exploitation of natural resources situated within them. 
This is of obvious relevance to the discussion regarding the impacts of the tailings ponds, 
which is focused upon the potential seepage of materials, or aspects thereof, into the 
ecosystem in which they are situated, and the controversy surrounding their reclamation. 
However, the impacts to which they contribute are more widespread than simply 
contamination and failed reclamation. For example, many of the impacts which adversely 
affect boreal woodland caribou and are caused by reduced water levels directly in the north 
east of Alberta can also be attributed, wholly or in part, to the creation and management of 
tailings ponds which are composed of, amongst other materials, vast quantities of water.
The combination of the varied effects of their physical presence and the potential 
contamination they might cause allows for the consideration of a variety of legal provisions 
applicable to the impacts upon those most susceptible to tailings ponds. The overall aim of 
such a varied approach would be to promote a progression towards either the abandonment of 
their use or technological, scientific and administrative steps towards eliminating or 
significantly reducing the aforementioned impacts. This however is unlikely to come to
946 See for the example the work o f Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (previously the Oil Sands Tailing 
Consortium), a body comprised seven companies, which have opted to share technology and resources on the 
management o f tailings in order to ensure continuing improvements in their storage, disposal and reclamation.
See: Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance <http://www.cosia.ca/> Accessed j O July 2014.
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fruition and abate the concerns of the First Nations affected in the short term, and as such 
focus is largely upon the granting of participatory rights to curb the immediate use of this 
form of waste storage. In this regard, the recognition of the need to, as a minimum, consult947 
indigenous peoples affected by the storage of such materials under Article 29 is of particular 
significance. The provision necessitates the gathering and consideration of information 
regarding adverse impacts as part of the regulatory framework comprising binding legal 
commitments. Canada has itself adopted the aforementioned minimalist approach as is 
evidenced by its comments on the Declaration and specifically Article 29. Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada948 conceded consent may be required where hazardous 
materials were stored on indigenous peoples’ lands directly. However, the universal 
application of the concept to all situations in which storage may give rise to secondary or 
transboundary949 impacts, as in this instance, was said to be, ‘clearly not an appropriate 
standard.’950
The key addition to the binding provisions available within the domestic and 
international legal spheres is the aforementioned concept of the ‘productive capacity’ of the 
land to which the indigenous peoples are entitled. This interpretative addition to the right to 
traditional lands is of use to the contention that all of the impacts of the tar sands projects
947 Whether there exists a right to free, prior and informed consent is the source o f  heated academic debate. See: 
Anton, D.K. and Shelton, D.L. (n696) 431 and Magraw, D and Baker, L. ‘Communities and Human Rights: 
Community Based Property Rights and Prior Informed Consent (2007) 35 Denver Journal o f International Law 
and Policy 413 and by contrast the more supportive assertions o f , Upasana, K. ‘Indigenous Peoples' Right
To Free, Prior, and Informed Consent In The Context Of State-Sponsored Development: The New Standard Set 
By Sarayaku v. Ecuador And Its Potential To Delegitimize The Belo Monte Dam’ (2013) American University 
International Law Review 29(1) 165 and Buppert, T. and McKeehan, A. 'Free, Prior and Informed Consent: 
Empowering Communities for People-Focused Conservation’ (2014) Harvard International Review 35(3) 48. 
However for the purposes o f the piece only the generally accepted demand for consultation will be considered 
owing to the aim o f  creating a viable basis for litigation with a reasonable prospect o f success.
948 The federal government authority responsible for First Nations issues according to the constitutional 
arrangements o f Canada with respect to the division o f federal and provincial responsibilities and jurisdictions.
Internally defined administrative boundaries in this case.
50 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada Canada s Statement o f  Support on the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples (2010) < http://www.aadnc- 
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142> Accessed 30th July 2014
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discussed by the piece are a breach of established rights the Canadian state is obliged to 
respect, protect and fulfil. However, it is of particular utility to the arguments concerning 
available water quantity and quality. Specifically the difficulties with regard to proving the 
secondary impacts of low water flows951 and high contaminant levels in the water courses of 
north east Alberta as a result of extraction projects would arguably be reduced. Normally the 
effect of such projects on the flora and fauna of the region would have to be shown to directly 
inhibit the ability of the First Nations populace to express their culture, or affect their health, 
both high burdens of proof. Should Article 29 of the DRIP952 be read into provisions 
protecting those lands this threshold may be reduced significantly. This would mirror existing 
Canadian approaches to the protection of proprietary rights to First Nations lands, which are 
increased relative to the strength of the title to land.953 In this regard it could be argued that 
reading domestic precedents in line with obligations under Article 29, the stronger the 
connection to the land, the more stringent and precautionary the protection of the ecosystem 
prevalent upon it must also be.
As has been highlighted, at present for damage to breach the rights to land afforded in 
the domestic sphere, the severity of that damage would likely be required to be great, 
irreversible, and reasonably avoidable on the part of the industry and authorities. This is 
especially true as a result of the numbered treaties,954 owing to the protection of the right of 
the government955 to exploit natural resources of those lands. By introducing the concept of 
‘productive capacity’ to those domestic provisions, via interpretation in light of Article 29,
951 RAMP (n226)
952 DRIP (n39) Art. 29
953 In this regard, see; Potes, V. Passelac-Ross, M and Bankes, N. Oil and
Gas Development and the Crown's Duty to Consult: A Critical Analysis o f  Alberta s Consultation and Practice.
(2006) <http://science.ucalgary.ca/iseee/files/iseee/14-oil-and-gas-development-and-the-crownts-duty-to-
consult.pdf> Accessed 30th July 2014
954 Treaties 6 and 8 (n68)
Eluded to as ‘the Crown’ in the original text.
956 DRIP (n39) Art. 29
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the threshold for demonstrating a breach would be reduced to proof that only the ability of the 
land to support traditional activities had been impaired. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada highlighted the degree of relativity to the use of the environment 
protected by the provision in commentary on the position of the federal government in 
respect of the text. The government department suggested that it, ‘would have preferred text 
that ensured that the duties of States with respect to the protection of the environment 
generally are consistent with those in relation to indigenous lands,’ rather than the provision 
of a, ‘right to the conservation and the protection of the environment.’957
Thus, reading such a right into the context at hand, consistent reductions in fish 
stocks, flora in the proximity of projects, or caribou sightings would all support cession or 
restriction of water withdrawals, or the construction of tailings ponds and in-situ extraction 
operations. Under the mere protection of land itself, the capacity of First Nations traditional 
lands would have to be reduced to a degree approaching nil, or certainly to a potentially 
irretrievable level and be evidenced as being a direct result of said water withdrawals. This is 
as general environmental law provisions would allow both a margin of appreciation and 
permit many actions which did not impact on human health and established proprietary rights. 
In relation to the contention that licensed water withdrawals from, and contamination of, the 
natural water courses and bodies by tar sands extraction projects adversely impact the 
environment of the region to such a degree as to breach the rights of the indigenous peoples 
dwelling there, this degree of relativity is therefore of immense significance. In the 
construction of a case against the licensing authorities therefore the interpretation of binding 
provisions in line with the principle espoused in Article 29 of the DRIP is crucial. This is
957 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada Canada s Statement ofSuppoit on the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples (2010) < http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142> Accessed 30th July 2014
958 DRIP (n39) Art. 29
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due to the controversy and contention surrounding the scientific measurement of the impacts 
of water withdrawals959and levels of contaminants960 which otherwise could potentially rebut 
any case brought on this basis.
The inextricable link between the unique ecosystem of the boreal forest, the caribou 
reliant upon it and the continued existence of the culture of the First Nations Indians of north 
eastern Alberta is evident and well documented. Morse succinctly describes the paramount 
significance of this connection stating that, ‘the most fundamental matter of importance for 
First Nations...all across Canada is sustaining or regaining their relationship with traditional 
territories.’961 Article 29 of the DRIP both highlights and allows respect to be paid to this 
fundamental connection. The lack of binding effect for the Declaration is telling though, and 
potentially dramatically reduces its efficacy in relation to this and indeed any case concerning 
environmental damage. Despite the initial reluctance on the part of Canada to acquiesce to its 
provisions a bold and unabashed endorsement thereof followed. This fact, when coupled with 
the sheer number o f state parties to it, means the Declaration gains significant weight as a 
source of soft law with considerable interpretative impact in relation to cases concerning 
indigenous peoples, and that proposed by the thesis is no exception.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
International instruments afford a range of rights potentially applicable to the aim of 
the piece. However their discussion herein has highlighted the boundaries similarly felt at the 
regional and domestic levels to the use of those rights concerning harms against the person.
959 R A M P  ( n 2 2 6)
960 Indeed the peer review o f  aquatic monitoring in the regions impacted upon by the oil sands suggested 
increased monitoring o f  species native to those regions for contaminants specifically associated with such 
extraction in order to provide accurate data on their presence within the ecosystem, ibid. 39
M orse ,  B .W . Peoples o f  Canada and Their Efforts to Achieve True Repai ations in L enze i in i ,  F. ( n 9 1 3 ) , 286
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The consideration of the rights concerning society, culture and the family however has raised 
further interpretative and actionable additions to the potential litigation considered by the 
piece. In particular the introduction of the concept of ‘dependents’ upon the work of an 
individual as opposed to necessitating a familial connection common within the 
interpretations of what might broadly be termed ‘rights to work’ in other jurisdictions 
considered is significant. This significance is owing to the communal nature of many 
indigenous practices, and in particular hunting. An individual would be unlikely to hunt a 
caribou for himself and his family, but rather it would be divided amongst the nation to which 
he belonged.
Added to this common protection of work is the stipulation that it need not be the 
most economically productive form of work available, nor as seen in the regional sphere 
afford a pecuniary reward. The DRIP also affords an interpretative connection between 
conceptions of work in the indigenous context and the productive capacity of traditionally 
utilised lands. These two additions in particular to the broader protection of subsistence using 
traditional methods are of considerable significance to the context of the piece. They ensure 
that the general concept of work is able to be argued as interpreted in a manner in conformity 
with indigenous cultural approaches to securing a livelihood. In the prevention of the 
extinguishment of indigenous cultures by the tar sands extraction projects it is these culturally 
relative interpretations of broader rights which the piece argues are key, and which are 




The construction of any litigious action against the continued licensing and approval of 
tar sands extraction projects in Alberta, Canada would be met with significant opposition, 
both juristic and political, regardless of the field of law in which it was based. The proposal 
of a case in the field of human rights law however offers unique challenges to any potential 
applicants, and yet it is suggested also affords both relevant provisions and outcomes to the 
idiosyncratic reality of the indigenous populace impacted upon so acutely. In the conclusion 
to the piece, the most pertinent provisions and those with the greatest likelihood of success 
based will be put forward. This will be based upon assessments as to those which best reflect 
or are appropriate in which to frame the nature of the relationship between First Nations and 
specific environmental features, and which are best supported by precedents or progressive 
but not excessive interpretations of existing provisions. As was discussed in the 
methodological section of the piece, the proposed basis for such an action will be weighed 
against the demand that all legislative and administrative actions be for the ‘peace, order and 
good government of Canada,’ and that any limitations upon rights afforded to Canadian 
citizens only be limited to such an extent as is, ‘justifiable in a free and democratic society.’
6.1 Forum Conveniens
Throughout the piece a number of fora in which a case might be brought have been 
discussed. The three main options are that of the domestic Canadian courts, the Inter- 
American Commission, and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. All three 
could potentially hear an action brought under the auspices of the rights discussed herein, 
though there are merits and concerns to the utilisation of each. The aim of the piece was to 
suggest the optimum basis for a case against the tar sands developments in human rights law 
which takes into account the idiosyncratically acute nature of the relationship between the
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indigenous populace and the ecosystems they inhabit, however to fail to consider the most 
appropriate for such an action would be remiss.
The piece has considered the rights discussed in a manner suggesting either the use of 
the forum native present in each legal sphere,962 or through the interpretation of domestic 
rights in light of the provisions at the regional and international levels to which Canada was 
subject. The regional system underpinned by the American Declaration on Human Rights963 
offers the Inter-American Commission as a potential setting for a case akin to that suggested 
by the piece to be brought. The Commission and the Declaration it protects do not possess the 
ability to bind the Canadian state however and as such the consequences of even the most 
favourable Opinion of the Commission would be subject to the acquiescence of the domestic 
executive to the recommendations therein. Whilst the regional system to which the text and 
body belong possesses a binding forum, that of the American Court of Human Rights, which 
enforces the American Convention on Human Rights, 964 Canada refuses to ratify the 
Convention and thus be bound by the decisions of the Court owing to an aforementioned 
dispute regarding the prohibition of abortion.965
The jurisdiction of the Commission is also voluntary in nature, and as such any action 
brought by the indigenous populace would be subject to a decision on the part of the 
Canadian executive to engage with such a motion. As a result of the utility of the 
Commission with regards to the aim of the piece is dramatically reduced. The sheer amount 
of variables and decisions of other parties to which such an action would be subject is not
962 The Inter-American Commission regionally, the United Nations Human Rights Committee internationally 
and the Canadian judicial system domestically.
963 ADRD (n249)
964 ACHR ( n l87)
65 This is discussed in detail in the introduction to the chapter considering the rights emanating from the Inter- 
A m e r ic an  reg io n a l  sys tem .
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appropriate for a case o f the nature suggested by the piece. Given the immense economic 
benefit of the tar sands to Canada and North America as a whole,966 to suggest these consents 
would be forthcoming and that in the event of an unfavourable petition the state would 
comply in a manner satisfactory to the First Nations impacted would be foolhardy. Instead it 
is proposed that this fora be recognised as being of political influence, and an avenue through 
which pressure might be put upon the Canadian executive, it is devoid of binding legal 
impact upon them. As such the Inter-American system will be utilised as a source of 
interpretative influence on the forum identified as being the most appropriate to bring an 
action such as that suggested by the piece.
The international forum considered in relation to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,967 the UNHRC suffers from similar complications with regards to the 
aim of the piece. Firstly the Commission also possesses a voluntary jurisdiction over parties, 
and as such the acquiescence of the executive would be required. The Views of the 
Committee, like the outcomes of petitions to the Inter-American Commission, are not able to 
bind Canada to a particular course of action or make awards to one of the parties to an action. 
Again with regard to the aims of the piece, this reality is somewhat damning with regards to 
its utility. Indeed Canada has a chequered record with regards to the effectiveness of this 
organ of the United Nations as a means to solving disputes with its indigenous peoples. 
Arguably the most high profile action involving Canada before the Human Rights Committee, 
that of Lubicon Lake Band v Canada,968 remains unresolved.969 As such whilst the body 
remains one of the most significant in international human rights law, as a forum for a case
966 Alberta Government, US Economic Impact Oil Calculator (2010)
<http://www.oilsands.alberta.ca/USEconomicImpactOilCalculator.html> Accessed 30th July 2014
967 ICCPR (n l76)
968 Lubicon (n729)
969 Whilst the Committee has issued a View in this regard and suggested an outcome no agreement on the matter 
on which the communication was based has been reached.
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such as that suggested by the piece it is not the most appropriate. A note might also be made 
that given the controversy surrounding the outcome, or lack thereof, of the Lubicon Lake 
Band communication, especially in the eyes of the Canadian indigenous community, the 
forum may not be approved of by the First Nations affected by tar sands extraction except as 
an absolute last resort.
The piece also considers two further international instruments, the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights970 and the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. Neither of these instruments however have a monitoring or enforcement 
body which governs them in relation to Canada with regard to individual complaints. 
Although the economic, social and cultural rights Covenant has recently attained a 
monitoring body which can consider non-state complaints as the optional protocol 
establishing it received the requisite number of ratifications, Canada is not a party to it. By 
contrast the DRIP has no provision for monitoring compliance and is regarded by some as 
merely an aspirational text as a result. In relation to the assertions made by the piece 
regarding an action against continued tar sands extraction projects, neither of the two texts 
could be directly enforced by the indigenous populace impacted upon. As a result the 
provisions of both texts might be used solely as interpretative aids to similar rights in texts 
which are afforded enforcement mechanisms at various levels of enforcement considered by 
the piece.
By contrast to the international and regional legal spheres, the domestic judicial system 
offers a binding forum and potentially outcome for a case against the tar sands developments 
based in human rights law. The Canadian judiciary has, on numerous occasions been willing
970 ICESCR (n254)
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to interpret legislation in light of the commitments made at regional and international levels
* 971by the executive. Whilst this can also be said of the Inter-American Commission972 and the
973UNHRC the lack of a system of binding precedents in both systems does not ensure that 
previous judicial practice will be followed. A number of the contentions made within the 
piece are based upon the positions and interpretations adopted in previous decisions of these 
two organs of the regional and international human rights systems. As such to bring a case on 
the basis of those precedents in fora which were not necessarily bound by them would 
considerably lessen the likelihood of success, or certainly leave the outcome to little other 
than the opinion of the officials therein.
The domestic system of Canada is also an avenue through which any attempt to suggest 
breaches of the rights contained in the regional and international texts would have to pass. 
Both the Inter American Commission and Human Rights Committee require the exhaustion 
of all pertinent domestic remedies in all but the most exceptional of cases as an element of 
their admissibility criteria. As such the Canadian domestic system is not only the most 
effective forum in terms of potential outcome, but also must be utilised to ensure that any 
action in the other forums discussed be admissible. Whilst this reality suggests that the choice 
of forum is predetermined, the concerns regarding the regional and international systems 
require consideration should the case at the domestic level fail and the action be carried 
forward into them as was the case for the Lubicon Lake Band 974
Rights suggested as forming the basis for a case against the continued licensing of tar 
sands developments suggested as harming ecosystems on which indigenous cultures are
971
Slaight (n517)1056-7.
972 Grand Chief Michael Mitchell v. Canada, Case 790/01, Report No. 74/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,





reliant must therefore originate from, or be interpreted via those available in the Canadian 
domestic system, and specifically its seminal human rights legislation, the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms.975 The expansive approach to interpretation of this text adopted in 
by the Canadian judiciary,976 facilitates such an approach and further supports the contention 
of the piece that the domestic legal system of Canada offers the best forum in which to bring 
the proposed case. As a result the provisions to be suggested as representing the most 
appropriate basis for said action will be assessed on the basis of the protection offered to the 
environmental features inextricable for the indigenous culture, but also whether the 
interpretation of them in a manner supportive of the case at hand, or via the domestic 
provisions with which they share subject matter is probable. The reasoning for assessment of 
the rights on this ground is that a case based solely in theoretical and academic debate is of 
little use for the indigenous peoples of north east Alberta impacted upon by the tar sands 
extraction projects, but also to ensure that the conclusions reached add the growing academic 
field of the protection of the environment under human rights law.
6.2 Knowledge is Power
Before considering the rights which will be suggested as bearing the most potential to 
protect the inextricable connection between the First Nations peoples and particular 
environmental features, another issue is worthy of note. Regardless of the rights suggested as 
representing the best basis for a litigious action against tar sands extraction, the success of 
such an action would be predicated upon verifiable and supported evidence of impacts of the 
types discussed. In this regard, and although this has been discussed in detail in particular in 
relation to the domestic and European regional contexts, the right to access to information is
975 C CRF(nl74)
976 Embodied by the ‘living tree doctrine’ created in Edwards (n 196), 1 j 6
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crucial to any action of this type and warrants reference here. Whilst rights to access 
information exist within the domestic legal system of Canada, and are afforded in the context 
of the oil sands debate, the expansion on this concept emanating from the European system is 
of particular relevance. In particular the principles considered in the case of Guerra and 
others v. Italy 977 add significantly to domestic Canadian legislation concerning this notion.
As previously discussed the case extended the concept of access to information to entail 
the concepts of mitigation of damage and adequate provision of information regarding said 
damage, rather than simply access thereto. In the context of the piece, this addition affords a 
significant contribution to any case against the licensing of tar sands extraction projects, 
regardless of the other rights suggested as having been breached. The interpretation of this
Q -7 0
common right in the European context converts the right from its traditional conception as 
imposing a negative duty on the state to not inhibit, or allow the inhibition of information 
whether that be of a form which should be publicly available, or through active attempts to 
curtail the passage of information.979 The Court held that the right to receive and impart 
information now represented a, ‘positive obligation to collect, process and disseminate such 
information, which by its nature could not otherwise come to the knowledge of the public’ 
and, ‘had a preventive function with respect to ... serious damage to the environment and ... 
came into play even before any direct infringement of other fundamental rights, such as the 
right to life or to respect for private and family life, occurred.’980
977 Guerra (n620)
978 Espoused in the ADHR, ACHPR, ECHR, ICCPR and the majority domestic constitutional documents and 
legal systems.
979 Though this is not the concern o f the piece, there are clearly permitted derogations from the freedom of 
information common to human rights texts across the world. Few are applicable to the focus o f the piece 
however, with the exception o f  the weaker exception to the concept o f the preservation o f  private information in 
relation to commercially sensitive data.
980 Guerra (n620)
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In relation to the case at hand, this alteration in application of the right is particularly 
pertinent to the plight of the indigenous populace of Alberta. The interpretative value of the 
Guerra case is to demand that the potential for risk is constantly assessed, and that where 
necessary a risk to health or culturally significant environmental features is declared. The 
benefit of such an occurrence would be twofold in nature. Firstly as is implied by the right all 
available information regarding the risk in question would have to be disseminated to all 
potentially affected and means of mitigating damage suggested. The inference of the Guerra 
judgement being that should mitigation not be possible, compensation is presumed.981 
Secondly, such a declaration would concede an actual impact, or the significant risk thereof 
to human health, or the environment on which individuals and their families rely. The 
concession of an actual effect would circumvent or at least limit the perpetual issue regarding 
the burden of proof discussed throughout the piece. As such, in the context of the piece and 
the suggestion for a basis of a case against the developments, the influence of the principle 
emanating from the European jurisdiction and the Guerra case in particular is irrefutable. 
Although the result of successfully interpreting domestic provisions in line with the 
judgement would not in itself result in the cession of projects, or protection of particular 
parcels of land from licensing, it undeniably would facilitate and support contentions based 
upon the vast majority of the other rights considered in the piece.
6.3 Harms Against the Person
The rights discussed throughout the piece have been separated into two broad
categories, those concerning harms against the physical and psychological integrity of the
person, and those concerning the suppression of the abilities of those individuals to engage in
981 Whilst compensation is not at the forefront o f the concerns o f the First Nations peoples affected by the 
developments, the deterrent for the government o f ignoring potential risks or failing to assess them adequately 
before acting upon them is considerable.
289
activities relevant to their culture. This broad grouping of ‘harms’ primarily concerns the 
right to life and freedom from maltreatment which are common to all of the legal spheres 
considered. This distinction served to segregate rights bearing considerably different burdens 
of proof to establish their breach, and impacts which have varying degrees of separation from 
the individuals themselves. Harms to the individuals themselves are caused by impacts which 
directly affect the physical integrity or health of the individual, whereas suppressions of their 
abilities arise where impacts to features on which they rely to perform certain actions. The 
latter group undoubtedly entails the consideration of a far greater number of rights, and is 
inherently a more expansive notion, but both groups are worthy of note and the division best 
reflects judicial approaches to protecting the environment utilising human rights law.982
The rights considered concerning harms against the person have focused on two broad 
areas, threats to the life of the individual and threats to their physical integrity. These are 
predominantly various conceptions of the almost universal ‘right to life’ and prohibitions on 
severely harmful treatment.983 The provisions themselves are however not the only consistent 
element to this potential contention regarding the impacts of the tar sands upon the 
indigenous populace of the regions exploited to attain them. The burden of proof necessary to 
establish a breach of rights by actions alleged to have impacted upon the physical integrity of 
the individual are, as has been discussed, necessarily high. Whilst not insurmountable, a 
significant and scientifically proven detriment to health has to be illustrated to judicial organs 
in all legal spheres considering potential breaches of such rights. This is largely as a result of 
actions known to breach these provisions being seen as the most heinous of actions a state
982 Approaches to date have been somewhat bifurcated into impacts which cannot be justified under the doctrine 
of margin o f  appreciation (or a variation thereof), essentially those harming the individual directly, sand those 
which can under certain circumstances.
983 Though the terminology o f the three rights considered in the piece in relation to this concept varies 
(‘inhumane and degrading’ or ‘cruel and unusual’) the interpretation o f the provisions and the type and severity
of acts to which they pertain are largely identical.
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can take against its citizens, and as such bearing the most severe condemnation and 
consequences for breach.984
In relation to the impacts of the tar sands extraction projects, the impacts to human 
health have been the source of one of the most heatedly debated factors. The hamlet of Fort 
Chipewyan has formed the focus of this intense conflict regarding the safety of the economic 
juggernaut that is tar sands extraction. Potential human health ramifications gives the 
argument a ‘winner takes all’ nature, with proof of impacts of this nature likely halting 
developments at least until further investigation has been undertaken at a considerable cost to 
provincial and federal governments not to mention extractors. Supposed carcinogenic 
consequences to the populace of the hamlet have however been widely discredited by official 
health organisations at both provincial and federal levels.985 Indeed the doctor at the centre of 
what governmental authorities suggest is little more than a ‘scare’986 John O’Connor was 
threatened with having his licence to practice medicine revoked and for some time relocated 
to practice outside of the province for fear of persecution.
A series of competing reports have since been published by both sides of the debate, 
and more are forthcoming, yet a definitive answer remains elusive with both sides staunchly 
defending mutually exclusive positions. The reality is that after almost a decade of dispute no 
significant alteration in the licensing of projects or the practices of companies engaged in 
extraction can be attributed to the contentions of Dr O’Connor.987 In relation to the thesis, this
984 Clearly this is dependent upon the forum in any particular case, owing to the non-binding nature o f some as 
has been discussed.
985 Alberta Cancer Board, Cancer Incidence in Fort Chipewya, Alberta 1995-2006 (2009) ^
<http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/rls/ne-rls-2009-02-06-fort-chipewyan-study.pdf> Accessed j 0 July 2014
986 Wente, M. ‘The Great Oil-Sands Cancer Scare’ The Globe and Mail (2014)
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-great-oil-sands-cancer-scare/articlel7685139/> Accessed
30th July 2014.
987 Dr O’Connor began the official proceedings of which the region is still seeing the results in early 2006.
Marsden describes in detail the chronology o f  his struggle with the federal and piovincial authoiit ies in this
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is a somewhat damning illustration of the likelihood of success with regards to a claim that 
the extraction o f tar sands has had direct impacts to human health. To suggest therefore that 
further to this, in light of the aims of the piece being focused on the protection of the 
indigenous populace specifically, that they are in some way acutely impacted upon would 
raise the threshold o f proof beyond the considerable height at which it already appears set.988 
As such it is suggested that the considerable burden of proof which would be set to establish 
a breach of the rights pertaining to harms to the individual is so inhibitory to the validity of 
any proposed action that this group of rights is reduced to inefficacy in relation to the aims of 
the piece.
This analysis is however based upon the existing body of knowledge and research with 
regards to the impacts of tar sands extraction. The body of precedent and jurisprudence in 
human rights law concerning the application of prohibitions on harms to the person to 
environmental harms is considerable. As such note should be made that this analysis would 
be subject to revision in the event of the production of evidence sufficient to potentially 
breach the burdens placed upon establishing a breach of the aforementioned rights. The utility 
of said rights for the purposes of the piece is considerably diminished owing to the 
idiosyncratic nature of the evidence available and uncontested with regards to the impacts of 
tar sands extraction. To suggest however that such rights are of little utility with regards to 
environmental protection under the auspices of human rights law, or would never support a 
claim against the tar sands industry would be at best remiss.
regard. See: Marsden, W. Stupid to the Last Drop: How Alberta is Bringing Environmental Armageddon To 
Canada (andD oesn  7 Seem to Care) (Random House, Toronto, 2007) 185-194
988 There is something o f a macabre irony in the fact that the indigenous populace has already been the focus of 
debate in relation to the case o f  Fort Chipewyan. This is as it has been suggested that persons o f indigenous 
descent are more susceptible to the forms o f cancer which are suggested to have increased in prevalence in the 
population there. See: Mahoney, M.C. and Michalek, A.M .’ A meta-analysis o f cancer incidence in United
States and  C a n a d ia n  n a t iv e  p o p u la t io n s . ’ (1 9 9 1 )  20(2)  International Journa l  o f  E p id e m io lo g y  j 2 j .
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Beyond the evidentiary burden borne by these rights however, the jurisprudence in this 
regard is equally as ill-suited to the aims of the piece. Again this issue relates to the severity 
of both cause and effect in relation to actions concerning rights protecting the fundamental 
physical integrity and life of the individual. Owing to the high thresholds rights of this type 
entail, both in terms of evidence to establish and consequences of a breach for the perpetrator 
thereof, the minimum requirements placed upon meeting obligations in this regard are 
generic in nature. The ‘right to life’ common to human rights texts internationally is a clear 
example of this, being commonly interpreted as a minimum to be the prohibition of arbitrary 
killing of citizens by the state, and not a right to a life of a particular standard or lifestyle.989 
By way of explanation in relation to the context of the piece, cases involving suggested 
breaches of rights to life and freedom from abhorrent treatment arising from environmental 
conditions have considered impacts to environments which individuals inhabit solely in terms 
of their ability to sustain life, and not present risks to human health.990 The form of the 
environment in-situ is simply not considered by courts and non-binding judicatory bodies, 
including those considered by the piece, in seminal cases and actions of this type.991 This 
reality is evident in the discussion of Article 12 of the ICESCR concerning environmental 
hygiene, which is focused not upon a particular type of environment but one devoid of risk to 
human health.
In the context of the thesis presented therefore the approach taken by seminal bodies, 
and indeed conceded by many academics, in this regard reduces further the utility of this type 
of right in relation to the aims of the piece. Harms to the individual are rarely conceived of in
989 Schabas, W. The A b o litio n  o f  the  D ea th  P en a lty  in In tern ation al L aw  (3 Edition, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2002) 8
990 The decision to hear the case o f  T atar (n31) under the auspices of the right to private and family life as 
opposed to the right to life owing to a lack of evidence of a direct harm to health is clear evidence o f such an 
approach.
991 In such cases contentions as to the form o f environment have been brought under the auspices o f other rights 
such as those pertaining to cultural expression (Lubicon  (n729))and to private and family life (G u erra  (n620)).
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the culturally relative manner demanded by the piece in order to ensure protection of 
particular, culturally significant, environments and aspects thereof. As such rights pertaining 
to the physical integrity and life of the individual will form no part of the suggested basis for 
a case against the tar sands extraction projects and the licensing thereof, aimed at protecting 
environments inextricably linked to the First Nations peoples of Alberta.
6.4 Suppression of Abilities
The rights affording protection against harms to the person lacked a sufficient degree of, 
or potential for, culturally relative application. However, the rights considered affording 
protection against the suppression of the abilities of the individual to engage in activities 
relevant to their culture do not all suffer from such deficiency. This grouping encompasses 
protections of the expression of culture and the enjoyments of the benefit thereof. An element 
of choice is also embodied by this group as it protects also the idiosyncrasies of minorities 
from dominant cultural hegemonies. As a result of these factors they offer the most 
appropriate provisions on which to base an action such as that suggested by the piece. This is 
not to say that all of the rights in this grouping are of utility, merely that the nature of the 
rights contained therein affords, or has the potential to, the necessary recognition of the 
inimitable connection the First Nations peoples have with the ecosystems they inhabit.
The rights pertaining to the suppression of abilities can be segregated into three main 
groups; rights concerning cultural expression directly, those protecting rights to gain a 
livelihood, and those afforded protection to property and residence. Favourable 
interpretations of each would add significantly to any case against the developments in 
Alberta discussed in the thesis, however such interpretations are of varied degrees of
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elaboration on the accepted core requirements each places upon states party to them. As such 
the likelihood of the suggested potential interpretation of the rights discussed will be 
considered in establishing which offer the most positive basis for a challenge to the tar sands 
extraction projects threatening culturally significant environments or features thereof.
Rights protecting cultural expression would prima facie appear to offer an established 
basis for a case such as that suggested by the piece. Seminal actions such as that of Poma 
Poma, Mahuika, and the Lubicon Lake Band992 would support such an assertion, all having 
afforded protection to cultural expression as a result of environmental impacts. These actions 
are however largely predicated upon direct impacts to land used by the peoples concerned 
which are beyond dispute and are regarded as potentially threatening their continued 
existence.993 Indeed where impacts to indigenous peoples and traditional practices were 
limited, they have been deemed to potentially not be afforded protection over and above the 
interests of the majority of the population of a state.994 In relation to the impacts of the tar 
sands, this once again raises the spectre of having to establish to a high burden of proof 
impacts with the potential to cease the existence of a particular culture or traditional practice 
in its entirety. Whilst the impacts felt might over time have such an impact, to wait for them 
to reach a degree sufficient to breach this threshold would be to allow them to reach an 
irreparable level.
The plight of the First Nations is in contrast to the Sami people who brought the action 
in Lansman et. al. v Finland995 however. The Sami were herders of reindeer, rather than
992 Poma Poma (n 271 ), Mahuika (n861) and Lubicon (n729)
993 In Poma Poma  (n271) in particular the threat to the continued existence o f an inimitable culture was
particularly emphasised. , • r ;
*94 See for example the permitting o f a ‘certain limited impact’ upon indigenous cultures in: Lansman et al. v.
Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 0994)' at 9^ 4
995 Lansman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/199 ( )
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hunters of a species which might adopt alternate migratory patterns or feeding grounds over 
time and outside of the control of those reliant upon them as is the case with boreal woodland 
caribou. The connection of particular practices to the continued existence of minority cultures 
established in the cases mentioned above is of immeasurable utility in relation to the aim of 
the piece, indeed it represents the basis for the case itself. However, the necessary degree of 
impact that established jurisprudence suggests is necessary to establish a breach intimates that 
other protections will also be needed in order to ensure the cession or restriction of tar sands 
developments in particular areas sought by the piece.
Protections afforded to property by the legal texts considered in the piece are focused 
on the home and the standard thereof, and the ability to locate oneself and family as one sees 
fit. The rights considered are largely construed as protecting from unlawful interference with, 
or seizure of, the home or forced relocation or removal from a particular area. Rights to 
remain in particular996 were intended, in part, to prevent arbitrary removal from a location by 
the state to allow for projects of utilitarian value to the majority at the expense of an 
individual. The drafting intentions underpinning these rights are the factors which also inhibit 
their utility in relation to the aims of the piece. The First Nations peoples of Alberta could not 
be argued to be directly being forced to relocate from their reserved lands, nor are their 
homes being directly violated unlawfully. Whilst expansive interpretations of the rights might 
be suggested to afford protection from being left the choice to either abandon traditional and 
culturally significant practices as has been discussed, these are exactly that, expansive.
Such interpretations, whilst not completely unprecedented, offer little consistent 
application in this manner and thus certainty. Rights concerning the inviolability of the home
996 CCRF (nl74) s.6. and ADRD (n249) Art. VIII
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and residence in particular offer protection to inhabit a private property or area without direct 
interference from public authorities, but offer no guarantee as to the form of the surrounding 
environment.997 Thus only where impacts of the tar sands extraction projects forced 
relocation from an area in an absolute manner, such as through seizure of lands (and thus 
homes) by public authorities, or would force all persons, indigenous or otherwise, to relocate 
would these rights assure the protection sought by the piece. The aim of the piece is however 
to halt or restrict developments long before impacts reached such severity, and preserve 
cultural practices and the environments on which they rely prior to them becoming 
irreversible. As such rights concerning protection of the home and residence will not be 
suggested as a viable basis for an action of the type proposed by the piece.
Protections afforded to the gaining of a livelihood, whether this be in the form of work, 
a standard of living, or the productive capacity of lands, by contrast offer a degree of cultural 
relativity which is not present in other rights outside of those directly protecting cultural 
expression. The connection to a particular practice however ensures that inhibitions of a non­
absolute nature can however be considered. Whilst these would need to be greater than mere 
inconveniences in order to outweigh the margin of appreciation afforded to economically 
beneficial projects such as the tar sands project, restrictions on practices connected to certain 
lands which are deemed to have, ‘given rise to a distinctive culture,’998 will be prohibited. As 
such, a recognition of traditional practices of such significance as to form an integral part of 
the culture itself will be protected to the extent that the very lands on which they are 
performed will also be afforded a degree of protection sufficient to ensure their continuation.
997 Russell, P.H. Knopff, R. and Morton, T. Federalism and the Charter: Leading Constitutional Decisions (Mc­
Gill Queen’s Press, Montreal, 1989) 392
998 J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain o f  the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 
760/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000).
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Key in this regard is the inherent relativity the rights of this type afford. Notions of 
‘work freely chosen,’ 999 and accepted 1000 or a freely chosen vocation, 1001 supported by 
aspirational assurances of the ability to subside1002 on lands with a maintained productive 
capacity, accompany the basic protection of the ability to attain an adequate standard of 
living100 through work. Whilst these notions were not solely intended to protect activities of 
a culturally significant nature, the expansion of ‘work’ to include actions which do not 
produce a pecuniary income, but instead provide for dependents1005 or bear social value1006 
support the assertions of the piece. As such it is in rights not specifically intended to afford 
culturally relative protection that a viable basis for a case against the impacts of tar sands 
extraction felt so acutely by the indigenous peoples of Alberta is found. The protection of the 
ability to continue traditional practices as an extension of rights to gain a livelihood in the 
domestic context will therefore be suggested as the basis for the action proposed by the piece 
to restrict or cease operations harmful to ecosystems of cultural significance in Alberta, 
Canada. Before such a case can be suggested however, the validity of the case in light of 
Canadian human rights jurisprudence must first be considered.
6.5 For Peace, Order and Good Government and Justification in a Free and Democratic 
Society
The contention that the current approach to licensing tar sands projects is not for the 
peace, order and good government of Canada and thus breaches fundamental freedoms
999 CCRF (n l74) s.6
1000 ICESCR (n254) Art. 6
1001 ADRD (n249)Art XIV
1002 DRIP (n39) Art. 20
1003 ibid. Art. 29
1004 ICESCR (n254) Art 11
1005 ibid.
1006 ADRD (n249) Art XIV {pro homine interpretation) and DRIP (n39) Art. 11
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afforded in the CCRF is rebuttable in nature. An illustration that they are, ‘demonstrably 
justifiable in a free and democratic society’1007 would undermine any case suggested by the 
piece. The constitutional test, created in the case of R v. Oakes{m  demands;
‘respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and 
equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and 
faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups
in society.’1009
A legitimate breach of such rights must meet two conditions following the case. The reasoning 
for a breach must be, ‘of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected 
right or freedom.’1010 Secondly proportionality must be shown, an assessment based on three 
criteria. The cause of the breach must be designed to achieve the objective set, to have the least 
impact upon rights and freedoms achievable, and the resultant limitations must be proportionate 
to the aim to be achieved.1011
The case suggested by the piece as able to be brought against the current permitting of 
tar sands extraction projects must also contend that the limitations to rights they cause are not 
justifiable under the above test prescribed in Oakes. Whilst a number of rights have been 
disregarded as offering the best potential basis for such a case above, and as such need not be 
assessed in this regard, a particular issue is worthy of note. Environmental impacts to human 
health, and specifically those deemed of requisite severity to breach the various conceptions of 
the right to life, have been consistently regarded as non-derogable by either the texts affording
1007 CCRF (nl74) s.l
1008 Oakes (n207)
1009 ibid. 64
1010 Big M D rug Mart Ltd. (n212), 352.
10,1 Oakes (n207), 69
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them or courts enforcing them. As such the assessment as to the validity of limitations in this 
regard would be futile, as they are considered invalid by virtue of their severity alone. The rights 
proposed as forming the most appropriate basis for the action advocated by the thesis are 
however not contentions of direct impacts to human health. Indeed such insinuations are actively 
to be avoided owing to the inherent uncertainty caused by the need to prove almost 
incontrovertibly, and scientifically, a connection between extraction processes and the harms 
caused of relative proximity. The potential for governmental justification of the limitations to 
rights concerning the gaining of a livelihood potentially arising from the tar sands extraction 
projects as a result of environmental harms will therefore be the focus of discussion.
Limitations on the ability to secure a livelihood, as protected under the Charter could not 
be suggested as necessary for the preservation of peace or order in Canada. As such the 
provision of legislation and the administrative processes constructed thereby with regards to the 
licensing of tar sands extraction would have to be suggested as being under the auspices of 
ensuring good government. The ability of the government to legislate for the extraction 
industries, and the consequent environmentally and planning focused administrative bodies, is 
not in question. The format of the bodies might be questioned as being unbalanced and unjust 
but this does not preclude the ability of the governments of Alberta or the federal institutions of 
Canada to create them within the purview of the powers assigned to them within the constitution. 
Case law concerning the principle of ‘peace, order and good government’ focusing on the 
separation of powers between the federal and provincial jurisdictions offers little to a challenge 
that the approach taken to licensing is not ‘good government.’
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Such an approach is not however without some support, though the predominance of the 
application of the so called POGG criteria is to delineate between provincial and federal 
authority, the requirement of a legitimate purpose for the legislation, federal or provincial, has 
been proposed. Seizing the economic benefits of the tar sands at the expense of the 
fundamental rights of the indigenous populace of Alberta would arguably not be a legitimate 
purpose. Indeed, given that the contention of the piece will be the inhibition of the ability to gain 
a livelihood the suggestion that attaining the considerable number of jobs the extraction projects 
create was not a legitimate purpose for supporting the industry would be tenuous. This is 
especially true given that the suggestion of the legitimacy of purpose in Macdonald1014 as a 
criteria for justifying legislation is based merely upon a supportable public policy. However, the 
continued licensing of tar sands extraction projects and more specifically the legislation 
underpinning the administrative processes could be challenged on the basis of the Oakes test.
A successful challenge on this basis would thus require the valid assertion that the 
current licensing procedure inhibited the rights of the indigenous populace in a manner that 
could have been foreseen and had not been addressed to the greatest possible degree at present. 
This is as the principle of least drastic means would by definition not require the absolute 
cession of any environmental impacts. Instead only reasonable measures to limit or prevent 
harms would be necessary. In relation to the case to be suggested by the piece therefore it must 
be shown that the methods of obtaining the tar sands raw material are not the least impactful 
available upon the ability to continue to seek a livelihood in a culturally relevant manner. Given 
the current lack of monitoring of culturally significant species within the licensing procedure,
1012 A common abbreviation given to the principle o f ‘peace, order and good government.
1013 See in this regard the discussion by Justice Lamer o f the colouring o f criminal provisions in the case o f RJR- 
M a cD o n a ld In c . v. C a n a d a  (A ttorn ey  G enera l) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199
1014 R J R -M a cD o n a ld In c . v. C a n a d a  (A ttorney G enera l) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199
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and the approach of prescribed reclamation of restoring the ecosystem to one merely of 
equivalent capacity such a suggestion could be made. As such it is possible that on this 
basis the validity of the legislation underpinning the licensing of tar sands projects might be 
challenged. Such an action would halt the licensing procedures of Alberta until an approach able 
to account sufficiently for these impacts in the eyes of the court was found and implemented. 
Litigation of this type would contrast to the suggestion on a single instance of breaches of rights 
by specific licensed projects which would arguably be more likely to yield success, but which 
would only inhibit harmful practices in a single instance of extraction.
6.6 The Case Proposed
The premise that the impacts of governmental actions having severe health effects can 
give rise to breaches of human rights afforded under the CCRF is established in the case of 
Chalouli v Quebec (Attorney General).1016 However the notion that environmental impacts 
specifically could breach articles of the CCRF remains secured only in repeated obiter dicta.1017 
Crucial to the success of such a suggestion is the case of Vriend v Alberta,1018 which permitted 
the ‘reading in’ of protections into the rights of the Charter beyond a strict interpretation of the 
wording in which it was originally composed. As such the Canadian judiciary is both capable 
and supportive of the notion of environmental protection. Indeed some suggest Canada has one 
of the most proficient courts internationally with regard to environmental protection in the 
SCC.1019 The courts in Alberta have even accepted in the case of R. v. Sioui1020 regarding
1015 LARP (nl09)
1016 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 791
1017 Accepting the notion o f  a right to a safe environment in Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
1028 and that the environment is ‘a public purpose o f superordinate importance in R. v Hydro-Quebec. [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 213
1018 Vriend (n219)
1019 Jerry v. DeMarco, “The Supreme Court o f Canada’s Recognition o f Fundamental Environmental Values:
What Could Be Next in Canadian Environmental Law?” (2007), 17 Journal o f Environmental Law & Practice.
159.
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culturally significant practices that, the question is whether the type of occupancy ... is 
incompatible with the exercise of the activities...as these undoubtedly constitute religious 
customs or rites, and as such entail a duty to consult the peoples on the part of 
governmental authorities. The judgement in Cold Lake First Nation v. Alberta (Tourism, 
Parks and Recreation) stopped short of making this a veto power over any such occupancy or 
utilisation of traditional lands but did impose a duty to consult.1022
These features of the Canadian legal system coupled with the particular nature of the 
tar sands projects present a highly suited case study to consider the application of human 
rights law to the protection of culturally significant environments and features thereof. Thus it 
is in the basis for a case suggested as potentially viable in this instance that it is hoped an 
approach to human rights based protection of environments beyond direct impacts to human 
health might be found. This aim, as well as the construction of the CCRF, necessitated the 
consideration of both the judicial and interpretative potential of relevant regional and 
international instruments. As such the case suggested below should be read not only as a 
viable case in the Canadian legal system, but also as embodying a series of jurisprudential 
considerations which might be applied in other jurisdictions.
As has been discussed the focus of the case suggested will be the capacity of the 
indigenous populace to continue to gain a livelihood of cultural significance, regardless of its 
pecuniary or nutritionally sustaining value in the context of wider society. The core for this 
contention would be Section 6 of the domestic Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The right 
contained therein to ‘pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province,’ although
1020 R. v. S/ow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025
1021 ibid. per Lamer J.
10-2 Cold Lake First Nation v. Alberta (Tourism, Parks and Recreation) [2012] ABQB 579, 26
1023 CCRF (n l74) s.6
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originally conceived as a mobility right now prevents the use of removal of a means of 
securing a livelihood to force relocation. This elaboration to ensure all provinces, ‘cannot 
divest [anyone] of his right or capacity to remain and to engage in work,’1024 is key to the 
case proposed here. The inclusion of the notion of capacity to work allows for the 
consideration of features crucial to securing a livelihood. Further to this, given the 
multijurisdictional nature of the piece, the case of the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. 
Richardson1025 is also particularly significant. The case suggested that the domestic right 
should be read in conformity with provisions from jurisdictions beyond that of the Charter 
itself and specifically referenced international human rights standards. As an illustration of 
both the broad interpretative approach of the Canadian courts, and the precise manner in 
which this provision should be read, the precedent of the case is at the core of the suggestions 
made by the piece.
The interpretative breadth afforded by the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency litigation 
allows for proposed applications of the right to pursue a livelihood arising from provisions in 
particular internationally from the ICCPR, ICESCR and DRIP, and regionally from the 
ADHR. In spite of the fractious relationship between the Canadian government and the Inter- 
American human rights system1026 the provisions of the American Declaration on Human 
Rights offer some interpretative insight into the protection of the ability to secure a livelihood 
afforded domestically. Article XIV of the Declaration in particular adds two key components 
to the basic conception of productive capability protected by the domestic Charter. The first 
is the necessity for that capability to provide for both the individual bearer of the right and his 
family. Whilst the domestic right has been interpreted as incorporating the ability to provide
1024 Winner (n773), 919
1025 Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (n607)
1026 This is owing to the aforementioned disagreement regarding the interpretation o f the scope o f the right to 
life with regard to abortions.
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for dependents, the relativity of that work to the dependents is not assured. This is the 
second addition of the regional provision to the case at hand. Under Article XIV the work 
through which said living is made must be ‘suitable’ for both bearer and dependents. The 
notion of suitability adds recognition of a degree of relativity to the living attained. As such 
without the interpretative breadth afforded by the regional provision, the binding right 
afforded domestically would not protect a manner of working which did not afford a living 
able to sustain himself and his dependents in a culturally relative manner.1028
In the context of the impacts of tar sands extraction projects upon the ability of the 
indigenous populace of Alberta to secure culturally significant resources from the ecosystems 
they inhabit, this seemingly relatively minor addition to the domestic right is paramount. As 
has been put forward, the economic and wider social value beyond indigenous cultures of 
materials sought and practices engaged in, such as the hunting of caribou for meat and hide, 
would preclude it from being classed as work providing a standard of living were it not for 
this recognition. The prevalence of protection for cultural practices has been based upon 
potential extinguishment of inimitable cultures in their entirety, whether through land 
consumption as was the case in Lubicon,1029 or resource reallocation as in Poma Poma.1030 As 
such progressive impacts or mere limitations to the ability to, for example, hunt caribou 
would not necessarily give rise to the level of protection which has become more common in 
human rights law in recent decades. For this reason the reading in of a degree of cultural 
relativity to the domestic right to pursue a livelihood ensures that the particular impacts of the
1027 Children’s A id Society (n553)
1028 The reading o f cultural relativity into the provisions emanating from the Inter-American system would also
meet with the general perception o f it as focusing heavily upon cultural sensitivity in relation to Latin America
and the preservation o f inimitable cultures in the face o f  developing government there. This approach is noted in 
particular by Lixinski. Lixinski, L. ‘Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court o f Human Rights: 
Expansionism at the Service o f the Unity o f International Law (2010) 21(3) European Journal o f International 
Law 585, 595
1029 Lubicon (n729)
1030 Poma Poma (n271)
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tar sands can be addressed, and the difficulties in ascertaining and proving the specificities 
thereof can be avoided. Such an approach would also be supported by a reading of Section 6 
of the CCRF in light of Article XV of the Declaration1032 which highlights the importance 
of leisure activities with a non-pecuniary benefit in relation to culture. Whilst no comparator 
right to Article XV is available in the domestic context, the recognition of significance of 
activities with no or little conventional economic or social value is important in supporting 
the case outlined above.
The international legal sphere also offers a number of interpretative expansions upon 
the domestic and regional rights discussed in the formulation of a case against the licensing 
of tar sands extraction projects. The twin international human rights covenants which form 
the basis for many binding texts around the world offer further expansions upon the relatively 
restrictive domestic right to gain a livelihood. The immediate comparator right is found in the 
economic, social and cultural rights Covenant in Article 6.1033 As well as providing a further 
example of the right provided domestically however, the right adds that the activity protected 
should also be freely chosen. This addition rebuts the contention that the diminishing 
tendency for traditional practices to form an aspect of the provision of sustenance or nutrition 
reduces the need to ensure their continuation which might be proposed by governmental 
authorities. The ICESCR also offers the support for the core aspect of the case proposed from 
Articles 7 and 11 of the Covenant which demand the provision of healthy working 
conditions1034 and an adequate standard of living.1035 These two provisions build upon the 
base protection of the gaining of a livelihood by demanding certain environmental standards 
in which to conduct said pursuit, and that the fruits of said labour be relative to those seeking
1031 CCRF (n 174) s.6
1032 ADRD (n249) Art XV
1033 ICESCR (n254) Art. 6
1034 ibid. Art.7
1035 ibid. Art. 11
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them. Again in the context of the piece, these relatively minor additions encompass the 
idiosyncrasies of the impacts of the tar sands upon the indigenous populace of Alberta.
The ICCPR offers no right to work per se and might as such appear to offer little to 
the case proposed herein. This suggestion would however fail to consider the potential 
addition to the connections between the practices the piece hopes to protect and their cultural 
significance beyond the individual practising them which the text offers. Article 17 of the 
Covenant prohibits interference with family life on the part of the government. Such an 
interference it is argued would occur should the ability to engage in culturally significant 
practices, and pass the skills required to partake in them on to future generations, be restricted 
by the impacts of the tar sands extraction projects licensed by the authorities of both the 
province and the State. Although often conceived and indeed applied as a right to non­
interference with the home, property and correspondence, certainly in the European 
context,1036 the potential impacts of the tar sands upon family life of the First Nations of 
Alberta are undeniable, and as such to fail to add them to the contention of the piece would 
be inattentive to the aim thereof. The application of this right within the European regional 
system also explains the lack of its use here in the core aspects of the case proposed by the 
piece. The undoubted focus of the application of the mirror provision in that regional system 
to harms to the home and the ability in a generic sense to raise a family, which is still largely 
predicated upon impacts to human health and particularly the raising of children, offers little 
to the basis suggested beyond that which might be gleaned from Canadian Charter rights to 
life liberty and security of the person. 1037
1036 In particular the application o f the similar right in the European Court o f  Human Rights suggests such an 
interpretation even in relation to environmental harms. As is seen in the case o f s is seen in the case o f ....
1037 CCRF (n l74) s.7
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Beyond the binding provisions discussed above, the influence of non-binding 
instruments has also been considered by the piece.1038 The most relevant of these to the focus 
of the piece is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.1039 
Obviously the concentration of the text on indigenous peoples heightens its utility with 
regards to the piece generally, however a number of provisions of particular utility to the 
main contention of the piece. The key connection they add is that between traditional 
practices and the survival of the cultures engaging in them. The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, has highlighted this link succinctly stating that, “ by violating the rights of a 
community to continue to subsist... a number of basic human rights are violated... [including 
the right] to survival.’1040 Article 11 of the Declaration in particular affords ‘the right to 
practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs,’1041 and demands measures to 
ensure this from State parties. The rights also incorporate an intergenerational aspect, 
necessitating the assurance of the ability of indigenous peoples to perpetuate the practices 
protected for as long as they choose. In relation to the impacts of the tar sands such an aspect 
is of considerable significance as it would support suggestions that impacts with the potential 
to accumulate, such as the seepage of tailings material over time, which may have no adverse 
impacts at present should be taken into account by the judiciary considering the action 
suggested. There are also undeniable connections in this regard to the precautionary principle 
found in environmental law.
Highly specific interpretative approaches to the rights afforded in binding texts , and 
especially that in relation to the ability to gain a livelihood, are also found in the provisions of
1038 Indeed it should be noted that the American Declaration o f Human Rights is not in itself binding, though is 
subjected to a greater degree o f respect by Canada and possesses its own governing authority in the form of the 
Inter-American Commission, which Canada has generally submitted to the jurisdiction of.
1039 DRIP (n39)
1040 Mayagna (Sumo) (n901)
1041 DRIP (n39) Art. 11
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Article 7 and 29 of the Declaration. The two provisions afford protection to the productive 
capacity of traditional lands and from the assimilation of inimitable cultures into broader 
society. These provisions are of particular relevance to the reclamation of tailings ponds 
and the alteration of the ecosystems in the regions impacted upon. This is as the returning of 
reclaimed ponds to a safe environment but not that which once prevailed meets many of the 
legal demands upon the provincial and federal authorities. Articles 7 and 29 however 
necessitate the preservation to the greatest degree possible of the environment which supports 
the indigenous culture of the First Nations and the expression thereof. As a jurisprudential 
addition to the broader protections of the ability to secure a livelihood, they preserve also the 
expression of culture through activities which can also be deemed the securing of a livelihood. 
As the connection between these practices and the prevalent ecosystem of the regions 
exploited for the tar sands is inextricable, the representation of this connection in the legal 
protection and the case proposed by the piece ought to be so also. As such any contention as 
to the breach of provisions securing a livelihood in this context must also incorporate the 
significance of the cultural relativity of the livelihood protected, the necessity for respect of 
that livelihood regardless of its pecuniary value, and the significance within securing it of the 
ecosystem upon which it is predicated. Articles 7 and 29 pay respect to these fundamental 
connections in relation the action proposed by the piece, and indigenous peoples generally.
The piece therefore proposes that the protection of the ability to gain a livelihood offers 
an alternate approach to the protection of culturally significant environments under the auspices 
of human rights law to the prevailing precedents concerning harms to the physical security of the 
individual. Recognition of the inextricable connection to historically prevalent and untouched 
environments which indigenous peoples so often have is fundamental to this. However, a
1042 ibid. Arts. 7 and 29
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precedent of the need to preserve environments to ensure non-indigenous1043 livelihoods could 
also be contested should the case proposed by the piece be brought and be successful. This 
would however be far more speculative and likely to fail to overcome the considerable economic 
benefits of the extraction of a material as valuable as the crude oil yielded from the tar sands 
under any test akin to that established in Oakes1044 in the Canadian legal system.
The basis for the case circumvents the numerous potential issues for any suggestion of a 
human rights breach arising from the adverse impacts of the tar sands extraction projects it is 
argued. Contentions with regards to the scientific burden of proof necessary to establish human 
health impacts prevent the utilisation of rights conventionally used to oppose harmful industrial 
projects concerning physical integrity are avoided. The necessity to establish direct links 
between adverse impacts and the individuals themselves in relation to inhibitions to many of the 
rights discussed is also highly beneficial. This is as the impacts to the gaining of a livelihood can 
be suggested on the basis of increased difficulty in doing so, as opposed to complete inhibitions 
as has been required in seminal cases concerning indigenous rights protection, where only 
immediate threats to the very survival of cultures are upheld as breaches.1045 Similarly the rights 
considered from the various levels of enforcement combine to elaborate upon the core right 
enshrined in the domestic legislations and construct the proposed case which encompasses the 
fundamental connections to the environment upon which First Nations culture is predicated.
Thus, it is in the protection of an economic concept, that of work, which might be more 
habitually connected to those working within the tar sands industry than those impacted upon by 
it, that the thesis suggests there is the potential for the most pertinent protection to the
1043 The contention that the concept o f indigenous peoples is not clearly defined in human rights law and legal 
protections concerning them generally
1044 Oakes (n207)
1045 See for example: Poma Poma (n271)
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indigenous populace of Alberta. This irony is furthered by the fact that, ‘philanthropic 
instruments of progress and material advancement’1046 were suggested as reasoning for the 
establishment of federal control over indigenous lands. Now, ‘resource extraction initiatives 
have professed an interest in ‘helping’ Native communities by way of offering them ‘steady 
development.’1047 Yet it is in protections created to protect these very concepts that salvation for 
those threatened by them may be found.
Many of the jurisprudential arguments made herein might be applied to other instances 
of industrial impacts upon indigenous peoples where a domestic right to work exists and 
respects a non-pecuniary motivation for doing so. The contentions made however relate 
predominantly to the specific context of the tar sands extraction projects discussed and it is in 
this regard that they are therefore at their strongest, and indeed are needed to be. As Marsden 
suggests, individuals reliant upon the prevalent ecosystems of north east Alberta are, 
‘Battling a government they regard as deaf and an urban culture that seems disconnected and 
uninterested,’1048 and as such in this conflict they require not only all the assistance available 
to them, but which is specific to them, and it is this which it is proposed that the thesis 
provides.
1046 Huseman, J. and Short, D. (n!7)
1047 ibid. 228





U.S. Imports from Canada of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1993 32,597 30,671 32,030 31,564 34,965 33,499 39,198 38,659 39,560 42,463 37,084 38,892
1994 38,488 38,485 41,117 35,811 35,949 36,173 38,339 42,059 38,993 38,365 37,519 43,019
1995 41,691 36,714 37,441 37,294 43,590 42,609 39,647 41,708 37,550 40,308 42,081 45,597
1996 46,205 40,987 40,978 42,812 42,577 41,850 43,193 43,175 38,281 43,628 45,479 51,936
1997 48,713 44,940 46,735 43,619 48,688 46,373 47,952 50,528 47,322 46,589 46,771 52,372
1998 52,796 48,659 45,381 47,580 49,592 50,644 51,734 48,476 47,249 48,681 44,848 47,788
1999 49,613 40,844 42,310 41,186 47,222 44,314 52,516 51,256 42,202 50,435 47,772 52,211
2000 57,927 55,230 51,848 52,510 59,123 54,892 55,014 55,478 53,677 53,209 52,067 60.376
2001 59,983 52,274 60,065 55,546 55,182 56,994 52,387 53,405 50,564 53,766 56,957 60,251
2002 58,920 53,112 57,151 60,958 61,052 57,408 58,942 62,609 56,479 65,413 62,495 64,795
2003 70,440 55,908 58,740 53,372 62,463 58,684 66,066 66,082 62,462 67,535 65,575 69.027
2004 68,323 61,902 65,665 61,789 64,708 67,214 67,503 62,358 64,230 68,972 63,235 66.699
2005 69,297 59,199 63,159 62,175 68,689 65,121 64,492 64,637 66,447 65,380 69,156 78.467
2006 73,948 65,456 70,935 68,749 73,134 69,075 68,337 76,123 70,213 67,465 79,108 76,296
2007 78,398 70,922 73,063 74,942 77,494 72,291 73,971 78,336 75,604 75,285 72,124 73.546
2008 82,260 73,364 79,463 77,470 73,378 72,886 74,933 69,648 71,984 80,135 76,027 80,715
2009 79,026 70,808 75,818 68,602 68,662 76,134 82,576 78,201 70,737 73,363 76,962 84,025
2010 80,479 69,750 77,662 74,172 78,371 81,514 79,013 77,148 74,367 72,764 75,377 84.811
2011 90,552 82,104 84,446 80,790 77,652 75,451 81,171 81,295 85,077 82,810 83,919 90.741
2012 93,980 88,647 91,538 89,595 91,934 92,090 90,548 91,570 82,773 81,892 86,101 97.744
2013 107,143 96,793 94,148 96,243 88,464 86,540 93,428 95,556 92,574 99,743 93,898 102,172
2014^ 106,540 89,915 99,356 95,064 101,226 97,119
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7.2 Annex 2
US Crude Oil Imports 1973 - Date
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7.4 Annex 4
Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage tSAGD) Diagrammatic Representation
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A Map Illustrating the Oil Sands Fields of Alberta
ALBERTA
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7.7 Annex 7
Aerial Images of Tailings Ponds
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7.8 Annex 8
Images of Birds Following Landing Upon Tailings Ponds
7.9 Annex 9
Aboriginal Census Data 2006
G eograph ic  nam e T otal popu lation A borig inal identity population North Am erican Indian M etis Inuit Non-aboriginal identity population
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